"Ladies and Gentlemen.................
 

............. we are on final approach to the platform now so please check your seat belts are secure. I am handing control to my young co pilot Second Officer Ian Capable now and let's hope he's remembered what I've taught him because very shortly he will be the only one able to see the helideck"

Can you imagine making a similar announcement to the 400 passengers of a B747 on finals to Heathrow. There would be uproar. But we take it as read that it's quite OK for one pilot (maybe the PIC) to be unsighted during the critical part of the approach.

Do helicopter designers know what we do?....... and how we do it? I don't think so otherwise they wouldn't continue to make cockpit visibility such a low priority and windshield wipers in the centre of the windshield suitable only for runway approaches..... and where were the certification standards when we needed them on this subject. I've heard some say that the S76 should never have been allowed o work offshore and there were times when i tended to agree.

G

"Air Florida-Washington National...redux"
 

SAS,
He was prey to the same 'limits' mindset which was the 'beast' behind the accident at National many years ago. I am amazed that rather than 'offend' a coloured striping on a guage...many are quite prepared to take the plunge?
:ugh:
What is...or ever has been the fault of spreading bits and pieces here and there as long as the frame manages to struggle away from it's intended point of impact?
:}
Having 'fallen through' far too many times flying trail in a multi-ship CA lift...and desperately searching for a soft spot to bounce off, whilst forcing the collective deeper still into my armpit....I completely endorse your "limits" theory.
:D
(Had the 'pleasure' of riding those sims at FSI/Hurst far too many times to call it "fun"!!!!)
:yuk:
Teach it!
:ok:

Interesting bit of information I heard about the FDR and Decu's on the C++. Correct me if I am wrong but I was told that there is a water activated switch on the belly of the aircraft that theoretically when activated stops the FDR and DECU's from recording. (preserve last incident data???) Hence if any exceedance did occur after the switch was activated it would not be recorded.

I'm pretty sure that the FDR and DECU's on the Airlog aircraft did at some point stop recording, and that when the aircraft was returned to shore it went through more than float repacking.

Sorry MTPhillips that you didn't get the money you were hoping for. Since its been four months since the last posting on this thread, apparently no lawyers could be found that had any hope of a big payday.

Landing on the floats or arresting the descent a few feet above the water is a distiction without much difference. Engines redlined? Temp? Torque? N1? N2? Nr? What? Keep in mind the C+ has soft limiting. That no exceedences were recorded means just that. And damages? Not to the aircraft - look at the picture.

Worth every hour I have spent reading Rotorheads over the last couple of years! Very consistent with the approach of my crusty "old" instructor. His advice in this kind of situation: "Wind that torque gage around as many times as necessary to save your ass!"