Devistating news... My condolences to all the familys :uhoh:

It apears from one of the photos on the Baltimore sun website, that the main gear is down? Was the pilot in the process of putting it down when it crashed?

The team im sure will be remembered for helping others even when conditions they face put themselves at risk

Simon

ATC insight?
 

somewhat long post in the link but an ATC insight to transponder codes and equipment capibilities at Andrews AFB.


http://currentandundertow.*************/

maintenance issues surface
 

Unfortunate this is coming to light if true:

Whistleblower warned of problems before medevac crash

...I have not read the letter of Mr. Holt, nor do I know anything about maintenance procedures at the state police air support unit, but one thing that makes the whole thing smell kinda fishy:
Was there anything to report? (FAA § 830.2 Definitions: "Aircraft accident" means an occurrence associated [...] with the intention of flight [...]).
Aircraft have also been repaired or refurbished to great extends, fully complied with the manufacturers overhaul manuals, even after an accident - but hey! maybe there is something wrong in the books, I guess we'll find out!


"doomed helicopter" :yuk:

"Imabell", I don't know what the heck you're talking about. Care to expand on your comment "Same modus operandi, same result"?

Aside from being at night, and in the U.S., I see very little in common with most US EMS accidents:
This was an SPIFR program, most US EMS is VFR;
This was a twin, most US EMS is in singles;
This was a government program, most US EMS is 'for profit';
This pilot appears to have responded appropriately to a night IIMC encounter, and transitioned to IFR;
Had I the same decision to make, I might have accepted the run was in the accident pilot's situation. I don't see an obvious error right up until the call for a second approach- which is arguable.
I see a great deal wrong with the way my industry is run, but this one doesn't fit most of my issues. Please share what is so obvious to you. I'm really interested in your insight-I'm going on shift in 4+45 hours, flying an EMS night shift.

As there is no FDR or CVR in this helicopter (unless the MD State Police were very forward thinking), we'll have a great deal of difficulty finding out what happened in this accident.
But I would ask how many fixed wing aircraft crash on a missed approach? What differences are there between fixed wing operations and helicopters in this regard? What does the go-around mode look like in this helicopter?

Yet again what is so important in this crash is trying to understand what, specifically, might have caused it - and how it might have been avoided. Generalisations are not really very helpful. This does not seem to be the typical low level, night, very poor VMC going IMC, stumbling into the ground accident. It's hard to be sure, but from the little info that can be picked up it seems the 365 had correctly diverted due to poor weather, was trying to make a precision approach, had gone around because of lack of a reliable glideslope indication, and then crashed about 3 miles from the field while presumably making a second approach. When radar contact was lost at about 3 mile finals it was at 700ft - prob a bit low but given range tolerance not too far off for the distance to the field, assuming on either ILS or a standard approach.

Weather seems to have been 4 miles vis and 500ft base - not particularly bad for an airfield IMC approach, let's face it.

So what might have happened? Seems the G/S was known to be unreliable, so one presumes you'd back up a range to the field from GPS and DME with altitude checks and radalt height. Even with no ILS you could let down pretty easily with the A/P coupled to HDG and V/S, assuming that was all working. And this acft hit a long way out - not like it was at DA.

So what really might have caused it? Run out of fuel? No mention of pilot concern. Gyro/instrument failure causing loss of orientation? Major mechnical failure? Or perhaps pilot got vaguely visual so broke off an instrument approach to circle down with some ground lighting but then got into IMC with LOC again. 60kts was rather slow at 3 miles. Pilot incapacitation?

Ideas anyone?

Thunderstorm?

Min Airspeed for Autopilot in IFR - loss of aircraft control????
In the A109 60kt (55 kts on approach, Min IFR speed 50kts) is very close to the point where George falls over, anyone know what it is in the Dauphin??

Please read the article...and correctly identify the complainants. Pete Peterson is the fellow that has written to the FAA about general problems and mis-management while the other fellow is concerned about the aircraft having been involved in a blade strike incident/accident.

There have been rumblings for a while about the MSP operation and in the past they did in fact have some problems. A fatal accident that went un-noticed for quite a while and the reaction to that kick started them onto a much better path.

Overall they seem to be fairly well regarded for a Police/EMS operation despite the dual mission they perform. The old argument about j"acks of all trades" and such have to be considered applicable.

MSP pilot training memo
 

2007 pilot training memo story,

Video

If I recall our base received a similar memo last month from company and we started questioning but it fell on deaf ears.

Almost incredible that beneficial if not vital training/practising already in place within the ops system and budget should be removed like that.

Almost a year on from that video, what's the more "structured & consistent" training that's replaced it? Are the instrument flight & landing sessions back?

Or is there more to it... further improved training available now?

News story on NTSB preliminary report:

Pilot Concerned About Weather Before Chopper Crashed, Tapes Reveal|ABC 7 News

Very sad news.

I'm not clear as to whether this helicopter crashed on missed-approach, or on a second approach attempt.

Assuming the crash was during an approach attempt I can say that I have seen times when being vectored to ILS with an on-field VOR pilots dialing in the intended ILS freq. but leave that primary ILS box with the on-field VOR active thus no chance of receiving the glideslope.

This provides the ability to lock on to what can proximately be considered the inbound course. It could explain the lack of receiving the glideslope. It sounds brain-dead not to put the ILS freq. active, but it does happen.

I've also seen pilots revert to flying the non-precision minimums of a localizer (with or without that particular approach clearance) when not receiving the glideslope and thereafter do a sloppy job of altitude management. Human factors? Not enough time to shift gears from one approach monitoring mentality to the other? Too many distractions like talking to dispatch, the medical crew, etc.?

All speculation with respect to this accident but human factors generally play a large role in accidents and I think this could be one of them.

Controller reassigned
 

A properly trained and certified FAA Air Traffic Controller since 1985 this person was...."Ah...he is out there on final somewhere..."

Five hour old weather given.

Tower Cab window fogged up all day and not able to see out...

It took the Fire Chief to kick off the missing aircraft procedure?

Relieved from duty.....now that is a punishment that fits the crime if I ever heard of one!:mad::mad::mad:

Here I was thinking of some nice wooden crosses up on a hill somewhere...a bucket of iron spikes....a three pound hammer....and a nice view of an airport..:ugh:

Reassigning the controller is a nice diversion from other issues
 

From the Baltimore Sun on an issue not touched upon by NTSB:

As I sat here listening to the taped conversations between Dispatch and the other parties....a movie scene like image formed in my mind.

It was quite vivid....darkness, wooded area, odor of raw jet fuel, smell of hot hydraulic fluid, small scattered flickering smoldering fires, the sound of light rain drops falling, either tinkling on sheet metal or hissing from landing in the fires or on hot metal, the crackling of cooling engine exhausts.....and a cell phone ringing....and ringing....and ringing. Soft moans and someone crying out for help fearing no one is hearing them.

In the background you can hear the chatter on the phones and radio going....of a an attempt to determine where "Trooper 2" is? Each negative response adding to the worry....and in time....to the fear....finally to the acceptance that the worst of the fear and worry is realized....."Trooper 2" is down.

The sound track changes to a last conversation....as the scene fades to darkness...."If they can do it....so can we!" followed by laughter.

Changes Being Made At Maryland State Police EMS Following Fatal Crash
 

Several changes being made following the fatal crash that killed four.

Md.-Run Medevac Practices At Issue