First - I don not believe for one second all operators would ever agree to this!
Second - we can and do fly safely at night. We CAN remain Perf Class 1 throughout. We CAN train for SD. We CAN improve technology to increase our margins. We CAN operate to realistic minima.

I feel the idea of not being able to offer the same degree of safety at night must be examined, and is not as straight forwards as it appears. I would agree, in certain circumstances the margins are greatly reduced, but not all.

A clear moonlit night with 15kts, and low AUW, good horizon is not a huge problem. Nor is flying in the cruise day or night. I would argue that this situation is better than day, 1.5k viz, in fog/heavy mist or drizzle, no wind, cloud 200', and heavy - yet we are not arguing that we shouldn't fly in these conditions with an ARA down to minima and we do it regularly. I can clearly not GUARANTEE the same safety in this situation as day vmc, nor good night vmc for that matter. The point I am trying to make is that we fly in different conditions all the time - some times it is more difficult than others, and therefore more dangerous. We cannot just make one statement about the level of safety all the time. We take risk, and we accept risk all the time, the key is where is the border - when is it unacceptable and make a statement about that level. That is the line, and we do not cross it. Yes night flying can be more dangerous - therefore identify the highest risk areas compared with all other phases of flight, and put controls in place to mitigate or reduce that risk. Weather is probably the greatest factor here so increasing the wx minima or currency reqs may be a way forward, but just abandoning night flying all together is too simplistic an approach IMO.

Well, this is a list of 20 accidents in the North Sea over the last 35 years. It may not be complete, so I apologise if there are errors, but nothing has been deliberately left out or put in to skew the figures !!

What does it tell us ? Well firstly, quite a pat on the back to all the pilots and engineers who have contributed to this list being as short as it is. Given what we do, what we do it with, and the environment we do it in, its quite remarkable that when trying to get this list together, I felt like I had a personal knowledge of most of these accidents, either through experience or CRM debriefs. I thought I'd probably find many that I had never heard of, but it is true to say that in the past 18 years we have only had 6 accidents in the UK aircraft, which is probably less than I would have expected, and three of those everyone walked (or swam) away.

As you can see, most of the early incidents are mechanical, and I guess I want to focus on post Chinook disaster, 1990 and beyond, being my experience on the North Sea when most of the rules we live under today were in place. In those 18 years we've had about 8 offshore aircraft accidents / ditchings. Only 2 of those have been put down to mechanical failure, and one to weather. I guess we have to praise the huge advances in aircraft design and engineering practices.

Of the other five, two have no formal explanation. The first was where the crew were forced to ditch at night due to a perceived engine / control problem that to my knowledge has not been identified. The final one was the tragic loss of the Dauphin in Morcambe Bay with 9 on board which would appear to be a disorientation at night.

I have appended the incidents that were not mechanical failure with Day or Night, and all except the Den Helder incident occurred in or around a rig, most often on approach. In the case of the Cormorant Alpha, during a shuttle and the 212 accident in 1991 was during heli work on the Ekofisk, so was outwith the normal passenger flight proceedures.




1 Sikorsky S61 1973 Near Stavanger, Norway Tail rotor failure and ditch
2 Sikorsky S61 1974 North Sea, Netherlands Main rotor failure and crash
3 Sikorsky S58 1976 Forties Field Tail rotor/gearbox failure and crash
4 Sikorsky S61 1977 Near Stavanger, Norway Main rotor gearbox failure and crash
5 Sikorsky S61 1978 Near Bergen, Norway Main rotor gearbox failure and crash
6 Westland Wessex Mk 60 1981 Off Bacton, UK Main rotor gearbox power loss and crash
7 Bell 212 1981 Near Dunlin, UK Pilot disorientation and crash --- IMC
8 Sikorsky S76 1981 Near Peterhead, UK Rotor failure and aircraft break-up
9 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1982 Aberdeen Airport, UK Engine failure and crash
10 Bell 212 1984 Humber, UK Cause of crash unknown --- Night
11 Bell 212 1984 Dan Field, Denmark Tail rotor/gearbox failure and crash
12 Boeing BV234 (Chinook) 1986 Near Sumburgh, UK Main rotor/gearbox failure and crash
13 Sikorsky S61 1990 Brent Spar Helideck Collision and crash --- Day
14 Bell 212 1991 Ekofisk Main rotor struck flare --- Day
15 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1992 Near Cormorant 'A', UK Stall and crash --- Night
16 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1995 Near Brae Platform Lightning Strike, Tail Rotor Loss, Ditched
17 Eurocopter AS332 (Super Puma) 1997 Near Norne FPU, Norway Engine failure and loss of control
18 Sikorsky S76A (Modified) 2002 Leman Field, UK Main rotor failure and crash
19 Eurocopter AS332L2 2006 Den helder Aircraft Ditched - Under Investigation --- Night
20 Eurocopter SA365N (Dauphin) 2006 Morecambe Bay, UK Under investigation --- Night



So, in conclusion, whilst as I guessed would be the case, there are no clear cut answers here, I suppose these figures broadly support my belief that night flying does account for a disproportionate amount of offshore accidents, and how while we have made large safety improvements in other areas, night flying has not been addressed. It is also clear that as mechanical failures have become improved dramatically, the pilot errors stand out more than previously.

Of the 20 accidents, 13 were due to mechanical failure or mechanical failure following lightning. Of the remaining 7, which would not appear to be mechanical (Den Helder incident unsure), 4 of those occured at night, 1 in poor viz at 04:35 in the morning (summer time so officially daylight) and 2 in daylight. Of those two, one was heli-lifting so could perhaps be explained as unusual flying and the other is the Brent Spar incident - The only one I can find that defies usual reasoning. The only occasion we have where a serviceable helicopter was crashed during daylight operations - This alone speaks volumes for the quality of training and operational professionalism.

So, when night flying only makes up about 5% of offshore hours, surely those 4 out of 7 accidents are disproportionate ??

Shows the value in the introduction of HUMS (1991 on).

"Second - we can and do fly safely at night. We CAN remain Perf Class 1 throughout".

Hmmmm...you have never flown a S76 then horror box....class 2 offshore...only class one when we are empty, it's -20 degrees blowing gale force 8:eek:.....
Fly safe..
PH.

S25,

Which of those was the shuttle flight into the water that you referred to on page 1? I left the Brent in 79, so all were well after my time.

Re the Bristow Oz Puma accident, ISTR that Paddy was being checked, and there was quite some concern from him about the requirement for a steep approach to the platform, which of course resulted in VR. A long time ago, so I'm not 100% on the details, but having objected to the approach and been overruled, Paddy was able to take the High Ground at the subsequent BOE ;) Not quite as simple as it seems, I believe.

Going through the responses, and allowing for the modern safety analysis culture, I tend to agree with Horror box: there is little or Buckley's chance of banning night pax flights, but a more thorough regime whereby weather, currency, deck standards and crew proficiency (not the same as currency) must all be factored into a go/no go decision.

ps S25, are you really 35? Your references almost imply that you have been in the NS that long :p

John,

In answer to the above, there were two accidents (I think) during the period we were shuttling offshore - One in 1981 near the Dunlin where one passenger died, and another in 1982 where 6 crew members were killed near the Murchison when the aircraft flew into the water at night. I left this one out of the statistics as although it was the regular Offshore shuttle aircraft, they were engaged on a Search & Rescue call out, so I didn't want to skew the figures. So, the one I was referring to was the Dunlin accident, very early in the morning, just about daylight, poor viz.

Regarding the Oz accident, I didn't know the details or even the company involved. I saw it mentioned in an offshore safety report and I was just using it as an example of a bad approach the wasn't picked up at night, even by an experienced training captain. Also the idea that 'both pilots were 'comfortable' with this sort of approach' which I am sure is not talking about over-confidence or complacency, but about crew that have made lots of night landings without incident, but are as likely as anyone else to be caught out when it suddenly goes wrong. I'm sure you are right that there were all sorts of issues involved, but my only point is 'Things will happen' and its no point saying "he was a bad pilot", "they flew a bad approach", "the helideck lighting was bad" - We need to regulate as tightly as possible to ensure that when these inevitable things happen, we can pick them up, correct or fly away safely. Fortunately in that incident, both pilots were OK.

Could we ever ban night flying - I don't see why not. As argued above, there is no real necessity for offshore operations at night. According to the HSE report of offshore flying (from which most of my 'facts' were gleaned) this covers UK flying from 1977 to 2006 and suggests that while offshore sectors peaked in 1990 at about 360,000 flight sectors per year, by 2002 that figure had dwindled to about 160,000 sectors - A figure that remained fairly constant through until 2006.

The Chinook accident in 1986 throws all the figures out as horrendously 45 people were killed in one accident, but it was the catalyst for a lot of change in the industry. Looking at our operations since that time, we have had just 4 fatal accidents resulting in 35 deaths.

11 - Result of Mechanical failure ( 1 Accident - S76 Norwich)
6 - Accident on landing in daylight ( 1 Accident - S-61 Brent Spar)
18 - Flown into the water at night (2 Accidents, 332 Cormorant, Dauphin Morcambe Bay)

Obviously statistics can read whatever you want them to read, but sadly those are the facts - Half of all fatalities in UK Offshore operations would not have happened (in my oh so humble opinion) during daylight ops. It makes no direct mention of night flying, but is an interesting report, so don't take my word for it - Have a look

http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/issues/..._1976-2006.pdf

I don't believe I mentioned any aircraft type in this statement - S76 or otherwise. My implication is that we CAN and DO fly Perf Class 1 in some operations, with certain types. There is more than one type out there capable of this (S76 clearly not in that group). Therefore, if it can be done - it should be done. Further implication - if an aircraft cannot achieve this, then consideration should be made to either replacing it or adding further restriction, IAW JAR OPS regulation. If this needs to be amended to increase safety then so be it. I am quite familiar with the perf limitations of the S76, and would certainly agree that it is not suitable for all types of ops, especially night.

The Den Helder & Morecombe Bay reports can be expected between October & Christmas.

I believe HOMP has the potential to do for operational issues what HUMS has done for mechanical failures.

On the VRS Puma in Australia:
Puma SA 330J Helicopter VH-WOF, Mermaid Sound WA, 12 May 1991
199100126

ATSB Abstract:

The aircraft was tasked to carry out a marine pilot pick-up from a departing tanker. The flight was conducted by two pilots operating under night visual flight rules. Conditions were a moonless night with no defined horizon, no outside lighting other than from the ship, and a surface wind that was light and variable. The ship was steaming in a northerly direction at 12.5 kts. The flight proceeded normally until the aircraft was established on final approach to the helideck. As the aircraft descended through 500 ft the rate of descent had increased to about 1,000 ft/min. Although the pilot in command increased main rotor pitch, the aircraft's rate of descent continued to increase until just prior to impact with the water. Both occupants were rescued approximately 1 h after they evacuated the helicopter. The report concludes that the standard approach technique used by the pilots, coupled with the prevailing weather conditions, caused the aircraft to enter a high rate of descent shortly after the aircraft started its normal final approach to the deck. The high rate of descent was probably the result of entry to the incipient stage of Vortex-ring state'. A lack of visual cues and inadequate management of cockpit resources prevented the crew from recognising the abnormal situation until the aircraft was well into the descent. Recovery action was commenced too late to prevent impact with the water.

Though we have been around this bush many times, and I am not offshore qualified......
Why do we not fit or mandate an Enhanced Vision System "EVS" (uncooled IR)?

Less than $20K USD. Sees what is there, not what some computer modeler thinks.

Seems ideally suited to offshore work that requires forward viz above all else - where say EMS need things like NVG so they can look around the place and recce the HLS.

Interesting conclusion of VRS for that accident when it was more likely that the pilots let the speed drop below ETL and didn't have the visual cues to respond to the increased RoD. RNF approaches over water with no rate of closure information are notorious for ending up in high hover or hover-taxi conditions - this sounds like just such an incident.

Ref the Bristow accident, although both pilots were very experienced check pilots, Paddy was not under check. I'm told most of the pilots did not do the so called standard company approach as it was considered a bad procedure. Because there were 2 check pilots flying, Paddy thought it prudent to follow company procedures with subsequent disasterous results. I was also told it took about 16 seconds from 500 ft to ditching. It took the best part of 2 years to clear their name as it was considered the company procedure was at fault.

At the risk of being branded a reactionary - look at FW instrument approaches. All of them are now 'ILS like' so that every approach is flown the same way. Lots of good information about closure rates (thanks to having to maintain an airspeed to avoid stalling), knowing where the runway is, and so on.

What we need is a consistent approach methodology (with rate of descent and closure rate information coming from something other than visual cues) that will take us down to some very low height above the landing zone (50'? 100'?) so that then we can take over and land comfortably all the time. Repeat - all the time!
Differential GPS? WAAS GPS in the USA? Something out there will work.
Let's start pressuring for it.

I remember shuttling at night on the Southern North Sea, low decks, often no horizon and slack winds. Not only were the decks low, but small as well and we were in a S61. It used to scare me to death. Non-handler was completely unsighted for most of the approach and this was where young P2s were sent to built deck landing practise. Speed control was utterly vital. Setting yourself off at 500' with the correct speed could avoid no end of problems caused by ridiculous flaring at the bottom.

Nowadays the winter brings the joys of the same conditions landing in a field on a T on Exmoor. Often the only lights are the T so there is nothing else to give a relative movement reference. Sometimes you may be able to see a village in the distance, normally too far away to be of help and despite a ground visit in daylight perceptions play tricks on your senses. The T appears in the screen in the right place, the speed is right, but there is nothing else to see. The "leans" are a distinct possibility. A huge level of trust is placed in the hands of the man who sets the T up (he really earns his money) The passengers tend to be of the ilk where a broken nail will get them in the papers, get the approach wrong and go splat into something and you are going to be briefly (and probably posthumously) very famous.

Those nights I hate with a passion.

VH

Fixed-wing aircraft can fly identical approaches because they always land to a prepared, lighted runway already surveyed for obstacles. Helicopters don't have that luxury.

I am with Shawn here (again!).

Our little BK117 and A109 does a cracking hands off ILS down to a level off at 50ft! Everytime. Day/night/wind independant.

Is it REALLY that hard to design a GPS approach with WAAS and make the autopilot level off at say 100ft? Have the entire finals as a straight line after the IAF and add the EVS so you can see what is actually in front of you.

That way you get around several off shore issues that seem to be frustrating you all with standard minimums and EGPWS, etc.

How about these ideas for a standard GPS approach (with vertical guidance/glide path):

• Must be straight in from the IAF.
• Slow the helicopter to 50 or 60 before he FAF.
• Have the weather actual minimum higher than the 100 or 150 ft to cope with transient shipping and other temporary and permanent obstacles, say at 250 ft or so, and 400ft or more for no WAAS.
• Ensure that descent below that point must be accompanied by visual conditions and a clear EVS picture, and a serviceable autopilot level off.
• Autopilot levels off at designated hight with clear EVS image and visual met conditions, all coupled up.
• At missed approach point that would be in a standard position from the rig each time: say at the 1:30 at 1000m a warning flshes. Action here is either press go-around mode OR hand fly deceleration and finals.

For approaches to ships at sea (i.e. that do not have a permanent approach set up as they are on the move, it would already be possible to design an overwater approach in the same manner as described above. You could simply select the "Overwater" approach on the GPS, then it might ask for a destination lat/long and the wind direction as the only two inputs, but I think it would not be hard to also program boat speed and direction for better FAF to MAPWPt calculations and guidance. It can then construct the approach (including vertical guidance) IAW a standard design. It should even be able to compare the ground speed Vs IAS to tell you before the FAF if you have selected the incorrect wind (perhaps not allowing descent past the FAF if there is too much of an anomaly).

In the same manner as the rig approach above, the minima could be set to XXX ft after which a clear EVS image and visual met conditions are required. The approach could always aim to bring you out to the portside approach point at 1000m or so and again you get the warning with option for go-around or hand fly decel and approach.

These calculations should be able to made with today's technology. We have all the data collection points needed already. We have autopilots that are reliable enough to do it.

then again, maybe we should just keep spending money on PC1 and CatA performance!!:ugh:

Helmet fire - thanks for the support. We have the technology, but seem to lack the political will to demand it.
What about the large oil companies? Shell, etc.? Might they be interested?

You are right - we, as a group lack the will to fix such things, and I believe that will is as a direct consequence of the market forces that surround most of our thinking.

Very rarely does the appearance of a new technology get implemented without some regulatory requirement or some contractors requirement. Very rarely to we go into the bidding process with a much more expensive model due to the improved technologies fitted on board our aircraft knowing that the competitor will be cheaper and thus significantly more likely to win the contract. These are the issues that emerge as a feeling that we lack the will as a group to implement the solutions. There is NO better example than the American EMS industry.

Pprune is a very good place to share ideas, but so many people take it emotively and demonstrate quite easily that the "industry" is not a group per se, it is a fractured and competitive set of tribal groups based on background or company - and rarely can we gain a quorum - indeed I have yet to see one!

10 pilots = 11 opinions, all emotively defended!

But..at least if people keep sharing the info and discussing the issues we can edge toward a safer future. Look at NVG as an example. All the emotive arguments were played out time and time again on the prune, but the technology is inevitably seeping into our futures to make it considerably safer to fly at night. Despite all the arguments and ill-feeling. Even though an international panel of SME established the basis for safe civilian NVG flight in 1996 (see the RTCO SC-96 reports DO 275, & 268), few if any countries have adopted this standard. Many are still arguing over it. That is unfortunately as close as we seem to get! But we are getting there...:ok:

Helmet fire,

Firstly before anyone says it I know bugger all about landing on boats or rigs.

However I do know a bit about designing computerised things. Your suggestions seem very sensible to me, but in this day and age why should the pilots even by be worried about inputing lat longs and wind. A little bit of electronic communication between the vessel and the gubbins in the aircraft and you have sent to you the vessels GPS position and then fly your overwater approach with the GPS onboard calculating the wind for you [if you need it during the automatic phase of the approach]. Sounds easy to do, harder to achieve and certify in practice but surely something like this could save some hassles (perhaps even lives)

You could even couple up obstacle or terrain aware databases to help prevent you from running into known obstructions (of which I am told there are a few).

With regards to NVGs they'd make my life easier but how does a non exmil type like me get trained in the use (particularly in the UK ?). I am sure there may :rolleyes: even be people using them now in the UK , who perhaps not with approval of the authority have made their own jobs a bit safer.

I get the impresson that most of this comes down to cost and its impact on profits.

Just my early morning Wednesday thoughts.

GS

Shell Management and Nigel Osborn,

Thanks for straightening out my 5th hand description of events ;)

Pretty much exactly what we do already! Radar Approach with GPS overlay, fully coupled to MApt at 0.75nm. Nothing new here.

Horror Box:
What appears to be missing is instrument information on rate of closure / deceleration with the rig for the last segment. The issue is that the visual information isn't particularly reliable / repeatable and that's what should be made better.

I can't help but think we're missing the enormous ' Elephant in the Room' here. So, we can see from the stats, that half of the accidents and just over half the casualties in the UK Offshore market in the past 20 years have been during night flights. Just a quick glance through the latest accidents reported on here, there are titles such as '212 Accident Dubai', '139 Down Abu Dhabi', and 'GOM Air Log & EEL Crash'. These are the latest offshore accidents, all of them night flights.

Yet when we think of solutions, people talk about technology, new proceedures, training, NVG's etc. For the military, police and HEMS maybe because there is an added pressure and need to get the job done, but this is just public transport. There is no real need to put aircraft and passengers at risk ??? Just do it during the daytime.

We seem to spend a fortune sending people on courses to learn how to lift a box correctly and sit correctly at a computer terminal. The oil companies proudly state that safety comes first and who amongst us would dare not to hold the handrail when descending a flight of stairs - Heaven knows what could happen !!! And yet, lets stick 19 people in a helicopter and have effectively a single pilot making an approach in the dark with limited visual cues as to descent and closure - Hey no problem !!

The oil companies seem to be for ever looking at miniscule ways to reinvent the wheel and eek out that last ounce of safety. Well I could flick a switch and statistically cut the number of deaths on the North Sea by 50% - Just stop flying at night. QED !

No need to invent different types of approaches...get more technology etc etc..as horror box stated, standard ARA MAP @ 0.75nm, 300' at night is close enough for me...A set procedure to arrive at that point, difficult enough some nights but then it's that last bit flown manually with marginal vis,(especially in a S76)! no horizon, rain on the windscreen, extremely difficult to judge closure rate/ROD....max gross no wind....oops...messed that up ...going around now with NO visual cues..IFR at 300ft or less......What are we doing here... :ugh: we are as Special 25 stated.....just bloody public transport...not SAR..
Someone(or two) stated than they couldn't see night flying disappear??????
Why not? What small minds we have!!!!! Good job people thought differently when it came to that small thing called the civil rights movement!!!!!!!!!!!!
and all some want to do is ban night flying offshore as it (as statistics prove) is way more dangerous than day flying!!!!!!!!
Fly safe
PH

Great that you guys do that already - as I said, I am not an offshore pilot.
You are saying that you have an autolevel system coupled to the GPS approach, or does it level at a pre set rad-alt? How does it calculate approaches to ships? Are the ships on the move, or do you get them to stop?

I am with Shawn on the closure issue, and you seem to indicate that you have a "visual" picture from the radar image. So why the unusual accident rate at night? What are the possible solutions?

In throwing out some ideas, I mentioned that the EVS was a critical component to descent or decel past the MAPt. It seems that this would be such a simple and cheap addition to the visual issues, but I dont know how the IR image of the actual area and obstacles compares to the radar image.

If we could make the end of the night approach include a display that gives you the actual picture of the situation, it seems that would be the ideal way to go. Thats why I threw the EVS in.

Some of the accident rate can be likened to pulling your car into your garage, but it's actually not your garage at all... it's a bit different, someone changed the length of the drive, rearranged the gardening equipment, unscrewed the light bulb, and changed the intervals between those little pink flamingos or garden gnomes you use to gauge your speed into the garage. But until close to the garage itself... you still think it IS your garage. And probably some other colorful metaphors (or are those similes... no matter...)

I've no intention of taking a position on whether night flying in the offshore environment should or shouldn't happen (and I've done enough of it to have at least a passing acquaintance with most forms of visual illusions), but every risk management model I'm familiar with includes 'avoid' as a possible method of mitigating risk. It should at the least be considered, so while folks are pushing forward to develop capabilities to fly around the clock (which development is probably positive) it will indeed, at times, be in everybody's best interest to stay in bed. To spring load to 'accept' as a risk mitigation method is to lose the big picture, methinks.

There needs to be a balanced view between training, technology, administrative controls, risk management, and commercial pressure, or it's going to end badly.

Off topic - Oh that is good!!!:D I cannot quite see the correlation here between the black civil rights movement and night flying!! I am sure they were fighting for the advancement of rights and improving opportunity - not banning things! Gave me a grin anyway!

On topic - if we want to be narrow minded then we ban night flying. Is this the correct approach? We can all have opinions on this. We can also accept that our job involves night flying - our customer relies on it. I have done over 30 night decks already this week, and I am quite sure the banning of night flying would have a fairly severe impact on the industry in which we work. We SUPPORT the oil and gas industry, not the other way round. They have a list of requirements and our companies must try and achieve in the safest manner. The oil companies can accept the risk - FACT. Money talks.
Secondly - if we ban night flying, I think many of us will be looking for new jobs, and it certainly will not be good for the industry in general.
Thirdly - where do you draw the line? Do we only fly around day vfr. As mentioned before - 200' cloud base, 1nm viz, no wind is far worse than a good night. So do we ban this as well?
If you dont like flying at night, and you think your operation is unsafe, then speak to the CP, FSO, training manager and try and get things changed. You may have already done this. All of people I work with are happy with our operation and flying at night and we do a lot of it. There are plenty of ways to make night flying safe. I will completely agree that it is more dangerous than day flying, and needs to be more regulated, but I also think it can be done safely with the right aircraft types, and good procedures and the correct limitations. Flying an ARA to a deck at night is not too different to flying one in really ****ty weather, especially with a good AP with level off at mdh. It could be, for example, that we should reduce the number of decks landings in a night, and make each one an ARA when the viz is less than 10k if that helps standardize.
Both the oil companies and our own organizations do need to commit to new equipment though and fork up the cash to enhance our safety.
So - if we want to talk about being open minded, we need to really look outside at the big picture, and not just look at one option. Sure consider it, but look at all others as well. If we cannot get the required technology/aircraft types/safety equipment, then perhaps night flying should be re-examined. See how other operators deal with the problem.

Some good points HB, and it is excellent to get some view point from the other side of the fence. In response, I'd say, I don't think there is any need to ban night flying, but I would be of the opinion that night deck operations are not safe enough to be justifiable. Whether it be anecdotal, or statistical, landing and to a lesser extent taking-off offshore at night is probably the most dangerous thing we do and has resulted in the greatest number of accidents.

Could I ever see a situation where the oil companies felt that the risks outweighed the value ?? I'm not sure - I certainly don't see why not. I don't think the oil companies get that much value out of night flights, and I think if there was availability of aircraft, they would rather get their crew changes done by mid-afternoon - That was certainly the way it used to work. Unfortunately this then leaves the helicopter operators with a hanger full of aircraft that are being paid off, and insurance costs, just sitting there not earning. I don't think it would change operations significantly to adjust flights for the peak winter months to cover routine crew changes - Shuttles and offshore works programs that typically crew 6am - 6pm - 6am, might be more of an issue.

I think a general ban on offshore night flying (deck ops) might actually be good for crewing levels. We would still need to accomplish these same flights, but would need a 3 or 4 more airframes on the North Sea and the crews to fly them. or just a few extra flights at the weekend. Yes, this will cost money, but against the backdrop of the budgets involved and the investment in safety generally, it isn't a ridiculous suggestion.

Where would I draw the line ? Well, I think we have honed the rules of aviation fantastically over the life of the North Sea, and I think they are generally pitched pretty well. I don't share your opinion regarding IMC approaches to minima although I accept that they can be exciting !! Even going around at 200ft in less than 1km viz, you tend to be able to see the surface, have a well trimmed aircraft and the pilot flying goes from an IFR approach into an IFR go-around. There has not been an accident in this area to my knowledge and I've never felt a high risk factor. I think it is the nature of semi-IFR / VFR flying at night and the changeover between the two that probably accounts for the accident rate.

Where to go from here ??? Yes I have brought up my doubts on a number of occasions but generally fallen on deaf ears. I fear I may not be talking loud enough !! I certainly doubt that the oil companies have ever been consulted and I'm pretty sure they call up 7 stop night shuttles much as they would by day with little consideration as to the added risk - Why should they unless they had been educated so ??

I think the investment in new aircraft should really improve things particularly with the S-92 and EC225. Not sure the S-76C is really going to help too much but at least the power is there even if the view is not significantly improved !!

Is there some compromise - From my opinion, I'm not sure there is. Are things improving ? - Yes. But will they ever be safe enough ?? I don't think so. Not unless I can guarantee to my passengers that subject to no 'extraordinary' event, I can get them to work and home safe. Flying into the water in the dark isn't extraordinary, it would appear to be a statistical happening based simply on the amount of night flying conducted, and whilst based purely on opinion (and some fact) I can't see procedure, training or technology changing that.

Yep - some good points there, and I hear what you are saying. Oil companies should certainly be the target audience here if you really want to effect change. They will always want the cheapest option, not necessarily the safest unfortunately. However I hear that some of their unions are actually trying to clamp down on the amount of time their employees spend in a heli at night. Ironically this could actually end up increasing the amount of night flying and decks we do. I suppose they see it as reducing the odds of an accident per person, per flight! Changing crewing patterns for the oil companies may be an option, but they will take a hell of a lot of convincing. The main problem will be, as they see it, that at the moment you have a day shift and a night shift. If you change the handover to midday, then everyone is effectively working day and night. Either midday till mid-night or vice-versa. There are rules against this I suspect. There are only so many nights you can work in a set period, sleep patterns etc etc, hence the current handover times. Unions would kick up a huge fuss if this was changed.
However all that being said - it is certainly a topic worth addressing to the oil companies. The S92 and 225 have made huge advancements in safety, especially at night and in poor weather. A good 4 axis AP allows you to fly all the way to MAPt and beyond fully coupled or do a fully coupled go-around (single engine if necessary), with a "go-around" button on the cyclic to activate if all starts going wrong. The aircraft still wont land itself though, but it can get you to a HOGE hover coupled pretty bloody close to the deck if need be.

Quote,::Shuttles and offshore works programs that typically crew 6am - 6pm - 6am, might be more of an issue.::
Crewing may start at these times but more often then not by the time shuttles are finished its 3 hours later, and well into the 'Dark hours'

Not only do they start/finish at those times, the shuttles involve night ops for a good 3-4 months of the year, IIRC.

Horror Box..

"Off topic - Oh that is good!!! I cannot quite see the correlation here between the black civil rights movement and night flying!! I am sure they were fighting for the advancement of rights and improving opportunity - not banning things! Gave me a grin anyway!"

"On topic - if we want to be narrow minded then we ban night flying. Is this the correct approach?"

Well, off topic, I think you know what I meant...the people fighting for improvement in the civil rights movement were fighting the Government,public and private institutions,the Law etc etc..a massive uphill struggle..but didn't give up...
All we are trying to do is fight to ban a totally unsafe practise for public transport, mainly on the North sea as Tistisnot states that outside of Europe it is actually discouraged!!! Not really a big deal or a huge uphill struggle if we put our minds to it....narrow minded or sensible??? :confused: Trying to improve safety isn't narrow minded, and you can have all the equipment in the world, all the bells and whistles,but human error at night offshore will beat it everytime...the accident at Morcombe bay(I know the final report isn't yet published) but do you think some new type of gps guided approach with some sort of vasi or lighting system system on a rig, or anything else would have helped that night on the GA????
Human error rules, Bottom Line, and at night in poor vis,our senses just do not work well enough...

Fly safe
PH.

In a word - yes.

On an S92 you can fly the entire approach coupled, with FMS and Radar if you wish, and also a go-around if you wish. There is actually no-need for the pilot to touch the controls until he is happy to land. He can set the RADALT hold to maintain MDHor whatever height you wish to fly, fly coupled flt at 60kts, with NAV hold on the programmed cse, or HDG hold. in If not happy hit the go-around button, and let the AP fly the go around procedure, with either NAV or HDG. The AP coupled to FMS will also fly a perfect, wind corrected race track if you wish, setting you up on finals, into wind. There are many options, and I have to say I dont use that much, but on bad nights certainly it means you can be more "monitoring" than flying until the later stage.
I am starting to get the impression that your views are based on a limited number of aircraft, most likely the S76. I dont mean to sound patronizing, but I maintain my standpoint, that with more modern aircraft and systems the safety factor at night is greatly increased. Do you also want to ban flying DAY IFR ARA's? Not a huge difference from a good night as I have stated many times already, and you still have no response to that. Night flying can be done safely, and is being done safely. Sorry if that is not the case in your operation.

Horror Box:
the problem with any system (even the S-92's) is that you have to know what it is that it's actually doing.
It will fly a wind corrected race track pattern - but for the wind it knows exists at the time the race track was asked for (or some other time). We know there are significant wind shifts from as low as 500' to the surface - wind shifts that can be of great significance for a helicopter coming in to the hover, or trying to land on a deck.
Without some other precision guidance with respect to closure rate to the thing you're landing on, this system could come up and really bite you.
Wouldn't it be nice to have precision (i.e. ILS quality) guidance to touchdown, and also have an airspeed system that worked under 40 KIAS to tell you the real wind???

Shawn, I totally agree. No real comeback from me there on the idea of ILS like guidance or some sort of PAPI like setup. That would certainly be great.
As far as the system in the 92 regarding racetrack patterns - it was probably not the best example for me to use and detracted somewhat from the debate. It is something really only applicable for holding, but may have use elsewhere. The system can however calculate and update the wind constantly itself, therefore correcting. So in NAV mode it automatically flies track corrected for wind. That is not to say however, that it is always 100% but it is pretty damn good. The track is very easily monitored using the NDB on the rig and the GPS. My personal preference is to use HDG or NAV though, and I have only used the holding patterns for training. One could, without too much difficulty, devise a standard night poor weather approach procedure, which could be flown entirely coupled until a MAPt if required. A modified ARA, with a track straight to a FAP 3-5 miles d/w, allowing you to fly fully coupled with NAV to that point, then letting down to mdh, inbound at 60kts. Coupled with IAS, NAV/HDG, RALT/ALT, and the go-around track briefed, with ALTP set to climb away ht. Time consuming, but a variation of this may work. This in conjunction with some form of better approach guidance for the latter stages would be a good combination. This would have implications on those of us flying 15 night decks in one shuttle though.

Horror box:
thanks for the correction / update.

Could always put a 'meatball' on the rigs... of course, the cost might be excruciating, and of course, you'd need competency on the rigs to determine the wind (more difficult in practice than one might think) appropriate approach heading (and are you willing to leave that to the rig) and redirect the thing (with all that entails) accordingly... and operating/maintaining it (or any other rig-based aviation equipment) in the 3rd world... well, that's all I'm saying... and that's only for glideslope in visual conditions... and doesn't assist in the management of closure rate...

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...8CVN-69%29.jpg

Shawn-
Surely something out there for hover/low speed wind info is at least as accurate as the OADS (Omnidirectional Air Data System) we had in the HH-65A.

Un ...Lifting
Glad to see someone else liked that piece of equipment. And it was out 20+ years ago...
Used to be able to hover at 5,000' AGL with the thing (zero airspeed hover at that).

Air Accidents Investigation: G-BLUN Report Sections

The report into the Morcambe Bay tragedy has been published - See the other thread for responses regarding that incident.

But it does prove a lot of what we have talked about on this thread. Namely, experience doesn't count for much, anyone can be caught out. Night flying isn't a science, what can work for one approach one night, won't work for another. Visual cues are not there and disorientation can happen quickly with the other crew member not necessarily aware of your problem and potentially not able to establish safe control.

This report makes for very sad reading as many reading this thread are North Sea pilots who feel they have been close to that situation - But this is more than just a statistic, you can read their words, see their thought process, and who amongst us can say "that could never happen to me" ?

This thread has covered the problems of big helicopter night flying very well. My worry is that night training for PPL & CPL night ratings is almost invariably carried out to airfields and mostly to lit runways because these are the only places approved for night training. The navigation is inevitably done on good nights when there is a high probability of a visible horizon. Combine all this with the fact that instrument flying training is carried out using hoods or foggles without the cockpit being screened, means that people at the low experience end of the market have never been truly exposed to the realities of night flying when circumstances apply pressure to go as opposed to when you have the ability to choose your night.