5F6B, I can only conclude that someone else had decided, despite all evidence to the contrary including the AAIB accident report, that the Sea King crew was somehow to blame.

If there was any such criticism in any RAF BoI or accident report, then it sounds awfully like an MoD own goal.

To my mind, the issue here is not about fault or the compensation paid... or whether we should close MOD airfields to GA as a knee-jerk reaction to this accident... it's about the lessons we could learn to prevent something similar happening again?

I cannot really see that there are a great number of lessons to be learnt. Different aircraft types either in the circuit or waiting to take off/ land has surely been a feature of aviation for decades.
The only training that seems to be in question is the pilot currency in the Cessna.

Pilot currency, or more accurately 'recency', in the PPL world is, if anything, more specific now than in pre-JAR days.

To carry passengers, a pilot must have flown 3 take-offs and landings in the previous 90 days.

To validate his Single Engine Piston Class Rating, a pilot may revalidate by proficiency check in the last 3 months of the 24 month rating validity period. Or, if he chooses to do so by experience, in the second 12 month period of the 24 month rating validity period, he must complete 12 hours, of which 6 must be as PIC and 1 must be a training flight with an instructor.

Most of us in the GA world welcomed these increased training and recency requirements. Beforehand it was just 5 hours in 13 months with no requirement for any flying training at all. PPL pilots could fly for 40 years or more without ever having any refresher training.

Also Safety Sense Leaflet 26 - Visiting Military Aerodromes is now freely available in LASORS.

Benson has an excellent RW/light aircraft segregation policy. Basically,a 180m Final Approach and Take-Off (FATO) buffer zone centred on RW 01/19 has been established in order to provide safe separation between rotary and fixed-wing aircraft and pilots must remain clear of the FATO buffer zone when instructed.

The only real lesson to be learned is that if you attempt to operate a light aircraft in a manner for which you have not been trained, you become your own test pilot. Taxiing at high speed on a runway can turn the aircraft into a lethal wheelbarrow with exactly the same stability characteristics as a wheelbarrow when it ultimately groundloops....

Maybe the answer to the mystery.

I've been told the RAF Board of Investigators decided the SK probably distracted the Cessna but that shouldn't have made him go out of control and crash. Then an Air Chief Marshall decided it was all the fault of the SK crew and the Cessna pilot wasn't to blame at all. Sir John Dale, same guy as blamed the Chinook pilots in the Scotch crash.

Bronx, you have just opened a huge can of worms!!!! Do you have any proof of the the involvement of Sir John Dale? This would show an "anti-aircrew" bias on behalf of the ACM.

Indeed. If what you say is really true, then surely that would have totally undermined any defence against the claim?

I presume you mean Day, by the way, not 'Dale'.

Another Day, another Dollar as the saying goes.

He obviously does not like helis.

oldfella wrote
The AAIB report also states

and

Perhaps those statements, the £10m claim and the PR issues explain the MOD's decision to compromise? There's been no admission of liability.

Ian

You could be right but this was "After the runway excursion."
The Cessna was out of control long before then.

He did a very high speed taxi after landing and then before he got anywhere near any downwash he'd swung to the right, then careered out of control off the left side of the runway and smashed through a runway light before getting airborne so sharply the Cessna tail scraped the grass.

It seems any downwash from the SK was very weak by the time the Cessna went through it and if he hadn't gone off the runway he wouldn't have encountered in anyway.

From what I've heard, it would have hit either a hangar or the Tower next to it if he hadn't stalled in - with probably more deaths.

Another thing which struck me was that he had his throttle friction set so tight the AAIB had difficulty pulling it back. Maybe that explains why he didn't or couldn't just stop if he was worried about the Sea King.
What possesses someone to set the throttle friction so tight so close to the ground? :confused:

You may well be right about the MoD PR aspect - MoD fighting widow and children etc.
Still, at least the 50% settlement shows the family's lawyers realised he played a major part in his own demise whatever they say to journos. If it was as clear-cut as they make out they wouldn't have given away £5million.
Funny how they forgot to mention they'd settled for half when trumpeting the £5million to the Press. :rolleyes:

If what Bronx says about the ACM's comments is correct, it looks like Sir John Day shot the RAF in the foot again.