Apache
 

I realise that there are a lot of pongo teddies lying in the corner of this place. However, I would just like to know, do any of you left out there really want to fly the Apache...?
I know its the dogs k..b as an attack helicopter, but surely the jobs going to be **** , you all seem to be getting p*ss all flying in aircraft that are cheap and 'simple' to maintain, when you eventually bring this one on line isn't it just going to be worse?
Form an orderly queue outside my office!!

No Thanks..

As a 16 year Army vet who has flown multiple helos. I would not fly guns in general and absolutly not fly the Apache because to begin with there are no peacetime missions for the airfram. Thus you will spend most of your time in simulators and the other tidbit going to/from the firing ranges shooting dummy warheads. And the OR rate is very low, because of it's complexity. The marines have a better idea updating the Cobras instead. this is only a opinion. Have a blast.
j

------------------
carpe diem

i know plenty of army doctors, but do we really have vets too?? cooks, bandsmen, even plant ops and rat catchers, but vets?? please dont be shouting that too loud :)

suckback,

there are approx 400 - 500 army pilots. age 25-40 plus, cpl - lt col. if you take a small percentage of them, do you think they will get enough volunteers to fill 48 x 2 seats at front line? after all they will only be involved in the following:

state of the art video games
refuelling from the back of ascot
formation all weather
exotic range/deployment locations
weapons galore
airshows static and whizzing
no more westland wheels/ml handlers
no more NVG
working off the back of ships
airconditioning galore

not everyones cup of tea, but for the younger chap, i suspect there are a few that might want it :)

Yeah but if westland are going to build it, are the engines going to **** oil all over the floor.

i was very impressed with the engine bay of an apache i crawled over once deployed on ops, it was spotless, not a drip of oil. my thought at the time - this would be nice to have to clean on standards. i think it was a T700. of course the RR version will be mounted at the very same angle, and all the oil scavenge/seal/other oil probs of the other generation of RR gas turbines will not be evident in the new machine.

of course the proof will be on the dispersal they have just built. if the new machine marks a dispersal like the lynx does, cocking its leg like a dog for a pee, then we will know pretty quickly.

they have thought of that at RR haven't they?

"wonder if i should get my civvie mate to patent the 'bean can with a hook' for the exhaust area"

any comments from the chaps that have flown the WAH model? does it dribble?

[This message has been edited by Jeep (edited 28 May 2000).]

Remember that RR didn't design an engine for the WAH - it was thrust(!) on them by Portillo. They didn't even know whether it would fit.
They've obviously shoehorned them in under the cowlings but I reckon the RTM's must be too powerful for the WAH transmission.
So, either the transmission has been uprated (unlikely) or the beast is going to be TQ limited (probably).
That is probably why only test pilots will be flying it for some time to come I fear.
Boscombe loves FADEC!

I hardly think it was thrust on them by that nice chap with the lovely smile, RR would put it in the next ford family car if they could make money on it!!

No gearbox changes, simple laptop onto the FADEC, each pilot has his own settings depending on their body weight, mood of the day and 'are we going to, or returning from the airshow'.

Slightly different subject, but a wessex pilot said to me the other day, he could lift more than other pilots cos of the way he flew. does it have a MAUM? any wessex aircrew that can operate a puter?

Hi Jeep - I have seen some serious overcontrollers in my time (and so have you!) all they are doing is spilling lift which is why a good pilot can lift more!!

I would rather have v.d. in my medical file than Apache hours in my log book!!!

__D-Rat_____________________________

never heard that one before DR, did however hear an american say 'would rather have a sister in a cathouse than brother on chinooks' sort of similar eh?

er..mention the apache word again and the moderator will kick us off (again)

Apache fleet grounded!
 

U.S. Army grounds Apache helicopter fleet

WASHINGTON, Dec 15 (Reuters) - The U.S. Army said on Friday it was grounding its fleet of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters because of a potentially dangerous tail rotor problem.

The decision to ground all 742 Apaches as a safety precaution came late Thursday after the discovery of a faulty tail rotor "swashplate'' assembly, the service said in a statement.

Failure of the assembly could result in the loss of an aircraft and crew injuries, the statement said.

The Army said it was seeking to determine the cause of the fault and how many of its AH-64 helicopters, built by Boeing Co. (NYSE:BA - news), are affected.

The Apache fleet was previously grounded in November 1999 after the Army found suspect rotor bearings and transmission problems following crashes.

Six Army Apaches crashed last year, including two during training in Albania before the NATO air campaign against Kosovo. But the Army said the rotor bearings had nothing to do with the crashes in Albania.

Army officials said investigators found that a heating process used by Boeing to make the bearing assembly extra hard led to stress corrosion fractures in the bearing.

The following paragraph came out of a report prepared by The United States General Accounting office. The report is titled: APACHE HELICOPTER; Serious Logistical Support Problems Must Be Solved to Realize Combat Potential. This report was written in 1990.

Tail Rotor Swashplate: The tail rotor controls the lateral movement of the aircraft. The tail rotor blades, which are the control surfaces, are actuated by a rotating swashplate. The swashplate bearing fails prematurely, causing the swashplate seize and the aircraft to lose control. Such a failure caused a fatal crash in August 1987, prompting the Army to replace the swashplate every 250-flight hours. The swashplate bearing is not repairable by the Army and is replaced by the manufacturer under contract. Army documentation indicates several factors may have contributed to the tail rotor problems, including (1) inadequate bearing load capacity (actual loads exceeded design loads by 138%), (2) improper design techniques regarding the use of dissimilar metals, and (3) inadequate testing. One possible cause of the increased loads was the repositioning of the tail rotor lower on the tail assembly and increasing the diameter of the tail rotor to improve flight-handling performance during development. The prime contractor redesigned the swashplate bearing, and the Army began testing the new design in October 1989. On the basis of its’ performance in testing, the Army is installing the new swashplate on fielded aircraft as the old swashplates reach the 250-hour replacement interval.

These are my words. From what was said in the first post the failure was traced to a manufacturing process. When I wrote the FMEA for the Apache systems I specifically pointed out that faulty heat treat, inadequate vacuum degassing and hydrogen embrittlement could all result in failure of a component. What happened in this accident could have been prevented by proper quality control at the manufacturer. The major problem is one called batch sensitivity. If one unit in a manufacturing process is bad then it is likely that all or most of the parts in that same process are also potential failure candidates. This same thing happened recently on the Robinson helicopters where they found a cracked yoke and because of that they are going to replace all yokes from that same batch.

Its’ a shame that the crew and aircraft were lost but it was totally preventable.


------------------
The Cat

In talking about this model with various colleagues who have operated them, the general consensus, is that it is a piece of junk. The basis of that conclusion is not limited to operational performance and reliability, but the very clearly demonstrated inability of the manufacturer to produce quality parts, or effectively correct problems with the aircraft, systems or vendor produced sub-assemblies.

I would consider that most of these reports are accurate, as they are identical to the problems experienced with their commercial products!

The Border Patrol is now seriously considering whether it really wants any more MD600's, after the General Accounting Office (GAO) questioned the aircraft's ability to meet it's mission, reliability and availability requirements.

When MDHC operated the commercial programme, prior to the Boeing purchase, they demonstrated virtually every means on how not to run an effective commercial helicopter manufacturing and support operation. The commercial machines still have the same problems they had when they were first produced, and in many cases the "fixes" that have been attempted are as bad as the problems they were designed to overcome. There are consistent problems with quality control, and regular problems with parts that are modified, but are then unusable with the adjoining parts and assemblies.

The parts and logistic system is absolutely the worst in the business, with a very low volume of parts available downstream, and regular non-availability of parts from the factory. I would have no difficulty believing that this is the identical situation in the military programmes. I would add, that I have met a lot of very committed and capable individuals within the organisation, but it simply is one of the worst organised operations in it's field.

This opinions are not exclusive to me, and I would recommend that anyone interested in an independent account of these programmes read the following reports from the GAO;

MD600- <A HREF="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=gg00201.txt&dire ctory=/diskb/wais/data/gao" TARGET="_blank">http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.c gi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=gg00201.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao</A>

Apache logistics- <A HREF="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=ns99140.txt&dire ctory=/diskb/wais/data/gao" TARGET="_blank">http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=ns99140.txt&dire ctory=/diskb/wais/data/gao</A>

I think that an example of the "inside" knowledge on the Apache, was the battle with the Marine Corps over the replacement of the Cobra.

The Apache may be Boeing by name, but it is definitely McDonnel Douglas by nature!

[This message has been edited by Cyclic Hotline (edited 16 December 2000).]

To: Cyclic Hotline

You stated the followinng

The Apache may be Boeing by name, but it is definitely McDonnel Douglas by nature!

It should read, The Apache may be Boeing by name But the problems started with Hughes helicopters. Mc Donnell Douglas unwittingly bought a piece of crap and Boeing inherited it.

The following letter was posted elsewhere on another Apache thread.

August 30, 1999

Editor, Rotor & Wing
1201 Seven Locks Road
Potomac, Maryland
20854

Dear Mr. Persinos,

I am submitting this letter in response to your column in the July issue of Rotor&Wing as well as the article by Giovanni de Briganti in the August issue. Both of these articles addressed the failings of the AH 64 Apache Helicopter. The purpose of this letter is to shed light on the reasons why the Apache was and is such a poor performer. The letter will be broken into several segments referencing the following:

 Why the Apache has such a low degree of reliability and availability.

 The operational philosophy of the U S Army Aviation Command and how it influenced the training of Apache pilots and maintenance personnel.

 What the U S Army told the pilots regarding the survivability of the Apache relative to the ZSU 23-4 weapons system.

 How the Apache performed when placed in a combat situation.

 The investigation of the Apache by the Government Accounting Office outlining the serious logistical support problems and how these problems effected the Apaches’ combat readiness.

 The Apache night vision system: the selection of the vendor and how responsive the system is to combat demands.

In 1973 the writer was a technical consultant hired by Hughes Helicopters to prepare the response to the U S Army RFP for an attack helicopter. The writers task was to establish the Maintainability program per Mil documents 470 and 471 and to define the design for maintainability parameters for the various systems in response to the Army requirements, These included the number of maintenance personnel that would be involved in various maintenance activities and the length of time that the Army prescribed for each of those various maintenance actions. These activities involved extensive interface with the Hughes design team. It was obvious to the writer that the so called design team had exceeded their level of competence. Hughes Helicopters, at that time was not technically competent to take on a program as complex as the Apache. To top it off, they had absolutely no idea regarding Reliability and Maintainability and, for the length of the program that was managed by Hughes, that situation would not change. By the time McDonnell Douglas took the program over, the design with all its’ faults was cast in concrete.

The writer performed his assigned task and the response to the RFP was submitted to the Army. Having finished his assignment, the writer went on to other pursuits. Several months later, the writer was called back, as the entire submittal had to be re-written. With the completion of the re-write, the writer went to work for Bell Helicopter International in Iran as manager of service engineering and Reliability and Maintainability. Three years later, the writer returned to California and was invited to return to Hughes Helicopters as a senior R&M specialist with responsibilities of incorporating Reliability and Maintainability into the design of the AH 64 Apache. When the writer returned to Culver City he was shocked. Absolutely nothing had changed. It was as If the writer had left work on Friday and returned the following Monday. The only thing that did change was a sign in the Project Engineering offices. This sign had 10 elements defined in their order of importance to the contract. The first was performance and the second was Reliability and Maintainability. Upon his return, the writer looked at the sign and performance was near the bottom of the list followed by Reliability and Maintainability.

Absolutely no progress had been made relative to incorporating Reliability or Maintainability into the design. It seems that Hughes like many other defense contractors discovered that the incorporation of R&M into the design equates to increased costs. In dealing with engineering management, the writer felt that he was talking to a brick wall. The department managers absolutely refused to discuss R&M and they refused to recognize that the R&M requirements in the specification applied to engineering. After all, they told the writer,” R&M was not included as a part of the engineering design portion of the spec and therefore was not their responsibility”. This situation is quite common in the defense industry. When the military prepares the specs for a piece of equipment, they segregate R&M from engineering and in some cases, they include R&M as a part of the commercial section of the spec which further separates R&M from engineering. Not only were the department heads non-responsive to the requests of R&M, they were in most cases not qualified to manage a design program as complex as the AH 64 Helicopter. Examples of this were the department head of the hydraulics group. His claim to fame was the design of the shock strut for the Hughes 269 Helicopter landing gear. He also sat in the tail of the Spruce Goose monitoring the control actuators for leakage. This early on relationship with Howard Hughes placed this man in the position of a “House Guest”. This kept the man on the payroll no matter how ineffective he was in the performance of his assigned duties.

The head of the structures design group had in his resume’ that he supervised the design of the skid gear for the Model 269. This in no way equipped him to head up the design of such a complex helicopter. Since Hughes had never built a helicopter to Mil Specs prior to the Apache, they had never had to interface with R&M and Human Factors Engineers and they elected to ignore personnel from those groups. Later on they realized that the pilot interface could not be ignored so, the engineering department hired an ex Army helicopter Gun Ship pilot to supervise cockpit design.


The engineering department not only ignored R&M, the also ignored the Logistics Support organization. The engineering department viewed the input of these organizations as an infringement on their authority.

The R&M group was just as guilty of not having qualified management personnel. The department manager was a long time quality control manager while the manager of Reliability had a background in statistics. The manager of Maintainability was a former clerk who kept records on the Hughes OH 6. None had any experience in R&M. R&M was a part of the quality assurance organization which was headed by a “House Guest” that spent most of his time on a golf course. He had long ago exceeded his level of competence. The entire management structure was weak and because of their lack of understanding of the requirements of the spec and the importance of R&M in the design, they would not support the R&M personnel in arguments with engineering.

On one occasion the writer prepared a memo to be sent to the U S Army R&M program office in St. Louis. This memo outlined 27 different elements of the design that impacted R&M. This memo had to be submitted by a specific date relative to the contract start date. The memo was prepared well in advance of that date and it was submitted to the Manager of R&M for approval and he was to forward it to the Army program office. Instead, the memo ended up on the desk of the assistant chief engineer who was not involved in the review of R&M related material , and he refused to forward the memo on to the Aviation Directorate. The assistant chief engineer refused the writers requests to release the memo and would not say why. He later stated that he disagreed with the writer in his use of the terms shall and will. When the writer showed the assistant chief engineer a U S Army writing style document that upheld the writers use of the terms shall and will, the memo was returned to the writer. But by that time, it was too late. The Army accepted the design as it was and not as it should be. Each of those 27 items would later manifest themselves when the AH 64 went into service.

On frequent occasions, engineering would deny the requests of R&M to review the drawings while they were being created. R&M by contract was required to sign off on the drawings. Instead, the engineering department would accumulate several hundred drawings and they would call the R&M personnel on a Saturday giving them about two hours to perform their review. If the review could not be
Completed in that time, the drawings would be rolled up and the engineering department signed them off for R&M.

The engineering department suffered from the NIH (Not invented here) syndrome. During a final design review for the flight control system, the writer suggested that a component in the cyclic, collective and directional control systems be classified as Reliability Critical.
The component was a shear pin. The pin would be broken when the cyclic, collective or directional control system jammed and the pilot exerted sufficient force to break it. This allowed the effected control system to be operated “Fly by wire”. The writer raised the point three times during the meeting and three times he was told to shut up by the lead flight control engineer who was directing the meeting. In attendance at the meeting was a U S Army rep. He just sat there and listened. Evidently, the writer must have ticked the design engineer off by doing what was he was supposed to do. Fifteen minutes after the meeting was over, the writer returned to his office to be told that he was fired. The writer left that Friday and two months later, the U S Army rep that sat in on the meeting told engineering to make the shear pin a design critical item.

Hughes Helicopters was not equipped internally from a design and manufacturing standpoint to develop and manufacture the AH 64. From the very beginning, the design of the major life cycle items were farmed out to other firms. The only firm that the writer could interface with was Ryan Aeronautics in San Diego. Ryan assisted in the design of the fuselage and they built the entire airframe at their San Diego facility. The writer made twice-weekly visits to Ryan and found them to be very cooperative although none of the suggested changes could be incorporated because Hughes engineering would not approve them. All other vendors were off-limits to R&M

When McDonnell Douglas took over the program, all of the design flaws were cast in concrete. It didn’t take them long to realize that a major shake up in management was required. Most of the top managers that were let go ended up at Hiller Helicopters where it didn’t take them long to run that program into the ground.


Hughes Helicopters was not alone in the mismanagement of the AH 64 program. The U S Army shared much of the blame. The Army had recently cancelled the Cheyenne and they were looking for a replacement. The writer had worked on the Cheyenne program and he quickly realized that it was extremely complex and could not be maintained by the standard issue Army helicopter Mechanic in a combat situation. The Apache was even more complex and less maintainable in the field. The Army at that time was loosing a lot of maintenance personnel due to expiration of their first enlistment. Because of this, the Army was reluctant to send a new recruit to maintenance school to be trained on such a complex system as the AH 64. Instead, the new recruits would attend a basic maintenance-training program that was not system specific. These trainees would then be sent to Apache support companies where they would work under the direction of an experienced mechanic. To support this concept, the Army directed Hughes to develop technical manuals that were made for someone with a Junior High level education

There were more pictures than text and the pictures showed things such as a component with further smaller pictures of screws and nuts on that component. The text would direct the mechanic to pick out a specific screwdriver or a specific wrench and to place the tool as shown. Next to that was a picture of a clock with an arrow to indicate clockwise or counter clockwise direction. The text would then tell the mechanic how many turns to rotate the tool. Some of the illustrations were very complex. They were like the old medical texts that had multiple layers that could be peeled away to show the inner workings of the device. The total cost of this program was over 16 Million Dollars and the books were so expensive and so heavy that they could not be taken out to the aircraft. The Army had to revert to the same system used to support other aircraft in the fleet. Work cards that could be printed out and then discarded. There is no telling how much this added to program costs.

The Army also had their problems in the training of Apache pilots. Normally after training a pilot in basic flying skills he would be streamed into an organizational unit flying a specific type of helicopter where he would learn advanced skills. Many pilots that had been selected to fly the Apache were later found to be unable to adapt to the monocular sighting device on their helmet. This meant that his previous training to get to that point had been wasted. Later the Army tested all pilots early on to see if they could adapt to the monocular sight prior to being assigned to Apache training. By that time the Army had wasted Millions of dollars.

In every combat assignment the Apache proved to be a poor performer. In Panama the black boxes had to be opened up and dried out using a hair dryer. The boxes were designed for use in a European combat situation and not the high humidity of the tropics. In Desert Storm the Apache was used as a stand off weapon and never got “Down and Dirty” because the Army had come to understand that the Apache was not as invulnerable to ground fire as the design specification said it should be and, it didn’t stand up well to the dusty and sandy conditions. In the Balkans two Apaches’ were lost. One to pilot error and one to systems malfunction. Up to their transfer to that area of operations, the Apaches’ had been mainly maintained by civilian contractors. In the Balkans,they were being maintained by lower skilled Army personnel. Another situation that may have been rectified since the writers direct involvement, was the night vision system had to be operated for fifteen minutes to allow the cryogenic generator to bring the system down to operating temperature. This meant that if the Apache had an emergency flight assignment at night, the pilots would be flying blind for the first fifteen minutes.

The Army also lied to the pilots of the Apache relative to its’ invulnerability to the ZSU 23 weapons system. This was the primary weapon that would be used against the Apache if it were to attack a group of Warsaw Pact tanks.


This weapon was also being supplied to all of the governments that were in league with the Warsaw Pact. The U S Army commissioned a study by a so-called”Think Tank” to study the effectiveness of the ZSU 23 against the Apache. It was their considered opinion that the ZSU 23 was inaccurate, It had a low degree of reliability and that if the ZSU 23 did hit the Apache with one round, the pilot would have sufficient time to evade any further hits by dropping below the tree line. The uninitiated reader should understand that the ZSU 23 has a rate of fire of 1200 rounds per minute and that if one bullet hit its’ mark, there would be forty or fifty rounds right behind the first round. When the writer was on contract with Agusta helicopters he took a two week holiday in Yugoslavia. While there, the writer watched a T V program which was describing the weaponry of the Warsaw Pact. One of the weapons demonstrated was the ZSU 23. In the demonstration the weapon was pointed on a line parallel to a stand of trees. A helicopter popped up from behind the trees and in an instant the weapon acquired the helicopter and was pointed directly at it. The helicopter then dropped below the tree tops and at that time the gun was turned off. The helicopter was allowed to fly away and the gun was turned on. It immediately started to fire and it swept an arc approximately 30 to 45 degrees on either side of center. The trees started to explode. It looked like there were hundreds of chain saw wielding loggers in the tree stand felling trees as fast as they could. It appeared to the writer that if a hail of 23mm bullets didn’t hit the helicopter,it would be destroyed by a falling tree.

In 1990 the U S Congress commissioned the United Stated General Accounting Office to study the Apache and its’ poor performance relative to logistical support,reliability and other problems effecting the Army’s’ ability to maintain high availability rates. This report was requested by The Honorable Les Aspin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services and The Honorable John D. Dingell Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. The report went on in great detail to describe the problems of the Apache and , in reading the report, the writer felt that it was “Déjà vu all over again” Referring back to the 27 items outlined in the report which the Army never received, almost every one was addressed as a failing in the design of the Apache. The writer felt vindicated, but at what cost.

Another problem as perceived by the writer was the selection of the vendor for the TADS/PNVS. The problem didn’t arise when the contract was let but it did show up much later. As previously indicated the problem may have been in the writer’s own perception. At the award of the AH 64 contract the Army assigned a colonel to manage the program. This individual was influential in the selection of prospective vendors and signed off for the Army when a vendor was selected. The colonel was eventually promoted to one star general a position he maintained until his retirement.

This is where the writer sees the problem, as shortly after his retirement the General went to work as a Vice President of the firm that was the successful bidder on the TADS/PNVS. This is done quite often but the government specifies a waiting period. The writer feels that the waiting period had not expired. In fact, the waiting period had not even started.

The writer quite often questioned his superiors and the assigned Army personnel about how the Army would react to the discovery that the Apache could not be maintained in the field and that it would cost almost twice what Hughes Helicopters had bid to get the contract. Their collective response was that the Army would approach the Congress and request a supplemental budget to make up the difference in operational costs.

The writer has been involved in several programs which include the following helicopter designs; Agusta A 129, The Bell AH 1J, The Bell-Boeing V 22, The AH 64 and the Cheyenne. All of these air vehicles are designed to get “Down and Dirty “ in support of the ground forces. It is this writers opinion that the first four designs will not survive when exposed to a hostile environment. The pilot workload, under these conditions, will be so severe, that he, the pilot will be overcome while operating his systems, while trying to evade hostile enemy ground fire. He will be incapacitated by the IOP. The IOP or Intensity Of Pucker will manifest itself under these conditions and the pilot’s attention will soon be diverted from his assigned mission and he will be thinking mainly of protecting his butt.. The V 22 and the Comanche are made mainly from composite material which means that if either of these aircraft sustains major damage whether in peacetime or in battle, the aircraft will be lost to the operating unit because repairs can only be accomplished at the factory or depot. True, on paper a composite airframe can be shown to be more reliable than a metal airframe but when a metal airframe suffers damage it can be repaired locally. Even when a metal airframe has to be taken to the depot, it can be repaired in less time and at lower cost. It is this Writers personal opinion that the best combat attack helicopter ever made was the MD Defender. The U S Army could purchase 14 MD Defenders for every Apache. Look at the cost effectiveness and multiplication of the weapons capability when a unit commander has 112 MD Defenders instead of 8 Apaches. The MD Defender only requires one pilot so the only difference would be in the number of pilots that would be required. From a pilots point of view there are no sophisticated elements in the MD Defender and if the airframe is involved in an accident or it is shot down it is highly survivable.

Hopefully The writer has shown some of the basic reasons behind the poor performance of the AH 64 Apache. Just think, what would the Apache be if the writers’ memo got delivered on a timely basis.

Very truly yours, S L Zuckerman






------------------
The Cat

Enhanced Apache Longbow Completes First Flight
 

http://www.boeing.com/rotorcraft/mil...es/ah64new.jpg


MESA, Ariz., July 13, 2001
The first U.S. Army AH-64D Apache Longbow combat helicopter equipped with initial enhancements that will be introduced during the second multiyear production program completed its first flight Thursday at The Boeing Company in Mesa, Ariz.
The pre-production Apache Longbow, which flew for 23 minutes, was equipped with numerous system updates that incorporate commercial off-the-shelf technologies to reduce costs and allow for future growth while extending product operational life.
The enhancements also will provide a foundation to support the Army's emerging digitized battlefield requirements. "This first flight is a significant milestone for the program," said Al Winn, vice president for Apache programs. "It not only marks the start of the second multiyear production effort for the U.S. Army for 269 aircraft, but it also drives home our belief that Apache will remain a potent and relevant weapon for our customers for decades to come."
Representatives of Apache team companies from around the world were on hand to witness this first flight. "We are proud of our role in enhancing the features and capabilities of this superior product," said Martin Soltau, Apache program manager at Smiths Aerospace, United Kingdom. Smiths Aerospace UK produces the improved electrical power management system used in the Apache Longbow.
The first multiyear II helicopters - the sixth lot of U.S. Army Apache Longbows — will come off the production line in early 2002. Through 2006, the Army's fleet of AH-64D Apache Longbows will grow to 501 helicopters. Next-generation Apache Longbows continue to make their presence known around the globe through a growing customer base that includes Egypt, Israel, Singapore, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Several international competitions also are under way.
In addition to the remanufacturing of 269 aircraft, the second multiyear contract includes maintenance and operator training devices, spare parts, logistics and support services.

2001 technology mounted on a modified 1970s airframe and supported and steered by a rotor system that was developed in the 1960s. The systems are what make the helicopter and so far they have performed well. The airframe and the rotor systems are another story. The helicopter is unreliable and has poor maintainability characteristics. It is also very vulnerable to ground fire.

Apache Hellfire problems exaggerated by UK press
 

from Defence Helicopter. . </font><blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica">quote:</font><hr /><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica">Apache Hellfire problems exaggerated by UK press . .Headlines in UK newspapers -- the Daily Telegraph on Monday 25 March and the Daily Mail on 26 March -- saying that the British Army’s new WAH-64 Apache Longbows cannot fire their Hellfire missiles are likely to prove untrue.. .. .The reports, also carried by the Telegraph’s website and Defence Systems Daily’s web news service, cite an MoD test report leaked to the Daily Telegraph and claim that debris from the missile’s rocket motor could cause ‘catastrophic damage’, to the tail rotor or main rotor leading to the loss of the aircraft. . .. .The United States Army says it’s a non-issue for them and that they have never experienced any significant damage from such a cause. . .. .A source close to the UK Apache programme told Defence Helicopter that firing trials had revealed some ‘pitting’ of the tail surfaces resulting from particles from a plug (a weather seal) covering the exit of the rocket motor. The plug is designed to vaporise when the motor ignites, but was not behaving normally in this case. . .. .‘This is a non-issue for the US Army’, a source within the service told Defence Helicopter on Tuesday 26 March. The source went on to say that the problem had been overcome by fitting missiles with re-engineered sealing plugs. . .. .Apaches have been launching Hellfires successfully since the late 1970s at least and have fired them in combat on numerous occasions, both during Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1984 and in Desert Storm in 1991. . .. .The newspaper reports that US Army Apache crews fighting in Afghanistan have been instructed only to launch Hellfires from pylons on the right side of the aircraft so that any debris would be well clear of the tail rotor on the left side. If true, this restriction is likely to apply to older, unmodified missiles only and is a far cry from not being able to fire the weapon at all. . .. .The UK MoD bought all its Hellfires (AGM-114K laser-guided and AGM-114L Longbow radar versions) as a direct commercial sale from Lockheed Martin, so the fix will be negotiated between them. The weapons themselves are assembled by Thales Air Defence (formerly Shorts Missile Systems) in Belfast which could apply the fix already engineered in the US. </font><hr /></blockquote><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica">Any Rotorheads with personal experience?. . . . <small>[ 27 March 2002, 21:08: Message edited by: Heliport ]</small>