Double Bogey, before attempting to belittle him, I think you might be advised to do a little homework. Flying Lawyer is an experienced helicopter and fixed wing pilot (and has owned his own Gazelle). He has also just completed his term as Master of what is arguably the most prestigious aviation organisation in the UK.

As the parent of a military pilot at the time, I was drawn to the MoK campaign right from the beginning. As a PPL I could only play a very minor part in the years of repetitive debate but the fear of ever finding myself in the position of the Tapper and Cook families has driven me to take an above average interest in developments. The resurrection of this debate depresses me for the following reasons:

1. As far as I recall, no-one has ever denied the possibility of CFIT, so why are we arguing about it? Unless new information becomes available, this debate will go nowhere.

2. Hearing the same distortions of facts used to support arguments e.g. witnesses report that the Mull was shrouded in cloud. Well, the bit they were in obviously was but that doesn't necessarily mean that, FROM THE PILOT'S VIEWPOINT it was completely covered. Remember the pictures we were shown of orographic cloud covering parts of the Mull?

3. And the most depressing of all. The way that MoD and VVSO's have lied about the airworthiness of the HC2. This is compounded by the fact that they continue to to do so while people die. I particularly found it amazing that anyone would fly an aeroplane, especially with passengers, which required a DECU connector to be checked every 15 minutes because there was a history of them becoming detached. As an expert in light duty electrical contacts this was one area which I felt competent to comment on. I did ask at the time how many pilots would take to the air in such a machine and nobody responded. Interestingly, when I have asked a variety of civil and military pilots face to face, everyone said that they wouldn't.

It seems that, the introduction of the MAA and MAAIB has, as far as the FAA is concerned, made thing worse. I understand that they did have a fairly robust Air Safety organisation which relied on middle ranking officers who were unlikely to see further promotion and were therefore much more independent. I believe that this has now been superceded by a far less independent MAA.

DB,


Now you are being plain stupid and offensive at the same time.

FL's flying experience as well as his "Lawyer" credentials are impeccable along with his personal integrity being of the highest standard.

It is time you take a holiday or sober up, whichever will allow you to regain your senses and manners.

Shy torque, if someone wants to try and discredit an eyewitness on the basis that they are "Notoriously Unreliable" despite the facts indicating they were albeit spot on TOUGH! This is what I inferred from FLs post. If He did not imply this then maybe he can explain the relevance of his statement when in fact the witnesses evidence was, from my perspective, very accurate. I believe he used that statement to "Belittle" my post on the same subject, as if the yachtsman evidence was not worth considering.

As regards Experience I am non the wiser and have made no indication that I think FL is not experienced OR that I disrespect him. However, this is an Aviation forum not a forum of Law and as such the perspective of a Lawyer may differ considerably from the perspective of an operational pilot.

I do not know but I doubt FL has flown either commercially or in the Military. Thus his aviation experienced may be limited to recreation only, which whilst it sounds a lot more fun than commercial flying does not provide the kinds of pressure proffessional aviators can be subjected too.

I am sure FL is a nice guy to boot and a very good Lawyer.

Thanks for the advice, I had no idea. I'll try to bear that in mind.

But do remember that the yachtsman eyewitness (a Mr. Holbrook, iirc), changed his mind at least once.

I agree with the above comment by Boudreaux Bob.

Shytorque, As usual a post filled with veiled insults and cynical responses. Just what possible purpose do you think you have brought to this debate other than stirring the pot.

You think Bobs post is good! On one hand he calls me offensive and then he calls me an Idiot. A post so lacking in either moral, litary or intelligent fibre I could not bring myself to answer it.

Being rude and calling people names is childish behaviour not worth of a response.

DB,

I did not call you an "Idiot".

I did say your recent posts were "plain stupid and offensive". There is a difference between that and calling you an Idiot, although your interpretation is not far from the mark I guess.

I give far more credence to a very experienced Private Pilot and owner of several different airplanes and helicopters, who is also a very respected member of the Legal Profession, with qualifications in both aviation and legal proceedings, over a guy whose sole qualification is limited to just aviation.

That being said, it takes only a decent up bringing to grasp the basic tenets of courtesy.

I am reliably informed that Flying Lawyer is a very skilled Pilot with a control touch that would be envied by anyone with an appreciation for such attributes.

Ratings alone do not the Pilot make.

For sure, manners do the Gentleman make.

Honesty has always been considered a virtue.

Crab all you want DB, but you need to re-think the tone and content of your posts.

Surely you can be more professional sounding than you have lately?

Double Bogey

Your opening salvo in this going over of old ground was to suggest that if the crew had observed the simple concept of safety altitude then the accident wouldn't have happened.

If that wasn't apportioning blame, it was certainly very scathing by someone who clearly isn't as familiar with some parts of the report as he claims to be.

Therefore please stop trying to pretend that you don't now blame the pilots, when you clearly do.

In what other air accidents have the UK Military found pilots guilty of gross professional negligence? It might be instructive to see what it has taken in the past to achieve this accolade...

The more I read of this the more it seems that the MoD used that device in an attempt to slam the door on further enquiry which they feared would lead to hugely embarrassing revelations of their gross professional misconduct in various aspects of certification and operational use of the aircraft. The amount of sitting on files and obfuscation amongst the Top Neddies is pretty damning and reeks of a big, embarrassed cover-up at the highest levels.


This upset over the word "blame" doesn't help the discussion either. The "gross professional..." epithet was eventually removed and I gather has been taken by dome to amount to absolving the pilots of all blame. I can't see how one reaches that conclusion, there are infinite levels of "blame", though responsibility is probably a better word. Thank God the civvy accident investigators avoid the blame culture entirely, the mil would do well to do so too. Still, whichever way you cook it the primary responsibility of a pilot is to keep his machine from violent impacts with the ground, and failure to achieve that is generally considered to involve some degree of less than perfect piloting (discounting catastrophic failures etc)

DB has a point re safety altitude, had a safe altitude been achieved no such accident could have taken place. I think it is rather an overreaction to suggest that statement implies blame - something that occurs whenever the B word is used here, but it is nonetheless a factual statement.

Equally, I cannot understand why anyone would plot a route to a waypoint that is on a thousand ft high rock when cloudbase is 500ft, let alone when it is also forecast to have a PROB30 of being in IMC. The next leg to Fort William as planned ran along the length of the mountainous Mull. That too is inexplicable as a VMC route though would have worked for the trip home at medium level, excepting any question of icing conditions (I'm not aware of the temps forecast). Surely if you were expecting IMC over land and had 500ft cloudbase over water you'd plot a waypoint a mile or two SW or W of the lighthouse then go to Ft William over water the whole way? Again, this isn't blame at all, just questioning what seems to me a curiously impractical style of navigation. Why one earth would you not just fly up the western coast of the Mull - it takes you where you want to go?

Too many question with answers we'll never know, but suggesting that a pilot who flies into a stuffed cloud is devoid of responsibility is taking it too far, unless you can prove - that is conclusively prove - something catastrophic or entirely beyond his control caused it. And of course no one can even start to suggest any evidence for that. Unequivocal proof works both ways.

Quid pro quo, isn't it called?

Bob, do you actually read any posts properly. In the absence of anything to offer you resort to taunting me. Stay out of other people's discussions and let FL speak for himself.

Agaricus, that's just about the nub of the matter. Hence the reason for the Mull of Kintyre campaign.

Satsuma - my opening SALVO remains valid and correct. If they were at Safety altitude they would never have hit the hill.

My view is this was most probably inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT.

I do not agree the crew were negligent. That does not mean I believe no mistakes were made!

Now stop goading and add something of value if you have it.

if they had not taken off it would not have happened either, DB.

Why the need to be at Safety Height if they were intent upon remaining VFR/VMC?

Likewise, plotting a waypoint to a known bit of rock does not mean one has to get to the Way Point before changing course. After crossing some water, without Radar to show the coastline, perhaps they wanted to ensure where that bit of Rock was so as to facilitate a Visual point of Reference.

As there were no Survivors and no CVR, we shall never know what the Pilots were thinking, planning, or doing when they met their end in this tragedy.

What we know for sure is the aircraft struck the ground while in flight, the weather was not good, the aircraft did not have all the Avionics it could have had and in some views should have had, the aircraft itself had known issues that challenged it being declared air worthy, and that there was a huge miscarriage of justice when the RAF Management both attempted to cover all that up and did so by trying to laid sole blame upon the Pilots.

Coming along later with all this supposition with scant knowledge of the facts and putting forth as having any relation to what happened that day is a bit presumptuous in my view.

How many times by how many people must you hear that before you understand that?

Yes, I do read your posts. This is a public forum and thus any discussion is open to all and sundry.

Hate that as you might, you will just have to deal with it.

I have been posting for a long time, the only person I ever used the ignore facility was Walter. Bogey now makes two. A shame really because I promised to be more tolerant after getting involved in the fiasco Glasgow thread. I did try, but he caused overload.

Bob, read Agarus last post. He has summed it up very neatly and better than I could have. Then read the accident report on the section about the VFR rules and VMC minima in place at the time.

Jay, take a day off. 'Opinions are like' you surely you know the rest.

I would suggest DB's - 'I personally have a substantial amount of experience, in the air, in a helicopter, in similar conditions. I know what it looks, smells and feels like. Not the rarified atmosphere of the barrack room lawyer......or other kind. I know well the pressure, thought processes and strict priority of action required to survive in such situations especially when dealing with a malfunction'

Eloquently put.

Bar being in same country what has Glasgow got to do with it - nothing except you have a problem with DB. Try doing it privately or even give him a ring I'm sure he will give you a number should you so wish. The barrack room bit might be a bit of a freudian slip but I'm guessing FL has never seen the inside of a barrack room and as for qualifying experience levels on the fact somebody owns a Gazelle - pure crass - as being the Master of a guild, again crass albeit a pilot guild.

Dbs had his say and you yours - move on, agree to disagree.

I have, he's been set to ignore, I don't see his posts anymore.

We appear to have reached the same impasse that this highly emotive subject eventually resolves itself into.

Any perceived cover-up or whitewashing of the events may have had much to do with who was on the aircraft and where they were going - a lot of assets in one basket (sorry to mix metaphors) for the sake of what was essentially a social event. Having, by design or by accident, put pressure on the crew to complete the task in a less than perfect aircraft in less than perfect weather, it is no great surprise to me that an element of ar*e-covering then ensued by career-minded senior officers.

I haven't read the full report for quite some time but I don't remember any mention of GPS inaccuracies which I believe had been noted on the Chinook in that part of the world before.

DOUBLE BOGEY

I posted the entirety of the evidence relating to height including the ST data in post #64 in order to provide all the relevant information for those who have not read the reports in detail, or at all.
Surely it was very clear from what I posted that, in this instance, the witness's upper estimate was reasonably accurate? If I had been trying to "fool" or "hoodwink" anyone, as you suggest, I would not have posted the ST data.
Perhaps my general comment about the unreliability of height estimates was superfluous in this instance – although his lower estimate was way out (relative to the height being discussed). I readily admit that it is a hobby-horse of mine because, over the years, I've seen many pilots put at risk in court (prosecutions and civil actions) by the inaccurate estimates of witnesses.

You are correct. I have never flown commercially and, although I was fortunate to be taught to fly by the RAF, I have never flown in the military.
I have never claimed to be an experienced pilot. I've been lucky to get wider experience than many PPLs but that doesn't make me an experienced pilot.

I have not offered any opinion about what happened and would not presume to do so. (I find it irritating when PPLs, and even non-pilots, spoil the flow of discussions with their theories and argue with professionals in areas in which they have no expertise or experience. I confine myself to those aspects of discussions where I do have expertise and experience.)

I agree. I have focused on the evidence. I'm a lawyer so naturally I would.

You clearly have enormous experience of flying in challenging conditions. I respect that. (A few years ago, I travelled to Aberdeen in the hope of observing the sort of conditions with which off-shore pilots often have to deal. Unfortunately, for my purposes, the weather on both my jumpseat flights out to rigs was benign: Bristow Aberdeen)
I don't have the same experience as you, but I do have many years' experience of studying accident reports (AAIB & BOI), working closely with experts in accident investigation and aviation matters, examining evidence and dealing with aviation fatal accident cases.
Is it your view that I don't have appropriate experience to comment upon the evidence or, more to the point, the lack of it?

I disagreed with your interpretation of the absence of evidence of a defect in the helicopter, pointing out the extent of the damage and referring to the AAIB expert's comment about it
I pointed out that a causative defect could not be discounted. I did not suggest that the accident was caused by a defect.
Is it your view that I'm not qualified to make such comments?

I have also been critical of the BOI procedure then in force. The independent Review concluded that the BOI "was conducted under a system which was, by generally accepted standards of justice and fairness, manifestly unfair to deceased aircrew." That is also my view.
Is it your view that I'm not qualified to express such an opinion?

I repeat: I have not offered any opinion about what happened.
I have a hunch, based upon my experience of dealing with such matters, but I would not presume to post it.
For some reason, you appear to assume that I disagree with your view about what happened.


FL

DB,

As there are numerous investigations and reviews, I am not sure to which you suggest i read.

I found this in a summary. Is this what you are referring to when you talk about RAF Minimums and such?

Double Bogey

You said:

Nobody apart from the President of the Board of Inquiry that is. The icing clearance was +4, safety altitude for the entire route would have been about 6500 feet (at a guess). As our American cousins say, do the math.

ShyTorque

You said:
Can't be certain what you mean, but I'm not sure I necessarily agree. As an adviser at the FAI, I saw Mr Holbrook on the witness stand. He is (was) a scientific instrument maker by trade, and he was a very convincing witness. When asked how he had judged the helicopter's height, (200-400') he stated he had used the height of the Mull lighthouse (which he knew precisely) as a reference, and built in a boundary of error. For Flying Lawyer, I don't believe any height assessment Holbrook made can be contradicted by the evidence of RNS252 Supertans. (Which itself is of course a piece of navigation equipment never designed, or intended to provide historical data.) As FL will recall, Holbrook's evidence is referenced to a fairly precise time. Whilst the Supertans 'snapshot' was referenced to a geographical location. Indeed some of Supertans data was wildly inaccurate, though conveniently 'excused'!

I believe it was right at the end of the first week's evidence, when out of frustration with one barrister's obtuse questioning, Holbrook volunteered: "If you are trying to ascertain whether I believe the pilots of the chinook could see the location of the Mull lighthouse? Then the answer is, yes I believe they could."

This is the last eyewitness to see ZD576.

ShyTorque, having spoken to him later, he was quite clear that whilst he hadn't mentioned this in his statement to the BOI, it wasn't a 'change' to his evidence. He simply hadn't been asked! The FAI saw an addition.

DOUBLEBOGEY still hasn't answered my question of what he meant when he said the "radar data was clear". Perhaps because he knows as well as I do that there WAS no 'radar data'! It's a made up 'fact'! He's making it up, along with many other of his assertions!

As for Agaricus. The reason 'gross negligence' was rightly overturned was simply because there were many potential causes of this accident. Only one of which was CFIT. But it is simply not possible, on the available evidence to say with any certainty which of these options caused the accident.

Opinions on this matter are as valuable, or worthless, as you wish them to be.

There's little else to say!

TR, I defer to your direct dealings with Mr Holbrook. I can only refer to what was published because I was not in attendance at the time. I believe BB posted the summary to which I referred on the previous page, two posts before yours.
---------------------------------

Also in that summary is a reference to the RAF's rules about the limits for VFR flight. Despite what the summary stated, it was more normal (quite normal) to land if the minimum visibility rule could not be complied with, rather than make an emergency climb to SALT. A climb in cold weather would put any of the RAF SH helicopter types into known icing conditions, which was definitely not allowed because they were not equipped for that.

I am sure anyone who has been involved in an investigation of events such as this tragedy, even when seeking the absolute right answer, understands exactly how true that statement is re Witness Statements.

Witnesses, sometimes go home with accurate, reliable, and relevant information simply because they were not asked the right question and did not think to offer it up at the time of Interview.

That the very information surfaces later is no reflection upon them but rather to person doing the interview. Likewise, it helps if the Interviewer knows the right questions to be asking.

Lawyers in my Country use Depositions to gather information prior to Civil Litigation in Court. Many a case was lost because they failed to ask the right Question, especially when questioning folks testifying in Court.

All this talk about the Rules, once again, proves to me there is far too much concern about something written on paper as though it were really etched in Stone. That assumes the commentator "knows for a fact" what the Crew was seeing at the time. That is something that simply cannot be.

Likewise, there are so many Rules that at some point they paint you into a corner and no matter what you do, you violate a Rule. Which Rule do you choose Violate?

Stay down in VMC, clear of Cloud and Icing, or pop up and get an IFR Clearance.

In my Country, you must have the Clearance first and maintain VMC.

Is that what the attempted Radio Call was about, trying to get some sort of IFR Clearance before going IMC?

Just who would they have talked to in trying to obtain that IFR Clearance that could hear them at that Altitude and location? How long would it have taken to obtain that clearance?

No it wasn't. It was because the MoD finally accepted that there was no "unequivocal proof". PROOF.

There can be any number of reasons postulated for the accident but to suggest they can all be dismissed as of an equal probability as you seem to imply is simply dishonest.

CFIT is by far the greatest probability. All circumstantial evidence points to it. No evidence whatsoever that I am aware of points to or even suggests/implies anything else.

The MoD did not overturn the BoI.

Flying Lawyer, thank you for your very honest and clear post. I was wrong about you. You are clearly a very decent person with a clear and balanced view and. I accept that your previous post was not meant to distort the evidence from the yacht guy.

Please accept my apology for my comments. In mitigation I was fighting a somewhat rearguard action for my opinions and taking fire from many directions.

I will PM you. I have something to offer in way of reparation.

Best Regards

DB

Tandem. Thank you for your post on the yacht guy.

RADAR - I am referring to the initial radar trace as they left Aldergrove. It was my understanding they were cleared at 3k and descended to below 1 k after coasting out. However this is a memory buried deep and I cannot find any evidence today that supports that. In hindsight I made the remark as a rather crude tool to support my conclusion that the most probable cause was inadvertent IMC followed by CFIT.

Tandem - what is your view on the suggestion that in the later stages they made a cruise climb because reading the other ST data it seems to infer only that there was simply a clear difference in height by the point of first impact, when calculated against the time base, equated to 1000 fpm at 150 KIAS. However, with a serious double FADEC runaway this height accrual could have occurred in a very short space of time which could have led to inadvertent IMC and CFIT.

A lot of hypothesis but I am inclined to believe this rather than two good pilots simply forgetting where the mountain was and Fying into it in a cruise climb.

Of course if this were the case the crew could be said to have made an error in ending up so close to cloud beyond there VFR limits before the defining event took place. The real environment, as we know, is very difficult to maintain clear dimensional separation from cloud and this could be construed as an honest error. I certainly have ended up in such situations albeit with a machine behaving itself.

Bob, I hope you can now see the relevance of the VFR limits/requirements!

Some might think it a little strange that a witness such as Mr Holbrook did not 'offer' his complete recollection of the events and by implication not say something that would have been relevant. It simply doesn't work like that. Having been the main prosecution witness in a L@ser case I can say that the court draws from the witness what they need, and only that. I had a very clear idea of what had happened, but was never invited to (or given the chance to) describe the incident from my perspective in full, I was asked specific questions and answered them. I left the witness box feeling a little under used and wondering if the court had fully understood what had happened, but the result was the right one in my opinion.

While I know what you mean, it has been established beyond any doubt whatsoever that there was no legitimate clearance to fly the aircraft, and that in any case the illegal Release to Service did not have an Icing Section. The +4C you mention was removed at Amendment 1 (March 1994 - there only was one amendment as of 2.4.94). It was reinserted a couple of months after the crash. This was an administrative error, but nonetheless fact.

This is part of the evidence fully accepted by Lord Philip.


We have gone over all this in the past. I think the pertinent point today is this. For 17 years MoD railed against any notion that the pilots were anything but grossly negligent. They consistently called for "new" evidence. Just before the Philip Review was announced, we had the retired VSOs, and indeed current VSOs, writing to the press asserting they and MoD would continue their fight against the pilots.

Then, when Dr Fox made his announcement, NOTHING. Not a murmur. Not a word of dissent, except privately from those who had been caught lying (Alcock, for example, when claiming CHART didn't apply to Mk2. It mentioned Mk2 373 times!). You need to ask WHY. What "new" evidence was presented to suddenly make MoD shut up and retreat? Answer: The aircraft was not cleared for operational use and VSOs had made a series of false declarations that it was. As more than one knew of this, and acted together to present the same argument (i.e. lies), that was a conspiracy. Why are THEY not being pursued with the same vigour?

The weather that day was pretty poor. As previously mentioned, I walked out with the crew to take part in a 3 ship Puma trg sortie on the NE Antrim coast. Around the Cushendall area, the cloudbase was about 3-500' Amsl and we could see the scottish coastline in excellent visibility underneath that. We heard Scottish trying to call the Chinook on 243.0 but thought it wasnt answered because they were too low. Even though the cloud was so bad, we managed to get some useful training done underneath. The rest is history.

This thread has reminded me of a very interesting TV programme I saw recently entitled "How we make decisions." Here's a brief, edited, summary.
Those wondering what I mean, please bear in mind the quite stunning paucity of FACTS in the case of Chinook ZD576!

Please allow me to summarise them for you:

1) Ground witness marks at the accident sight.
2) Physical wreckage, of which (as I was corrected) 20% was destroyed, and 80% affected by the post impact fire.
3) precise positions of components in the flight control system at the moment of impact, including the Differential Air Speed Hold, and the Longitudinal Cyclic Trims.
4) Approximately three or four items of data from Supertans. This data was simply 'snippets' of information used by the navigation computer in the course of it's ongoing calculations. Non linked to each other. Supertans was never designed to provide historical data, nor has it's accuracy in that mode ever been verified, however at least one of those 'snippets' was demonstrably wildly inaccurate.
5) Weather reports from walkers on the Mull who described hill fog. The only weather report which had any bearing whatsoever on conditions from the cockpit came from a lady with a sea view from Antrim, and a yachtsman. Both of whom could clearly see the coast around the Mull, and conditions of bright sunshine.

I am unaware of anything else FACTUAL, though I am prepared to be corrected.

What there was NOT, is Flight Data Recorder, Cockpit Voice Recorder, survivors, eyewitnesses, radar traces, or radio conversations, though one call from F4J40 did go unanswered.

From this limited evidence, the BOI, had no choice but to resort to a computer model which was constructed in an attempt to tie together the dirth of factual information in a possible scenario which might 'fit'. This model was only ever designed to model the final 3.9 seconds of flight, but from a pre-existing trajectory. 3.9 secs! No more!

Apart from this there is no other evidence.

Against all this there is the fact that no versions of RAF Chinook we're recommended for low level flight due to problems with DASH which had caused numerous UFCMs. Chinook Mk2, and ZD576 in particular, was an extraordinarily unreliable machine, with very serious flight control and FADEC faults, both of which we're evident in the wreckage. Much later it has been discovered that Mk2 was not even cleared to fly, having 'switch on' clearance only. This was a criminally immature development.

So what could possibly have caused the accident? As far as I'm concerned it's anyone's guess. UFCMS due to DASH or flight control faults? (seen previously in ZD576 AND in the wreckage) Absolutely. FADEC malfunction which would have left no physical trace? Absolutely. CFIT? Absolutely. Powerful visual illusion? Absolutely - it caused a previous RAF Chinook fatal accident, and is another form of CFIT I guess.

All I would counsel is, never forget that 'absence of evidence' is NEVER equivalent to 'evidence of absence' and this case could almost have been designed to demonstrate that precise concept!

When you have such limited evidence, how can you even begin to assess the probability of each possible cause? How can you determine which was 'most' likely, and frankly what's the point? Not flight safety that's for sure! Very occasionally we may have to accept, we'll never know for sure. That's a tragedy to all concerned, and the responsibility for that lies with those choosing not to fit FDR and/or CVR. Not those at the controls of the aircraft!

Finally I refer you back to the quote I commenced with:

Your logical mind is a master of justifying what your intuitive mind has 'decided'!

For me, there is insufficient reliable evidence to reach any reasonable conclusion. Others think differently. That's fair enough, but they are now opining beyond what is officially accepted. It may occasionally be necessary to accept we will never know what caused certain accidents. That is a tragedy for those involved, but the responsibility for that inadequacy lies squarely with those responsible for decisions not to fit CVR/FDR. Those at the controls of this aircraft have lost their lives, they shouldn't also be required to lose their reputations simply due to the decisions of others!

Why is that, because its not as if he tried to hide his position and it was re-stated not all that long ago...

The link is via here from 2010...

Comparing the effects of the snow on attempts to travel to work - Telegraph

Chinook crash revisited
SIR – The current chief of the air staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CASs have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; “consistent” might be a more balanced term.
You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence?
As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons defence committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF – through the MoD – has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable. It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored.
Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners’ various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant. In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.
This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.
Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible?
You suggest that “institutionalised resistance” might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon
Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock
Chief Engineer, RAF, 1991-96
London SW1

Gentlemen, has this crash not been the subject of much speculation since the crash. Is it not better after all the time and effort put in by others led by Brian et al to let this tragedy rest.

Please think of the effects and distress caused to the families of all on board the Chinook that days in particular to the families of Rick Cooke and John Tapper by this debate being re-opened.

Mods, please lock this thread and discourage its continuance.

TANDEM - I do not entirely disagree with your post but for me, I see I significant difference in the balance of probabilities between:

1. A serious malfunction occurring at exactly the required moment to cause a crash on the Mull mountain, and;

2. The potential for a crash on the Mull mountain caused at that moment by a combination of poor visibility and airmanship.

I would like to think that a distraction, leading to inattention, to inadvertent IMC causing CFIT is the most probable. However the crew somehow made the decision to fly into a position where this likelihood was able to become a reality. Airmanship plays a role here surely whatever caused the final outcome.

Lack of a FDR or CVR played no part in this accident. Lack of WX Radar probably and almost certainly did.

While there is an argument for both cases, for entirely differing reasons, the lack of radar and avionics must surely be recognised as a contributing factor. In other words, the lack of FDR and CVR would not have been apparent if the radar worked, they used it and responded with appropriate airmanship as the coast approached.

This kind of logic has been lost in the heat of discussion and the dogmatic approach you and others pursue in the light of any intimation that the crew may have been responsible for the final flight path.

As our helicopters have become more sophisticated with many systems providing situational awareness, in offshore SAR and O&G support there is a trend towards downgrading, mentally, the essential role of the WX Radar in identifying and avoiding lumpy bits over the ocean or coasting in. 25 years ago in an S61 with Decca VOR and NDB we placed very high value on the black and white storms cope picture as we coasted in! In this respect nothing has or should change. In my view!

tecumseh,thank you for your post.
Humans will make errors and faults and we must do everything to avoid that those mistakes cost lives.
here we have 25 VIP`s in relation to the national safefy of GB and a pilot with a lot of experience and renomme an it was his opinium that this heli was not airworthy.
So who was responsable to deny the pilots another heli even in light of the importance of the passenger on board.
Whar arguments had had been there to deny this request ?
IMOP this is the root cause of this accident throwing the well founded opinium of the pilots in the bin.

DB,


Having a bit of experience messing about in foul weather over the water and around large rocky ground, I also understand that "VFR Limits/Requirements (Rules)" have relevance but are not etched in Stone. They certainly have the weight of Gold in Tribunals reviewing a Pilot's decisions and actions.

The bottom-line for me is to remember that it is easy to remind others of the Rules after the fact and sometimes ignore the reality of life that occurs when it comes to the practical application of those very Rules by Pilots.

With the risk of Icing in Cloud and yet another of one of the "Rules" runs foul of reality.

The CVR would not have prevented this Accident but it would surely have aided in the determination of the actual cause of the Tragedy. That in itself is very important as it might lead to the prevention of another event of the same.

I have been harping about poor Decision Making lately.

As in almost every aircraft accident, we see poor Decision Making playing a role.

Sadly, we tend to limit our application of blame to just the Crew as they commonly are not around to defend themselves. If the Crew erred in this tragedy, they paid a price for it. Those that put them into the situation seemed to have escaped.

How does One address the fact the Aircraft was in service without a proper Airworthiness Release? If Senior RAF Officers lied under Oath, why were they not prosecuted?

If the Aircraft did not have a proper Release to Fly and the Senior Officers knew it beforehand then why were they not held accountable?

Bad Decisions, even if it was only to remain silent when someone in the chain of command should have stood up and refused to allow that aircraft to be flown operationally, should bear liability and should have been addressed.

This letter from 2010 was written before Alcock and Graydon knew that the author of CHART had come forward. That gem was withheld deliberately, the aim being to help them dig their hole deeper. They did. Far deeper than we dared hope for.

At this period, these VSOs and the MoD staffs they briefed, consistently referred to the "53 page" CHART report. However, when I discovered there was nearly 350 additional pages, containing the most damning evidence, a Freedom of Information request was satisfied. The 53 pages had been lodged in the House of Commons library. We now had evidence that these VSOs had withheld the bulk of the report from the BoI, the FAI and both Houses. That was a serious offence.


At more or less the same time, many of the missing pages from the RTS were provided by the same MoD office, including the SFI from March 1994 warning of UFCMs. (I won't name names, but the RAF officer who provided them turned out to have a VERY close interest in the case, being aware the FAI had been misled by MoD and that the RTS was a fabrication. He is a good man). Those involved from the early days, such as Tandemrotor, Brian Dixon, Shy Torque, John Blakeley and others will confirm that the many requests for the CAR (i.e. Part 1 of the RTS) did not produce these pages; so MoD were again proven to have withheld vital evidence. Lord Philip was NOT amused. (A key clue in this case was MoD always referring to the CAR, never the RTS. You ask why this deceit, and follow the lies).


In parallel with my RTS request, I asked one of the widows to make the same request. The strategy here was we knew a different part of MoD would reply to her, because she was an "interested party". This proved correct, and MoD replied to her denying the very existence of RTSs, saying they didn't exist until 1996; naming and blaming Sir Donald Spiers for signing the only Release (his Switch On Only, not yet airworthy, CAR in Nov 1993, and AL1 in March 1994, current as of 2.6.94). So, literally on the same day, I received a full RTS (or at least, much more complete than hitherto provided) and the widow got a letter saying there was no such thing. That naming and blaming of Spiers was a gross lie, and the first indication of a break in the VSO's ranks.

Yet again, MoD were seen to lie through their back teeth, and Lord Philip was, again, NOT amused. In particular, Baroness Liddell was incandescent. The Review demanded the widow receive a written apology. She did. It is the most grovelling letter I've ever seen from a Minister's office. THAT was the day I think we knew we'd won. That Minister turned against MoD, his own Department. He did not like being lied to (whereas many are completely ambivalent about it).



Alcock and Graydon say;


Their bluster was exposed by the uncovering of the complete CHART report. It debunked their entire argument. This vital evidence HAD, demonstrably, "been hidden for all these years". There were only two names on the distribution; Alcock and Bagnall. Lord Philip agreed that it was inconceivable CAS was not informed by Bagnall, as it hit Bagnall's desk in his first day as ACAS in August 1992. The CHART Leader's Terms of Reference, signed by Alcock, specifically forbade him speaking to MoD's airworthiness experts or departments, thus compartmentalising the issue.

With hindsight, the content of CHART (Aug 1992) explained the (at the time) inexplicable behaviour of Alcock's immediate subordinate, Baker, when in Dec 1992 he threatened to dismiss civilian staffs who were saying the same thing. That is, complaining about systemic airworthiness failures under Alcock's policy of "savings at the expense of safety". (A policy that had its roots in another policy promulgated by one of his predecessors, prepared in 1987. He used to post on here).


There, you have the cadre who conspired to hide this evidence. It simply did not cross their arrogant minds that the author would come forward after all these years and that he would still know exactly what to ask for. Or that anyone in MoD would know enough to prepare comprehensive and irrefutable evidence that the Chinook HC Mk2 was NOT airworthy on 2.6.94, and that ACAS knew this to be so yet still signed a false declaration that it was. You will appreciate the significance of ACAS's actions. he was both a recipient of the CHART report and signatory to the RTS. MoD withheld the former from all inquiries, and denied the existence of the latter. Alcock, Spiers, Graydon, Bagnall, Johns; none have ever been called as witnesses in this case. Yet they are the appointed mouthpieces of MoD. If they think they know so much, let them give evidence and answer questions about the offences they have committed. No? Oh dear, what a surprise.

DOUBLE BOGEY
To back that statement up, you would need to know the cause of the accident. But you don't. Nobody does.

We are denied that knowledge due to lack of CVR/FDR.

Tecumseh, that is truly an appalling story of deceit and lies.

I do not want to dilute the nature of the deceit so please do not take this the wrong way, but....do you believe or have evidence to suggest that the accident aircraft actually suffered failure(s) or indeed that the NAV suite was so ****e that it may have directly caused the accident.

You will appreciate that despite all of that paperwork and deceit the crew still planned a marginal flight on a less than ideal route that ultimately took them close to the Mull. I recognise that without an IFR clearance for the AC their options were severly limited but still.....the route selection does not make a great deal of sense if VCF was their only legal option at the planning stage.

In addition, what major changes if any, apart from the FADEC software, were made to the HC2 variant before the RTS was legal. If the answer is none or very little then the deceit you have outlined, although shocking in nature, may not actually be that relevant to the actual accident. I have an open mind so if you think otherwise I would be interested to share your views.

DB