Steve Hislop killed in helicopter accident: threads merged
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My IMC training was all on planks, and yes, this is exactly what I was taught. Climb on instruments to above cloud then sort yourself out as necessary.
However, my PPL(H) training never came even close to cloud. Under the CAA PPL(H) there was no instrument training at all. You never went into IMC, hence no need to train for it. Actually I did a couple of hours just for the experience, but there was no official need for it. The JAA (H) syllabus does require 5 hours IF though.
In the case I mentioned above, I knew exactly where I was, the terrain was flat, and I had only just flown into it. I also knew it was a very shallow layer so opted to drop down out of it rather than attempting a 180 in a very unstable IF platform. I still think that was the correct decision in the circumstances.
However, my PPL(H) training never came even close to cloud. Under the CAA PPL(H) there was no instrument training at all. You never went into IMC, hence no need to train for it. Actually I did a couple of hours just for the experience, but there was no official need for it. The JAA (H) syllabus does require 5 hours IF though.
In the case I mentioned above, I knew exactly where I was, the terrain was flat, and I had only just flown into it. I also knew it was a very shallow layer so opted to drop down out of it rather than attempting a 180 in a very unstable IF platform. I still think that was the correct decision in the circumstances.
The problem is that it would require the PPLH pilot to do some proper pre-flight planning and know the safety altitude, know the frequency for a radar service (possible have it dialled up as a standby freq), know where the zero degree isotherm was, have thought about his actions in the event of IIMC, know where his nearest diversion was etc etc etc.
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Just coming towards the end of my PPL(H), and what we were taught is how to fly straight and level on instruments, and how to make level turns, to a compass point. We did some raise/lower altitude, but not climbing or descending turns.
The aim (I have been led to understand) is to perform a 180 turn on instruments to get back where we came from.
However the underlying advice (in no uncertain terms) is stay away from clouds and if it doesn't look nice, don't go, or land. For me, that means if you can't maintain 1500 ft due to cloud, that's the decision point for go home/land, and it's been made.
BW
The aim (I have been led to understand) is to perform a 180 turn on instruments to get back where we came from.
However the underlying advice (in no uncertain terms) is stay away from clouds and if it doesn't look nice, don't go, or land. For me, that means if you can't maintain 1500 ft due to cloud, that's the decision point for go home/land, and it's been made.
BW
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The discussions regarding inadvertent IMC have raised some very good responses and it is in the interests of all VFR pilots to heed these words of wisdom.
I have noticed that many people state that if going IMC, they would make a 180 and get out of it, as they were taught to do. This raises an important issue, because the IF element of the PPL(H) syllabus is not designed to teach people to do a 180 if they get in trouble. It is IF awareness, designed to show people how difficult it is, and to give them some sort of chance of holding it together long enough to DESCEND to get out of trouble.
A 180 turn is neither the quickest nor safest option to recover from IMC - a DESCENT is the answer, as this will restore the forward viz you had before going IMC.
As a flight examiner, I am required to ensure that a student can perform a 180 turn on instruments as part of his License Skills Test. This is there to assess whether the student has sufficient ability to control the machine by sole reference to instruments, and is considered by JAA to be a manouevre that will demonstrate this or otherwise.
I believe that this test requirement has been adopted by some instructors as the IMC recovery method, and it is drilled into the student - make sure you can do a 180 for the examiner.
I always ask a candidate what he/she would do if they went IMC, and invariably the answer is - 'do a 180, because it was clear where you just came from'. Wrong answer.
Fly at a speed commensuare with the viz, if necessary go lower and slower, and then make the decision early and land, or turn back.
Get this idea of a 180 out of your heads, please.
I have noticed that many people state that if going IMC, they would make a 180 and get out of it, as they were taught to do. This raises an important issue, because the IF element of the PPL(H) syllabus is not designed to teach people to do a 180 if they get in trouble. It is IF awareness, designed to show people how difficult it is, and to give them some sort of chance of holding it together long enough to DESCEND to get out of trouble.
A 180 turn is neither the quickest nor safest option to recover from IMC - a DESCENT is the answer, as this will restore the forward viz you had before going IMC.
As a flight examiner, I am required to ensure that a student can perform a 180 turn on instruments as part of his License Skills Test. This is there to assess whether the student has sufficient ability to control the machine by sole reference to instruments, and is considered by JAA to be a manouevre that will demonstrate this or otherwise.
I believe that this test requirement has been adopted by some instructors as the IMC recovery method, and it is drilled into the student - make sure you can do a 180 for the examiner.
I always ask a candidate what he/she would do if they went IMC, and invariably the answer is - 'do a 180, because it was clear where you just came from'. Wrong answer.
Fly at a speed commensuare with the viz, if necessary go lower and slower, and then make the decision early and land, or turn back.
Get this idea of a 180 out of your heads, please.
Senis Semper Fidelis
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In my opinion, it seems that any sort of "Instrument Awarness" given to any new PPL(H) posibly gives them more confidence to go nearer or even flirt with the soft wispy veiled stuff that is always on the edges of most cloud systems.
So why does this new system cover any of the instruments required for blind flying, if the PPL(H) student isn't going onward into the full CPL course why give that possibility of allowing one or two New Pilots the ability to feel they can handle cloud, when quite clearly it is for experts only!!
PeterR-B
Vfr
So why does this new system cover any of the instruments required for blind flying, if the PPL(H) student isn't going onward into the full CPL course why give that possibility of allowing one or two New Pilots the ability to feel they can handle cloud, when quite clearly it is for experts only!!
PeterR-B
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VFR,
I was under the impression that the 'instrument awareness' training was never designed to offer reduced personal minima or encourage 'confidence to go nearer or even flirt with the soft wispy veiled stuff'.
My understanding is that it hopes to give a low hour PPL(H) a fighting chance if they encounter I-IMC and prevent the very incident discussed in this thread.
If one or two pilots become overly confident due to this training then we can review their actions in the next AAIB report, however the overall benefit of this additional training on a new PPL(H) must outweigh this.
Head Bolt,
It's good to hear a voice of reason is still in a position of authority and influence. Too many low hour FI's regurgitating text book training having had almost no more 'instrument awareness' than their students!.......And certainly no practical experience of attempting a rate-one under stress.!
I was under the impression that the 'instrument awareness' training was never designed to offer reduced personal minima or encourage 'confidence to go nearer or even flirt with the soft wispy veiled stuff'.
My understanding is that it hopes to give a low hour PPL(H) a fighting chance if they encounter I-IMC and prevent the very incident discussed in this thread.
If one or two pilots become overly confident due to this training then we can review their actions in the next AAIB report, however the overall benefit of this additional training on a new PPL(H) must outweigh this.
Head Bolt,
It's good to hear a voice of reason is still in a position of authority and influence. Too many low hour FI's regurgitating text book training having had almost no more 'instrument awareness' than their students!.......And certainly no practical experience of attempting a rate-one under stress.!
Senis Semper Fidelis
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Uwantme,
Thank you, I understand what you are saying, but what percentage of entry into cloud incidents happened before and then after the introduction of this very basic Instrument awarness was introduced,
By the nature of human beings and their natural ability to learn and advance, this sort of "Instrument Awarness" will give that sort of additional confidence to some new pilots, I am not saying its a bad thing, but are the intructors giving enough dire examples to student pilots about the problems they will be in if the inadvertantly enter cloud, lets face it clouds are pretty easy to see, they dont lurk round any corners, so inadvertant entry is a little bit of a strange way to explain the fact that if you are a PPL(H)without any instrument rating you really should be well away from anything that remotely looks like a cloud.
How many new pilots could at a sconds notice tell you where they were, some are hopeless at knowing what is underneath them, I personally will never go near any clouds, I would hate to have to try and execute a 180 to get out, in most of the training helis and small SFH types you would more likly come unstuck just by doing any 180 in cloud!
Peter R-B
Vfr
Thank you, I understand what you are saying, but what percentage of entry into cloud incidents happened before and then after the introduction of this very basic Instrument awarness was introduced,
By the nature of human beings and their natural ability to learn and advance, this sort of "Instrument Awarness" will give that sort of additional confidence to some new pilots, I am not saying its a bad thing, but are the intructors giving enough dire examples to student pilots about the problems they will be in if the inadvertantly enter cloud, lets face it clouds are pretty easy to see, they dont lurk round any corners, so inadvertant entry is a little bit of a strange way to explain the fact that if you are a PPL(H)without any instrument rating you really should be well away from anything that remotely looks like a cloud.
How many new pilots could at a sconds notice tell you where they were, some are hopeless at knowing what is underneath them, I personally will never go near any clouds, I would hate to have to try and execute a 180 to get out, in most of the training helis and small SFH types you would more likly come unstuck just by doing any 180 in cloud!
Peter R-B
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VFR,
I can see the point you make about basic IF perhaps instilling unwarranted confidence, but in practise I don't think this is the case.
It is my experience when teaching basic IF that the student actually develops a very healthy respect for the difficulties involved, and comes away with a stronger than ever conviction to stay away from cloud.
I always include some hood time when conducting LPCs, not to assess the candidates IF ability but to reinforce the point that they can't do it well enough to save their life.
I find that almost without exception they can't, and they come away with their conviction renewed - my parting words are usually along the lines of 'if you're in doubt, then there is no doubt - you shouldn't be there'.
Seems to work for me.
I can see the point you make about basic IF perhaps instilling unwarranted confidence, but in practise I don't think this is the case.
It is my experience when teaching basic IF that the student actually develops a very healthy respect for the difficulties involved, and comes away with a stronger than ever conviction to stay away from cloud.
I always include some hood time when conducting LPCs, not to assess the candidates IF ability but to reinforce the point that they can't do it well enough to save their life.
I find that almost without exception they can't, and they come away with their conviction renewed - my parting words are usually along the lines of 'if you're in doubt, then there is no doubt - you shouldn't be there'.
Seems to work for me.
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Well said H-B, I agree with how you are looking at it,
Sadly I dont think any one thing points towards why PPL(H) pilots get into Cloud problems I am sure they dont purposely set out to get involved with clouds but as one other poster to the thread wrote, possibly it would help with better route planning and taking more notice of the Wx and how fast it was moving comparative to the route they were planning to fly.
I feel only careful flying to build up hours and experience are the main thing we can hope for, and the PPL(H)'s remember that experience by flying as safely as possible at all times, after all PPL(H)'s are only doing it for the freedom and fun, unlike the CPL's and the Mil pilots who do it for their living!
Vfr
Sadly I dont think any one thing points towards why PPL(H) pilots get into Cloud problems I am sure they dont purposely set out to get involved with clouds but as one other poster to the thread wrote, possibly it would help with better route planning and taking more notice of the Wx and how fast it was moving comparative to the route they were planning to fly.
I feel only careful flying to build up hours and experience are the main thing we can hope for, and the PPL(H)'s remember that experience by flying as safely as possible at all times, after all PPL(H)'s are only doing it for the freedom and fun, unlike the CPL's and the Mil pilots who do it for their living!
Vfr
Just a numbered other
Poor Steve. Such a ballsy racer, who held the fastest lap of the TT course for so long.
Once again the combination of the world's most demanding machine in the hands of the inexperienced has bitten.
The AAIB's words sum up my view of this horrid helicopter:
Once again the combination of the world's most demanding machine in the hands of the inexperienced has bitten.
The AAIB's words sum up my view of this horrid helicopter:
Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 27.143 concerning pilot reaction times states that:
'No corrective action time delay for any condition following power failure may be less
than - For the cruise condition, one second, or normal pilot reaction time (whichever is
greater); and for any other condition normal pilot reaction time.
It is therefore questionable that pilots, particularly of relatively low experience, should be expected
to consistently and reliably react within, what appears to be, an unrealistic timescale.
'No corrective action time delay for any condition following power failure may be less
than - For the cruise condition, one second, or normal pilot reaction time (whichever is
greater); and for any other condition normal pilot reaction time.
It is therefore questionable that pilots, particularly of relatively low experience, should be expected
to consistently and reliably react within, what appears to be, an unrealistic timescale.
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Arkroyal:
I'm concerned about the AAIB's addition of their seemingly irrelevant remarks on intervention time, which I believe distract from the lessons of this accident.
The report says that it is possible in an R44, under certain regimes of flight, for Nr to fall from the level at which the horn is activated to an unrecoverable value in as little as two seconds.
Now hold on there... how many light helicopters would, without intervention, take any more than two seconds to reduce from 97 percent to an unrecoverable value at max pitch in a climb? If the certification criteria for helicopters were changed to reflect the AAIB's concern, I suspect it would take out every helicopter up to and including the 206.
Steve Hislop must have had the lever in his armpit to sustain a virtually level turn at 120 knots in a 44 and may well have overpitched it, but the gyrations of his helicopter from the moment it apparently went IMC would indicate that the jig was up long before the main rotor hit the tailboom.
To my mind, the mandate to fly five hours on instruments for a PPL (H) is the most disastrous piece of nonsense the JAAs have come up with. A lot of helicopter students are immensely capable, self-confident people. We show them how to fly on instruments, we give them five hours experience of instrument flying – more than virtually any other exercise – then we tell them not to do it. What we've done is change the little voice in the backs of their minds that used to say: "I'm dead if I go in there" to say "there is another option..."
If the five-hour instrument requirement was wise, then this accident would not have happened. Time to get rid of it.
I'm concerned about the AAIB's addition of their seemingly irrelevant remarks on intervention time, which I believe distract from the lessons of this accident.
The report says that it is possible in an R44, under certain regimes of flight, for Nr to fall from the level at which the horn is activated to an unrecoverable value in as little as two seconds.
Now hold on there... how many light helicopters would, without intervention, take any more than two seconds to reduce from 97 percent to an unrecoverable value at max pitch in a climb? If the certification criteria for helicopters were changed to reflect the AAIB's concern, I suspect it would take out every helicopter up to and including the 206.
Steve Hislop must have had the lever in his armpit to sustain a virtually level turn at 120 knots in a 44 and may well have overpitched it, but the gyrations of his helicopter from the moment it apparently went IMC would indicate that the jig was up long before the main rotor hit the tailboom.
To my mind, the mandate to fly five hours on instruments for a PPL (H) is the most disastrous piece of nonsense the JAAs have come up with. A lot of helicopter students are immensely capable, self-confident people. We show them how to fly on instruments, we give them five hours experience of instrument flying – more than virtually any other exercise – then we tell them not to do it. What we've done is change the little voice in the backs of their minds that used to say: "I'm dead if I go in there" to say "there is another option..."
If the five-hour instrument requirement was wise, then this accident would not have happened. Time to get rid of it.
Just a numbered other
Fair point Pat.
I agree that the instrument flying appreciation probably does more harm than good in most cases.
My point is that the robbie is most demanding to fly, and also the most unforgivimg of the mistakes typical of the inexperienced.
That's why I don't like it.
I reckon a 206 would have fared better.
I'm still a bit worried about anything that has such a habit of having a mid-air collision with itself.
I agree that the instrument flying appreciation probably does more harm than good in most cases.
My point is that the robbie is most demanding to fly, and also the most unforgivimg of the mistakes typical of the inexperienced.
That's why I don't like it.
I reckon a 206 would have fared better.
I'm still a bit worried about anything that has such a habit of having a mid-air collision with itself.
Ark:
Helicopters are prone to "midairs with themselves" - rotating things at high speed close to a tailboom is an occupational hazard, if you will, and the teetering head doesn't help, for sure.
R22/R44s aren't the only ones who do this - a B206 lost its main rotor in flight about 8 years ago, and although the cause wasn't fully determined, mast bumping was the prime suspect see (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resou...pdf_500156.pdf for the report in full).
I think the issue here is not that the helicopter did something wrong, but that the pilot got into a position where he found it necessary to make inputs which lead to the final result. The precursor to that? Flying into cloud. Not much about the helicopter design implicated in that stage of the flight, I'm afraid.
Helicopters are prone to "midairs with themselves" - rotating things at high speed close to a tailboom is an occupational hazard, if you will, and the teetering head doesn't help, for sure.
R22/R44s aren't the only ones who do this - a B206 lost its main rotor in flight about 8 years ago, and although the cause wasn't fully determined, mast bumping was the prime suspect see (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resou...pdf_500156.pdf for the report in full).
I think the issue here is not that the helicopter did something wrong, but that the pilot got into a position where he found it necessary to make inputs which lead to the final result. The precursor to that? Flying into cloud. Not much about the helicopter design implicated in that stage of the flight, I'm afraid.
Just a numbered other
All helicopters prone, Nr Fairy?
I've managed 5000 hours plus on helos without encountering it so far.
The mast bump in the 206 is extreme and rare.
Farnborough has a skip full of robbie tail booms cut off by their own rotor blades.
As for this particular accident, I can only agree with you. But, the last thing a pilot needs when it all goes pear shaped, is a machine whose requirents for safe extrication exceed his experience and abilities.
It went pear shaped, possibly due to the cosy feeling engendered by the instrument awareness course. It became fatal, possibly because the robbie is a bitch in low-houred hands.
I've managed 5000 hours plus on helos without encountering it so far.
The mast bump in the 206 is extreme and rare.
Farnborough has a skip full of robbie tail booms cut off by their own rotor blades.
As for this particular accident, I can only agree with you. But, the last thing a pilot needs when it all goes pear shaped, is a machine whose requirents for safe extrication exceed his experience and abilities.
It went pear shaped, possibly due to the cosy feeling engendered by the instrument awareness course. It became fatal, possibly because the robbie is a bitch in low-houred hands.
Better red than ...
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It went pear shaped, possibly due to the cosy feeling engendered by the instrument awareness course.
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Pat,
I am surprised that you can make the bold statement that this accident 'would not have happened' without the instrument awareness training.
That may be your opinion, but that does not make it a fact.
Do you have the accident stats to show that inadvertent IMC accidents have increased since the introduction of the 5 hours IF, because pilots now think they can handle it?
I have posted previously that it has been my experience that students actually become acutely aware of how difficult it is to fly on instruments, even in simulated IMC, and this tends to make them more cautious.
Obviously this will not always be the case, and there may be those who may think they are better equipped to press on when they shouldn't.
Thoughts from other instructors on this?
I am surprised that you can make the bold statement that this accident 'would not have happened' without the instrument awareness training.
That may be your opinion, but that does not make it a fact.
Do you have the accident stats to show that inadvertent IMC accidents have increased since the introduction of the 5 hours IF, because pilots now think they can handle it?
I have posted previously that it has been my experience that students actually become acutely aware of how difficult it is to fly on instruments, even in simulated IMC, and this tends to make them more cautious.
Obviously this will not always be the case, and there may be those who may think they are better equipped to press on when they shouldn't.
Thoughts from other instructors on this?
I presume the mandated 5 hours IF is all simulated and therefore only useful for teaching basic scan techniques - maybe mandating one hour (or even less) of actual IF would be more benficial. Simulated IF can build false confidence and nothing removes any over-confidence quicker than entry into real cloud.