Blackhawk Emergency Landing
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Blackhawk Emergency Landing
I’m not sure if this one is new or not? I’d certainly like to know what’s going on and if that was the only place it could be put down.
Halfway through Ray Leoni's book "Black Hawk - The Story of a World Class Helicopter" - now that is the helicopter I want to crash in - if you see what I mean! Incredible design effort from the outset. Design initiatives and processes still not surpassed by 'modern' contenders.
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word on the street is that the crew reported a loss of Rotor RPM, noise/whine, and a chip light, entered autorotation, and during the auto, something "broke free" and single engine power was re-established. This allowed them to continue on one engine down to the traffic circle. During the deceleration, the aircraft caught a wire that was strung between the light poles and that brought the pole down. I'm purposely leaving more specific details out because everything I know is at least 3rd hand info. Based on what I heard, it sounds like the crew did a good job managing an abnormal situation and subsequent loss of NR.
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word on the street is that the crew reported a loss of Rotor RPM, noise/whine, and a chip light, entered autorotation, and during the auto, something "broke free" and single engine power was re-established. This allowed them to continue on one engine down to the traffic circle. During the deceleration, the aircraft caught a wire that was strung between the light poles and that brought the pole down. I'm purposely leaving more specific details out because everything I know is at least 3rd hand info. Based on what I heard, it sounds like the crew did a good job managing an abnormal situation and subsequent loss of NR.
Thanks for the update that helps make sense on the profile and initial approach to the traffic. It would be good to know mechanically what actually happened.
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Greetings
Hello all, just joined up here. Read a lot of posts/threads on here over the years, mostly while trying to find information regarding incidents/accidents in the rotorcraft world like this one out of Romania that is being discussed now.
As you can tell from my user name this incident is of interest to me because I crew/maintain Blackhawks for work(nearly 12 years now). It will be interesting to find out the rest of the story on this one, thankfully there was no loss of life so those involved will be able to recount what happened. The aircraft’s IVHUMS system will have recorded everything as well, so lots of good data will come out.
My first impression watching the videos was what happened to cause the rapid decent? It was very aggressive, like an entry into an autorotation. Which fits into the loss of power/drooping NR scenario that has been mentioned.
I can only assume at this point that no systematic mechanical fault has been identified as no ASAM has been released by the Army for special inspection of components etc.
Second impression is that the crew did well to get it on the ground safely, although there were several points in the videos where it appears they were mere feet(inches?) from destruction.
The new crew coordination training for the Army and the new emergency procedures in the checklists stress “Fly the aircraft first”, gain or maintain safe rotor speed, attitude, altitude, speed and heading rather than immediately actions, though obviously for some emergencies there are still immediate actions that are required.
They are trying to cut down on incidents where crew have shutdown the wrong engine or misinterpreted/responded to the wrong emergency procedure and crashed a flyable aircraft.
The new procedures/checklist have only been out for a little over a year, will be interesting to see how that affected this incident as well. As a side note, the only emergency procedure in the new checklist that has AUTOROTATE as an immediate action step is dual engine failure. Only 6 are LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Looking forward to the information/discussions on this forum!
Dan
As you can tell from my user name this incident is of interest to me because I crew/maintain Blackhawks for work(nearly 12 years now). It will be interesting to find out the rest of the story on this one, thankfully there was no loss of life so those involved will be able to recount what happened. The aircraft’s IVHUMS system will have recorded everything as well, so lots of good data will come out.
My first impression watching the videos was what happened to cause the rapid decent? It was very aggressive, like an entry into an autorotation. Which fits into the loss of power/drooping NR scenario that has been mentioned.
I can only assume at this point that no systematic mechanical fault has been identified as no ASAM has been released by the Army for special inspection of components etc.
Second impression is that the crew did well to get it on the ground safely, although there were several points in the videos where it appears they were mere feet(inches?) from destruction.
The new crew coordination training for the Army and the new emergency procedures in the checklists stress “Fly the aircraft first”, gain or maintain safe rotor speed, attitude, altitude, speed and heading rather than immediately actions, though obviously for some emergencies there are still immediate actions that are required.
They are trying to cut down on incidents where crew have shutdown the wrong engine or misinterpreted/responded to the wrong emergency procedure and crashed a flyable aircraft.
The new procedures/checklist have only been out for a little over a year, will be interesting to see how that affected this incident as well. As a side note, the only emergency procedure in the new checklist that has AUTOROTATE as an immediate action step is dual engine failure. Only 6 are LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Looking forward to the information/discussions on this forum!
Dan
Good post, Dan. Bucharest is roughly 300 ft msl and July temps max average 84F, so the empty except for crew 60 had single engine hover capability+, yet they chose to land on a major street with vehicles, ergo, something else was going on, one would surmise.
60,
The basic failing of Emergency Checklists is that sometimes the failure does not show up in the list even if it is correctly identified.
Anyone that immediately reaches for the ECL before ensuring they are flying the aircraft and have decided upon exactly what that means....including who is driving, where the destination is, and how they are going to get there....running down items on a checklist is not that hurried a task.
The new Army concept makes far more sense than what was known as the "Dipped Shoulder Method" where one of the Pilots upon seeing a Master Caution Light immediately reached for the ECL which easily led to mistakes as crews hurried through the procedures.
The basic failing of Emergency Checklists is that sometimes the failure does not show up in the list even if it is correctly identified.
Anyone that immediately reaches for the ECL before ensuring they are flying the aircraft and have decided upon exactly what that means....including who is driving, where the destination is, and how they are going to get there....running down items on a checklist is not that hurried a task.
The new Army concept makes far more sense than what was known as the "Dipped Shoulder Method" where one of the Pilots upon seeing a Master Caution Light immediately reached for the ECL which easily led to mistakes as crews hurried through the procedures.
It was known as the 'flashing white glove' in the AAC after someone shut the engine down in a Gazelle without waiting for confirmation of the problem - turning a minor emergency into a major one
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Agree that a lot doesn’t show up on the checklist. Speaking from the “crewie” perspective, it is a pain to dive into the checklist and back up the guys up front like they want us to, mainly because years of immediate action to emergencies have been drilled into them, they are so fast responding that I can rarely catch up! Which, as someone else has mentioned on this topic, can result in less than desirable outcomes.
I will say though, the biggest positive in the crew coordination efforts the Army is driving includes pulling the guys in the back into the diagnostic part of the emergency more than in the past, and the aircrew training manual lines out more what we should be doing in the back as far as confirming PCL(ECL) and fuel selector lever positions etc.
Having experienced only one real world emergency in my time working on these things the big takeaway was that the calm assessment of the situation by my pilots resulted in a non-event, we landed safely back at our home field after a single engine failure. The affected engine was properly identified, Was left running until it was determined that there was no good reason to keep it running due to rising TGT/lack of power indications at which point it was shut down.
Of course not everyone is calm and collected and nobody knows how they are going to respond when something bad really happens in the aircraft until it happens.
On that note, is there anybody on here that has been a crew chief who can offer any additional insights on how to help and not hinder during emergencies?
60
I will say though, the biggest positive in the crew coordination efforts the Army is driving includes pulling the guys in the back into the diagnostic part of the emergency more than in the past, and the aircrew training manual lines out more what we should be doing in the back as far as confirming PCL(ECL) and fuel selector lever positions etc.
Having experienced only one real world emergency in my time working on these things the big takeaway was that the calm assessment of the situation by my pilots resulted in a non-event, we landed safely back at our home field after a single engine failure. The affected engine was properly identified, Was left running until it was determined that there was no good reason to keep it running due to rising TGT/lack of power indications at which point it was shut down.
Of course not everyone is calm and collected and nobody knows how they are going to respond when something bad really happens in the aircraft until it happens.
On that note, is there anybody on here that has been a crew chief who can offer any additional insights on how to help and not hinder during emergencies?
60
60,
As this seems to be a new approach to incorporating the guys in back more than has been done in the past then it shall take time and effort to bring it together.
Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) reminds Pilots that resources outside the Cockpit can be valuable assets....which of course includes the guys in the back.
The majority of my Crew served aircraft time was spent in Chinooks and was done long before CRM gained its official wings and took off.
We very much included the guys in the back with the Flight Engineer being the Lead of the three man cabin crew (or up to ten or so depending upon the mission).
We did to include them in monitoring the cockpit so much but did rely upon them for "minding the store" in back, doing maintenance checks, clearing us into and out of LZ's, looking for air traffic, and of course handling the Machine guns for defense of the aircraft. It was not unheard of that sometimes in bad weather we might even inquire of them if they saw anything familiar.....which was very useful information sometimes.
I would suggest inter-crew discussions about this new system and its implementation be done over coffee or other aviation related beverages with a view to determine what works best, which input has the most value and effectiveness, and what only detracts from essential transfer of information. Sometimes too much information can lead to distraction or delay at a critical moment.
The two halves of the Crew....those in front and those in back....need to know what actions the other will be taking...are taking...and will take.....during emergencies so that each know ahead of time what they can or should do without being told to do.
An example....in our Preflight Brief at the start of the day I had to read the Rules of Engagement directly off the Yellow Card issued to us by Command.....and I did word for word. Then, upon putting that card back into its appointed place in the Checklist folder....I gave the Aircraft Commander's Brief which elaborated on those ROE's.....that way we had a clear understanding that if we were getting shot at AND hit.....and if the Gunner knew where the Friendlies were...and knew where the bad guys were....then he had my express permission to start shooting but all other instances he had to inform me of the situation first and get my permission. My responsibility was to keep the crew briefed on where the friendlies were and were not....which I would obtain from the unit on the ground we were working with. I used the same method for the jettisoning of external loads during an inflight emergency.....the Flight Engineer or Crew Member in control of the cargo hook position was instructed when he should unilaterally decide to jettison the underslung cargo....and not wait to inform the Pilots. Outside of the few reasons that would justify that he was to inform the Pilots of the situation and we would make a decision based upon all the factors.
The CRM thing demands trust and respect between all of the members of the crew but with a proper sharing of authority amongst the crew with the Aircraft Command being the senior and lead authority but not having absolute dictatorial authority....but he does hold the final authority and responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft and the other Crew Members are charged with helping the AC to make the best decisions possible based upon good information that is provided in a careful effective manner.
You are asking very good questions....and have an excellent perception of the need for effective implementation of he new method.
Keep us posted on how it is going ....just remember there is a lot of experience amongst the attendee's here....and there is excellent posts to be read and sometimes learned from....even if it is about some way not to do something.
We sometimes throw brickbats at one another but it is usually done with a good heart....except when I beat up on Crab because he always deserves it....meaning anytime when he disagrees with me.
As this seems to be a new approach to incorporating the guys in back more than has been done in the past then it shall take time and effort to bring it together.
Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) reminds Pilots that resources outside the Cockpit can be valuable assets....which of course includes the guys in the back.
The majority of my Crew served aircraft time was spent in Chinooks and was done long before CRM gained its official wings and took off.
We very much included the guys in the back with the Flight Engineer being the Lead of the three man cabin crew (or up to ten or so depending upon the mission).
We did to include them in monitoring the cockpit so much but did rely upon them for "minding the store" in back, doing maintenance checks, clearing us into and out of LZ's, looking for air traffic, and of course handling the Machine guns for defense of the aircraft. It was not unheard of that sometimes in bad weather we might even inquire of them if they saw anything familiar.....which was very useful information sometimes.
I would suggest inter-crew discussions about this new system and its implementation be done over coffee or other aviation related beverages with a view to determine what works best, which input has the most value and effectiveness, and what only detracts from essential transfer of information. Sometimes too much information can lead to distraction or delay at a critical moment.
The two halves of the Crew....those in front and those in back....need to know what actions the other will be taking...are taking...and will take.....during emergencies so that each know ahead of time what they can or should do without being told to do.
An example....in our Preflight Brief at the start of the day I had to read the Rules of Engagement directly off the Yellow Card issued to us by Command.....and I did word for word. Then, upon putting that card back into its appointed place in the Checklist folder....I gave the Aircraft Commander's Brief which elaborated on those ROE's.....that way we had a clear understanding that if we were getting shot at AND hit.....and if the Gunner knew where the Friendlies were...and knew where the bad guys were....then he had my express permission to start shooting but all other instances he had to inform me of the situation first and get my permission. My responsibility was to keep the crew briefed on where the friendlies were and were not....which I would obtain from the unit on the ground we were working with. I used the same method for the jettisoning of external loads during an inflight emergency.....the Flight Engineer or Crew Member in control of the cargo hook position was instructed when he should unilaterally decide to jettison the underslung cargo....and not wait to inform the Pilots. Outside of the few reasons that would justify that he was to inform the Pilots of the situation and we would make a decision based upon all the factors.
The CRM thing demands trust and respect between all of the members of the crew but with a proper sharing of authority amongst the crew with the Aircraft Command being the senior and lead authority but not having absolute dictatorial authority....but he does hold the final authority and responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft and the other Crew Members are charged with helping the AC to make the best decisions possible based upon good information that is provided in a careful effective manner.
You are asking very good questions....and have an excellent perception of the need for effective implementation of he new method.
Keep us posted on how it is going ....just remember there is a lot of experience amongst the attendee's here....and there is excellent posts to be read and sometimes learned from....even if it is about some way not to do something.
We sometimes throw brickbats at one another but it is usually done with a good heart....except when I beat up on Crab because he always deserves it....meaning anytime when he disagrees with me.
Must have been a gearbox warning indication with serious secondary symptoms (whining/moaning/squealing/shaking/temp rise), so the land ASAP cause seems reasonable. Or something like hyd leak detection/isolation in the -60 would make me want to land very asap, because hyd fluid loss can be a killer (but this would be a low probability event outside of battle, i.e. taking a round through the tail). Landing like that for an engine fault or failure is not required - just secure it and fly to an airport with a nice hotel nearby. The other things these helicopters are famous for is spurious engine fire indications (low sun peeking through cowls), but even then, it's easy to look for actual smoke while finding a decent place to land. Doubtful it was an auto - just a split-ass descent and landing. My five cents...
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SASless,
Thanks for your comments, it appears that what is old is new again for Army CRM(now called ACT-E, Aircrew Coordination Training-Enhanced. Because Army 🤣
What you described is generally what we do day to day, though we have no tactical concerns, strictly maintenance or ferry flights.
I feel like the hardest nut to crack on all of this CRM stuff is communicating. I find that it’s easy for me to read about an incident/accident and process that if someone had just spoken up it could have prevented the whole situation. In practice it’s much harder, sometimes maybe excessive professional courtesy or not wanting to be “that guy” makes it hard to express something isn’t right.
I need to emphasize at this point that my organization is by no means dangerous and unregulated, far from it. The safety culture is in my opinion top notch and by and large everyone is on the same page as
far as procedures and safety are concerned. But a lot of people on here, pilots and crew alike have probably had at least one brush with weather that wasn’t so great and got in a bad situation because on that day a choice was made that they wouldn’t have normally made. Nobody spoke up.
It’s funny how it’s mostly weather, seems maintenance doesn’t get “pushed”, it’s either broken or it isn’t, although some on here could probably speak to the pressures to push maintenance they’ve experienced.
So, back to the point of communicating to break that chain. There have been a couple of times over the years where simply asking “what are we doing?” has broken the chain, or saying “I’m not comfortable with the weather now, let’s wait a bit here.” that’s all it took and there was no conflict or argument about it. In the end it built a better crew relationship, it’s just funny that even after positive experiences we humans don’t learn sometimes!
Great discussion going on this enjoying it.
As far as the comments on this incident go someone suggested hydraulics issues, I would agree with it, it would be disconcerting and out of the norm, although on the UH-60 I would put it in the same boat as an engine problem in that you have a well designed redundant system that will get you on the ground safely without drama. In the worse case scenario where a leak couldn’t automatically or manually be isolated there is time, though not unlimited, available to get it on the ground.
A failure in the input module to the main transmission could conceivably be a cause of what they experienced but I would assume that would be sorted out quickly and fleet wide safety messages would be out to inspect components.
The MH-60 that crashed from a hover at Hunter army airfield in Savannah several years ago is a good example, it seems we were bore scoping tail rotor gearboxes to inspect that the 7/16” nut/bolt holding the tail rotor pitch change shaft to the tail rotor servo had a cotter pin installed within a very short period of that accident occurring as the separation of that hardware was what caused the accident.
Time will tell as they say.
60
Thanks for your comments, it appears that what is old is new again for Army CRM(now called ACT-E, Aircrew Coordination Training-Enhanced. Because Army 🤣
What you described is generally what we do day to day, though we have no tactical concerns, strictly maintenance or ferry flights.
I feel like the hardest nut to crack on all of this CRM stuff is communicating. I find that it’s easy for me to read about an incident/accident and process that if someone had just spoken up it could have prevented the whole situation. In practice it’s much harder, sometimes maybe excessive professional courtesy or not wanting to be “that guy” makes it hard to express something isn’t right.
I need to emphasize at this point that my organization is by no means dangerous and unregulated, far from it. The safety culture is in my opinion top notch and by and large everyone is on the same page as
far as procedures and safety are concerned. But a lot of people on here, pilots and crew alike have probably had at least one brush with weather that wasn’t so great and got in a bad situation because on that day a choice was made that they wouldn’t have normally made. Nobody spoke up.
It’s funny how it’s mostly weather, seems maintenance doesn’t get “pushed”, it’s either broken or it isn’t, although some on here could probably speak to the pressures to push maintenance they’ve experienced.
So, back to the point of communicating to break that chain. There have been a couple of times over the years where simply asking “what are we doing?” has broken the chain, or saying “I’m not comfortable with the weather now, let’s wait a bit here.” that’s all it took and there was no conflict or argument about it. In the end it built a better crew relationship, it’s just funny that even after positive experiences we humans don’t learn sometimes!
Great discussion going on this enjoying it.
As far as the comments on this incident go someone suggested hydraulics issues, I would agree with it, it would be disconcerting and out of the norm, although on the UH-60 I would put it in the same boat as an engine problem in that you have a well designed redundant system that will get you on the ground safely without drama. In the worse case scenario where a leak couldn’t automatically or manually be isolated there is time, though not unlimited, available to get it on the ground.
A failure in the input module to the main transmission could conceivably be a cause of what they experienced but I would assume that would be sorted out quickly and fleet wide safety messages would be out to inspect components.
The MH-60 that crashed from a hover at Hunter army airfield in Savannah several years ago is a good example, it seems we were bore scoping tail rotor gearboxes to inspect that the 7/16” nut/bolt holding the tail rotor pitch change shaft to the tail rotor servo had a cotter pin installed within a very short period of that accident occurring as the separation of that hardware was what caused the accident.
Time will tell as they say.
60