Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Aircrew Forums > Rotorheads
Reload this Page >

N72EX (Kobe Bryant) Crash Update-

Rotorheads A haven for helicopter professionals to discuss the things that affect them

N72EX (Kobe Bryant) Crash Update-

Old 28th May 2021, 21:49
  #281 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Wanaka, NZ
Posts: 2,570
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
Originally Posted by Torquetalk View Post
...the lack of familiarity and confidence to engage an upper mode is clearly a contributor to the accident.
It is unlikely he knew what buttons to push, simple as that. I used to see it all the time with S76 recurrent trainees in the simulator. Pilots with ATP tickets who would not only struggle to fly it manually on instruments, they didn't know what buttons to push when the manual flying got a bit tough for them. The key to solving that problem was to demonstrate the pushing of buttons and insist on never hands flying the thing. Simulator time is expensive and there is no time allocated on a recurrent course to teach pilots with IR tickets basic IF.
gulliBell is offline  
Old 29th May 2021, 00:28
  #282 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Downeast
Age: 74
Posts: 17,789
Received 146 Likes on 59 Posts
In the Sim and in the aircraft doing training....to assess basic instrument flying skills I used a simple method.

I fabricated a false narrative....saying we would start each session with a quick warm up period of a few minutes then get into the training...and explained we would do some simple turns, climbs, descents etc....and a quick "unusual attitude recovery".

For the unusual attitude segment I would perform the tried and true routine of having the trainee close their eyes....and I would put the aircraft through some gyrations...just enough to get them to think I was setting them up in a bank, climb, side slip or something with an odd power setting for that situation.

What I was really doing was setting them up for something far more telling.....with the fellow's eyes closed I would reach over and adjust his ADI into a ten degree bank one way or another then start the maneuvering and when I turned the flight controls over him...I had the aircraft dead flat level but recovering from a dive so the airspeed would be. higher than normal...and a power setting picked at random....but remember the Pilot's ADI would be showing a bank due to the offset I had put onto his display.

Mind you this was always in a Sim or Aircraft that had three ADI's.....one for each Pilot and the Standby/Emergency ADI. Two of the three would be showing the same and actual attitude of the aircraft.

Some guys never got the aircraft stabilized...some got it stabilized and announced the ADI problem but never cross checked the other two ADI's.

Some immediately polled the jury by looking at all of the panel to see if there had been some sort of instrument failure.

My question to some was...."Do you fly Instruments or just the ADI?".

The Teaching Point was to use everything you have available while recovering control of the aircraft....try to figure out what was going on well enough to keep the aircraft flying.

The other interesting thing was to watch a crew crash with some sort of malfunction... something relatively mundane then turn around and have them put the Autopilot to work and watch it fly an approach to the same runway with the same malfunction without crashing.

Not that the Sim exactly replicates a failure or aircraft response but to remind Pilots that sometimes getting distracted can cause you more harm than the actual malfunction or problem.




SASless is offline  
Old 29th May 2021, 03:20
  #283 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: N/A
Posts: 4,946
Likes: 0
Received 57 Likes on 25 Posts
I seriously, seriously doubt that the Kobe flight was Ara's first foray into IMC conditions
So you're saying the pilot regularly went into IMC without logging the fact, his operator was VMC only, IMC not permitted. If that's a fact, which I'll let you prove/disprove, it points to a somewhat lax attitude to the business, in which case, if true, the accident might come as no surprise.
On the 76....some models did much the same or built in the algorithms into the Sperry System as I understand it
My understanding SAS is that the system was just removed, I believe that's all they did to our machines, the Blackhawk received the same treatment. Why they retained the system as an option I don't know, JohnDixson John Dixon would have the low down.
Surprised that with your experience, you noticed no quirkiness in the S76 FED
I'm with FED, 12,000 hours, we're either thick as bricks or have such superlative skills we took such things in our stride with little perception.

Last edited by Senior Pilot; 29th May 2021 at 04:07. Reason: Add username link
megan is offline  
Old 29th May 2021, 03:58
  #284 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Downeast
Age: 74
Posts: 17,789
Received 146 Likes on 59 Posts
I have asked Brother Dixson to join us here by separate correspondence as I hang upon his every word when it comes to all things Sikorsky.

He very much is a good source of information and a source of good information too.

I tried to search past threads here but did not find the posts I was looking for....made by another old Sikorsky Man In The Know that no longer visits with us here.

I suppose my experience flying A Model Chinooks with the SAS turned off kinda dulled me to merely skittish acting helicopters as the Hook could jingle your nerves a bit as you sat there with your boot toe against the chin bubble and the forward droop stops pounding themselves to death as the side slip approached 90 Degrees with an entry airspeed of a hundred plus knots when the SAS kicked off with no warning. Oddly.....the sound of the howling wind roaring through an open Pilot's Door Window lessened the clatter a bit on the upwind side. Maybe that is why the specter of the PBA mucking about with the goings on doesn't seem to have taken on the significance for me as one may have suspected it might.

I bet a Wessex could squirm a bit if a Harrier got close by.

Last edited by SASless; 29th May 2021 at 04:10.
SASless is offline  
Old 29th May 2021, 17:33
  #285 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Hobe Sound, Florida
Posts: 888
Received 18 Likes on 14 Posts
SAS, for some reason I did not receive your email, but have looked in here anyway. Disclaimer is that after the 76A development/FAA certification and some B model maneuverability envelope testing, I didn't have the opportunity to participate much as the machine went thru the various C models/engines.

That said, I was intrigued by the following sentence:

" My understanding SAS is that the system was just removed, I believe that's all they did to our machines, the Blackhawk received the same treatment."

I assume you meant the pitch bias actuator. It was removed from the UH-60's but not because, the pilots couldn't tell if it was working or not ( absolutely true ) but finally the Army looked at the actuator maintenance removals and used that reason to remove it. I can't recall the specifics of the S-76 PBA, so I'll try getting in touch with the man with near perfect recall, Nick Lappos.

Both ships only at the most aft center of gravity and at the highest level flight speed, would not have a slightly positive stick position slope as speed increased or decreased from a collective fixed trim point. So, you trim the ship at 156 or so,(smooth air required) and then gently nudge the stick forward to achieve 166, move the stick as require to achieve a solid data point and take a record. Now get this, one had to move the stck forward ( stable right? ) to go faster, but the trim stick position at 166 could be 1% aft of where you started at 156. UNSTABLE says the FAA and hence the PBA. Same test is done in the slower direction and the results were as I recall, similar. Having an AFCS that provides attitude hold ( in the case of the UH-60 it had both attitude hold and then, after 12 seconds, an airspeed hold loop added itself ) was not recognized as being relevant. This so called static stability regulation derived from the rather ancient fixed wing certification standards, but neither the FAA nor the Army were motivated to modify them in light of more modern basic control systems. The irony of the entire subject is that if one looks at the FAA and military approval for fly by wire aircraft, the whole concept of stick position stability and slope vs speed has gone out the window, for exactly the realization of the irrelevancy due to the factors involved doing the testing as described above! Sorry for the rant. BTW, SAS's CH-47 had a PBA ( under a different name ) early on for exactly the same irrationality.

JohnDixson is offline  
Old 29th May 2021, 18:23
  #286 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Downeast
Age: 74
Posts: 17,789
Received 146 Likes on 59 Posts
Good to see you joining in Brother Dixson....always appreciate your input on things.

Memory serves me we had DCP (equivalent to PBA) and also Speed Trims the worked off Airspeed to drive electric rams that worked to level the airframe to reduce drag.

We had the ability to control them through the use of momentary switches and a mode switch....On/Off/Auto.

Leaving them on in Manual and landing or coming to a a hover was a NO NO...as it put a tremendous amount of stress on the Aft Rotor Shaft.
SASless is offline  
Old 29th May 2021, 20:25
  #287 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Hobe Sound, Florida
Posts: 888
Received 18 Likes on 14 Posts
SAS, you’ll recall that I got a CH-47 checkout from two Boeing test pilots immediately after graduating from flight school, and recall the Differential Collective Pitch system clearly ( because I pestered those two guys about explaining the why and wherefore-the flight manual was no help and the checkout at the test board was old fashioned: take the flight manual test, fly it for 20 hrs, and get signed off. As I recall, the no-no you referred to bit a couple of USMC aviators in the similar CH-46 ).

Back to this accident: haven’t seen any indication there was an aircraft problem, and ATC provided the help they could, but they certainly can’t fly the aircraft for the pilot. Flying VIP’s in the LA basin and expecting to meet your schedule and never, never have to resort to some IFR flying? That’s a “ C’mon man “. No indication from the posts that the operation prepared for this eventuality.

TT I just saw and read your sentence: “Immediate yes, but don’t forget that PBA working in the background; it can help so much against flapback that it can seriously spoil your day.”
As I mentioned previously, its there only to provide an artificial positive stick slope vs speed, and is a series actuator,, i.e. does not apply force/movement to the cyclic. There is sufficient longitudinal control available to deal with an inoperative PBA, at whatever position it were to fail.


Last edited by JohnDixson; 29th May 2021 at 20:50. Reason: additional thought
JohnDixson is offline  
Old 30th May 2021, 02:10
  #288 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Hobe Sound, Florida
Posts: 888
Received 18 Likes on 14 Posts
Nick says that in the B, there is no PBA as in the A originally, but the PBA function was buried n the AFCS.
JohnDixson is offline  
Old 30th May 2021, 02:55
  #289 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: yes
Posts: 324
Likes: 0
Received 3 Likes on 3 Posts
Originally Posted by JohnDixson View Post
...
It was removed from the UH-60's but not because, the pilots couldn't tell if it was working or not ( absolutely true ) but finally the Army looked at the actuator maintenance removals and used that reason to remove it. I can't recall the specifics of the S-76 PBA, so I'll try getting in touch with the man with near perfect recall, Nick Lappos.
...
FWIW, I remember it as the PBA removal being recommending by Sikorsky to the Army. Other oddities surround the PBA removal, but don't get me started.
JimEli is offline  
Old 30th May 2021, 05:43
  #290 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: N/A
Posts: 4,946
Likes: 0
Received 57 Likes on 25 Posts
Other oddities surround the PBA removal
Please share Jim, start another thread if necessary, am interested.
megan is offline  
Old 30th May 2021, 10:12
  #291 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Downeast
Age: 74
Posts: 17,789
Received 146 Likes on 59 Posts
That could be an interesting discussion especially if we can get some Engineers or Test Pilots to offer up some behind the scenes information on how FAA Airworthiness Rules (or CAA Rules) do not always cross over from Airplanes to Helicopters.

Imagine what the V-22 and 609 design engineers went through on those programs.....and still are.
SASless is offline  
Old 30th May 2021, 13:16
  #292 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Hobe Sound, Florida
Posts: 888
Received 18 Likes on 14 Posts
JimEli, see: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA183954. I’m curious about the “ other oddities” you mentioned.
JohnDixson is offline  
Old 30th May 2021, 18:13
  #293 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: Pensacola, Florida
Posts: 739
Received 2 Likes on 1 Post
Sooooo...all this talk about the PBA with reference to 72EX is irrelevant then?

Megan:
So you're saying the pilot regularly went into IMC without logging the fact, his operator was VMC only, IMC not permitted. If that's a fact, which I'll let you prove/disprove, it points to a somewhat lax attitude to the business, in which case, if true, the accident might come as no surprise.

Megan, heh, you don't fly in the U.S., do you missy?


I'm not saying that Ara "regularly"' went IMC when he was supposedly VFR, but if one of his pilots can be believed, the Kobe accident was not Ara's first time punching in and doing what needed to be done. Even SAS alludes to this practice when he asked about which GOM pilot hadn't done an VFR-IMC let-down through a cloud deck? His assumption, evidently, is that it was if not exactly common, then at least routine. Getting back to the topic at hand, if Ara did it more than once, we can legitimately question what kind of judgment he had as a pilot. And from the results of his last revenue flight, I'd say his judgment was fairly lacking. YMMV.
FH1100 Pilot is offline  
Old 30th May 2021, 19:26
  #294 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Downeast
Age: 74
Posts: 17,789
Received 146 Likes on 59 Posts
FH,

if you wish to quote me....there is a "Quote" function you can use that ensures you are restating what I actually said.

It is a small point but carries some real significance as you did not quite get it right.

What I said was....."Over water IMC descent to find VMC conditions.....now who flying offshore has never done that?

Granted it is safer with Radar installed and working....perhaps even having an installed and functioning Auto Pilot."

My offshore flying was done mainly outside the United States with the exception of one Summer in Alaska.

All of that Offshore flying was done on IFR Operations with a lot of flying in Uncontrolled Airspace with no IFR Airways or Control Zones.

There is life outside the GOM.

Am I right to assume you were always at the Small Bird Table where it was VFR/VMC only?

We seem to be viewing Offshore flying through different prisms....mine from an IFR lens....and yours from a VFR lens.

Thus two different kettles of fish.




SASless is offline  
Old 30th May 2021, 19:42
  #295 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Wanaka, NZ
Posts: 2,570
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
For a pilot to have 10 hours experience on type, let alone 1000+ hours experience, and not be familiar with a critical S76 system such as the autopilot (or so it seems), and not safely and optimally configuring the S76 for instrument flight each and every time such flight is necessary, is quite remarkable. What is also plainly evident is it seems to be a deficiency of knowledge more common than one might expect. It seems to me the primacy of this accident is more relevant to lack of systems basic knowledge and application rather than lack of instrument recency. One might be able to demonstrate satisfactory practical standards in a Robinson on foggles with climb, descend, turns, intercepts, etc, but go try and do that in a S76 the following day in cloud without understanding the operation of its autopilot, it probably 'aint gonna work. Or it might work once, but not the next time. Eventually you're gonna get bit.
gulliBell is offline  
Old 30th May 2021, 23:58
  #296 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: yes
Posts: 324
Likes: 0
Received 3 Likes on 3 Posts
Originally Posted by gulliBell View Post
For a pilot to have 10 hours experience on type, let alone 1000+ hours experience, and not be familiar with a critical S76 system such as the autopilot (or so it seems), and not safely and optimally configuring the S76 for instrument flight each and every time such flight is necessary, is quite remarkable. What is also plainly evident is it seems to be a deficiency of knowledge more common than one might expect. It seems to me the primacy of this accident is more relevant to lack of systems basic knowledge and application rather than lack of instrument recency. One might be able to demonstrate satisfactory practical standards in a Robinson on foggles with climb, descend, turns, intercepts, etc, but go try and do that in a S76 the following day in cloud without understanding the operation of its autopilot, it probably 'aint gonna work. Or it might work once, but not the next time. Eventually you're gonna get bit.
Noting the previous year’s (2018) concurrent part 135.293/299 S-76 check flight lasted just 36 minutes, I'm sure his knowledge and ability were deeply evaluated. Chomp.
JimEli is offline  
Old 31st May 2021, 00:56
  #297 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2011
Location: NEW YORK
Posts: 1,351
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
Originally Posted by JimEli View Post
Noting the previous year’s (2018) concurrent part 135.293/299 S-76 check flight lasted just 36 minutes, I'm sure his knowledge and ability were deeply evaluated. Chomp.
Always an economics issue. The pressures on a charter shop are brutal. A longer check ride costs more money, so the aim is to minimize the time. The idea that it is an occasion to learn/remind becomes secondary.
etudiant is offline  
Old 31st May 2021, 01:38
  #298 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Wanaka, NZ
Posts: 2,570
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
On a recurrent S76 simulator course, 36 minutes gets you to the point of having the engines running and launching off on your first traffic pattern. We do cover all the engine starting issues during that 36 minutes. You might be surprised how many students leave an engine running without oil pressure, until it doesn't want to run any more. Reset. Try again. The economics of that learning point in the simulator alone are far more economical than making the same mistake in your real helicopter.
gulliBell is offline  
Old 31st May 2021, 02:43
  #299 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: yes
Posts: 324
Likes: 0
Received 3 Likes on 3 Posts
Originally Posted by etudiant View Post
Always an economics issue. The pressures on a charter shop are brutal. A longer check ride costs more money, so the aim is to minimize the time. The idea that it is an occasion to learn/remind becomes secondary.
you get what you pay for.
JimEli is offline  
Old 31st May 2021, 03:34
  #300 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Downeast
Age: 74
Posts: 17,789
Received 146 Likes on 59 Posts
Etudiant,

If you read back over the thread you will notice I have said several times the Pilot failed to do a straight ahead climb to VFR on Top which in a fully instrumented S-76....a maneuver that should have been very simple but he failed to rise to the occasion.

You will also notice I. have been saying he had a lot of help in failing to be adequately prepared to to do that and that there is plenty of blame to be spread around to a lot of people individually and organizations to include the FAA.

The whole sad affair smacks of complacency and failure to do right resulting in a decent guy killing himself and his passengers.

Box Checking instead of effective training, half assed Checkrides, inadequate SOP's, failed Safety Climate, cozy relationship with third party trainers, and incompetent oversight by the FAA and a general lack of professionalism....harsh wording but well earned.

The NTSB's investigation is so shallow as to be embarrassing.

It raised far more questions than it answered.

Had I given him a Check Ride in the aircraft or the Simulator....I am not sure how it would have turned out as I do not know the fellow and have not flown with him.

Most folks try to fly their current helicopter like they flew their previous aircraft....in this case Ara flew other types of helicopter...most of which probably did not have Autopilots and almost certainly were all VFR Only machines thus no actual instrument flying with his currency and so called proficiency being maintained by some limited training and a check ride at the required intervals mandated by the FAA. We all know...or should know...the difference between being current and proficient and being proficient by being current.....currency does not convey proficiency except for the FAA's Rules and the reality is those rules set folks up for disaster if they do not practice IFR flying.....which requires two pilots....one acting either a Safety Pilot or as an Instructor, vision limiting devices or flight in actual IMC weather.....and Ara was flying in a single pilot operation....how does one get that recent IMC/IFR/Simulated IMC flight time?

JimEli....sometimes what you pay for is not worth squat....beyond checking a few boxes on some FAA required paperwork.
SASless is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service - Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Copyright © 2023 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.