UH-1H missing from Coffs Harbour 6th Sept 2019
Good update in Brisbane Courier Mail
A pretty well written update with some new information in today's Courier Mail here (may be pay walled so reproduced sans pictures below)
One of the accompanying photos showing the iPad was being used as a moving map display.
Even with a tailwind Coffs to Bankstown would have to have been a stretch.
One of the accompanying photos showing the iPad was being used as a moving map display.
Chopper in fatal crash not equipped for risky flying
The Vietnam War-era helicopter that crashed at night in severe winds killing five people was not equipped or certified to fly using equipment designed to survive low-visibility conditions.
EXCLUSIVE Kelmeny Fraser, The Courier-Mail
THE Vietnam War-era helicopter that plummeted into the ocean in darkness and during severe winds last month, killing all five people on board, did not have the technology to survive risky conditions.
Aviation sources close to Brisbane pilot David Kerr, who was killed in the September 6 crash, told The Courier-Mail neither he nor the helicopter was rated to fly under instrument flight rules, which are required when cloud and darkness reduces visibility to dangerous levels.
And there are strong doubts as to whether Mr Kerr was qualified to fly at night at all, even in clear weather, meaning he should have been on the ground at least 10 minutes before “last light”.
A Courier-Mail investigation can reveal the 1966-built, restored Bell UH-1H Iroquois helicopter, known as a Huey, was certified in mid-October last year for day flying only.
The Huey was flying after dusk in turbulent weather when it crashed into the sea near Anna Bay, south of Port Stephens in New South Wales.
All five people on-board were killed, including Mr Kerr’s friends – ex-police detectives Jamie Ogden and Grant Kuhnemann – and Sydney couple Jocelyn Villanueva and Gregory Miller, who was looking to buy the Huey.
The flight time and severe weather have raised the likelihood the pilot found himself in low visibility conditions that pushed him beyond his qualifications and the helicopter’s capabilities.
Photographs obtained by The Courier-Mail of the helicopter’s instrument panel from earlier this year appeared to be missing some night flying equipment, according to one pilot.
And the artificial horizon – a must for night flying – was on the wrong side, he said.
Adding to the mystery of the crash, another source close to Mr Kerr said the pilot of about eight years previously cancelled flights in bad weather and only flew by daylight.
Under Civil Aviation Safety Authority rules, aircraft not certified to fly at night must be on the ground 10 minutes before “last light” – the aviation term for after sunset.
Instrument flight rules kick in when poor light or cloud cuts visibility below safe levels. Pilots need to be qualified to fly in those conditions, primarily using instruments, and the aircraft needs to be certified.
Australian Warbirds Association chief executive Mark Awad said Mr Kerr’s Huey was certified a year ago for day flying only and documents showed it was at the time not intended for night flying.
The Association is responsible for issuing certificates of airworthiness for limited category ex-military aircraft, as well as vetting and approving warbird operators for commercial adventure flights.
“While we do not want to prejudice the investigation, we feel that it’s a reminder to all pilots that proper pre-flight planning can prevent serious mishaps and accidents like this,” Mr Awad said.
“It’s quite distressing that the accident occurred and there and there was such a substantial loss of life.”
Mr Kerr had a commercial helicopter licence, but was not approved for adventure flights.
BIG NIGHT OUT PLANNED
Mr Kerr had originally planned to stop over on the night of the flight in the Hunter Valley before flying to Sydney the next day for a boozy night with mates, sources said.
It was to be his last flight in the Huey, which he had sold and was ferrying to a new owner. The party planned to return on a commercial flight.
Minutes before last light, the Huey’s pilot asked air traffic control for clearance through Williamtown air space and to be allowed to climb higher to “keep the tailwind on me,” a recording of the radio call reveals.
A tailwind can boost the groundspeed of a helicopter, speeding up the flight.
Mr Kerr took off from Archerfield Airport about 2.30pm, refuelling at Coffs Harbour before flying into fading light and strong winds whipped up by a cold front.
He struck trouble while flying through controlled airspace near Williamtown, home to a Royal Australian Airforce base, which is co-located at Newcastle Airport.
Defence owns the runway, authorises flights to land and runs air traffic control.
At some stage, Mr Kerr decided to fly direct to Bankstown Airport near Sydney, 40 minutes away from the crash site, instead of stopping over in the Hunter Valley.
Air Traffic Control told the pilot to switch frequencies to request authorisation. He then called Clearance Delivery – the air traffic control agency responsible for issuing airways clearances – and asked to transit through the airspace along a coastal transit lane.
A Defence spokesman said the pilot was immediately issued the clearance and continued tracking into the base’s airspace via the requested coastal corridor.
But minutes later, the pilot requested and was granted an amended airways clearance to track from a position near the Tomaree Peninsula – about 12km from the crash site – direct to Bankstown Airport.
The spokesman said the pilot did not request to land at Newcastle Airport and was not held up. “Air Traffic Control did not issue any holding instructions to the pilot … or delay the aircraft,” she said.
Radar images indicate the Huey turned left out to sea off Birubi Point at Anna Bay before crashing, raising speculation the pilot was operating in darkness and rough weather.
“When you go over water it is pitch black and there is no reference to the horizon,” one pilot, who asked to remain anonymous told The Courier-Mail. “It is like driving down the M1 without lights.”
Flight tracking data indicates the helicopter was being thrown around in severe turbulence, with both its ground speed and altitude dramatically rising then falling before crashing. It ascended to more than 3500ft (1km) before falling at a catastrophic rate.
By 6.15pm – 13 minutes after last light at Williamtown and 14 minutes after his last radio call – the Huey had dropped off the radar.
MAST BUMP THEORY
CASA in 2015 tightened its rules around flying in night conditions in the wake of the shocking 2011 helicopter crash at Lake Eyre, which killed the pilot and two passengers filming an ABC documentary.
It found the pilot “probably became spatially disoriented” on a dark night.
A year later, a safety campaign warned that pilots who fly outside of their qualification into low-visibility condition that dictated “instrument flight rules” was a “prominent safety issue.”
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau had at the time recorded 111 instances in a decade, including 18 serious incidents.
But aviation sources have also questioned whether the stricken Huey became a victim of “mast bump”, a problem linked to the helicopter model.
That is where in severe turbulence causing low-G conditions, or during abrupt movements, excessive flapping of the blades is followed by the rotor mast and blades severing, breaking up the aircraft.
A police boat spotted the tail rotor of the Huey the morning after the crash, while a rescue helicopter spotted the main airframe of the helicopter 45 minutes later.
The tail boom has been recovered, and police divers have recovered debris and the remains from two bodies.
ATSB investigators are looking into the value of recovering any more of the wreckage and will release a preliminary report this month.
The Vietnam War-era helicopter that crashed at night in severe winds killing five people was not equipped or certified to fly using equipment designed to survive low-visibility conditions.
EXCLUSIVE Kelmeny Fraser, The Courier-Mail
THE Vietnam War-era helicopter that plummeted into the ocean in darkness and during severe winds last month, killing all five people on board, did not have the technology to survive risky conditions.
Aviation sources close to Brisbane pilot David Kerr, who was killed in the September 6 crash, told The Courier-Mail neither he nor the helicopter was rated to fly under instrument flight rules, which are required when cloud and darkness reduces visibility to dangerous levels.
And there are strong doubts as to whether Mr Kerr was qualified to fly at night at all, even in clear weather, meaning he should have been on the ground at least 10 minutes before “last light”.
A Courier-Mail investigation can reveal the 1966-built, restored Bell UH-1H Iroquois helicopter, known as a Huey, was certified in mid-October last year for day flying only.
The Huey was flying after dusk in turbulent weather when it crashed into the sea near Anna Bay, south of Port Stephens in New South Wales.
All five people on-board were killed, including Mr Kerr’s friends – ex-police detectives Jamie Ogden and Grant Kuhnemann – and Sydney couple Jocelyn Villanueva and Gregory Miller, who was looking to buy the Huey.
The flight time and severe weather have raised the likelihood the pilot found himself in low visibility conditions that pushed him beyond his qualifications and the helicopter’s capabilities.
Photographs obtained by The Courier-Mail of the helicopter’s instrument panel from earlier this year appeared to be missing some night flying equipment, according to one pilot.
And the artificial horizon – a must for night flying – was on the wrong side, he said.
Adding to the mystery of the crash, another source close to Mr Kerr said the pilot of about eight years previously cancelled flights in bad weather and only flew by daylight.
Under Civil Aviation Safety Authority rules, aircraft not certified to fly at night must be on the ground 10 minutes before “last light” – the aviation term for after sunset.
Instrument flight rules kick in when poor light or cloud cuts visibility below safe levels. Pilots need to be qualified to fly in those conditions, primarily using instruments, and the aircraft needs to be certified.
Australian Warbirds Association chief executive Mark Awad said Mr Kerr’s Huey was certified a year ago for day flying only and documents showed it was at the time not intended for night flying.
The Association is responsible for issuing certificates of airworthiness for limited category ex-military aircraft, as well as vetting and approving warbird operators for commercial adventure flights.
“While we do not want to prejudice the investigation, we feel that it’s a reminder to all pilots that proper pre-flight planning can prevent serious mishaps and accidents like this,” Mr Awad said.
“It’s quite distressing that the accident occurred and there and there was such a substantial loss of life.”
Mr Kerr had a commercial helicopter licence, but was not approved for adventure flights.
BIG NIGHT OUT PLANNED
Mr Kerr had originally planned to stop over on the night of the flight in the Hunter Valley before flying to Sydney the next day for a boozy night with mates, sources said.
It was to be his last flight in the Huey, which he had sold and was ferrying to a new owner. The party planned to return on a commercial flight.
Minutes before last light, the Huey’s pilot asked air traffic control for clearance through Williamtown air space and to be allowed to climb higher to “keep the tailwind on me,” a recording of the radio call reveals.
A tailwind can boost the groundspeed of a helicopter, speeding up the flight.
Mr Kerr took off from Archerfield Airport about 2.30pm, refuelling at Coffs Harbour before flying into fading light and strong winds whipped up by a cold front.
He struck trouble while flying through controlled airspace near Williamtown, home to a Royal Australian Airforce base, which is co-located at Newcastle Airport.
Defence owns the runway, authorises flights to land and runs air traffic control.
At some stage, Mr Kerr decided to fly direct to Bankstown Airport near Sydney, 40 minutes away from the crash site, instead of stopping over in the Hunter Valley.
Air Traffic Control told the pilot to switch frequencies to request authorisation. He then called Clearance Delivery – the air traffic control agency responsible for issuing airways clearances – and asked to transit through the airspace along a coastal transit lane.
A Defence spokesman said the pilot was immediately issued the clearance and continued tracking into the base’s airspace via the requested coastal corridor.
But minutes later, the pilot requested and was granted an amended airways clearance to track from a position near the Tomaree Peninsula – about 12km from the crash site – direct to Bankstown Airport.
The spokesman said the pilot did not request to land at Newcastle Airport and was not held up. “Air Traffic Control did not issue any holding instructions to the pilot … or delay the aircraft,” she said.
Radar images indicate the Huey turned left out to sea off Birubi Point at Anna Bay before crashing, raising speculation the pilot was operating in darkness and rough weather.
“When you go over water it is pitch black and there is no reference to the horizon,” one pilot, who asked to remain anonymous told The Courier-Mail. “It is like driving down the M1 without lights.”
Flight tracking data indicates the helicopter was being thrown around in severe turbulence, with both its ground speed and altitude dramatically rising then falling before crashing. It ascended to more than 3500ft (1km) before falling at a catastrophic rate.
By 6.15pm – 13 minutes after last light at Williamtown and 14 minutes after his last radio call – the Huey had dropped off the radar.
MAST BUMP THEORY
CASA in 2015 tightened its rules around flying in night conditions in the wake of the shocking 2011 helicopter crash at Lake Eyre, which killed the pilot and two passengers filming an ABC documentary.
It found the pilot “probably became spatially disoriented” on a dark night.
A year later, a safety campaign warned that pilots who fly outside of their qualification into low-visibility condition that dictated “instrument flight rules” was a “prominent safety issue.”
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau had at the time recorded 111 instances in a decade, including 18 serious incidents.
But aviation sources have also questioned whether the stricken Huey became a victim of “mast bump”, a problem linked to the helicopter model.
That is where in severe turbulence causing low-G conditions, or during abrupt movements, excessive flapping of the blades is followed by the rotor mast and blades severing, breaking up the aircraft.
A police boat spotted the tail rotor of the Huey the morning after the crash, while a rescue helicopter spotted the main airframe of the helicopter 45 minutes later.
The tail boom has been recovered, and police divers have recovered debris and the remains from two bodies.
ATSB investigators are looking into the value of recovering any more of the wreckage and will release a preliminary report this month.
So there was no reason for the deviation off the clearance with the left turn out to sea when it got dark. Can only be explained by a loss of SA in conditions the pilot was not authorized to operate in.
On the instrument panel photo. Pilot side turn indicator doesn't seem to be working. Attitude indicator would have been far more useful installed in front of the pilot. And a big disparity in ASI indications between left and right side.
On the instrument panel photo. Pilot side turn indicator doesn't seem to be working. Attitude indicator would have been far more useful installed in front of the pilot. And a big disparity in ASI indications between left and right side.
Under Civil Aviation Safety Authority rules, aircraft not certified to fly at night must be on the ground 10 minutes before “last light” – the aviation term for after sunset.
Last edited by Squawk7700; 13th Oct 2019 at 07:22.
It's only the ASI that has a large (70Kt) discrepancy so there is clearly something wrong with the pitot system somewhere unless they are flying sideways.
The scan to that AI on the left had side would be a challenge for an experienced instrument pilot in difficult conditions let alone someone who isn't qualified.
Mast bumping or not, this seems like yet another easily avoidable accident caused by poor decision making.
The scan to that AI on the left had side would be a challenge for an experienced instrument pilot in difficult conditions let alone someone who isn't qualified.
Mast bumping or not, this seems like yet another easily avoidable accident caused by poor decision making.
Well spotted! For night flying, let alone IFR, an Artificial Horizon would really be useful. In many jurisdictions, for commercial VFR night ops an AH (or two, with independent power source) are part of the required minimum equipment.
An attitude indicator amongst other things are required in Australia for NVFR
If I was in that aircraft and had a sudden loss of visual reference, the only real choice is to look across the cockpit at the AI on the left. It is indicating a right turn. Next to it is an ASI showing 30kt. The response would be to roll left, and lower the nose.
The aircraft is already in a left turn and doing 90kt. The extra roll and lowering of the nose will lead to a spiral dive. Adding to the confusion is a turn indicator showing no turn. The feeling from the seat of the pants, the wind noise increasing, and the instrument discrepancies will lead to a complete loss of situational awareness and eventually loss of control.
The aircraft is already in a left turn and doing 90kt. The extra roll and lowering of the nose will lead to a spiral dive. Adding to the confusion is a turn indicator showing no turn. The feeling from the seat of the pants, the wind noise increasing, and the instrument discrepancies will lead to a complete loss of situational awareness and eventually loss of control.
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So there was no reason for the deviation off the clearance with the left turn out to sea when it got dark. Can only be explained by a loss of SA in conditions the pilot was not authorized to operate in.
On the instrument panel photo. Pilot side turn indicator doesn't seem to be working. Attitude indicator would have been far more useful installed in front of the pilot. And a big disparity in ASI indications between left and right side.
On the instrument panel photo. Pilot side turn indicator doesn't seem to be working. Attitude indicator would have been far more useful installed in front of the pilot. And a big disparity in ASI indications between left and right side.
Uncommanded ascent (several thousand feet) followed by an abrupt descent (causing everything to stick to the ceiling). If it was rotary I would probably not be here.
Never used to be for NVFR AG, only requirement used to be airspeed, altimeter and turn and bank or turn coordinator. On a dark night out the middle of nowhere without turn lights a bit of a handfull. Have the requirements changed?
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C.A.O. 20.18 appendix VIII quoted below, different appendix for Ag ops:-
Appendix VIII
Instruments required for night V.M.C. flight in helicopters except while engaged in agricultural operations
1 The flight and navigational instruments required are:
(a) an airspeed indicating system; and
(b) a sensitive pressure altimeter; and
(c) (i) a direct reading magnetic compass; or
(ii) a remote indicating compass and a standby direct reading magnetic compass; and
(d) an accurate timepiece indicating the time in hours, minutes and seconds. This may be carried on the person of the pilot or navigator; and
(e) an outside air temperature indicator; and
(f) an attitude indicator (artificial horizon); and
(i) standby attitude indicator; or
(ii) turn indicator; and
(g) a heading indicator (directional gyroscope); and
(h) a slip indicator; and
(i) a vertical speed indicator; and
(j) means of indicating whether the power supply to the gyroscopic instruments is working satisfactorily.
2 For operations onto vessels or platforms at sea by night an instantaneous vertical speed indicator is required in place of the vertical speed indicator specified at paragraph 1 (i) of this Appendix.
3 The attitude indicator and standby attitude indicator or turn indicator as specified in paragraph 1 (f) of this Appendix, must have separate and independent power sources.
4 A gyro-magnetic type of remote indicating compass installed to meet the requirements of subparagraph 1 (c) (ii) of this Appendix may be considered also to meet the requirement for a heading indicator specified in paragraph 1 (g) of this Appendix, provided that such installation complies with the power supply requirements of
clause 3 of this Appendix.
28
Authorised Version F2017C01115 registered 04/12/20
Appendix VIII
Instruments required for night V.M.C. flight in helicopters except while engaged in agricultural operations
1 The flight and navigational instruments required are:
(a) an airspeed indicating system; and
(b) a sensitive pressure altimeter; and
(c) (i) a direct reading magnetic compass; or
(ii) a remote indicating compass and a standby direct reading magnetic compass; and
(d) an accurate timepiece indicating the time in hours, minutes and seconds. This may be carried on the person of the pilot or navigator; and
(e) an outside air temperature indicator; and
(f) an attitude indicator (artificial horizon); and
(i) standby attitude indicator; or
(ii) turn indicator; and
(g) a heading indicator (directional gyroscope); and
(h) a slip indicator; and
(i) a vertical speed indicator; and
(j) means of indicating whether the power supply to the gyroscopic instruments is working satisfactorily.
2 For operations onto vessels or platforms at sea by night an instantaneous vertical speed indicator is required in place of the vertical speed indicator specified at paragraph 1 (i) of this Appendix.
3 The attitude indicator and standby attitude indicator or turn indicator as specified in paragraph 1 (f) of this Appendix, must have separate and independent power sources.
4 A gyro-magnetic type of remote indicating compass installed to meet the requirements of subparagraph 1 (c) (ii) of this Appendix may be considered also to meet the requirement for a heading indicator specified in paragraph 1 (g) of this Appendix, provided that such installation complies with the power supply requirements of
clause 3 of this Appendix.
28
Authorised Version F2017C01115 registered 04/12/20
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Says who? The pitot-static system in that aircraft might have been all messed up (look at the 70 kt discrepancy between left and right side ASI). Meaning the data captured in those graphs, which I point out none of which made much sense when cross referenced across the parameters recorded, is all suspect. Assume those climb/descent/speed rates do not reflect reality.
Not referring to the accident aircraft, or the tracking data provided.
Referring to an event I experienced that looks somewhat similar to this event.
You made an intentional decision for operational reasons that seem sensible in the circumstances, despite the interesting ride that came of it. Where-as the accident aircraft here, there does not seem to be an operational reason for doing what they did, turning out to sea, most likely losing all external visual references in doing so, and not having internal references to compensate for lost external references, and contrary to their assigned clearance.
And there are strong doubts as to whether Mr Kerr was qualified to fly at night at all, even in clear weather, meaning he should have been on the ground at least 10 minutes before “last light”.
are
Are the rules different there as In EASA land last light is 30 mins after sunset ?
are
Are the rules different there as In EASA land last light is 30 mins after sunset ?
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You made an intentional decision for operational reasons that seem sensible in the circumstances, despite the interesting ride that came of it. Where-as the accident aircraft here, there does not seem to be an operational reason for doing what they did, turning out to sea, most likely losing all external visual references in doing so, and not having internal references to compensate for lost external references, and contrary to their assigned clearance.
Avoiding/ escaping something? Or was control already lost?
In crap weather, couldn't see outside, he might not even had known he turned and was heading out to sea. Fair chance the loss of control came after the loss of situation awareness, and because of it. The only thing he needed to avoid was darkness, and the solution to that is usually pretty simple in a helicopter.
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Wx that day was what we here call a "dry change", that is a front with little cloud and negligible precipitation. "Crap weather" in as much as it was very windy and rough.
Anna Bay, shore side of the accident, population around 4000, well lit. One of five such settlements within a 5 Nm radius.
To the immediate front at 15 Nm, Newcastle, population 320,000, also well lit. About 7 Nm wide viewed from the NE, a horizon in its own right.
I would respectfully suggest a VFR clearance through the zone would not have been available, had VMC conditions not been conducive.
Did I fly that day? Nope. Too rough. And I wasn't even downwind of the Blue Mountains.
Anna Bay, shore side of the accident, population around 4000, well lit. One of five such settlements within a 5 Nm radius.
To the immediate front at 15 Nm, Newcastle, population 320,000, also well lit. About 7 Nm wide viewed from the NE, a horizon in its own right.
I would respectfully suggest a VFR clearance through the zone would not have been available, had VMC conditions not been conducive.
Did I fly that day? Nope. Too rough. And I wasn't even downwind of the Blue Mountains.