AW139 Crash in Bahamas - 7 Killed
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Looks like another great case study for MCC & CRM courses. And they just keep happening. (Mostly to the people who are not doing MCC or CRM training).
Originally Posted by [email protected]
How did either of them hold a licence? The good ole boys do helicopter flying.........
Unprofessional doesn't even start to describe it - what a senseless waste of lives.
Unprofessional doesn't even start to describe it - what a senseless waste of lives.
I believe the PM was ex-RAF fixed wing.
Also, it was G-LBAL.
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Clearly taking off from the runway is always the best option if available. But they were there illegally as the airport was closed, with pad, taxiway and runway lighting switched off. From the transcript it sounds like they were able to identify the tower from obstacle lights on it and they had some help on the ground providing lighting guidance to the pad. So the question is which illegal approach and departure with only on-board lighting and maybe golf cart lights would be safest…. trick question.
Taking off with the FTR on the cyclic depressed is normal enough. The power is set, a profile is flown to achieve a safe airspeed (40-50 KIAS), then released. The AW139 is really stable and will continue to fly the attitude hands and feet free without any further AFCS mode engagement (although clearly best practice). All CAT A profiles then ensure a climb and acceleration to at least Vy. Safe. Really safe. That‘s why commercial operators fly them.
The PM didn’t intervene because he wan’t one. This was two single pilots who didn’t plan (or even brief) either the approach or departure properly. Nothing was ever agreed. So at what point does the PM notice a deviation, when there is no standard or plan? If they had flown a defined CAT A pad departure from the pad, that both understood, and were practiced in, then the outcome would surely have been very different. And there is another of the lamentable parallels with the G-LABL accident. The PNFs insight before impact was needed whilst they were still on the ground.
Taking off with the FTR on the cyclic depressed is normal enough. The power is set, a profile is flown to achieve a safe airspeed (40-50 KIAS), then released. The AW139 is really stable and will continue to fly the attitude hands and feet free without any further AFCS mode engagement (although clearly best practice). All CAT A profiles then ensure a climb and acceleration to at least Vy. Safe. Really safe. That‘s why commercial operators fly them.
The PM didn’t intervene because he wan’t one. This was two single pilots who didn’t plan (or even brief) either the approach or departure properly. Nothing was ever agreed. So at what point does the PM notice a deviation, when there is no standard or plan? If they had flown a defined CAT A pad departure from the pad, that both understood, and were practiced in, then the outcome would surely have been very different. And there is another of the lamentable parallels with the G-LABL accident. The PNFs insight before impact was needed whilst they were still on the ground.
I can see maybe taking off the FT for a day takeoff or at night with runway lights but a max performance into IMC? I'm not trying to be a smart ass, but I don't know why you would do this. The hat should work just fine with maybe a little push of forward cyclic. But take it out entirely? I'm sure it's stable as hell, but I image it's just basically a big R-22 with no SAS. About the only time I press the FT release is to center up the cyclic after a little hand flying. To me, taking out the SAS in that situation is a horrible idea to all but those that have been trained for it.
I realize it wasn't a two pilot crew but when you see the guy next to you in a dive and a banking so close to the ground (or water), plan or no plan, you gotta do something!
Last edited by helonorth; 22nd Aug 2020 at 20:38.
Given the paucity of light, I think they would have been better off with a pad departure rather than trying a running take-off from the runway, which is not a published CAT procedure and might well end up with the same poorly defined power and attitude constellations that got these guys in trouble.
G-LBAL - thanks for the correction FNW
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Pressing the FTR button just deselects attitude hold for the time you hold it (in the accident PF‘s case, the whole time). SAS is still there and unless you‘re whipping the llama‘s ass, controlled attitude changes are not difficult at all. Release the button; attitude held.
Given the paucity of light, I think they would have been better off with a pad departure rather than trying a running take-off from the runway, which is not a published CAT procedure and might well end up with the same poorly defined power and attitude constellations that got these guys in trouble.
G-LBAL - thanks for the correction FNW
Given the paucity of light, I think they would have been better off with a pad departure rather than trying a running take-off from the runway, which is not a published CAT procedure and might well end up with the same poorly defined power and attitude constellations that got these guys in trouble.
G-LBAL - thanks for the correction FNW
The usual could've, would've, should've response and every commenter is correct in their own way. The aircraft was likely even capable of taking off all by itself with TU mode. It was the Bahamas and there are virtually no obstacles to hit after all. So start the clock folks and place your bets and count down the seconds to the next preventable disaster. The technology gets better but the pilots never seem to.
some people are talking about Vmini and Autopilot, Vmini is 50KIAS, the AW139 has so many different phases of software and since this was an older machine the FD won't work below 60KIAS even the GA (if you can find it) button won't work, later phases you can enage the FD at 50KIAS and the GA button works at 41KIAS.
reading the transcript you can see from the moment they left PBI there was no CRM at all.
So sad.
reading the transcript you can see from the moment they left PBI there was no CRM at all.
So sad.
The toxicology report found both pilots had ethanol in their blood and urine. The report doesn't say whether that was from the consumption of alcohol, or from natural processes postmortem.
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The bottom line of this is that there were two pilots neither of whom were competent for the task. It seems there were two fundamental failings; firstly neither could hand fly (a stabilised helicopter) adequately on instruments, and secondly they did not adequately understand how to make the automatics work for them, leading to the AFCS being engaged with cyclic FTR engaged and hence (as I understand it) not having the cyclic controlled by the AFCS. Another example too of when two poor pilots is worse than one good one, both assuming the other is more competent than they are feeling.
What a mess. Scary too - I wonder how many other similarly incompetent crews there are out there?
What a mess. Scary too - I wonder how many other similarly incompetent crews there are out there?
And, just like the Norfolk accident, this could have been prevented by implementing a simple and widely taught (in the military) IF take off from the hover.
Is it PC1/Cat A? No but not very different from a helipad take off. When you are breaking the rules like this, complying with PC1 is probably the last of your worries.
The problem is that with more complex and capable aircraft, it is too easy just to rely on 'George' and lose those hand-flying on instruments skills.
FNW - you would have thought someone ex-mil FW would have some idea of CRM.
Just fly the f***ing aircraft.......
Is it PC1/Cat A? No but not very different from a helipad take off. When you are breaking the rules like this, complying with PC1 is probably the last of your worries.
The problem is that with more complex and capable aircraft, it is too easy just to rely on 'George' and lose those hand-flying on instruments skills.
FNW - you would have thought someone ex-mil FW would have some idea of CRM.
Just fly the f***ing aircraft.......
It was not MCC. And engine failure had nothing to do with it.
But proper SOPs, MCC/CRM would have ruled out the obvious contributing factors. A better understanding of the aircraft would also not have gone amiss.
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Rotorspeed- If you want to know the general level of competence out there, I can tell you as a TRE who has worked with pilots/crews from all corners of the world that I would never willingly fly as a passenger in a helicopter anywhere unless I had personal knowledge of the competence of the operation. There is a very significant percentage even of commercial operators who dont get close to what I would describe as "professional".
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Couldn’t agree more Crab. There should have been nothing difficult about that departure had the pilots had the ability to “fly the just f***ing aircraft“, as you put it so well. They clearly were relying on the AFCS to do the job for them but weren’t anything like proficient enough on how to use it. I’ve not flown a 139 but am pretty sure it would be a nice stable platform with which to pull the collective from the hover with wings level and hover pitch, until they got to a safe height to calmly tip the nose down 15 deg or whatever to get Vmini and climb away under complete control and with spatial awareness. Even the basics of the PNF calling the heights was missing! Seems too that, just like G-LBAL, they were too keen to get some airspeed before they’d really got high enough, no doubt because they were not confident of the procedure or their ability to follow it.
Interesting and very worrying Non-PC. I think part of the problem is that some owners think that just because they’ve bought a nice shiney big IFR twin with lots of bells and whistles, and have a pilot(s) who has a confident air and a sharp shirt, they must be in good hands. They just don’t know how different and more challenging flying can be at times, such as night and bad weather.
Interesting and very worrying Non-PC. I think part of the problem is that some owners think that just because they’ve bought a nice shiney big IFR twin with lots of bells and whistles, and have a pilot(s) who has a confident air and a sharp shirt, they must be in good hands. They just don’t know how different and more challenging flying can be at times, such as night and bad weather.
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just an unlit pad which makes it all the more crazy
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I don't know how we got the entire VCR transcript, it is not a normal procedure????
You just read the first leg and understand they should have never been there. And the guy on the left seat who was giving advises during the first leg totally disappear during the most important take-off procedure ????
Why, flying above water at night, anybody would start a descent from 2000 ft 25 NM out???? many guys crashed doing that....
There is a big problem with the fact that an owner buy an aircraft, hire somebody to fly it, but has no clue what this guy is really able to do. We see so many accident like that, there is serious training/knowledge problem.
How an owner is able to trust his pilot anymore?
You just read the first leg and understand they should have never been there. And the guy on the left seat who was giving advises during the first leg totally disappear during the most important take-off procedure ????
Why, flying above water at night, anybody would start a descent from 2000 ft 25 NM out???? many guys crashed doing that....
There is a big problem with the fact that an owner buy an aircraft, hire somebody to fly it, but has no clue what this guy is really able to do. We see so many accident like that, there is serious training/knowledge problem.
How an owner is able to trust his pilot anymore?