AW139 Crash in Bahamas - 7 Killed
Are we getting too focused on the minutiae of take off procedure when we still have no clue as to what actually happened?
I have seen no reason to distrust the crew, plus the reports that they had requested to not use this aircraft again would surely indicate that they would be on full alert when forced to fly it again.
Consequently I believe that a catastrophic mechanical failure is at least as plausible cause a cause as crew failure.
My only issue is the total absence of any reported communications. Even at 500', if things go bad, there is time to say something.
I have seen no reason to distrust the crew, plus the reports that they had requested to not use this aircraft again would surely indicate that they would be on full alert when forced to fly it again.
Consequently I believe that a catastrophic mechanical failure is at least as plausible cause a cause as crew failure.
My only issue is the total absence of any reported communications. Even at 500', if things go bad, there is time to say something.
Talking is fine....but there has to be someone listening that hears you.
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Sir, you have NO IDEA how frustrating it was for an experienced IFR helicopter pilot to work for this organization.
Etudiant:
Read through the thread again. No one is saying that the crew could not be trusted. They were apparently highly experienced and competent. It may have been a mechanical failure and that should quickly become apparent once the accident investigators issue a statement. Meanwhile on this forum people use their experience and knowledge to discuss what 'might' have been the cause. Had this been a day VFR, overland departure then a mechanical failure would be the most likely cause of two experienced pilots flying an inverted AW139 into the ground. But (as far as we know) it was a night departure over water (which is worse than normal IMC) in response to a medical emergency flown by two pilots who were not current in this type of operation.
Unless you have yourself flown a departure in those circumstances you will not understand the difficulties and risks involved. As a former military, offshore, HEMS and SAR pilot I have done this many times and occassionally felt very uncomfortable despite the fact that I was experienced and current. Yes the AW139 has many automated features that are extremely useful in assisting this kind of take-off. For instance SAR crews do not generally operate to any normal weather limitations and the AW139 can fly a safe, departure in IMC conditions (fog) surrounded by obstacles from a confined area using coupled flight director modes. BUT it is a technique flown by an experienced, NVG and FLIR equipped crew of four who practice this on a daily basis in all conditions and are regularly tested.
Pilots who blithely state that this should never happen to an experienced pilot flying a highly automated helicopter simply do not understand the risks involved.
I have seen no reason to distrust the crew
Unless you have yourself flown a departure in those circumstances you will not understand the difficulties and risks involved. As a former military, offshore, HEMS and SAR pilot I have done this many times and occassionally felt very uncomfortable despite the fact that I was experienced and current. Yes the AW139 has many automated features that are extremely useful in assisting this kind of take-off. For instance SAR crews do not generally operate to any normal weather limitations and the AW139 can fly a safe, departure in IMC conditions (fog) surrounded by obstacles from a confined area using coupled flight director modes. BUT it is a technique flown by an experienced, NVG and FLIR equipped crew of four who practice this on a daily basis in all conditions and are regularly tested.
Pilots who blithely state that this should never happen to an experienced pilot flying a highly automated helicopter simply do not understand the risks involved.
Same Again - agreed 
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Sorry but what a ridiculous statement!!!. Remember the saying Aviate, Navigate and communicate in that order. If my life's on the line talking to someone is the least of my problems.
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Etudiant:
Unless you have yourself flown a departure in those circumstances you will not understand the difficulties and risks involved.
Pilots who blithely state that this should never happen to an experienced pilot flying a highly automated helicopter simply do not understand the risks involved.
Unless you have yourself flown a departure in those circumstances you will not understand the difficulties and risks involved.
Pilots who blithely state that this should never happen to an experienced pilot flying a highly automated helicopter simply do not understand the risks involved.
Pilots who blithely state that this should never happen to an experienced pilot flying a highly automated helicopter simply do not understand the risks involved
Hot and Hi - I am utterly surprised, and shocked at the same time, about the level of excuses you career ATP’s have for fellow aviators failing to keep the blue side up (“can happen to anyone ... can happen to the best ... can happen to me”)!
What is the difference between a dark night (“deep IMC”, whoa, what a word) and, say, being in a cloud. The only problem with IMC is if you don’t realize you are in IMC, and continue flying by the seat of your pants.
Why would an IMC departure over water (read “no obstacles”) ever be a problem? Some airspeed, positive climb, attitude, heading. Come on, you got those instruments, not? Plus in an AW you can set the AP, and then focus on your customs declaration.
I do not understand how a plethora of honorable posters before me concede they too could have put her into the drink under similar circumstances.
What is the difference between a dark night (“deep IMC”, whoa, what a word) and, say, being in a cloud. The only problem with IMC is if you don’t realize you are in IMC, and continue flying by the seat of your pants.
Why would an IMC departure over water (read “no obstacles”) ever be a problem? Some airspeed, positive climb, attitude, heading. Come on, you got those instruments, not? Plus in an AW you can set the AP, and then focus on your customs declaration.
I do not understand how a plethora of honorable posters before me concede they too could have put her into the drink under similar circumstances.
Have to say that I find these comments by very experienced operators disturbing.
If a competent crew in full awareness cannot operate a modern machine at night with high probability of success, there is a gap that badly needs filling.
On what basis is the certification granted? One disaster per 50 departures or one per 5,000?
If a competent crew in full awareness cannot operate a modern machine at night with high probability of success, there is a gap that badly needs filling.
On what basis is the certification granted? One disaster per 50 departures or one per 5,000?
The success rate is very high and the failures are well documented, you can search the NTSB site for examples. It's just that the folks who are in the business recognise how easy it is to become a statistic. Humans being human will always have the means of screwing up, take a trip to your local panel beaters, you'll find there the results of humans operating in a far more benign environment.
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Have to say that I find these comments by very experienced operators disturbing.
If a competent crew in full awareness cannot operate a modern machine at night with high probability of success, there is a gap that badly needs filling.
If a competent crew in full awareness cannot operate a modern machine at night with high probability of success, there is a gap that badly needs filling.
I ride a large, powerful motorbike. I passed my licence test 30 years ago and have never had to re-certify. Which is why, if I have not ridden all winter, I have my first ride on a nice, dry day in Spring, ride quiet roads slowly and get used to the controls and riding again. I don't start on a dark, wet night on a busy road taking the bends at high speed.
An Air Nuigini ATPL holder with 19,000 hours flew his B737-800 into Truk lagoon last year. And he was watched doing it by an ATPL holding co-pilot who said or did nothing until it was too late. Despite 16 EGPWS warnings that said they shouldn't be doing what they were doing. And they were both current and recently sim checked. And that was during daylight hours.
If it was not the case that Humans are the weak link in the accident chain.....Rotorheads would be a very quiet place as we would have much less to discuss and argue about.
The majority of the threads are about accidents unfortunately....and far too many of them are caused by the Human rather than the machine or weather.
The majority of the threads are about accidents unfortunately....and far too many of them are caused by the Human rather than the machine or weather.
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private island vhf+ miles from any kind of ATC at 2am
Good luck talking to yourself - it's the islands where it was hard to get someone up at IFR cruise altitudes between places including the US ADIZ. At that altitude from where they were coming it would take atmospheric magic, apart from which things were probably fairly busy. A CVR may be standard gear and may yield something. If so doubtless the AIB will tell us all - eventually.
Last edited by crunchingnumbers; 20th Jul 2019 at 14:05.
It is nice to see that there is such a lively debate around this point.
I'd hope we could all agree that such per performance on the job is unexpected (without saying that it has never happened) and also unacceptable.
There is a big difference between me (as most of us would) not saying that it couldn't happen to us on one side, and on the other side saying "that it can happen to the best".
Let us be our best, and let's assure to put all measures in place that it doesn't.
...ATPL holder with 19,000 hours flew his B737-800 into Truk lagoon last year. And he was watched doing it by an ATPL holding co-pilot who said or did nothing until it was too late. Despite 16 EGPWS warnings...
There is a big difference between me (as most of us would) not saying that it couldn't happen to us on one side, and on the other side saying "that it can happen to the best".
Let us be our best, and let's assure to put all measures in place that it doesn't.
Last edited by Hot and Hi; 20th Jul 2019 at 16:14.
I have to say that I find your simplistic view equally disturbing. Certification is only one part of our profession. The other equally if not more important parts are practice, currency and the knowledge of our own limitations. Which is why a fully certified ATPL(H) holder with an AW139 type rating and 10,000 hours R22 hours has an accident.
I ride a large, powerful motorbike. I passed my licence test 30 years ago and have never had to re-certify. Which is why, if I have not ridden all winter, I have my first ride on a nice, dry day in Spring, ride quiet roads slowly and get used to the controls and riding again. I don't start on a dark, wet night on a busy road taking the bends at high speed.
I ride a large, powerful motorbike. I passed my licence test 30 years ago and have never had to re-certify. Which is why, if I have not ridden all winter, I have my first ride on a nice, dry day in Spring, ride quiet roads slowly and get used to the controls and riding again. I don't start on a dark, wet night on a busy road taking the bends at high speed.
Moreover, this crew would surely be especially alert if they were indeed required to fly an aircraft that they had expressed reservations about.
We don't know what that issue was, or whether it may be a related factor. But this flight was clearly not routine, so the claims of crew distraction/inattention seem implausible to me.
Given the catastrophic result, if there were no mechanical issues, one would have to question the adequacy of current regulations to ensure safety.
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