AW139 Crash in Bahamas - 7 Killed
RL77CHC - the technique you describe is exactly how I, as an ex-mil pilot, would have done it but what is the legality of flying the aircraft manually (even if you are following the blue lines on the FD) below VminI?
If you were using the GA/TU of the later phases of software then fine but you are trying to fly an IMC profile below VminI.
I'm not saying it is difficult, because it isn't if you have been trained for it and checked on it, just asking why it doesn't form part of the IR.
The reports about the pilot not being happy to fly the aircraft due to engine issues could lead to distraction during a tricky departure when you are already under pressure.
If you were using the GA/TU of the later phases of software then fine but you are trying to fly an IMC profile below VminI.
I'm not saying it is difficult, because it isn't if you have been trained for it and checked on it, just asking why it doesn't form part of the IR.
The reports about the pilot not being happy to fly the aircraft due to engine issues could lead to distraction during a tricky departure when you are already under pressure.
Thread Starter
SASLess - Chris's operation was totally corporate, he also had just taken delivery, or right about to of a brand new H130 and I think he also used a Koala from time to time.
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Bahamas Press
I wouldn't put too much stock in the veracity of their reporting....that's the late Tim McCormack pictured below the photo of Mr. Cline in the link to the article.
Cabby,
Every EMS Pilot in the World has experienced this on more than an in-frequent basis.
Dark holes in the woods or along a highway, in a wire environment, responding to a scene call with no notice in the pitch dark....middle of the night...lots of blood and gore...Med Crew struggling to get the patient taken care of.....that is the stock and trade for our folks doing the EMS thing.
I find it hard to believe that the passengers were patiently, quietly sitting in the passenger compartment. I could easily immagine screaming, crying, and outright chaos.
Black Hole liftoft, short flight preparation, billionaire owner onboard, chaos in the passenger compartment. I am not sure that any of us pilots could reliably pull that off, or should even try. However, if it truly was a life and death situation, I am not sure as a pilot how you say no.....
Black Hole liftoft, short flight preparation, billionaire owner onboard, chaos in the passenger compartment. I am not sure that any of us pilots could reliably pull that off, or should even try. However, if it truly was a life and death situation, I am not sure as a pilot how you say no.....
Dark holes in the woods or along a highway, in a wire environment, responding to a scene call with no notice in the pitch dark....middle of the night...lots of blood and gore...Med Crew struggling to get the patient taken care of.....that is the stock and trade for our folks doing the EMS thing.
Chris's operation was totally corporate
Even offshore in the North Sea we’ve had a 139 departing a deck away from the field into a black hole get the wobblies. No big deal, copilot covered it with smooth CRM, because he was monitoring and as he was trained to. A solid operational control system will have a backup for the inevitable contingencies. What system doesn’t know their aircraft is missing for 12 hours?
Chris had a 109 last year and was now getting a 119 and 130, meaning what, a distain for multi-engine? I’m just not seeing a good understanding of the risks and their management in this operation.
Please educate me why the simple rules that I had stated here would not guarantee a safe night departure
Megan is right....another large oil company that on its face maintained high standards but once you got to looking it was another. matter.
The management evolved from a Gulf of Mexico operator and brought over that same old attitude with them.
The FAA sets VFR minimums based upon "Weather" (Ceiling and Visibility)....not what you can see out the windows.
So right next to 412's with Sperry Helipilot systems with Flight Directors....you had 212's with no SAS of any kind flying the same routes at the same time of day as the 412's.
Offshore, particularly on an overcast and hazy night....about the only thing you could see sometimes was two very big white shiny eyes looking back at you from your Windscreen.
But...hey...it was VFR right!
You had a thousand and three, right?
That is where I elected to use the room name of ..... Sasless!
I was not impressed as you might guess.
The management evolved from a Gulf of Mexico operator and brought over that same old attitude with them.
The FAA sets VFR minimums based upon "Weather" (Ceiling and Visibility)....not what you can see out the windows.
So right next to 412's with Sperry Helipilot systems with Flight Directors....you had 212's with no SAS of any kind flying the same routes at the same time of day as the 412's.
Offshore, particularly on an overcast and hazy night....about the only thing you could see sometimes was two very big white shiny eyes looking back at you from your Windscreen.
But...hey...it was VFR right!
You had a thousand and three, right?
That is where I elected to use the room name of ..... Sasless!
I was not impressed as you might guess.
The EMS/Offshore experience here sees this flight as safe and routine if managed according to the commercial standards we use to move 10,000 rig pigs per day and night. Selection, training, equipment, operational control. The part91 guys here feel it was a doomed flight because they’re scared of the dark, get the difference?
That's right. Almost 26 years in the game for me and I've never been sent on a simulator course. Not once. Not ever. The first time I saw a simulator was when I was hired to start teaching in them. And that's when I came to realize how revealing and eye-opening and mind-boggling the experience of simulator teaching can be.
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That's right. Almost 26 years in the game for me and I've never been sent on a simulator course. Not once. Not ever. The first time I saw a simulator was when I was hired to start teaching in them. And that's when I came to realize how revealing and eye-opening and mind-boggling the experience of simulator teaching can be.
That includes ALL costs including travel, hotels, etc.
.... and if we crash the thing we can still go for pints. 😁
Originally Posted by [email protected]
RL77CHC - the technique you describe is exactly how I, as an ex-mil pilot, would have done it but what is the legality of flying the aircraft manually (even if you are following the blue lines on the FD) below VminI?
I'm not saying it is difficult, because it isn't if you have been trained for it and checked on it, just asking why it doesn't form part of the IR.
I'm not saying it is difficult, because it isn't if you have been trained for it and checked on it, just asking why it doesn't form part of the IR.
These departures are trained and tested under company OPCs (‘base checks’). They aren’t tested under the EASA IR for a couple of reasons: firstly, the procedure is aircraft specific, not generic. But mainly, the IR(H) is primarily a test of fixed-wing IR procedures. There are virtually zero helicopter specific procedures which can actually be used in ‘the real world’.
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Cabby,
Every EMS Pilot in the World has experienced this on more than an in-frequent basis.
Dark holes in the woods or along a highway, in a wire environment, responding to a scene call with no notice in the pitch dark....middle of the night...lots of blood and gore...Med Crew struggling to get the patient taken care of.....that is the stock and trade for our folks doing the EMS thing.
Every EMS Pilot in the World has experienced this on more than an in-frequent basis.
Dark holes in the woods or along a highway, in a wire environment, responding to a scene call with no notice in the pitch dark....middle of the night...lots of blood and gore...Med Crew struggling to get the patient taken care of.....that is the stock and trade for our folks doing the EMS thing.
I find it hard to believe that the passengers were patiently, quietly sitting in the passenger compartment. I could easily immagine screaming, crying, and outright chaos.
Black Hole liftoft, short flight preparation, billionaire owner onboard, chaos in the passenger compartment. I am not sure that any of us pilots could reliably pull that off, or should even try. However, if it truly was a life and death situation, I am not sure as a pilot how you say no.....
Thanks for the feedback Sasless, but the quote you mentioned in post 286 about the passengers and their actions, I think you'll find it was from 626DM and not me.
It had been mentioned in post 281 where I enquired about the witness.
Last edited by Cabby; 15th Jul 2019 at 10:16. Reason: Earlier posts
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I think Malabo hit the nail on the head........
This departure is completely routine for the Offshore / EMS / Military guys. The CAT A helipad departure profile that needs to be flown in the AW139 does not change whether it's day or night, engine failure or not. The second that aircraft hits TDP and the pilots starts their rotation it's a pure instrument procedure after that. The flying pilot manually flies the profile and acknowledges the non flying pilots callouts while the non flying pilot make his standard calls and monitors for any deviations. If the deviation callout isn't acknowledged and or corrected by the flying pilot, the non flying pilot immediately takes control of the aircraft. This is standard two crew, multi ifr operations anywhere in the world.
I would guess that the departure SOPS's and callouts would look similar to this from 99% of the AW139 Multi Pilot, IFR operators out there
Flying Pilot "Lifting"
Applies collective to pull into hover
Non Flying Pilot "Two AP's"
Ensures both autopilots are on before the aircraft is pulled into the hover
Fly Pilot "C of G okay Hover Checks"
Calls for hover checks in a stable 5' hover
Non Flying Pilot "Flight Instrument Checked, Temperatures and Pressure in the green, CAS messages checked, you are hovering at XX PI, Target PI XX, Hover Checks Complete"
Flying Pilot "Departing"
Smoothly applies target takeoff power
Non Fly Pilot "Target PI Set"
Monitors PI and ensures the correct takeoff power is set
Flying Pilot "Check"
Non Flying Pilot "TDP"
Calls takeoff decision point, TDP, at the briefed radalt for the CAT A profile selected
Flying Pilot "Rotating"
Rotates to -10 degrees for one second and then levels the wings with the horizon on instruments
Non Flying Pilot "Two positive Rates of Climb"
Flying Pilot "Check"
Non Flying Pilot "Airspeed Alive"
Calls airspeed alive when it begins to move
Flying Pilot "Check"
Non Flying Pilot "VTOSS"
Calls VTOSS at 40 KIAS
Flying Pilot "Check"
Adjusts pitch to +5 degrees nose up
Non Flying Pilot "VY - Select 100NR"
Calls VY at 80 KIAS
Flying Pilot "Check - 100NR Selected Confirm?"
Non Flying Pilot "I confirm 100NR Selected"
Flying Pilot "Setting Climb Power"
Non Flying Pilot "Check Climb Power Is Set"
Etc, Etc, Etc
If a loss of power were to occur nothing changes with the calls or the profile. There might be a bit of NR droop initially but it wouldn't be below the minimum limitation if you did nothing with the collective at max gross weight. You would have to regain the NR to 100% passing VTOSS but this would only take a slight downward correction on the collective. The non flying pilot not only has to make the dozen or standard calls within the first 20-30 seconds of flight but also has to monitor for any deviations and be quick to take control if the calls aren't met with an immediate correction or acknowledgement. The list of standard deviation calls that most two crew, multi-ifr helicopter operators use is way more comprehensive than the standard SOP calls listed above on a CAT A helipad departure. The bottom line is this stuff is not hard at all when you train to proficiency. All of us can have our internal gyros toppled departing into a blackhole but if the monitoring, standard calls, deviation calls and a means to take control are all clearly defined this should be a non event. I'm interested to see how accurately the CAT A profile was flown and what calls were made between the flying pilot and non flying pilot from the hover point through the departure. The CVR and FDM data should sort that out extremely quickly. Does the NTSB issue a preliminary finding to rule out a mechanical issue or pilot error like we do in the UK? I know there are several operators that are crossing their fingers the fleet of AW139's isn't grounded due to a mechanical issue. This is still sounding like a classic CFIT(W) case with a flight crew that wasn't given the opportunity to maintain proficiency.
This departure is completely routine for the Offshore / EMS / Military guys. The CAT A helipad departure profile that needs to be flown in the AW139 does not change whether it's day or night, engine failure or not. The second that aircraft hits TDP and the pilots starts their rotation it's a pure instrument procedure after that. The flying pilot manually flies the profile and acknowledges the non flying pilots callouts while the non flying pilot make his standard calls and monitors for any deviations. If the deviation callout isn't acknowledged and or corrected by the flying pilot, the non flying pilot immediately takes control of the aircraft. This is standard two crew, multi ifr operations anywhere in the world.
I would guess that the departure SOPS's and callouts would look similar to this from 99% of the AW139 Multi Pilot, IFR operators out there
Flying Pilot "Lifting"
Applies collective to pull into hover
Non Flying Pilot "Two AP's"
Ensures both autopilots are on before the aircraft is pulled into the hover
Fly Pilot "C of G okay Hover Checks"
Calls for hover checks in a stable 5' hover
Non Flying Pilot "Flight Instrument Checked, Temperatures and Pressure in the green, CAS messages checked, you are hovering at XX PI, Target PI XX, Hover Checks Complete"
Flying Pilot "Departing"
Smoothly applies target takeoff power
Non Fly Pilot "Target PI Set"
Monitors PI and ensures the correct takeoff power is set
Flying Pilot "Check"
Non Flying Pilot "TDP"
Calls takeoff decision point, TDP, at the briefed radalt for the CAT A profile selected
Flying Pilot "Rotating"
Rotates to -10 degrees for one second and then levels the wings with the horizon on instruments
Non Flying Pilot "Two positive Rates of Climb"
Flying Pilot "Check"
Non Flying Pilot "Airspeed Alive"
Calls airspeed alive when it begins to move
Flying Pilot "Check"
Non Flying Pilot "VTOSS"
Calls VTOSS at 40 KIAS
Flying Pilot "Check"
Adjusts pitch to +5 degrees nose up
Non Flying Pilot "VY - Select 100NR"
Calls VY at 80 KIAS
Flying Pilot "Check - 100NR Selected Confirm?"
Non Flying Pilot "I confirm 100NR Selected"
Flying Pilot "Setting Climb Power"
Non Flying Pilot "Check Climb Power Is Set"
Etc, Etc, Etc
If a loss of power were to occur nothing changes with the calls or the profile. There might be a bit of NR droop initially but it wouldn't be below the minimum limitation if you did nothing with the collective at max gross weight. You would have to regain the NR to 100% passing VTOSS but this would only take a slight downward correction on the collective. The non flying pilot not only has to make the dozen or standard calls within the first 20-30 seconds of flight but also has to monitor for any deviations and be quick to take control if the calls aren't met with an immediate correction or acknowledgement. The list of standard deviation calls that most two crew, multi-ifr helicopter operators use is way more comprehensive than the standard SOP calls listed above on a CAT A helipad departure. The bottom line is this stuff is not hard at all when you train to proficiency. All of us can have our internal gyros toppled departing into a blackhole but if the monitoring, standard calls, deviation calls and a means to take control are all clearly defined this should be a non event. I'm interested to see how accurately the CAT A profile was flown and what calls were made between the flying pilot and non flying pilot from the hover point through the departure. The CVR and FDM data should sort that out extremely quickly. Does the NTSB issue a preliminary finding to rule out a mechanical issue or pilot error like we do in the UK? I know there are several operators that are crossing their fingers the fleet of AW139's isn't grounded due to a mechanical issue. This is still sounding like a classic CFIT(W) case with a flight crew that wasn't given the opportunity to maintain proficiency.
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To save you an unnecessary visit to the ABC site the quote is simply a confirmation that NTSB has taken over (as I have suggested earlier in this thread) and that a preliminary report will be out within 2 weeks.
Both FDR have been recovered. No mention of readability but I guess shouldn't be a issue here.
Both FDR have been recovered. No mention of readability but I guess shouldn't be a issue here.
Bravo73 - I agree with what you say regarding training for such departures but you are talking about offshore pilots departing from helidecks with this procedure as part of their OPC.
Were either of the pilots in this accident offshore trained? Even if they were how long since they did an offshore OPC to practice this technique.
I completely get the 139 profile, I've done it myself both in the sim and the aircraft but if you have two guys not au fait with the procedures and calls then any distraction could be problematic.
I understand the IR is FW orientated but I don't understand why the helicopter community hasn't pushed for something that better represents RW ops - God knows we've been doing them long enough.
The basic military IFTO can be SP or MP and is very similar to the 139 procedure detailed by RL77CHC but you wait for positive climb on rad alt and bar alt before starting to transition forwards as there is no TDP.
We will eventually learn the cause of this accident but if it turns out to be CFIT, saying offshore pilots could do it easily isn't very helpful since it seems they weren't.
Were either of the pilots in this accident offshore trained? Even if they were how long since they did an offshore OPC to practice this technique.
I completely get the 139 profile, I've done it myself both in the sim and the aircraft but if you have two guys not au fait with the procedures and calls then any distraction could be problematic.
I understand the IR is FW orientated but I don't understand why the helicopter community hasn't pushed for something that better represents RW ops - God knows we've been doing them long enough.
The basic military IFTO can be SP or MP and is very similar to the 139 procedure detailed by RL77CHC but you wait for positive climb on rad alt and bar alt before starting to transition forwards as there is no TDP.
We will eventually learn the cause of this accident but if it turns out to be CFIT, saying offshore pilots could do it easily isn't very helpful since it seems they weren't.
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Crab,
You brought up some good discussion points in your last post. Assessing a candidate on a PPC/LPC in the Level D simulator for an instrument departure requires they maintain runway heading +/- 5 degrees until VY under EASA, TC, FAA and the CAA. Any deviation outside of this tolerance that is not corrected in a timely manner would generate a “2” or below standard grade.
If flight safety was compromised the checkride would be assessed as a failure and stopped. Windsocks, antennas and other infield obstacles become the concern if the Flight Crew drift off the runway due to poor heading control.
Now applying these same heading tolerances to a night helipad departure into a black hole would pretty much guarantee a slew of unsuccessful checkrides and suspended instrument privileges for most of us, myself included some days. During monitored checkrides there is no breathing room for the TRE. Greater than 5 degrees, correction not made in a timely manner and it’s a fail for the two guys up front. Keeping the low visibility fix wing type runway departure in those checkrides rather than a helicopter specific helipad departure is probably by design.
Maintaining that heading within 5 degrees or less is definitely a developed skill that most guys struggle with. Until the aircraft hits 40 KIAS it’s up to the pilot’s boots to keep it tracking straight out which is easier said than done. Most of us yaw a little off the bug and then come back quickly but 5 degrees or less is damn challenging.
We are not assessed doing these departures on OPC’s either as they are in the daylight only where I work. Our opportunity to practice “black hole” helipad and helideck departures happens at night offshore in the actual aircraft every 90 days and during our annual simulator training and LOFT session after the checkride in the sim. Each pilot does no less than six takeoffs each during the LOFT concentrating on their scan and technique at different weights. We do another 3-4 night helipad departures during the IFR training sessions before the checkride.
As soon as they are climbing through VY we snapshot them back to the rig for another departure in quick succession. Various incapacitation events are introduced as are minor distracting emergencies to get the crew to focus on flying the profile first or rejecting prior to rotation without hesitation.
If our guys are weak during the training, specifically helipad black hole departures, the sim instructor does not sign them off for the checkride. We’ve had several pilots require additional specific IFR training before the instructor gives them the go ahead as it should be. Unfortunately, there’s too much turning a blind eye pencil whipping Checkrides and Training out there. Eventually it catches up with individual and something bad happens.........
You brought up some good discussion points in your last post. Assessing a candidate on a PPC/LPC in the Level D simulator for an instrument departure requires they maintain runway heading +/- 5 degrees until VY under EASA, TC, FAA and the CAA. Any deviation outside of this tolerance that is not corrected in a timely manner would generate a “2” or below standard grade.
If flight safety was compromised the checkride would be assessed as a failure and stopped. Windsocks, antennas and other infield obstacles become the concern if the Flight Crew drift off the runway due to poor heading control.
Now applying these same heading tolerances to a night helipad departure into a black hole would pretty much guarantee a slew of unsuccessful checkrides and suspended instrument privileges for most of us, myself included some days. During monitored checkrides there is no breathing room for the TRE. Greater than 5 degrees, correction not made in a timely manner and it’s a fail for the two guys up front. Keeping the low visibility fix wing type runway departure in those checkrides rather than a helicopter specific helipad departure is probably by design.
Maintaining that heading within 5 degrees or less is definitely a developed skill that most guys struggle with. Until the aircraft hits 40 KIAS it’s up to the pilot’s boots to keep it tracking straight out which is easier said than done. Most of us yaw a little off the bug and then come back quickly but 5 degrees or less is damn challenging.
We are not assessed doing these departures on OPC’s either as they are in the daylight only where I work. Our opportunity to practice “black hole” helipad and helideck departures happens at night offshore in the actual aircraft every 90 days and during our annual simulator training and LOFT session after the checkride in the sim. Each pilot does no less than six takeoffs each during the LOFT concentrating on their scan and technique at different weights. We do another 3-4 night helipad departures during the IFR training sessions before the checkride.
As soon as they are climbing through VY we snapshot them back to the rig for another departure in quick succession. Various incapacitation events are introduced as are minor distracting emergencies to get the crew to focus on flying the profile first or rejecting prior to rotation without hesitation.
If our guys are weak during the training, specifically helipad black hole departures, the sim instructor does not sign them off for the checkride. We’ve had several pilots require additional specific IFR training before the instructor gives them the go ahead as it should be. Unfortunately, there’s too much turning a blind eye pencil whipping Checkrides and Training out there. Eventually it catches up with individual and something bad happens.........
That's interesting stuff RL77CHC, it will be illuminating to know what, if any, training on such profiles the crew in this case had experienced.
Maintaining that heading within 5 degrees or less is definitely a developed skill that most guys struggle with. Until the aircraft hits 40 KIAS it’s up to the pilot’s boots to keep it tracking straight out which is easier said than done.