FAI into Clutha crash opens
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I often wonder whether 2 engines have any real tangible benefit in the helicopter world.
For prolonged transits over 'hostile' terrain I can see the rationale - which was originally airline's reasons for having extra engines - but for non-complex operations, there must be statistics that suggest that B206's have done a lot better in some areas ...
For prolonged transits over 'hostile' terrain I can see the rationale - which was originally airline's reasons for having extra engines - but for non-complex operations, there must be statistics that suggest that B206's have done a lot better in some areas ...
I often wonder whether 2 engines have any real tangible benefit in the helicopter world.
For prolonged transits over 'hostile' terrain I can see the rationale - which was originally airline's reasons for having extra engines - but for non-complex operations, there must be statistics that suggest that B206's have done a lot better in some areas ...
For prolonged transits over 'hostile' terrain I can see the rationale - which was originally airline's reasons for having extra engines - but for non-complex operations, there must be statistics that suggest that B206's have done a lot better in some areas ...
And even nowadays I d rather have a spare engine operating over congested areas, hovering prolonged times, day and night.
If a donk fails on you it’s just more relaxing having another one keeping you in the air instead of the need to react instantaneously to recover the Nr, getting speed, deciding where to autorotate to (especially at night with NVG).
How many engine failures had I?
One sputtering engine allowing limited power only, on a Bell206 where parts of the compressor housing went through the engine , several times when I tried to increase power - with passengers on board,
One engine to shut down on a Bo105
One engine to shut down on a BK117
The occurrences on the twins were much less stressful, nearly „non events“, except for the paperwork involved...
So ne question for me, what I prefer....
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That could probably be just what this pilot and many others were thinking too...
OR the imaginary world where engine redundancy is an imagined magic cure?
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It DOES NOT concur with the EASA data analysis, which gives about 10% of the 20% that are system failures.
Are you including engine accidents for twins there?
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anchorhold
The relatives DO need closure. This isn’t endless inquiries, this is THE inquiry. The AAIB report will be part of it. An inquest doesn’t just look at why the helicopter crashed. It looks at post crash responses, lessons to be learned and more importantly, how EACH and every victim died. It looks at many many things other than the accident report. In other words, it’s vital. So, apology accepted.
Now, why don’t we all listen to what is said over the next 6 months, see if we can learn anything new about what happened and let the families have the inquest that they deserve. It’s not all about compensation you know.........
The relatives DO need closure. This isn’t endless inquiries, this is THE inquiry. The AAIB report will be part of it. An inquest doesn’t just look at why the helicopter crashed. It looks at post crash responses, lessons to be learned and more importantly, how EACH and every victim died. It looks at many many things other than the accident report. In other words, it’s vital. So, apology accepted.
Now, why don’t we all listen to what is said over the next 6 months, see if we can learn anything new about what happened and let the families have the inquest that they deserve. It’s not all about compensation you know.........
DV
I haven’t seen these posted before but this is the list of issues the FAI will address
SHERIFFDOM OF GLASGOW AND STRATHKELVIN
Court Ref: GLW-B1473-18
CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ISSUES
1. When and where each of the deaths occurred.
2. When and where the aircraft crash occurred.
3. The cause or causes of each of the deaths.
4. The cause or causes of the helicopter crash, including:-
4.1. how fuel was managed on the aircraft and in particular why both
transfer pumps were switched OFF, rendering unusable the
otherwise usable fuel in the main tank;
4.2. whether the Pilot’s Checklist was available to the pilot;
4.3. whether it was within the competence of a helicopter pilot
qualified to fly G-SPAO on police duties to comply with the
requirements of the Pilot’s Checklist;
4.4. at what stage in flight did the LOW FUEL warnings likely occur;
4.5. why, having acknowledged the LOW FUEL warnings, did the pilot
not complete the actions detailed in the Pilot’s Checklist;
4.6. whether the timing and/or the initially intermittent character of the LOW FUEL warnings contributed to the Pilot’s Checklist procedure not being completed;
4.7. whether there have been other instances of LOW FUEL warnings
not being followed;
4.8. whether the pilot believed the fuel transfer pumps were
operating, notwithstanding the LOW FUEL warnings, because he believed he had switched the fuel transfer pumps back ON, and if so whether the design or layout of the switches contributed to such errors occurring;
4.9. whether the pilot believed the transfer pumps were operating, notwithstanding the LOW FUEL warnings, as a result of erroneous fuel indications being displayed on the CAD;
4.10.what the root cause or causes were of any such erroneous fuel indications and whether they were adequately investigated and acted upon prior to the accident;
4.11.whether there was a failure of any part of the CAD prior to the accident;
4.12.what steps were open to a helicopter pilot qualified to fly this helicopter after both engines flamed out;
4.13.whether the designed time-interval between engine flame-outs was compromised by the design of the fuel tank system and, in particular, the undivided volume above the supply tanks, which, depending on the attitude of the helicopter, might have allowed fuel to migrate from one supply tank to another;
4.14.why autorotation, flare recovery and landing were not completed successfully;
4.15.whether the ability to carry out autorotation, flare recovery and landing was compromised by the design of the cockpit layout.
5. The precautions, if any, which could reasonably have been taken, and which, had they been taken, might realistically have resulted in the helicopter crash being avoided, including whether the crash might realistically have been avoided:-
5.1. by including within the fuel contents indication system a caution or warning that both transfer pumps were switched OFF;
5.2. by including within the fuel contents indication system a caution or warning that a fuel pump, having been switched OFF, has since been submerged in fuel;
5.3. by designing the fuel tank system and fuel contents indication system in such a way that the fuel transfer pumps did not require to be switched ON or OFF during flight;
5.4. by including within the fuel contents indication system a caution or warning, in the case of anomalous or implausible combinations of outputs from the sensors;
5.5. by designing the fuel tank system, and in particular the differential capacities of the supply tanks, in such a way as to ensure that the design objective of creating an interval of 3-4 minutes between engine flame-outs, or such other interval of time as would be represented by 4.5kg of fuel, or any other safe interval of time, was achieved;
5.6. by ensuring that power to the RADALT and steerable landing light was automatically maintained in the event of a double engine flame- out.
6. The defects, if any, in any system of working which contributed to the deaths or the accident, including:-
6.1. whether any aspect of the system of maintenance of G-SPAO, including its washing regime, contributed to the contamination of the fuel and/or the fuel tank system with water;
6.2. whether any aspect of the pre-flight check procedures contributed to the accident occurring;
6.3. whether any aspect of the training of pilots, in particular, with regard to fueling, pre-flight checks, the pilot handover procedure, the operation of the fuel contents indication system, erroneous fuel indications, the appropriate response to fuel cautions and warnings, and the execution of an autorotation at night, contributed to the accident occurring;
6.4. whether the practice of the “day-shift” pilot handing the aircraft over already fueled to the “night-shift” pilot contributed to the accident occurring.
7. any other facts which are relevant to the circumstances of the deaths, including:-
7.1. whether, and the extent to which, the Safety Recommendations of the AAIB in their Report 3/2015 have been adopted and implemented;
7.2. whether, and the extent to which, the operator, helicopter manufacturer and engine manufacturer have taken necessary and appropriate safety actions following the accident, including those considered by the AAIB in their Report 3/2015;
7.3. whether, and the extent to which, any recommendations should be made by this Court.
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/de...9.pdf?sfvrsn=2
SHERIFFDOM OF GLASGOW AND STRATHKELVIN
Court Ref: GLW-B1473-18
CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ISSUES
1. When and where each of the deaths occurred.
2. When and where the aircraft crash occurred.
3. The cause or causes of each of the deaths.
4. The cause or causes of the helicopter crash, including:-
4.1. how fuel was managed on the aircraft and in particular why both
transfer pumps were switched OFF, rendering unusable the
otherwise usable fuel in the main tank;
4.2. whether the Pilot’s Checklist was available to the pilot;
4.3. whether it was within the competence of a helicopter pilot
qualified to fly G-SPAO on police duties to comply with the
requirements of the Pilot’s Checklist;
4.4. at what stage in flight did the LOW FUEL warnings likely occur;
4.5. why, having acknowledged the LOW FUEL warnings, did the pilot
not complete the actions detailed in the Pilot’s Checklist;
4.6. whether the timing and/or the initially intermittent character of the LOW FUEL warnings contributed to the Pilot’s Checklist procedure not being completed;
4.7. whether there have been other instances of LOW FUEL warnings
not being followed;
4.8. whether the pilot believed the fuel transfer pumps were
operating, notwithstanding the LOW FUEL warnings, because he believed he had switched the fuel transfer pumps back ON, and if so whether the design or layout of the switches contributed to such errors occurring;
4.9. whether the pilot believed the transfer pumps were operating, notwithstanding the LOW FUEL warnings, as a result of erroneous fuel indications being displayed on the CAD;
4.10.what the root cause or causes were of any such erroneous fuel indications and whether they were adequately investigated and acted upon prior to the accident;
4.11.whether there was a failure of any part of the CAD prior to the accident;
4.12.what steps were open to a helicopter pilot qualified to fly this helicopter after both engines flamed out;
4.13.whether the designed time-interval between engine flame-outs was compromised by the design of the fuel tank system and, in particular, the undivided volume above the supply tanks, which, depending on the attitude of the helicopter, might have allowed fuel to migrate from one supply tank to another;
4.14.why autorotation, flare recovery and landing were not completed successfully;
4.15.whether the ability to carry out autorotation, flare recovery and landing was compromised by the design of the cockpit layout.
5. The precautions, if any, which could reasonably have been taken, and which, had they been taken, might realistically have resulted in the helicopter crash being avoided, including whether the crash might realistically have been avoided:-
5.1. by including within the fuel contents indication system a caution or warning that both transfer pumps were switched OFF;
5.2. by including within the fuel contents indication system a caution or warning that a fuel pump, having been switched OFF, has since been submerged in fuel;
5.3. by designing the fuel tank system and fuel contents indication system in such a way that the fuel transfer pumps did not require to be switched ON or OFF during flight;
5.4. by including within the fuel contents indication system a caution or warning, in the case of anomalous or implausible combinations of outputs from the sensors;
5.5. by designing the fuel tank system, and in particular the differential capacities of the supply tanks, in such a way as to ensure that the design objective of creating an interval of 3-4 minutes between engine flame-outs, or such other interval of time as would be represented by 4.5kg of fuel, or any other safe interval of time, was achieved;
5.6. by ensuring that power to the RADALT and steerable landing light was automatically maintained in the event of a double engine flame- out.
6. The defects, if any, in any system of working which contributed to the deaths or the accident, including:-
6.1. whether any aspect of the system of maintenance of G-SPAO, including its washing regime, contributed to the contamination of the fuel and/or the fuel tank system with water;
6.2. whether any aspect of the pre-flight check procedures contributed to the accident occurring;
6.3. whether any aspect of the training of pilots, in particular, with regard to fueling, pre-flight checks, the pilot handover procedure, the operation of the fuel contents indication system, erroneous fuel indications, the appropriate response to fuel cautions and warnings, and the execution of an autorotation at night, contributed to the accident occurring;
6.4. whether the practice of the “day-shift” pilot handing the aircraft over already fueled to the “night-shift” pilot contributed to the accident occurring.
7. any other facts which are relevant to the circumstances of the deaths, including:-
7.1. whether, and the extent to which, the Safety Recommendations of the AAIB in their Report 3/2015 have been adopted and implemented;
7.2. whether, and the extent to which, the operator, helicopter manufacturer and engine manufacturer have taken necessary and appropriate safety actions following the accident, including those considered by the AAIB in their Report 3/2015;
7.3. whether, and the extent to which, any recommendations should be made by this Court.
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/de...9.pdf?sfvrsn=2
Last edited by chinook240; 26th Apr 2019 at 19:00.
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Looks like the investigating officers have been asking the right questions. Hopefully the armchair investigators who had all the answers on Pprune will now realise there are many more issues that need to be addressed before we character assassinate Dave. The conclusion may or may not agree with the original board, however he will be able to rest in peace, knowing that he has been given a more thorough hearing. Everyone involved deserves that.
Yes. These are essentially the sub-sub-sections of section 6. sub-section (1) of the 1976 Act, with (a) and (b) each split into two streams to address the individual deaths and the crash event separately. It fleshes out the statutory purposes of the Inquiry to the next level of detail, almost certainly by the Procurator Fiscal, so that it provides a framework for the PF to present the evidence.
Nice, encompassing questionaire, but there is one important question missing:
4.16 whether the ability to carry out autorotation, flare recovery and landing was compromised by Helicopter Police of Scotland (sp?)
through not providing sufficient opportunities for their pilots to practice real world EOLs in EC135 types, by day and night.
Now, lets see virtual hands from those EC135 drivers on pprune, that actually did practice real EOL in an 135!
And how many of you did practice them at night, w/o rad-alt?
anyone at all?
4.16 whether the ability to carry out autorotation, flare recovery and landing was compromised by Helicopter Police of Scotland (sp?)
through not providing sufficient opportunities for their pilots to practice real world EOLs in EC135 types, by day and night.
Now, lets see virtual hands from those EC135 drivers on pprune, that actually did practice real EOL in an 135!
And how many of you did practice them at night, w/o rad-alt?
anyone at all?
But it would enhance the chance to get things right- i.e. switching the EmerShedBus early with the first problems arising, (low fuel warning i.e.), if pilots had a go in a simulator once or twice a year....
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Simulator time. Training budget.
Certainly saw a night and day different approach to risk management once the police employed us directly. As pilot's provided by a contractor we had the absolute minimum training the employer was mandated to provide. Once we were tupe'd across to direct employment the gravity of responsibility hit home with the police employer and we regular took part in simulator, first aid, fire fighting and dunked training.
I was flamed for suggesting this earlier, but as it's a rumour site, I'll try again...
Has there been any investigation into the personal relationships between the souls on board? All the points to be covered reflect technical issues - either physical systems, training, compliance, procedural, etc. but what about emotional factors? It wouldn't be the first time an aircraft was deliberately crashed...
Has there been any investigation into the personal relationships between the souls on board? All the points to be covered reflect technical issues - either physical systems, training, compliance, procedural, etc. but what about emotional factors? It wouldn't be the first time an aircraft was deliberately crashed...
I fly a 135 most night shifts. I still don't understand why they ran out of fuel. There are so many warnings, notwithstanding basic airmanship that it makes no sense at all. Mission lock possibly coupled with poor CRM is the only conclusion that I can come up with.
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toptobottom, RVDT,
While personal relationships and personal issues may be relevant, they are unlikely to be considered outside of professional CRM issues aboard the aircraft. If there were known issues prior to the flight, management will be heavily censured and criticised for not doing anything about it. Close or familial relationships are generally forbidden between officers serving together, although it is not unknown for husband and wife to serve at the same station and/or work together in the same vehicle. The problem is that allegations of collusion will be levelled if an account of events by such officers is disputed.
If such matters are considered, it is likely that that part of the FAI will be heard behind closed doors and the conclusions omitted from the final report unless they point directly to being a primary cause of this incident.
While personal relationships and personal issues may be relevant, they are unlikely to be considered outside of professional CRM issues aboard the aircraft. If there were known issues prior to the flight, management will be heavily censured and criticised for not doing anything about it. Close or familial relationships are generally forbidden between officers serving together, although it is not unknown for husband and wife to serve at the same station and/or work together in the same vehicle. The problem is that allegations of collusion will be levelled if an account of events by such officers is disputed.
If such matters are considered, it is likely that that part of the FAI will be heard behind closed doors and the conclusions omitted from the final report unless they point directly to being a primary cause of this incident.
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Evil Twin and RVDT - while I get this is a rumour forum and bearing in mind I did not know the Pilot I am struggling to understand how you can possibly come up with that hypothesis.
