Helicopter down outside Leicester City Football Club
Zero accident deaths ... last year
"2017 safest year on record for commercial passenger air travel
Airlines recorded zero accident deaths in commercial passenger jets last year,"
Probably carried more people in the first hour of 2017 than the entire global helicopter industry in the whole year. Someone might be able to work it out properly.
Helicopters are not as safe.
The aforementioned helicopter passengers seem to be behaving quite rationally.
Jet airliners and operations have proven themselves safe. Helicopters - still some way to go it seems.
I’ve just picked on this individual post because it sort of illustrates my point; absolutely no criticism of it or the poster is intended.
Is it a particular helicopter thing to demand groundings the moment something happens?
On Monday a 737 crashed into the sea killing everyone on board, but I’ve yet to see any calls for 737s to be grounded.
In 2014 a 777 vanished without trace in the Indian Ocean, but I saw no calls for the 777s to be grounded, or questions about lack of emergency ADs/ASBs?
Three weeks after the 2016 EC225 crash in Norway, an Egyptian A320 crashed into the Med, with total loss of life. The cause is (AFAIK) still not known, yet our oil workers were happy to fly to Aberdeen on an Airbus A320 the next day before refusing to fly on an Airbus EC225.
What is it with helicopters that we have to react this way when our FW cousins do not?
Is it a particular helicopter thing to demand groundings the moment something happens?
On Monday a 737 crashed into the sea killing everyone on board, but I’ve yet to see any calls for 737s to be grounded.
In 2014 a 777 vanished without trace in the Indian Ocean, but I saw no calls for the 777s to be grounded, or questions about lack of emergency ADs/ASBs?
Three weeks after the 2016 EC225 crash in Norway, an Egyptian A320 crashed into the Med, with total loss of life. The cause is (AFAIK) still not known, yet our oil workers were happy to fly to Aberdeen on an Airbus A320 the next day before refusing to fly on an Airbus EC225.
What is it with helicopters that we have to react this way when our FW cousins do not?
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The probable causes now remain:
Part of the TR assembly failed and departed flight.
Something struck the tail area causing a catastrophic failure.
Part of the TR assembly failed and departed flight.
Something struck the tail area causing a catastrophic failure.
Yep, I reckon. Countless times trying to get out of a tight spot in the boonies, back it up as far as you can go, get some airspeed whilst still in ground effect and then zoom climb it out at best angle. Many of those you'd never get out vertically, you just run out of puff before finding clear air above the trees.
Yep, I'm wondering the same thing, why so high? Doing rejected elevated heliport night takeoffs in a S76 from 60' CDP is a pretty harrowing experience on the way down. I'd be uncomfortable being needlessly exposed any higher without airspeed.
Statistically, is it in fact more or less just as probable that other causes remain to be considered - however apparently unlikely - i.e. pilot incapacity, sabotage, etc?
Watching video's taken from several perspectives does tend to point one's interest in one direction but absent more definitive information pointing a finger at a cause at this time is pure speculation.
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The only 169 profile suitable to this stadium which factors obstacle clearance is the variable TDP helipad. The TDP is 115ft + the height of the obstacle in your takeoff path so I’d guess a minimum of 250-300ft. The single engine failure before TDP is a not an overly ‘dynamic’ manoeuvre unlike some types. You need good references through the chin window and you fly back down the same path with up to 192% TQ available.
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The back up profile as used in this case, and on most AirBus helicopters actually is quite gentle. You have power in hand (it should never need full power until you rotate into forward flight), keep the take-off point in view all the time and the reject is a reduction in collective to contain the power (not slamming it down) drop the nose around 8 degrees and the aircraft flies back to the take-off point slowly and under full control, over the pad use collective to cushion the touch down. Like a few of the posters on this thread I use that technique most working days, I trust it, and practise rejects every six months. I never liked the S76 vertical due to the application of full power when on the ground, the loss of site picture and aggressive reject.
Give me what Eric did every time. The back up technique also guarantees obstacle clearance in the event of an engine failure after TDP.
And for those who doubt a goose could down a helicopter, how about the Blackhawk in January 2014 in Cley, Norfolk, UK, But I really don't believe either geeese, mute swans or anything else at the moment.
SND
Posted on another thread but probably best here.
Engines should meet a reliability figure of 1 x 10**-5; in ICAO parlance, this qualifies them as very reliable (the reason for the low standard is that a failure, at worst, should only result in an outcome of 'Major' - i.e. 'physical distress including injuries).
Tail-rotors should meet a reliability figure of 1 x 10**-9 because a failure could result in an outcome of 'Hazardous' or 'Catastrophic' - i.e. a fatality or multiple fatalities.
Reliability targets for tail-rotors are therefore 4 orders of magnitude better than engines - i.e. 10,000.
(A probability does not mean that a failure will occur after the reliability number has been reached, it can occur at any time but it should only occur once in the period.)
A helicopter certificated in Category A can depart or arrive utilising Category A procedures where failure of an engine should not result in damage.
A single-engine helicopter can depart or arrive using a Category B procedure where failure of the engine should not result in damage. It does this by accelerating below the HV avoid curve until it achieves a climb speed clear of the 'knee' of the HV curve.
Any departure other than that published in the Flight Manual - for either a Category A or Category B helicopter - could, following an engine-failure, result in a 'Hazardous' or 'Catastrophic' outcome (with a probability for a single of 1 x 10**-5, or for a twin or 2 x 10**-5).
An engine-failure in the cruise for a twin will be a non-event. An engine-failure in the cruise for a single might result in an outcome of 'Major' (as above) unless it is being flown over a hostile environment in which case the outcome might be 'Hazardous' or 'Catastrophic'.
In the recent accident, the profile flown was the AW169 Category A variable TDP procedure. Whatever caused the accident was not the result of having flown this procedure. It was within the defined and certified operational envelope.
JimL
Engines should meet a reliability figure of 1 x 10**-5; in ICAO parlance, this qualifies them as very reliable (the reason for the low standard is that a failure, at worst, should only result in an outcome of 'Major' - i.e. 'physical distress including injuries).
Tail-rotors should meet a reliability figure of 1 x 10**-9 because a failure could result in an outcome of 'Hazardous' or 'Catastrophic' - i.e. a fatality or multiple fatalities.
Reliability targets for tail-rotors are therefore 4 orders of magnitude better than engines - i.e. 10,000.
(A probability does not mean that a failure will occur after the reliability number has been reached, it can occur at any time but it should only occur once in the period.)
A helicopter certificated in Category A can depart or arrive utilising Category A procedures where failure of an engine should not result in damage.
A single-engine helicopter can depart or arrive using a Category B procedure where failure of the engine should not result in damage. It does this by accelerating below the HV avoid curve until it achieves a climb speed clear of the 'knee' of the HV curve.
Any departure other than that published in the Flight Manual - for either a Category A or Category B helicopter - could, following an engine-failure, result in a 'Hazardous' or 'Catastrophic' outcome (with a probability for a single of 1 x 10**-5, or for a twin or 2 x 10**-5).
An engine-failure in the cruise for a twin will be a non-event. An engine-failure in the cruise for a single might result in an outcome of 'Major' (as above) unless it is being flown over a hostile environment in which case the outcome might be 'Hazardous' or 'Catastrophic'.
In the recent accident, the profile flown was the AW169 Category A variable TDP procedure. Whatever caused the accident was not the result of having flown this procedure. It was within the defined and certified operational envelope.
JimL
With the scant information available to the public at this point....Commonsense alone indicates considering all possible causes to be the bett4er course.
Watching video's taken from several perspectives does tend to point one's interest in one direction but absent more definitive information pointing a finger at a cause at this time is pure speculation.
Watching video's taken from several perspectives does tend to point one's interest in one direction but absent more definitive information pointing a finger at a cause at this time is pure speculation.
The maxim is keep your mouth shut and your eyes wide open and let the investigation unravel the cause and effect.
This is particularly important when there is loss of life.
a reduction in collective to contain the power (not slamming it down)
I never liked the S76 vertical due to the application of full power when on the ground, the loss of site picture and aggressive reject.
And for those who doubt a goose could down a helicopter, how about the Blackhawk in January 2014 in Cley, Norfolk, UK, But I really don't believe either geeese, mute swans or anything else at the moment.
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[QUOTE=Torquetalk;10301362]Is max power not limited by automatic switching to an OEI mode as with the 139? Lowing the collective in a 139 reject is to check the climb and intiate descent, and need not be (often should not be) a big reduction.
I don't know on the 169, I've only got as far as looking at it for a prospective purchaser, but the reject should only need a check down. I don't know how the 169 protections work, but what you state is logical. I do think that the thinking from the colonies is that a Class 1back-up is either complex or tough on the aircraft. It just isn't. In fact the easiest part of it is that apart from a look to make sure you're inside SSE, and the thing isn't on fire, the whole reject is flown on the edge of the translational burble, giving fantastic references for speed being right, allowing eyes out to touch down, and that is the same on every aircraft I've flown with such a profile apart from the S76.
SND
I don't know on the 169, I've only got as far as looking at it for a prospective purchaser, but the reject should only need a check down. I don't know how the 169 protections work, but what you state is logical. I do think that the thinking from the colonies is that a Class 1back-up is either complex or tough on the aircraft. It just isn't. In fact the easiest part of it is that apart from a look to make sure you're inside SSE, and the thing isn't on fire, the whole reject is flown on the edge of the translational burble, giving fantastic references for speed being right, allowing eyes out to touch down, and that is the same on every aircraft I've flown with such a profile apart from the S76.
SND
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I was really wondering if there could have been a perceived anomaly in the performance/response or any other aspect of the aircraft (that we can't see) that might have lead to the pilot wanting to gain more height that 'normal' and that, if so, whether this might give any clues as to what subsequently caused the apparent catastrophic failure (that we can see).
Zero Airspeed Auto with pedal turns.....normal part of every CoA Airtest on Bell 212's for sure SASless
UK CAA Certificate of Airwothiness Test Flight Requirement.
The CAA had some interesting requirements for the CoA.
UK CAA Certificate of Airwothiness Test Flight Requirement.
The CAA had some interesting requirements for the CoA.
I completely understand that the procedure was 'within the defined and certified operational envelope' - my question was whether or not it was 'normal' in terms of how others had observed this and similar aircraft taking off from this location in similar circumstances before. Equally, I didn't mean to suggest that - even if the procedure was 'abnormal' in those terms, it was the cause of the accident.
I was really wondering if there could have been a perceived anomaly in the performance/response or any other aspect of the aircraft (that we can't see) that might have lead to the pilot wanting to gain more height that 'normal' and that, if so, whether this might give any clues as to what subsequently caused the apparent catastrophic failure (that we can see).
I was really wondering if there could have been a perceived anomaly in the performance/response or any other aspect of the aircraft (that we can't see) that might have lead to the pilot wanting to gain more height that 'normal' and that, if so, whether this might give any clues as to what subsequently caused the apparent catastrophic failure (that we can see).
The only 169 profile suitable to this stadium which factors obstacle clearance is the variable TDP helipad. The TDP is 115ft + the height of the obstacle in your takeoff path so I’d guess a minimum of 250-300ft. The single engine failure before TDP is a not an overly ‘dynamic’ manoeuvre unlike some types. You need good references through the chin window and you fly back down the same path with up to 192% TQ available.
So what?
Countless times trying to get out of a tight spot in the boonies, back it up as far as you can go, get some airspeed whilst still in ground effect and then zoom climb it out at best angle. Many of those you'd never get out vertically, you just run out of puff before finding clear air above the trees.
Cables near statium
There are 100 foot towers with cables to the north and east of the stadium. the stadium is in blue, centre background.
Would this influence departure planning?
According to Google Earth's radar the stadium flat roof is 19m above the pitch.
https://goo.gl/maps/ZLNQyosngDu
Leicester City Football ground - in blue.
Would this influence departure planning?
According to Google Earth's radar the stadium flat roof is 19m above the pitch.
https://goo.gl/maps/ZLNQyosngDu
Leicester City Football ground - in blue.
And I ˋm not talking engine chips, had actually parts of the compressor going through the engine, a friend a loose generator smashing the engine bay, but no tailrotor related issues so far....
