Helicopter down outside Leicester City Football Club
The context was trying to auto to deal with a catastrophic anti-torque failure within that height range.
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Having watched the video's it looks like the a/c just dropped while spinning. If the pilot had become incapacitated I doubt the front seat passenger would have had time to do anything with the controls.
In the offshore industry pilots are trained incase a pilot ever becomes incapacitated. The technique used is to pull back on the collapsed pilots harness, which isn't as easy as it looks, while making sure the seat harness locks are on, to stop the pilot falling forward onto the controls.
In the video taken from the pitch it would appear that the a/c engines are still running during the descent as there doesn't appear to be any change in the noise, so the pilot didn't turn the engines off. The witness on the ground said it went silent? Maybe lack of tail rotor noise on the descent?
The lack of any AD's nearly a week since the accident to check other AW169's, makes me wonder if the AAIB haven't found any obvious mechanical failures at the moment? Does the AW169 type have a cockpit voice recorder?
What surprised me watching the video taken near to the crash site was the way the post crash fire seemed to consume the cabin Very quickly. The two brave pc's who approached the crashed a/c managed to get close to the cockpit until an explosion made them move away. Don't Leonardo fit crash proof fuel tanks to this new type of a/c?
When was it last serviced, and was the AD sent out to all operators in Sept 2018 for the Emergency Windows, actually completed?
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-englan...shire-46017499
In the offshore industry pilots are trained incase a pilot ever becomes incapacitated. The technique used is to pull back on the collapsed pilots harness, which isn't as easy as it looks, while making sure the seat harness locks are on, to stop the pilot falling forward onto the controls.
In the video taken from the pitch it would appear that the a/c engines are still running during the descent as there doesn't appear to be any change in the noise, so the pilot didn't turn the engines off. The witness on the ground said it went silent? Maybe lack of tail rotor noise on the descent?
The lack of any AD's nearly a week since the accident to check other AW169's, makes me wonder if the AAIB haven't found any obvious mechanical failures at the moment? Does the AW169 type have a cockpit voice recorder?
What surprised me watching the video taken near to the crash site was the way the post crash fire seemed to consume the cabin Very quickly. The two brave pc's who approached the crashed a/c managed to get close to the cockpit until an explosion made them move away. Don't Leonardo fit crash proof fuel tanks to this new type of a/c?
When was it last serviced, and was the AD sent out to all operators in Sept 2018 for the Emergency Windows, actually completed?
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-englan...shire-46017499
I knew Eric well and am deeply saddened by these events. As an airline pilot of some reasonable experience my aviation mid life crisis was to take a ppl (h) course. This took 7 years to complete part time probably a) because I was fairly useless and b) the eye watering expense. Hugely enjoyable, though and I finished in 2014.Ironically, Eric was one of my subject matter experts I phoned for all matters, rotary. The point that I will make that even with my experience as a professional fixed wing pilot, my initial embarrassingly ham- fisted attempts to control the R22, exponentially in the hover would in my view, make it unlikely that Isabella sitting in the other seat could really assist in a catastrophic event assuming she really had no official helicopter qualifications. Anyway, RIP to all.
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https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/61...l#post10295630
If it was a large illegally flown drone, then the police would already have been alerted due to debris found at scene on the Sunday night and be actively pursuing or arresting someone and it would be in the media IMHO
Any other failure due to component failure would have serious global implications and there is no grounding or inspections going on
I have no knowledge of the direction the pilot was heading in, but there are power lines on one side of the KP stadium which appear to be higher than the stands. The stadium is actually quite compact, and the stands aren't perhaps as tall as you might think (about 6 storeys from ground to roof, plus the cantilevers)
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Magplug, a very succinct description of a very possible scenario. The critical duties of a P2 following a loss of TR control is to to shut down the engines ASAP while the P1 attempts to enter Autorotation. As somebody else mentioned, with roof mounted ECLs, this is going to be difficult if not impossible for a single pilot. Whenever I flew with a non-rated person in the left seat, the duties always included a full brief on how to close the ECLs in an emergency, but thankfully I never got to find out if any of that information had been absorbed.
The mention of 'dead man's curve' by the media is not so much rubbish as is being represented above.
It you suffer a TR failure in any conventional helicopter in a normal hover then you have no option but to check down on the collective and cushion the subsequent touchdown. If you are in a hover high above the ground then your chances of a tidy touchdown diminish with height. Away from the ground the only way to stop the spinning from the anti-torque reaction is to chop both engines by simultaneously retarding both power levers and dump the collective to enter autorotation.
Unfortunately you now have another problem of sorting out the self-induced double engine failure. You now need forward airspeed of at least 40-60 knots to execute an engines-off landing. To gain that airspeed you have to pitch sharply nose-down which not only increases your rate of descent but appreciably kills some of your remaining rotor RPM which is your life blood in executing a successful EOL. The chances of a successful EOL from a free-air hover of between 50 and 1000 feet are negligible.... even before you consider the complication of the confined area beneath you..... that's the dead man's curve.
It you suffer a TR failure in any conventional helicopter in a normal hover then you have no option but to check down on the collective and cushion the subsequent touchdown. If you are in a hover high above the ground then your chances of a tidy touchdown diminish with height. Away from the ground the only way to stop the spinning from the anti-torque reaction is to chop both engines by simultaneously retarding both power levers and dump the collective to enter autorotation.
Unfortunately you now have another problem of sorting out the self-induced double engine failure. You now need forward airspeed of at least 40-60 knots to execute an engines-off landing. To gain that airspeed you have to pitch sharply nose-down which not only increases your rate of descent but appreciably kills some of your remaining rotor RPM which is your life blood in executing a successful EOL. The chances of a successful EOL from a free-air hover of between 50 and 1000 feet are negligible.... even before you consider the complication of the confined area beneath you..... that's the dead man's curve.
This incident is surely the worst case scenario that any helicopter crew could experience. So far there has been very little advice offered on how you might survive such an event, presumably because few ever have. As an SAR pilot I have spent the majority of my career in high OGE hovers and TR failure was never far from mind. With that in mind I always took the opportunity during simulator currency trips to attempt to recover from a 300 feet OGE hover; the advice given which I tried to follow was- lower the collective, nose down for airspeed and roll into the turn then kill the engines if you could . The result was always a crash landing which was sometimes survivable. I know the sim is only as good as the engineer's model but for now it is the best we have but the one thing it cannot do is replicate the centrifugal force associated with the violent yaw experienced during a TR fail. Like Crab, I also knew and talked to the pilot involved in the Wessex incident and my stand out memory was him saying how hard it was to reach the speed select levers which were right next to the collective due to the spinning forces; more chilling was that I had delivered that airframe to Valley the week before and it could have been me.
Watching the video of this incident I would say that the pilot had cocked off to the left during the backup, as would be normal, and that the tail failure happens(if that is what happened) just as he kicks it straight prior to transition to forward flight. Is it possible that the two events are linked? I mention this because the Wessex incident happened during a tail rotor malfunction demo with an large pedal input used to simulate the malfunction.
Watching the video of this incident I would say that the pilot had cocked off to the left during the backup, as would be normal, and that the tail failure happens(if that is what happened) just as he kicks it straight prior to transition to forward flight. Is it possible that the two events are linked? I mention this because the Wessex incident happened during a tail rotor malfunction demo with an large pedal input used to simulate the malfunction.
Magplug, a very succinct description of a very possible scenario. The critical duties of a P2 following a loss of TR control is to to shut down the engines ASAP while the P1 attempts to enter Autorotation. As somebody else mentioned, with roof mounted ECLs, this is going to be difficult if not impossible for a single pilot. Whenever I flew with a non-rated person in the left seat, the duties always included a full brief on how to close the ECLs in an emergency, but thankfully I never got to find out if any of that information had been absorbed.
skadi
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@EwanWhoseArmy... The Dead mans Curve is establshed during test flying of a new type. A couple of test pilots start at say 2000' in the hover and chop the engine just as your instructor on the R22 did. They then enter autorotation and land. At the next attempt they bring the height down by 100' and repeat.... until they scare each other at which point they put an X on the graph and move on to the next part of the test. The Dead-Man's curve for the R22 will look very different to the profile for an AW169. Remember also... In a twin-engined helo the significance of the DMC is much less because you have two engines and the chances of one failing is very slim, the chances of two failing together in normal operation is infintisimal.
The safest way to leave a confined area like a football stadium involves balancing risks in order to minimise you exposure to them....
- Climb vertically until you are clear of obstructions and in 'clean air'.
- For a twin-engined helo continue climbing until you have sufficient height clear of obstructions that you will clear them in transition if one engine fails and you lose some height.
- Transition to forward flight as soon as possible
- For a single engined helo do all of the above minimising your time inside the dead-mans curve.
FWIW I didn't see anything particularly unusual about the height he climbed to on the night of the accident.
@VintageEngineer... Whilst some of what you say about the TR debris is valid, you are drawing way too many conclusions from a simple photo. TR blades are of a complicated composite construction and the AAIB engineers will have to put it all under a microscope before pronouncing on the cause of failure.
Originally Posted by Gustosomerset
So, if some of the observations above are correct and the pilot chose to climb to an unusually high hover, why might he have done so?
- Climb vertically until you are clear of obstructions and in 'clean air'.
- For a twin-engined helo continue climbing until you have sufficient height clear of obstructions that you will clear them in transition if one engine fails and you lose some height.
- Transition to forward flight as soon as possible
- For a single engined helo do all of the above minimising your time inside the dead-mans curve.
FWIW I didn't see anything particularly unusual about the height he climbed to on the night of the accident.
@VintageEngineer... Whilst some of what you say about the TR debris is valid, you are drawing way too many conclusions from a simple photo. TR blades are of a complicated composite construction and the AAIB engineers will have to put it all under a microscope before pronouncing on the cause of failure.
No roof mount ECL in 169 and the engine control switches are on centre console on right side, next to and aft, of the Emergency landing gear handle and normal landing gear handle.
As an aside, the R22 will also indulge maneuvers that an AW169 almost certainly wouldn‘t. Zero speed auto? Expect an extremely dangerous rate of descent once the aircraft has finished accelerating (this in itself would require hundreds of feet) - lethal at low altitudes; 180 pedal turn during such an auto would also likely cause huge structural stress. Can’t imagine test pilots having that high on their list of things to try.
Myra - remember that it was the simulation of the TR/ASE malfunction that caused the TR disconnect coupling to disconnect - there isn't, to my knowledge, one of those on the 169 so an unlikely cause and probably the reason it didn't happen to you on the delivery flight
How should anyone know?
That surely depends on what the last action/reaction before passing out was:
Could be stepping in one pedal.
Could be pulling/pushing/doing something else with the cyclic.
Could be pulling/pushing the collective.
Could be anything.
Could be nothing at all.
That surely depends on what the last action/reaction before passing out was:
Could be stepping in one pedal.
Could be pulling/pushing/doing something else with the cyclic.
Could be pulling/pushing the collective.
Could be anything.
Could be nothing at all.
It was the swiftness with which pilot incapacitation was dismissed based on the behaviour of the aircraft that made me wonder if it was an evidence based response.
Crab,
That was my point, the Wessex incident occurred after the simulated malfunction caused the disconnect coupling to engage from its incorrect position and the subsequent torque shock loading snapped a TR drive shaft leading to the loss of TR drive. I know it was unlikely to happen to me but the underlying cause, compacted grease within the coupling, had built over time and would have been present during my delivery flight.
I know the 169 has no disconnect coupling but as I said, looking at the video it looks like the incident began just after the application of pedal to kick the aircraft straight prior to transition. Coincidence? Probably but until the data recorder has been analysed we only have speculation so I try to keep mine to observable occurrences, I wish others could do the same to discourage some of the nonsense contained in this discussion.
That was my point, the Wessex incident occurred after the simulated malfunction caused the disconnect coupling to engage from its incorrect position and the subsequent torque shock loading snapped a TR drive shaft leading to the loss of TR drive. I know it was unlikely to happen to me but the underlying cause, compacted grease within the coupling, had built over time and would have been present during my delivery flight.
I know the 169 has no disconnect coupling but as I said, looking at the video it looks like the incident began just after the application of pedal to kick the aircraft straight prior to transition. Coincidence? Probably but until the data recorder has been analysed we only have speculation so I try to keep mine to observable occurrences, I wish others could do the same to discourage some of the nonsense contained in this discussion.
@EwanWhoseArmy... The Dead mans Curve is establshed during test flying of a new type. A couple of test pilots start at say 2000' in the hover and chop the engine just as your instructor on the R22 did. They then enter autorotation and land. At the next attempt they bring the height down by 100' and repeat.... until they scare each other at which point they put an X on the graph and move on to the next part of the test. The Dead-Man's curve for the R22 will look very different to the profile for an AW169. Remember also... In a twin-engined helo the significance of the DMC is much less because you have two engines and the chances of one failing is very slim, the chances of two failing together in normal operation is infintisimal.
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The Sun's video shows the (red) strobe light clearly and it illuminates the disc in an interesting way. It flashes as regularly (a fraction over 1Hz) as you'd expect but something changes when the helicopter spins, even at the start of the spin it's not obvious anymore. I don't think strobe has stopped but something looks odd there. It could just be the yawing spreads the disc illumination making it far less visible?
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@magplug. Thank you. You’re right. I agree that we should be careful being definitive, particularly based on one such image, which is why I included IMO. The AAIB will have access to far more than I do, although final assessments are normally unsurprising. I’m therefore happy for readers to take what I say with a pinch of salt.
Risking going off at a tangent, I had run my thoughts past a friend who works with composites for F1 and aircraft. He agreed with me, albeit based only on the image with all the restrictions you point out.
At least the image puts to bed a wild goose chase (hitting one would not cause that damage).:-)
Risking going off at a tangent, I had run my thoughts past a friend who works with composites for F1 and aircraft. He agreed with me, albeit based only on the image with all the restrictions you point out.
At least the image puts to bed a wild goose chase (hitting one would not cause that damage).:-)
Originally Posted by [email protected]
torquetalk - that manoeuvre was part of the standard post-maintenance flight test for a Sea King (much bigger than a 169) so there is no reason to expect that it hasn't been done on the 169 for certification purposes to demonstrate sufficient TR authority/control margin.
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In order to justify a grounding there would have to be an indication of a general design flaw. In order to identify this they have to analyse what broke and how. I guess they are simply not at that point, yet.
For issuing an AD you need to have an idea what exactly to look for. Also this requires the identification what gave first and how. See above.
It could also simply be a maintenance issue (for the sake of the mechanics who last serviced it i surely do hope not) or indeed a Goose hitting the TR. Re the question if a Goose can damage a TR: You can bet so. Geese are veeery substantial animals (up to 15lbs !). When people are worried about a tiny DJI wiping out a TR, think about what an object 7 times as heavy will do.
For issuing an AD you need to have an idea what exactly to look for. Also this requires the identification what gave first and how. See above.
It could also simply be a maintenance issue (for the sake of the mechanics who last serviced it i surely do hope not) or indeed a Goose hitting the TR. Re the question if a Goose can damage a TR: You can bet so. Geese are veeery substantial animals (up to 15lbs !). When people are worried about a tiny DJI wiping out a TR, think about what an object 7 times as heavy will do.
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Zerospeed autos were done very frequently to confirm tail rotor rigging, did many as a FM.