Helicopter down outside Leicester City Football Club
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Very tragic result, which I fear the AAIB will find several areas of concern. Unless Leonardo have a different CAT A confined area profile from the AW139, then he was in between that profile and a back-up profile(something that would not have worked going out of that stadium.
Stadium top obstacles? Wind direction? Why the gear up before VTOSS? At a crucial stage of flight the Pilot selected gear up(collective hand used) If he didn’t select the gear up, then a non-rated ‘passenger’ in the left seat, reach across the center console to make the selection? Swiss cheese model.... plus bad luck. Damned bad luck.
Stadium top obstacles? Wind direction? Why the gear up before VTOSS? At a crucial stage of flight the Pilot selected gear up(collective hand used) If he didn’t select the gear up, then a non-rated ‘passenger’ in the left seat, reach across the center console to make the selection? Swiss cheese model.... plus bad luck. Damned bad luck.
Jesus wept, why are so many people trying to play amateur detective?
The ground it is on appears to be flat concrete, perhaps half derelict for a while, with pieces of broken concrete and some plant matter (such as might grow up through joints in old concrete) nearby.
But I'd distrust even that cursory look at one picture and it may turn out to be quite flat compacted soil.
Any impact can produce witness marks on both items, such as scratches in the rotor which may match scrapes on the other object, with paint fragments left on one or both objects.
I say again, leave it to the professional investigators, with access to far better evidence than a telephoto lens picture, video from a different day, fourth rate guesses based on third hand rumour of what some unidentified person may have said, miscellaneous other stuff.
The ground it is on appears to be flat concrete, perhaps half derelict for a while, with pieces of broken concrete and some plant matter (such as might grow up through joints in old concrete) nearby.
But I'd distrust even that cursory look at one picture and it may turn out to be quite flat compacted soil.
Any impact can produce witness marks on both items, such as scratches in the rotor which may match scrapes on the other object, with paint fragments left on one or both objects.
I say again, leave it to the professional investigators, with access to far better evidence than a telephoto lens picture, video from a different day, fourth rate guesses based on third hand rumour of what some unidentified person may have said, miscellaneous other stuff.
I know the limitations of what a picture can offer, but I see in that picture evidence that offers alot of information to the possible cause, and alot for post incident.
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He was into the wind...Look at the flags on the video......
And beside that, nobody does a Cat A take-off tailwind, it is head wind, crosswind with a head wind component....
You can climb to 400ft like that.....the confined area is 100ft to 400 ft TDP....
And it is a stadium, do you need something bigger when you have a huge flat surface with all reference you need to land?????
All those PPruners who can already determine everything.....
Painful !
And beside that, nobody does a Cat A take-off tailwind, it is head wind, crosswind with a head wind component....
You can climb to 400ft like that.....the confined area is 100ft to 400 ft TDP....
And it is a stadium, do you need something bigger when you have a huge flat surface with all reference you need to land?????
All those PPruners who can already determine everything.....
Painful !
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If it is indeed a TR failure, does it beg the question on new FADEC types, the need for a crash handle to cut the engines to give you half a chance? Centrifugal forces trying to unguard those tiny switches? Sad day!
At that altitude and low forward speed, what chance do you have chopping the throttle?
I’ll also step in and comment on the building concept that a vast soccer stadium is somehow a ‘confined area’; I don’t agree. It has plenty of visual clues, is a massive open space and is in no way a confined area: that’s a small clearing surrounded by high obstacles, usually 3-4 rotor diameters or less.
Departure profiles are i.a.w. the manufacturer profiles as published, not made up on the spot. Second guessing by some here is not helpful to the understanding of what happened when they foster a false belief to visitors and press who reference Rotorheads whenever there is a serious accident such as this.
I've formed some theories on this too, but more important to me is a step back at a larger picture in terms of avoidance. My flight-time was in the armed forces. I never flew in combat, or anything close to it. All training sorties, and some general ferrying of people here and there, with the obvious check-rides. Much later in life, I taught a course in business ethics at the undergrad level. I found that what it came down to was what I term 'situational ethics'. Applying some of the means-test to this flight and crash, I'd like to bring up a couple of things surrounding the decision-making of the flight in question.
1. What profiles I would fly during training, and check-ride would be far more discrete and cautious than the profile I would choose in a combat situation(would the mission likely fail if the profile were not flown?). In the case of this flight, I would want to know the pressure for completing this flight from the pilots perspective concerning his job, and his continued position. i.e. if he should decide the profile is not suitable for the mission what would happen to him for rejecting the flight profile?
2. If this profile were an established recurring run, and they had not had any issues previous, was the profile the best-case to complete the mission?
3. What cost-benefit would there be to an alternate landing site, and what customer impact would that have?
4. Knowing the risk of the low/slow regime of flight that helicopter pilots typically minimize, the greater exposure here would the pilot have done more prior to the flight approach to accept or reject based on; day/night, wind, visibility, weight, time to alternate. Maybe some other critical path decisions that I'm not familiar with on this ship, relating to how it handles the unusual(or normal, if that is the case) flight regimes.
These are the things that everyone who pulls pitch would probably consider, but the most important to me would be the perceived, or potential pressure to complete the flight, given the risks that are present, and the alternatives available. One of the tests I was given on a check ride was the choice to drop materiel right on the defensible position and NOT pick up casualties, or to fly another 250-300 meters, and land in a suitable(but still tight) LZ, offload smartly, and pick up what I could to get out of harm's way. It was one of the tests which got me thinking along the lines of alternatives, and the risks, which seem to be increasing, or might have been rationalized along the way as the flight profile was done repeatedly. If the previous 6 or 8 or 15 flights had been made with this profile successfully, there is every reason to believe that this one would work out. However, it is no guarantee that the next profile would proceed much better in terms of escape actions, should the feces hit the rotational air moving device, at the worst possible time(backward flight, OGE, non-translation speed, paying pax, night, wind, etc). I will say with no illusions that based on what I've read here, and seen on the few videos, this profile gives me the willies. I don't like having the willies with a stick between my legs, and my feet on the pedals.
1. What profiles I would fly during training, and check-ride would be far more discrete and cautious than the profile I would choose in a combat situation(would the mission likely fail if the profile were not flown?). In the case of this flight, I would want to know the pressure for completing this flight from the pilots perspective concerning his job, and his continued position. i.e. if he should decide the profile is not suitable for the mission what would happen to him for rejecting the flight profile?
2. If this profile were an established recurring run, and they had not had any issues previous, was the profile the best-case to complete the mission?
3. What cost-benefit would there be to an alternate landing site, and what customer impact would that have?
4. Knowing the risk of the low/slow regime of flight that helicopter pilots typically minimize, the greater exposure here would the pilot have done more prior to the flight approach to accept or reject based on; day/night, wind, visibility, weight, time to alternate. Maybe some other critical path decisions that I'm not familiar with on this ship, relating to how it handles the unusual(or normal, if that is the case) flight regimes.
These are the things that everyone who pulls pitch would probably consider, but the most important to me would be the perceived, or potential pressure to complete the flight, given the risks that are present, and the alternatives available. One of the tests I was given on a check ride was the choice to drop materiel right on the defensible position and NOT pick up casualties, or to fly another 250-300 meters, and land in a suitable(but still tight) LZ, offload smartly, and pick up what I could to get out of harm's way. It was one of the tests which got me thinking along the lines of alternatives, and the risks, which seem to be increasing, or might have been rationalized along the way as the flight profile was done repeatedly. If the previous 6 or 8 or 15 flights had been made with this profile successfully, there is every reason to believe that this one would work out. However, it is no guarantee that the next profile would proceed much better in terms of escape actions, should the feces hit the rotational air moving device, at the worst possible time(backward flight, OGE, non-translation speed, paying pax, night, wind, etc). I will say with no illusions that based on what I've read here, and seen on the few videos, this profile gives me the willies. I don't like having the willies with a stick between my legs, and my feet on the pedals.
How safe is helicopter flying
I posted on here several months ago as I had lost friends in the Grand Canyon accident where an incident would have been survivable had the helicopter not turned into a fireball on impact. On the face of it this seems another accident where the fatalities are caused, not by the impact but the subsequent fireball! Did this helicopter have a self sealing fuel system installed? Would it have been a survivable accident if it had not turned into an inferno immediately on impact? How many more people have to be lost before EASA insists that it is retro fitted? This seems to be a known issue that is not being addressed. I cannot believe that if this was a problem on fixed wing pax carrying a/c it would have been addressed by now. The Manchester B737 disaster caused a rethink on all aspects of A/C susceptibility to fire issues. I would hope that this might cause a rethink over mandating self sealing fuel systems on ALL helicopters.
Anything from Leonardo yet, statement, inspection or AD? Is the type grounded in the EU or UK? Any labor union passengers, or the seemingly at risk “wealthy class”, refusing to fly in it?
Join Date: Aug 2000
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Jeez, there's some real guff being posted on here by so called 'experts'. The flight manual gives you a handful of profiles that will work in pretty much all normal situations and the pilot flies them, as he appeared to do CORRECTLY on the video (only an guess). He doesn't make it up as he goes along because it isn't a check ride FFS. The EC135 has a modified profile that fits a stadium type departure perfectly, I guess the 169 does as well.
It's a single pilot aircraft, so the copilot is a red herring on all your wacky theories. Those pilots who DO THIS JOB understand the reason that single pilot aircraft have copilots that are non type rated. It's common practice in the industry when customers request a 2nd crew member in the front.
Lowering the lever pretty much removes the torque, but engines down is a big bonus.
The fact is that this helicopter had a critical failure at the worst possible moment; I would hazard a guess that HEMS pilots, Corporate pilots Offshore pilots, or any pilots! would struggle to get away with this one. I for one would not fancy my chances. Remember the Sully Hudson River incident?? It could be done, but the startle effect would work against you.
Sometimes life just deals you a sh*t hand and even the best can fail to pull it off
It's a single pilot aircraft, so the copilot is a red herring on all your wacky theories. Those pilots who DO THIS JOB understand the reason that single pilot aircraft have copilots that are non type rated. It's common practice in the industry when customers request a 2nd crew member in the front.
Lowering the lever pretty much removes the torque, but engines down is a big bonus.
The fact is that this helicopter had a critical failure at the worst possible moment; I would hazard a guess that HEMS pilots, Corporate pilots Offshore pilots, or any pilots! would struggle to get away with this one. I for one would not fancy my chances. Remember the Sully Hudson River incident?? It could be done, but the startle effect would work against you.
Sometimes life just deals you a sh*t hand and even the best can fail to pull it off
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Non survivable accident
You need to look at the video again. The helicopter dropped out of the sky from somewhere between 300ft and 400ft agl . The subsequent fire had nothing to do with the survivability of the crew and passengers.
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What I find a bit strange is that it didn't seem to start accelerating into a forward direction even after being already quite high above the stadium. It seems to have come down several seconds later relatively close to where it left the picture of the CCTV.
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Does neither look like it hit something on climbout nor does it look like a tailwind hitting when leaving the 'Bowl' caused it.
What I find a bit strange is that it didn't seem to start accelerating into a forward direction even after being already quite high above the stadium. It seems to have come down several seconds later relatively close to where it left the picture of the CCTV.
What I find a bit strange is that it didn't seem to start accelerating into a forward direction even after being already quite high above the stadium. It seems to have come down several seconds later relatively close to where it left the picture of the CCTV.
I’ve seen relatively minimal damage to TRBs which completely severed a TRDS so I’d be surprised if it made contact with the stadium and continued the climb.
Looking at the CCTV video the helicopter had ample climb performance coming out of the stadium, there did not appear to be any downwind, there appeared to be ample clearance from obstacles, the helicopter disappears out of view and then reappears, spinning to the right, nose pitched down, and dropping like a stone. That is sudden TR drive failure at high power setting, probably with the collective full down after the failure. The pilot wasn't steering that thing away from anything, absolutely impossible at that rate of rotation. Probably not enough time to shut down the engines before impact, or even find/reach the switch to do it.
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I don't think so. Look at the sink rate. Impact with the ground at that vertical speed is probably not survivable, even in a helicopter with impeccable crash-worthy design.
Looking at the CCTV video the helicopter had ample climb performance coming out of the stadium, there did not appear to be any downwind, there appeared to be ample clearance from obstacles, the helicopter disappears out of view and then reappears, spinning to the right, nose pitched down, and dropping like a stone. That is sudden TR drive failure at high power setting, probably with the collective full down after the failure. The pilot wasn't steering that thing away from anything, absolutely impossible at that rate of rotation. Probably not enough time to shut down the engines before impact, or even find/reach the switch to do it.
Looking at the CCTV video the helicopter had ample climb performance coming out of the stadium, there did not appear to be any downwind, there appeared to be ample clearance from obstacles, the helicopter disappears out of view and then reappears, spinning to the right, nose pitched down, and dropping like a stone. That is sudden TR drive failure at high power setting, probably with the collective full down after the failure. The pilot wasn't steering that thing away from anything, absolutely impossible at that rate of rotation. Probably not enough time to shut down the engines before impact, or even find/reach the switch to do it.
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Good point, but how do you detect it reliably and without false positives? Lowering the collective is always going to be first on the to-do list.