Helicopter down outside Leicester City Football Club

[Sir Korsky]

Originally Posted by nodrama

55% reservoir quantity

Thanks ND - also, do you know if hot fluid is the only time an EP permits closing the main 1(2) SOV ?

[nodrama]

Originally Posted by Sir Korsky

Thanks ND - also, do you know if hot fluid is the only time an EP permits closing the main 1(2) SOV ?

OPC ? 🙂

EP instructs main SOV closure for high fluid temperature and low fluid quantity (providing other system is serviceable)

[Pozidrive]

Originally Posted by nodrama

Part of the above is incorrect (I was watching the football, pathetic penalty shoot-out). The nut on the servo end of the pitch control rod doesn’t get touched during an actuator replacement. It is part of the hyd actuator component and assembled/ locked at manufacture of the component.

Yes, understood. That bit is clearly shown in the bulletin Figures.

In spite of the football, it was still a good explanation!

[Sir Korsky]

Originally Posted by nodrama

OPC ? 🙂

Not quite, but thanks again for your answer. I'm just interested in evolution/progression of Augusta design logic.

[MurphyWasRight]

Have not seen any updates on investigation. Wondering if I missed something posted elsewhere.
Not sure when updates would be expected.
thanks

[W u W]

Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight

Have not seen any updates on investigation. Wondering if I missed something posted elsewhere.
Not sure when updates would be expected.
thanks

​​​​​​Still under investigation no new updates from the aaib since October, not even been changed to finalizing, they must be struggling with something in my opinion.

WuW

[Bravo73]

I suspect that Covid 19 hasn’t helped with the speed of their investigations.

[chopjock]

Originally Posted by W u W

​​​​​​Still under investigation no new updates from the aaib since October, not even been changed to finalizing, they must be struggling with something in my opinion.

WuW

Perhaps they are just baffled by how a heavily regulated supposedly ultra safe Cat A take off profile with all those engines can still manage to crash and burn...

[W u W]

Originally Posted by chopjock

Perhaps they are just baffled by how a heavily regulated supposedly ultra safe Cat A take off profile with all those engines can still manage to crash and burn...

Perhaps you are right chop, I have followed you for awhile, I can't help but think this is one rare instance that hindsight quick thinking thought processes couldn't of turned this pilot into a hero , I try to stay in the background on this forum, this thread gets to me, RIP to all involved.

WuW

[jimjim1]

Is this not the one where the tail rotor bearing failed resulting in the tail rotor not rotating anymore? What went wrong is known. The causal chain is not (yet public).

[etudiant]

Originally Posted by chopjock

Perhaps they are just baffled by how a heavily regulated supposedly ultra safe Cat A take off profile with all those engines can still manage to crash and burn...

Exactly. Having a well supported private aircraft kill everyone on board during a routine takeoff does not inspire confidence.
Evidently there was no obvious design defect, so the investigators are now clutching at straws.

[Monty Niveau]

Originally Posted by etudiant

Evidently there was no obvious design defect, so the investigators are now clutching at straws.

Your ‘Evidently’ interests me. What evidence are you referring to?

[W u W]

Originally Posted by jimjim1

Is this not the one where the tail rotor bearing failed resulting in the tail rotor not rotating anymore? What went wrong is known. The causal chain is not (yet public).

​​​​​I believe TR did not lose rpm but went full pitch. The chain of how that happened is all in this thread.

They could be clutching at straws struggling to try work out how a simple component (duplex bearing) can fail in away that's not been seen before and lead to such a catastrophic loss of control and what could be done to prevent it again. Just a opinion

WuW

[ShyTorque]

Originally Posted by jimjim1

Is this not the one where the tail rotor bearing failed resulting in the tail rotor not rotating anymore? What went wrong is known. The causal chain is not (yet public).

No, it was a tail rotor control failure. The tail rotor continued turning but the blades ran to full negative pitch, which is worse than a failed tail rotor drive.

[[email protected]]

Perhaps they are just baffled by how a heavily regulated supposedly ultra safe Cat A take off profile with all those engines can still manage to crash and burn...

poor maintenance procedures will get you whatever other protections you put in place.

[212man]

Originally Posted by [email protected]

poor maintenance procedures will get you whatever other protections you put in place.

let’s see if this component was ever touched after it left the factory - pretty low hours I think.

[Monty Niveau]

Well, none of the above should take anything like as long as the enormously expensive AAIB are taking. And I invite those who think, unhesitatingly, to defend the organisation, to pause for once and consider the facts.

[[email protected]]

let’s see if this component was ever touched after it left the factory - pretty low hours I think.

That leaves you with poor design or incorrect installation - nothing you can do as a pilot will affect those.

[John R81]

Monty N

Slightly naive comment, as it is not just the technical members of the AAIB who determine when a report is released. I can think of delayed reports in the past where it has not been the AAIB or the investigation that were the problem, it was the lawyers for the party who appears to be "at fault" and thereby facing financial and reputational consequences, who then tried every avenue to "water down" the report findings before publication.

This particular airframe was one of the first in production, and it had reasonable use. One might therefore expect any issues in design, original build or maintenance scheduling to become apparent on an airframe like this. The information released so far indicates that a duplex bearing in the tail rotor control control mechanism failed and AW issued a service bulletin requiring this part to be checked in all 169 & 189 back in 2018. I guess that both AW and the AAIB know the result of that check, but to my knowledge that result has not been published. It would be interesting to hear from any owner or mechanic who can say what this check found.

[etudiant]

Originally Posted by Monty Niveau

Your ‘Evidently’ interests me. What evidence are you referring to?

The type was not grounded, nor was there any immediate service bulletin, as would have been expected had there been an obvious issue.
The cause, a duplex bearing failure, did get a service bulletin as noted by Jahn R81, as a result of the investigation.