Helicopter down outside Leicester City Football Club
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What do you mean by "inherently safer"? If the t/r drive was faulty (if that is what caused this, hopefully initial findings will soon be made public) the accident might have occurred at a slightly different time but would possibly have put the aircraft down in a less fortunate place for those on the ground. Helicopters are designed to operate vertically, btw! The departure flown appears to have followed a certified Category A / Class 1 profile so it should have been as safe as any other.
TC
Sorry Chopjock is correct, if you actually care to read the post Chop was referring to you will find Chop's answer is strictly correct. Unless you would prefer to be at 400 ft with no forward airspeed when the Tr assy takes a holiday. Personally I would take lower and probably doing around 60 to 80 kts ( that he would have arrived at in the time to go vertical to 400 ft.) At least your stabilisers would be doing something.
Sorry Chopjock is correct, if you actually care to read the post Chop was referring to you will find Chop's answer is strictly correct. Unless you would prefer to be at 400 ft with no forward airspeed when the Tr assy takes a holiday. Personally I would take lower and probably doing around 60 to 80 kts ( that he would have arrived at in the time to go vertical to 400 ft.) At least your stabilisers would be doing something.
A question for you Legal Scholars posing as Helicopter Pilots.....the British way of doing a Confined Area Takeoff (I learned it as a Towering Takeoff) differed from the American way of doing the same thing (each used the same power) is far different from the various CAT A, Perf Class One (or whatever you are calling things this week).
Instead of this backwards and up to 400 feet (or so) as we saw used.....what if an old fashioned Towering Take Off had been used from as far downwind as possible and the aircraft accelerate much lower but clear of obstacles.....could Vtoss and Vbroc been achieved much quicker?
What Rules, Regulations, etc.....prohibit such a Takeoff like that a situation as is under discussion?
Are Rules getting ahead of reality and causing greater risk instead of making flying safer?
Instead of this backwards and up to 400 feet (or so) as we saw used.....what if an old fashioned Towering Take Off had been used from as far downwind as possible and the aircraft accelerate much lower but clear of obstacles.....could Vtoss and Vbroc been achieved much quicker?
What Rules, Regulations, etc.....prohibit such a Takeoff like that a situation as is under discussion?
Are Rules getting ahead of reality and causing greater risk instead of making flying safer?
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
All the AW 1*9 family have puller TR on the right hand side and all have MR rotation anti-clockwise when viewed from above.
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A question for you Legal Scholars posing as Helicopter Pilots.....the British way of doing a Confined Area Takeoff (I learned it as a Towering Takeoff) differed from the American way of doing the same thing (each used the same power) is far different from the various CAT A, Perf Class One (or whatever you are calling things this week).
Instead of this backwards and up to 400 feet (or so) as we saw used.....what if an old fashioned Towering Take Off had been used from as far downwind as possible and the aircraft accelerate much lower but clear of obstacles.....could Vtoss and Vbroc been achieved much quicker?
What Rules, Regulations, etc.....prohibit such a Takeoff like that a situation as is under discussion?
Are Rules getting ahead of reality and causing greater risk instead of making flying safer?
Instead of this backwards and up to 400 feet (or so) as we saw used.....what if an old fashioned Towering Take Off had been used from as far downwind as possible and the aircraft accelerate much lower but clear of obstacles.....could Vtoss and Vbroc been achieved much quicker?
What Rules, Regulations, etc.....prohibit such a Takeoff like that a situation as is under discussion?
Are Rules getting ahead of reality and causing greater risk instead of making flying safer?
SASless, it is a cart/horse question on regulation/performance profiles and which comes first. There are lots of risks and hazards in helicopter flying only some of which are addressed by regulation. And those tend to be the quantifiable ones. Easiest is the airline model where the worst that can happen is an engine failure, and so that is then applied to helicopter and the regulators come up with different standards, exposures, etc. Some, like EASA, have more focus on compliance to OEM flight test certification procedures than others. In our Wild West view of confined, the greatest risk is hitting something, in the EASA view or PC1, it is the first engine failing (the second one never fails). So the certification authorities go back to the manufacturers and say "give us the numbers and performance charts, and publish them in the RFM". Now over to sales where performance sells, so the manufacturer uses their test pilots to develop OEM recommended procedures to maximize performance and payload, regardless of the real-world additional risks introduced. Two examples: the back up profile in a true "confined" area where you might actually hit something; some of the PC1 runway takeoffs where the TDP is an altitude instead of an airspeed. When I first flew S76, the PC1 takeoff profile was like a "cobra" maneuver, accelerate to a certain speed, balloon up and level, accelerate some more and then climb - just the thing not to do on a black night in monsoon rain with a new national copilot.
Anyway, a horse beat to death, and there are many on this forum (such as JimL) that can explain it much more clearly than I can. Needless to say, in todays world nobody will risk any SOP other than the OEM provided one, to the point that even where there are obvious flaws operationally, like the original AW139 offshore helideck with the too rapid climb through 20', we will fly a far riskier profile until the OEM can come up with a published revised profile. And yes, in the past we had free rein to make those up and apply them ourselves.
Anyway, a horse beat to death, and there are many on this forum (such as JimL) that can explain it much more clearly than I can. Needless to say, in todays world nobody will risk any SOP other than the OEM provided one, to the point that even where there are obvious flaws operationally, like the original AW139 offshore helideck with the too rapid climb through 20', we will fly a far riskier profile until the OEM can come up with a published revised profile. And yes, in the past we had free rein to make those up and apply them ourselves.
Except for the 109 and 119, which push
Hmm, I'm not sure I quite understand what exactly is b*****ks with @Chopjocks remark? Reducing the time spent at zero forward speed will reduce the time spent in very unhelpful conditions when encountering a TR drive failure. Any forward speed will unload the TR, thereby reducing torque effect and will additionally increase effectiveness of the fin. At >50kts there is a reasonable fighting chance in case of a TR drive failure. At zero kts not so much.
Reducing the time spent at zero forward speed will reduce the time spent in very unhelpful conditions when encountering a TR drive failure. Any forward speed will unload the TR, thereby reducing torque effect and will additionally increase effectiveness of the fin. At >50kts there is a reasonable fighting chance in case of a TR drive failure.
In the current designs with very small vertical surfaces be aware they virtually have no fin or it is very weak in effect -
Phoinix
8th Dec 2015, 13:16
I just finished my recurrent on the 412 at DFW South location. It's a brand new sim capable of 412EP with EFIS, Fast Fin and 4 axis AP. Extremely detailed visuals and updated flight data. The later was a huge surprise.
The instructor gave us a tail rotor drive shaft failure... Surprise surprise, the 412 is not capable of flight at any speed, Fast fin or not. If you enter an autorotation fast enough your only option is to follow it through the right turn, flaring at about 100-ish ft and of course than the left yaw comes that will turn you about 90º. So the flyaway no longer possible they teach to auto immediately and follow it through the right yaw.
I was on the old 212 sim and slightly newer 412 sim some years ago and I remember you could clearly fly away at a low power setting at vy.
8th Dec 2015, 13:16
I just finished my recurrent on the 412 at DFW South location. It's a brand new sim capable of 412EP with EFIS, Fast Fin and 4 axis AP. Extremely detailed visuals and updated flight data. The later was a huge surprise.
The instructor gave us a tail rotor drive shaft failure... Surprise surprise, the 412 is not capable of flight at any speed, Fast fin or not. If you enter an autorotation fast enough your only option is to follow it through the right turn, flaring at about 100-ish ft and of course than the left yaw comes that will turn you about 90º. So the flyaway no longer possible they teach to auto immediately and follow it through the right yaw.
I was on the old 212 sim and slightly newer 412 sim some years ago and I remember you could clearly fly away at a low power setting at vy.
It is now exactly a week since the accident happened. Short of brief statements by the AAIB telling people what they already knew, there has been what can only be described as a deafening silence with regard to the cause. Would we be correct in thinking that, due to zero statements regarding the mechanical causes of this tragic accident, it can be assumed that the aircraft didn’t suffer a mechanical malfunction ? Or is this normal to have no word, even if it was found to be say a mechanical defect ? Obviously I’m not saying it was, but I seem to recall in previous events, that a failure of a particular item on an aircraft would render that type grounded until further investigation could rule it out. By not having any AD or SB issued, is it fair to say that the AW 169 has not suffered a catastrophic mechanical failure, but the cause is more likely to be external forces of some description, (drone strike) or pilot error? (I doubt it’s pilot error but that we have no details whatsoever yet)
Why is anyone quizzing the CAT A departure? In commercial ops it is a requirement not an option. So debating whether a takeoff profile other than this, is better - is a load of Bo**ox.
The pilot initiated a standard departure for the size of the site.
The probable causes now remain:
Part of the TR assembly failed and departed flight.
Something struck the tail area causing a catastrophic failure.
Once an aircraft enters a developed TR failure flight path (rotating) NOTHING the pilot does to recover (with the cyclic) will resolve the issue simply because the pitch/roll datums continuously change [as described earlier very succinctly].
The suggestion that the pilot fought to steer clear of people or property is wishful thinking At this stage in the flight, the pilot(s) became a passenger.
The pilot initiated a standard departure for the size of the site.
The probable causes now remain:
Part of the TR assembly failed and departed flight.
Something struck the tail area causing a catastrophic failure.
Once an aircraft enters a developed TR failure flight path (rotating) NOTHING the pilot does to recover (with the cyclic) will resolve the issue simply because the pitch/roll datums continuously change [as described earlier very succinctly].
The suggestion that the pilot fought to steer clear of people or property is wishful thinking At this stage in the flight, the pilot(s) became a passenger.
It is now exactly a week since the accident happened. Short of brief statements by the AAIB telling people what they already knew, there has been what can only be described as a deafening silence with regard to the cause. Would we be correct in thinking that, due to zero statements regarding the mechanical causes of this tragic accident, it can be assumed that the aircraft didn’t suffer a mechanical malfunction ? Or is this normal to have no word, even if it was found to be say a mechanical defect ? Obviously I’m not saying it was, but I seem to recall in previous events, that a failure of a particular item on an aircraft would render that type grounded until further investigation could rule it out. By not having any AD or SB issued, is it fair to say that the AW 169 has not suffered a catastrophic mechanical failure, but the cause is more likely to be external forces of some description, (drone strike) or pilot error? (I doubt it’s pilot error but that we have no details whatsoever yet)
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Tc
I'm questioning it because it didn't work very well here did it? Cat A PC1 is so focused on one of two engines failing it completely disregards the extra exposure to the one and only tail rotor.
Why is anyone quizzing the CAT A departure?
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It is now exactly a week since the accident happened. Short of brief statements by the AAIB telling people what they already knew, there has been what can only be described as a deafening silence with regard to the cause. Would we be correct in thinking that, due to zero statements regarding the mechanical causes of this tragic accident, it can be assumed that the aircraft didn’t suffer a mechanical malfunction ? Or is this normal to have no word, even if it was found to be say a mechanical defect ? Obviously I’m not saying it was, but I seem to recall in previous events, that a failure of a particular item on an aircraft would render that type grounded until further investigation could rule it out. By not having any AD or SB issued, is it fair to say that the AW 169 has not suffered a catastrophic mechanical failure,
Is it a particular helicopter thing to demand groundings the moment something happens?
On Monday a 737 crashed into the sea killing everyone on board, but I’ve yet to see any calls for 737s to be grounded.
In 2014 a 777 vanished without trace in the Indian Ocean, but I saw no calls for the 777s to be grounded, or questions about lack of emergency ADs/ASBs?
Three weeks after the 2016 EC225 crash in Norway, an Egyptian A320 crashed into the Med, with total loss of life. The cause is (AFAIK) still not known, yet our oil workers were happy to fly to Aberdeen on an Airbus A320 the next day before refusing to fly on an Airbus EC225.
What is it with helicopters that we have to react this way when our FW cousins do not?
The probable causes now remain:
Part of the TR assembly failed and departed flight.
Something struck the tail area causing a catastrophic failure.
Part of the TR assembly failed and departed flight.
Something struck the tail area causing a catastrophic failure.
The probable causes now remain:
Part of the TR assembly failed and departed flight.
Something struck the tail area causing a catastrophic failure.
Part of the TR assembly failed and departed flight.
Something struck the tail area causing a catastrophic failure.
mjb
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I’ve just picked on this individual post because it sort of illustrates my point; absolutely no criticism of it or the poster is intended.
Is it a particular helicopter thing to demand groundings the moment something happens?
On Monday a 737 crashed into the sea killing everyone on board, but I’ve yet to see any calls for 737s to be grounded.
In 2014 a 777 vanished without trace in the Indian Ocean, but I saw no calls for the 777s to be grounded, or questions about lack of emergency ADs/ASBs?
Three weeks after the 2016 EC225 crash in Norway, an Egyptian A320 crashed into the Med, with total loss of life. The cause is (AFAIK) still not known, yet our oil workers were happy to fly to Aberdeen on an Airbus A320 the next day before refusing to fly on an Airbus EC225.
What is it with helicopters that we have to react this way when our FW cousins do not?
Is it a particular helicopter thing to demand groundings the moment something happens?
On Monday a 737 crashed into the sea killing everyone on board, but I’ve yet to see any calls for 737s to be grounded.
In 2014 a 777 vanished without trace in the Indian Ocean, but I saw no calls for the 777s to be grounded, or questions about lack of emergency ADs/ASBs?
Three weeks after the 2016 EC225 crash in Norway, an Egyptian A320 crashed into the Med, with total loss of life. The cause is (AFAIK) still not known, yet our oil workers were happy to fly to Aberdeen on an Airbus A320 the next day before refusing to fly on an Airbus EC225.
What is it with helicopters that we have to react this way when our FW cousins do not?
To try and answer the question, I think much of it is simply “perception”. Be it U.K. or US, I think we hold our carriers and their pilots and ground staff in such high regard, that an incident of this kind makes us feel that questioning the air worthiness of the aircraft is our first legitimate port of call. When incidents occur with operators from what we see as either third world or countries that we perceive not to maintain the standards we do, then there is a tendency to consider pilot error or low grade maintenance to be a primary factor. Rightly or wrongly, that tended to be the viewpoint back in the 70s, 80s and 90s. Having flown with operators in SA and Africa, there were plenty of moments when that bias was re-inforced.....rightly or wrongly.