Mid-air collision between EMS helicopter and light fixed wing in southern Germany
As FED says, one odd coloured blade will stand out like the dogs proverbials whereas evenly spaced bands of colour are not so obvious. The flicker effect will attract attention even when one is not looking directly at the rotors.
Moorabbin Airport has a 700’ Helicopter circuit height vs 1,000’ for fixed wing following a mid air many, many years ago when a FW let down onto a helicopter in identical conditions to all these fatal accidents being discussed. The problem is by no means a new one and ‘corporate knowledge ‘ often diminishes and has to be re-learned.
Moorabbin Airport has a 700’ Helicopter circuit height vs 1,000’ for fixed wing following a mid air many, many years ago when a FW let down onto a helicopter in identical conditions to all these fatal accidents being discussed. The problem is by no means a new one and ‘corporate knowledge ‘ often diminishes and has to be re-learned.
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It would be interesting to know whether TCAS was in use by either aircraft. I am a big fan, because I would not be sitting here if it wasnt for that little box of tricks (I would be splatted on the front of a crab fast jet which never knew I was there).
Yes, you still need to visuallly acquire the other aircraft with a TA, but at least you know your relative altitudes (assuming both are squawking mode C). That gives you some idea of where to look, and the urgency to move out of the way.
Yes, you still need to visuallly acquire the other aircraft with a TA, but at least you know your relative altitudes (assuming both are squawking mode C). That gives you some idea of where to look, and the urgency to move out of the way.
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Care to explain that comment?
Commonsense tells us that is correct as evidenced by a Single Pilot aircraft....at some point you do have to look inside and take care of business....but then you look back outside.
In a Three Crew Aircraft....why can one of the two Pilots (preferably the one handling the controls or tasked with controlling the flight path) not be left free to look outside at least similar to that of being a single pilot in an aircraft?
Are you advocating it is just fine to just not look out if you have something to do that takes more than just a few seconds?
How long do you "not" look out at a time and think it is safe to do so?
Commonsense tells us that is correct as evidenced by a Single Pilot aircraft....at some point you do have to look inside and take care of business....but then you look back outside.
In a Three Crew Aircraft....why can one of the two Pilots (preferably the one handling the controls or tasked with controlling the flight path) not be left free to look outside at least similar to that of being a single pilot in an aircraft?
Are you advocating it is just fine to just not look out if you have something to do that takes more than just a few seconds?
How long do you "not" look out at a time and think it is safe to do so?
Calm down old mate, you'll throw your back out (although by reading through your previous comments I reckon you've already done it)
Well back at ya; Are YOU advocating that a "few seconds" is acceptable? How long is a few seconds? 2...7? Where do you draw the line? It seems to me like you are a bit out of touch with the reality of operating an aircraft (which is good because you totally should not fly with back pain)
Your "MK1 eyeball" isn't perfect, and neither is anyone else's for that matter. You could scan out the window 100% of the time and not pick an aircraft up until it is too late. We do our best, but that's reality.
How long do you "not" look out at a time and think it is safe to do so?
Care to explain how long you think it is fine not to look outside when VFR/VMC?
Of course there are weaknesses of the ol' eyeball...but not looking out really does negate what usefulness it does allow....or did I miss something in all those years of flying?
In your three crew operation how do you divide Cockpit duties that would required all three to be focused inside for very long?
At altitude in cruise...knowing the eye's inability to focus much beyond the nose of the aircraft...and the closing rates of Jet Aircraft....it is hard to see other traffic until too late. Add in obstructions to vision and it gets more difficult yet.
In a terminal area during approach in VFR/VMC conditions where there is a lot of traffic it would seem self preservation would suggest keeping as sharp a lookout as possible would sound acceptable to you.
Non PC-Plod,
TCAS, TAS, FLARM, ADS-B et al are all valuable SA tools. None, however, can replace a good, thorough look-out scan. In fact, they can degrade lookout by giving the operator a false sense of security or causing distraction (eg, looking at a contact that has already declared and therefore not scanning the arc where the danger is coming from). None of these systems are 100% effective - far from it in Open FIR where the vast majority of non-electronically co-operative traffic is (ultra/microlights, GA, paragliders etc). Crews can also forget to make the appropriate settings (especially on Xpdrs) or be unaware that the kit isn't working as advertised - a C130J and C27J collided at night in the US thinking they were both protected by TCAS (one of the systems was faulty). GAPAN (as was) commissioned a study to identify the MAC risk, and therefore S2A requirements, for RPAS operating in UK airspace, but it has relevance for manned operations as this was the measure. One comment is revealing - "Flying in VMC around aerodromes and glider sites in Class G airspace below 3000ft was much more risky than flying at night, in IMC and in controlled airspace. It was not difficult to see why. The sky at night was much less crowded than it was by day; and GA aircraft, gliders and micro-lights were rarely flown then. Even in the military, those pilots flying at night did so more procedurally, more sedately, using a visual-instrument flying mix even when flying under VFR. Through both regulation and sensible practice, in general, pilots flying at night, and in controlled airspace, and in IMC, tended to be more experienced, and tended to fly more extensively equipped aircraft, more predictably and often more procedurally, to tighter tolerances, under higher levels of radar service, with better self- illumination (both by lights and by electronic means) than pilots operating under VFR by day." The full study is here - it contains some interesting facts and statistics. https://www.airpilots.org/file/737/s...d-aircraft.pdf
TCAS, TAS, FLARM, ADS-B et al are all valuable SA tools. None, however, can replace a good, thorough look-out scan. In fact, they can degrade lookout by giving the operator a false sense of security or causing distraction (eg, looking at a contact that has already declared and therefore not scanning the arc where the danger is coming from). None of these systems are 100% effective - far from it in Open FIR where the vast majority of non-electronically co-operative traffic is (ultra/microlights, GA, paragliders etc). Crews can also forget to make the appropriate settings (especially on Xpdrs) or be unaware that the kit isn't working as advertised - a C130J and C27J collided at night in the US thinking they were both protected by TCAS (one of the systems was faulty). GAPAN (as was) commissioned a study to identify the MAC risk, and therefore S2A requirements, for RPAS operating in UK airspace, but it has relevance for manned operations as this was the measure. One comment is revealing - "Flying in VMC around aerodromes and glider sites in Class G airspace below 3000ft was much more risky than flying at night, in IMC and in controlled airspace. It was not difficult to see why. The sky at night was much less crowded than it was by day; and GA aircraft, gliders and micro-lights were rarely flown then. Even in the military, those pilots flying at night did so more procedurally, more sedately, using a visual-instrument flying mix even when flying under VFR. Through both regulation and sensible practice, in general, pilots flying at night, and in controlled airspace, and in IMC, tended to be more experienced, and tended to fly more extensively equipped aircraft, more predictably and often more procedurally, to tighter tolerances, under higher levels of radar service, with better self- illumination (both by lights and by electronic means) than pilots operating under VFR by day." The full study is here - it contains some interesting facts and statistics. https://www.airpilots.org/file/737/s...d-aircraft.pdf
It is an interesting report - shame they couldn't see an obvious reason for less airprox reports from Mil aircraft between 1998 and 2008, perhaps they could have considered where a lot of mil aircraft were being flown for a lot of that period, and it wasn't UK
In our neck of the woods, in uncontrolled airspace we heavily rely on pilots making regular radio calls (position and intention reports). This has proven to work relatively well, at least outside the pattern. Away from the airfield, pilots tend to avoid reported traffic by a wide margin, and/or making arrangement with conflicting traffic to the same effect.
In the pattern the perceived restrictions in going higher or lower, or left or right, make people become more stubbornly stick to their planned trajectory. And then the lack of precision in reporting the exact position, combined with the lacking ability of most or all humans to create a perfect dynamic mental picture sometimes catches us out.
Thanks, Evalu8ter, and also echoed by many others here and in other threats. And who wants to disagree.
But it can also be the other way around. I just came back from a 1 hr flight in a busy weekend GA airspace. During the course of this flight, I made half a dozen of arrangements with other airspace users going to the same aerodrome that I intended flying over, or flying in opposite direction, to achieve or maintain 500 FT vertical separation, or similar. All based on blind radio calls, and thereafter both parties' mental determination that this might constitute "conflicting traffic".
To my total shame I must admit that despite my best endeavours I did not visually acquire a single of those other aircraft that I 'negotiated' with. We could as well all have been in a cloud, with the same satisfactory outcome. (Before somebody asks, I hold a recent Class 1 medical, and my - corrected - eye sight is well above 100%).
So how good would have been my chances to visually acquire traffic that I wasn't even aware of and expecting?
In the pattern the perceived restrictions in going higher or lower, or left or right, make people become more stubbornly stick to their planned trajectory. And then the lack of precision in reporting the exact position, combined with the lacking ability of most or all humans to create a perfect dynamic mental picture sometimes catches us out.
But it can also be the other way around. I just came back from a 1 hr flight in a busy weekend GA airspace. During the course of this flight, I made half a dozen of arrangements with other airspace users going to the same aerodrome that I intended flying over, or flying in opposite direction, to achieve or maintain 500 FT vertical separation, or similar. All based on blind radio calls, and thereafter both parties' mental determination that this might constitute "conflicting traffic".
To my total shame I must admit that despite my best endeavours I did not visually acquire a single of those other aircraft that I 'negotiated' with. We could as well all have been in a cloud, with the same satisfactory outcome. (Before somebody asks, I hold a recent Class 1 medical, and my - corrected - eye sight is well above 100%).
So how good would have been my chances to visually acquire traffic that I wasn't even aware of and expecting?
Hot and Hi - that is exactly the reality tablet that some of those who are convinced it is all about a 'fighter-pilot' level of lookout need to take.
Small, slow moving aircraft are just very difficult to see - big stuff or fast pointy stuff is much easier to notice.
ANYTHING that helps you detect a conflicting or potentially conflicting aircraft is a good thing - even with the false alarms such systems can give.
Those that think the Mk1 eyeball is enough have probably missed hundreds of potential conflicts in the past but just don't know it.
A colleague was saved by TAS just last week when a light FW nearly went straight through their 2-ship RW formation - it came from behind so the best lookout in the world wouldn't have saved them. TAS allowed them to detect and avoid.
Small, slow moving aircraft are just very difficult to see - big stuff or fast pointy stuff is much easier to notice.
ANYTHING that helps you detect a conflicting or potentially conflicting aircraft is a good thing - even with the false alarms such systems can give.
Those that think the Mk1 eyeball is enough have probably missed hundreds of potential conflicts in the past but just don't know it.
A colleague was saved by TAS just last week when a light FW nearly went straight through their 2-ship RW formation - it came from behind so the best lookout in the world wouldn't have saved them. TAS allowed them to detect and avoid.
In our neck of the woods, in uncontrolled airspace we heavily rely on pilots making regular radio calls (position and intention reports). This has proven to work relatively well, at least outside the pattern. Away from the airfield, pilots tend to avoid reported traffic by a wide margin, and/or making arrangement with conflicting traffic to the same effect.
In the pattern the perceived restrictions in going higher or lower, or left or right, make people become more stubbornly stick to their planned trajectory. And then the lack of precision in reporting the exact position, combined with the lacking ability of most or all humans to create a perfect dynamic mental picture sometimes catches us out.
Thanks, Evalu8ter, and also echoed by many others here and in other threats. And who wants to disagree.
But it can also be the other way around. I just came back from a 1 hr flight in a busy weekend GA airspace. During the course of this flight, I made half a dozen of arrangements with other airspace users going to the same aerodrome that I intended flying over, or flying in opposite direction, to achieve or maintain 500 FT vertical separation, or similar. All based on blind radio calls, and thereafter both parties' mental determination that this might constitute "conflicting traffic".
To my total shame I must admit that despite my best endeavours I did not visually acquire a single of those other aircraft that I 'negotiated' with. We could as well all have been in a cloud, with the same satisfactory outcome. (Before somebody asks, I hold a recent Class 1 medical, and my - corrected - eye sight is well above 100%).
So how good would have been my chances to visually acquire traffic that I wasn't even aware of and expecting?
In the pattern the perceived restrictions in going higher or lower, or left or right, make people become more stubbornly stick to their planned trajectory. And then the lack of precision in reporting the exact position, combined with the lacking ability of most or all humans to create a perfect dynamic mental picture sometimes catches us out.
Thanks, Evalu8ter, and also echoed by many others here and in other threats. And who wants to disagree.
But it can also be the other way around. I just came back from a 1 hr flight in a busy weekend GA airspace. During the course of this flight, I made half a dozen of arrangements with other airspace users going to the same aerodrome that I intended flying over, or flying in opposite direction, to achieve or maintain 500 FT vertical separation, or similar. All based on blind radio calls, and thereafter both parties' mental determination that this might constitute "conflicting traffic".
To my total shame I must admit that despite my best endeavours I did not visually acquire a single of those other aircraft that I 'negotiated' with. We could as well all have been in a cloud, with the same satisfactory outcome. (Before somebody asks, I hold a recent Class 1 medical, and my - corrected - eye sight is well above 100%).
So how good would have been my chances to visually acquire traffic that I wasn't even aware of and expecting?
Those that think the Mk1 eyeball is enough have probably missed hundreds of potential conflicts in the past but just don't know it.
Who has advocated that?
The Mk I eyeball is the basic method of detecting and avoiding traffic in VMC/VFR conditions beginning with the dawn of aviation and remains so today.
Everything else like TCAS and other aids....assist that Mk I eyeball.
As Hot and Hi notes....those secondary methods may prevent the MK I method being successful but none the less he was looking outside trying to see the traffic.
If none of the additional methods, equipment, or services exist....what do you do to achieve traffic separation in the end.....look outside of course or gamble blindly relying upon the small aircraft big sky method?
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Everything else like TCAS and other aids....assist that Mk I eyeball.
Another place and time was heading downtown for some orbits of the CBD and was told by the tower to do left hand orbits. On my left about a mile away was a big yellow blimp doing the same thing at same altitude. Thought I had the speed (bad assumption in a H300) and some time to peruse the scenery only to look left again and notice that big fat blimp had quickly snuck right up to me and was really moving (tailwind). Flicked the little H300 hard left and went behind that big yellow bag of gas.
And yet another place and time, had a FW training hack catch on fire just after takeoff. Turning around in a smoked filled cabin, flying "blind-ish" and powerless straight through the RW training area to line up on a non-duty RWY, it then very nearly turned into a collision with a landing FW because ATC had been distracted by the event happening too quickly.
Tightgit
It is sadly typical of pprune these days, that we can even manage to make a subject on which we all broadly agree (that it can be busy out there, and we ought to use all the facilities available to us, Mk1 eyeball, crew co-operation, TCAS/TCAD, ATC, blind calls, etc. To avoid 'physical interaction' with another aircraft). And turn it into an 'I'm more right than you are' discussion. Surely if we are going to learn from incidents like the one in the OP, it's about encouraging good practice generally and not about personal point scoring?
If none of the additional methods, equipment, or services exist....what do you do to achieve traffic separation in the end.....look outside of course or gamble blindly relying upon the small aircraft big sky method?
the FW involved in this accident was a PA-28 Cherokee.
I have few hours in one of those and I always hated it for limited forward down view, see in the video I linked.
Knowing one of the pilots on the EC-135 and flew with him few times in formation involving 2 or 3 helicopters I know he had very good situational awareness and was very precautious pilot.
RIP Chris
I think part of the problem of more frequent near misses or mid-air collisions lately is due to lack in radio/communication professionalism or discipline.
At least in my part of the world, and we have had more of these reports coming in and I've had more of incidents or almost incident in the last 2-3 years than in the 15 years before.
Is it because we have children that where trained by children that are teaching children to fly today? .... little or no experience is begin passed on.
At least today I try to avoid small fixed wing traffic in the air more than ever before.
I have few hours in one of those and I always hated it for limited forward down view, see in the video I linked.
Knowing one of the pilots on the EC-135 and flew with him few times in formation involving 2 or 3 helicopters I know he had very good situational awareness and was very precautious pilot.
RIP Chris I think part of the problem of more frequent near misses or mid-air collisions lately is due to lack in radio/communication professionalism or discipline.
At least in my part of the world, and we have had more of these reports coming in and I've had more of incidents or almost incident in the last 2-3 years than in the 15 years before.
Is it because we have children that where trained by children that are teaching children to fly today? .... little or no experience is begin passed on.
At least today I try to avoid small fixed wing traffic in the air more than ever before.
Crab,
You over look that "rule" applies to the over taking aircraft as well as the one being overtaken.
For sure unless we have eyes in the back of our heads and the ability to see around the airframe....checking Six is a bit hard.
Nice bright Strobe Lights and brightly colored airframes with hi-vis painted rotor blades are about the best we can do along with TCAS and other aids.
You over look that "rule" applies to the over taking aircraft as well as the one being overtaken.
For sure unless we have eyes in the back of our heads and the ability to see around the airframe....checking Six is a bit hard.
Nice bright Strobe Lights and brightly colored airframes with hi-vis painted rotor blades are about the best we can do along with TCAS and other aids.
Crab,
You over look that "rule" applies to the over taking aircraft as well as the one being overtaken.
For sure unless we have eyes in the back of our heads and the ability to see around the airframe....checking Six is a bit hard.
Nice bright Strobe Lights and brightly colored airframes with hi-vis painted rotor blades are about the best we can do along with TCAS and other aids.
You over look that "rule" applies to the over taking aircraft as well as the one being overtaken.
For sure unless we have eyes in the back of our heads and the ability to see around the airframe....checking Six is a bit hard.
Nice bright Strobe Lights and brightly colored airframes with hi-vis painted rotor blades are about the best we can do along with TCAS and other aids.
In modern aviation, transponders and TAS/TCAS should be mandatory, even in class G - as we are seeing more MAC, lookout (good as it is) is often not enough.
as we are seeing more MAC, lookout (good as it is) is often not enough.
Perhaps that Lookout needs to be improved....so the question might be why is that?
Pilot technique, complexity of the cockpits, cockpit workload, flaws in training?
With the number of MAC's in the past month or so....something is wrong!
Perhaps that Lookout needs to be improved....so the question might be why is that?
Pilot technique, complexity of the cockpits, cockpit workload, flaws in training?
Pilot technique, complexity of the cockpits, cockpit workload, flaws in training?
GA, whether flying for pleasure or learning/instruction, is forced into fewer areas with other (perhaps incompatible) airspace users (gliders and microlights vs Cessnas and Robbies for example) for a variety of reasons, one of which will be that the relatively low costs of GA have encouraged many more people into the air.
As I have alluded to before, the most dangerous time is a good weather day either just before or just after Winter when the whole world launches airborne.
Maybe we now have to treat other aviators as I was advised many years ago to treat other drivers on the road - assume they are all idiots out to kill you and plan accordingly!