Driving on the Planet Mongo
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Re: Controlled airspace. In the US the airspace is "controlled" in that the operations might be under ATC approval, esp in IMC, but otherwise (VMC)everybody can enter and use it without ATC permission, contact or clearance. Thus it does not affect GA operations unless the space is IMC, when it surely should. Generally, any airspace above 1200 feet AGL is controlled, and sometimes above 700 feet.
IFR flight is permitted, uncontrolled, in Class G airspace. IFR flight in Class E airspace 'assumes' entry and exit to/from sites with let-down procedures; hence the boundary at 1,200ft lowering to 700ft around airfields - which are themselves in controlled airspace.
As was previously indicated, IFR (or AFR) flights into 'operating sites' within Class G airspace i.e. not controlled, is a challenge that needs to be faced. The capability of properly certificated helicopters is not in doubt so 'detection and avoidance' of other (legitimate) users and 'terrain and obstacle avoidance' have to be acknowledged and addressed.
It is not clear that we can compete with fixed wing in operations to/from airfields; the rotorcraft’s niche remains its unique ability to operate to very small sites.
There are a number of ways solutions can be viewed - they can be regarded as looking backward or forward:
Using existing methods and procedures i.e. making the airspace 'controlled' as the basis of a solution. All required operating sites would need to be surveyed and certificated and have their own control zones - taking us closer to a fixed-wing (and noncompetitive) world. This solution completely ignores the fact that the financial imperative of drone operation will be substantially more important than that of helicopters – so, this is likely to be resisted. It could also discourage operators from moving towards a proposed solution to DVE operations.
Using a 'nudge' solution that accepts interoperability with drones and builds on the (now inevitable) move to registration and electronic (tag) identification. If such identification is extended to universal 'electronic visibility', as appears likely, and is embraced by all airspace users, we are almost there (the use of UAT on 978Mh and ADS-B in and out in the USA encourages this uptake; a second frequency for Europe is sorely needed). This addresses the first of the issues (AFR could ensure this is a safe option); it also mitigates the ever tricky subject of ineffective VFR ‘see and avoid’.
The second issue, which is common to any solution, is how to achieve a let-down to a defined site, or to continue VFR. This requires the effective mapping and recording of terrain and obstacles and promulgation of verified electronic terrain and obstacle databases (eTODs). Most States are committed to the latest ICAO initiative in this respect. This still leaves the subject of temporary obstacles, moot.
One thing is certain: it is not possible to’ segregate’ ourselves from drones if we wish to continue to operate to remote sites in Class G airspace. Better to take advantage of the vast sums that are being invested in autonomous flight and interoperate with drones on agreed terms. Not to come to grips with this will result in them eating our lunch.
Jim
As was previously indicated, IFR (or AFR) flights into 'operating sites' within Class G airspace i.e. not controlled, is a challenge that needs to be faced. The capability of properly certificated helicopters is not in doubt so 'detection and avoidance' of other (legitimate) users and 'terrain and obstacle avoidance' have to be acknowledged and addressed.
It is not clear that we can compete with fixed wing in operations to/from airfields; the rotorcraft’s niche remains its unique ability to operate to very small sites.
There are a number of ways solutions can be viewed - they can be regarded as looking backward or forward:
Using existing methods and procedures i.e. making the airspace 'controlled' as the basis of a solution. All required operating sites would need to be surveyed and certificated and have their own control zones - taking us closer to a fixed-wing (and noncompetitive) world. This solution completely ignores the fact that the financial imperative of drone operation will be substantially more important than that of helicopters – so, this is likely to be resisted. It could also discourage operators from moving towards a proposed solution to DVE operations.
Using a 'nudge' solution that accepts interoperability with drones and builds on the (now inevitable) move to registration and electronic (tag) identification. If such identification is extended to universal 'electronic visibility', as appears likely, and is embraced by all airspace users, we are almost there (the use of UAT on 978Mh and ADS-B in and out in the USA encourages this uptake; a second frequency for Europe is sorely needed). This addresses the first of the issues (AFR could ensure this is a safe option); it also mitigates the ever tricky subject of ineffective VFR ‘see and avoid’.
The second issue, which is common to any solution, is how to achieve a let-down to a defined site, or to continue VFR. This requires the effective mapping and recording of terrain and obstacles and promulgation of verified electronic terrain and obstacle databases (eTODs). Most States are committed to the latest ICAO initiative in this respect. This still leaves the subject of temporary obstacles, moot.
One thing is certain: it is not possible to’ segregate’ ourselves from drones if we wish to continue to operate to remote sites in Class G airspace. Better to take advantage of the vast sums that are being invested in autonomous flight and interoperate with drones on agreed terms. Not to come to grips with this will result in them eating our lunch.
Jim
Last edited by JimL; 22nd Jul 2017 at 18:17. Reason: Correcting UAT frequency.
Here is an example where there is a peripheral benefit that would be obtained from a move to 'AFR' and 'electronic visibility'. Although the use of 'FLARM' (or a system compatible with 'FLARM') was mentioned, a more wide-ranging review of operations, where 'see-and-avoid' is the overarching mitigation against mid-air collisions, is probably merited. This does not just apply to Scotland, the West Country, where there is a more diverse military/civil VFR traffic mix, is probably more pressing.
Jim
Scotland’s Charity Air Ambulance was forced to take evasive action to avoid colliding with a glider in the skies above Perthshire, it has been revealed. The helicopter had been returning to its Perth base when the pilot failed to spot the motorised glider due to it being obscured by the windscreen pillar. After spotting it approaching from the north at the last minute, the SCAA pilot pulled to the right, passing the glider by just 200 metres.
The incident happened on March 25 at a height of 2,700ft, near Forteviot. The SCAA aircraft, an EC135, was returning to base after transporting a patient to Glasgow. The near-miss resulted in an investigation by the UK Airprox Board (UKAB), which questioned why the SCAA helicopter was not fitted with a collision warning system (CWS).
It pinned the cause of the incident on the late sighting by the SCAA pilot. In instances where two aircraft are at risk of colliding head on, both are required to turn to the right to avoid contact. The UKAB noted that although the glider had also turned, they had been unable to contact that pilot to ascertain whether it was an evasive manoeuvre.
They said: “Members noted that the EC135 was not fitted with a CWS and, given the likelihood of encountering gliders during their tasking, some members wondered whether the operating authority had considered fitting a FLARM-compatible CWS or similar. Ultimately…see-and-avoid was the EC135 pilot’s only mitigation against mid-air collision, and the fact that he was conducting his arrival checks had understandably reduced his and his crewman’s capacity for robust and effective look-out. “That being said, although it was a late sighting, he did see the other aircraft in time to take avoiding action, albeit achieving less separation than would be desirable.
SCAA leases both the EC135 helicopter and its pilots.
The charity’s chief executive David Craig said: “We are currently reviewing the report and the observations and recommendations contained within it.
“I am meeting with our aviation providers – Babcock Mission Critical Services (Onshore) Ltd – later this week to determine what steps, if any, we should be taking in response to this incident and the report findings,” he added.
The incident happened on March 25 at a height of 2,700ft, near Forteviot. The SCAA aircraft, an EC135, was returning to base after transporting a patient to Glasgow. The near-miss resulted in an investigation by the UK Airprox Board (UKAB), which questioned why the SCAA helicopter was not fitted with a collision warning system (CWS).
It pinned the cause of the incident on the late sighting by the SCAA pilot. In instances where two aircraft are at risk of colliding head on, both are required to turn to the right to avoid contact. The UKAB noted that although the glider had also turned, they had been unable to contact that pilot to ascertain whether it was an evasive manoeuvre.
They said: “Members noted that the EC135 was not fitted with a CWS and, given the likelihood of encountering gliders during their tasking, some members wondered whether the operating authority had considered fitting a FLARM-compatible CWS or similar. Ultimately…see-and-avoid was the EC135 pilot’s only mitigation against mid-air collision, and the fact that he was conducting his arrival checks had understandably reduced his and his crewman’s capacity for robust and effective look-out. “That being said, although it was a late sighting, he did see the other aircraft in time to take avoiding action, albeit achieving less separation than would be desirable.
SCAA leases both the EC135 helicopter and its pilots.
The charity’s chief executive David Craig said: “We are currently reviewing the report and the observations and recommendations contained within it.
“I am meeting with our aviation providers – Babcock Mission Critical Services (Onshore) Ltd – later this week to determine what steps, if any, we should be taking in response to this incident and the report findings,” he added.
Hi Jim
I imagine, as a partial solution to my previous point about temporary obstructions, the same technology that you are proposing for drones could be mandated for any temporary obstruction over a height of 100'. It could be argued that fitting such devices to temporary masts, mobile cranes etc. would actually be easier than trying to retrofit thousand of unregistered drones that will be in the air prior to any legislation being introduced.
Regards
TeeS
I imagine, as a partial solution to my previous point about temporary obstructions, the same technology that you are proposing for drones could be mandated for any temporary obstruction over a height of 100'. It could be argued that fitting such devices to temporary masts, mobile cranes etc. would actually be easier than trying to retrofit thousand of unregistered drones that will be in the air prior to any legislation being introduced.
Regards
TeeS
Tees,
An excellent idea provided it is part of a systematic approach to the issues of eTODs and Electronic Visibility. It could even work for local let-down implementations - as provided in Norway.
One impression that was gleaned from the conference was that, what little is being done to address the improvement of operations in DVE (e.g. PROuD), is not part of joined-up thinking by SESAR on future airspace management. They appear to have little appetite for anything that is not related to large aeroplanes (nor operations out of controlled airspace).
There also appears to be little discernible public debate even when it is blindingly obvious that a properly constructed let-down procedure might have provided a break in the accident causal chain - for example in the Irish SAR accident (not even mentioned at the recent RAeS conference). There were one-or-two passing references in the PPRune thread but it was not, perhaps, acknowledged as a primary cause of the accident. Hopefully it will be fully covered by the IAAIB when they report but might have been addressed in the interim report.
We, in Europe, also appear to be miles behind the current work on UAS Traffic Management (UTM) that is well down the planning route and being driven by NASA/FAA in the US.
Jim
An excellent idea provided it is part of a systematic approach to the issues of eTODs and Electronic Visibility. It could even work for local let-down implementations - as provided in Norway.
One impression that was gleaned from the conference was that, what little is being done to address the improvement of operations in DVE (e.g. PROuD), is not part of joined-up thinking by SESAR on future airspace management. They appear to have little appetite for anything that is not related to large aeroplanes (nor operations out of controlled airspace).
There also appears to be little discernible public debate even when it is blindingly obvious that a properly constructed let-down procedure might have provided a break in the accident causal chain - for example in the Irish SAR accident (not even mentioned at the recent RAeS conference). There were one-or-two passing references in the PPRune thread but it was not, perhaps, acknowledged as a primary cause of the accident. Hopefully it will be fully covered by the IAAIB when they report but might have been addressed in the interim report.
We, in Europe, also appear to be miles behind the current work on UAS Traffic Management (UTM) that is well down the planning route and being driven by NASA/FAA in the US.
Jim
