BHS - CHC in Brazil S92 recent event
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Captain on the left side has 45 years experience in helicopters (41 offshore)[/QUOTE]
If this is true, he was either asleep or unwell or his bucket but of luck has just lasted an extraordinary long time.
If this is true, he was either asleep or unwell or his bucket but of luck has just lasted an extraordinary long time.
76Heavy, Albatross, Double Bogey: yes, a botched approach by a new command upgrade candidate "supervised" by a training captain.
I disagree with Fareastdriver, too simplistic and accepting of the inevitability of bad luck and fate. Not on my watch. And I disagree with lvgra, I've done hundreds of offshore landings with newly minted foreign national pilots, with my seat as high as it would go and loosened seatbelts so I could pull myself up further and be assured it was a safe landing on my correct approach angle and my profile. Which is the same as the three contributors above describe, common sense and all that, but we don't know if that profile and technique is this operator's SOP.
Like the Sumburgh or Irish CG crash I'd be looking at something more systemic rather than subscribe to the theory of only one bad pilot apple in the barrel. The training pilot must be well known in Brazil, qualified, trained and endorsed by the operator to conduct this kind of training and evaluation. The worldwide training system and worldwide SOP of a sophisticated, experienced operator allowed this situation to happen. The question is why?
I disagree with Fareastdriver, too simplistic and accepting of the inevitability of bad luck and fate. Not on my watch. And I disagree with lvgra, I've done hundreds of offshore landings with newly minted foreign national pilots, with my seat as high as it would go and loosened seatbelts so I could pull myself up further and be assured it was a safe landing on my correct approach angle and my profile. Which is the same as the three contributors above describe, common sense and all that, but we don't know if that profile and technique is this operator's SOP.
Like the Sumburgh or Irish CG crash I'd be looking at something more systemic rather than subscribe to the theory of only one bad pilot apple in the barrel. The training pilot must be well known in Brazil, qualified, trained and endorsed by the operator to conduct this kind of training and evaluation. The worldwide training system and worldwide SOP of a sophisticated, experienced operator allowed this situation to happen. The question is why?
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Malabo, I agree with you 100 %. No way this can ever be put down to,"Oh well, it was in my blind spot".
The actual trajectory flown, well I might have expected that from a brand new offshore pilot during his initial deck certification. However, from a P1 candidate!!!!!
The actual trajectory flown, well I might have expected that from a brand new offshore pilot during his initial deck certification. However, from a P1 candidate!!!!!
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Caused, in majority of cases, by over obsessing about engine failures.
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Of course with CHC changing SOP's and calls constantly the PF may have been so focused on making sure he made the correct latest calls of the month he missed the antenna....only so much brain power available.
Guys, stop speculating, here are some answers to your questions and doubts:
It was a 45° approach made by a pilot in command under supervision; in the 92 there is a few seconds on final approach that the opposite seat looses completely the view of the helideck till it starts seeing it again from his side; the pilot flying enter too early and still not above the helideck at that precisely moment; no vision from LH seat; tail rotor hit the rig radar antenna; stabilizer broke due to strong vibration (flutter, there was no impact); landing was well before the yellow circle because you have to put it on the ground immediately before you start spinning due to the loss of tail rotor; both engines were shut down immediately; tail rotor shaft was cut on the ground due to impact (crash landing); LH sponson damaged due to LH landing gear collapse. ADELT was automatically deployed; Captain on the left side has 45 years experience in helicopters (41 offshore)
It was a 45° approach made by a pilot in command under supervision; in the 92 there is a few seconds on final approach that the opposite seat looses completely the view of the helideck till it starts seeing it again from his side; the pilot flying enter too early and still not above the helideck at that precisely moment; no vision from LH seat; tail rotor hit the rig radar antenna; stabilizer broke due to strong vibration (flutter, there was no impact); landing was well before the yellow circle because you have to put it on the ground immediately before you start spinning due to the loss of tail rotor; both engines were shut down immediately; tail rotor shaft was cut on the ground due to impact (crash landing); LH sponson damaged due to LH landing gear collapse. ADELT was automatically deployed; Captain on the left side has 45 years experience in helicopters (41 offshore)
One thing I quickly discovered when I started instructing is that experience is not a reliable measure of competence. Another thing is, older experienced pilots are more likely to fall asleep at the wheel than younger in-experienced pilots. It's when both pilots are asleep at the wheel, whatever their age, that things quickly become perilous, particularly when operating in proximity to unforgiving steel structures. The passengers on that aircraft were lucky. The repair bill for that S92 will be eye-watering.
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Im not claiming I could have done any better but I would dispute that there was a "need to throw it at the deck before it started to spin". The majority of damage occurred after the strike through the very hard landing. There Is no evidence of rotation in the video before or during the landing. I am certain that the TR was still providing thrust at the point that the lever was dumped. In the simulator, on pre briefed and anticipated TR failures, at low airspeed, even the quickest pilots cannot prevent some rotation.
You've just twanged the whirly thing at the back, I think anyone's reaction so close to a deck would be to slam it down.
If it's not yet spinning, it could be about to, you can't assess the damage from where you are sat. Once it starts spinning, it's too late
If it's not yet spinning, it could be about to, you can't assess the damage from where you are sat. Once it starts spinning, it's too late
Yep. I dare say that both pilots were probably still engrossed in the "WTF? was that" moment by the time the aircraft arrived at the scene of the accident. The outcome was mostly via good fortune, I doubt there was time for any conscious effort to throw it at the deck, let alone throw it on the deck before directional control was lost. Any pilot action in that last instant was probably purely reactive and instinctive. Collective full down after contact was all that was required, and I'm guessing that's exactly what they did.
Not saying this is the situation here.....but I have seen far too many TRE/IRE's that were in exactly the wrong employment. Length of tooth is not a valid criteria.
We all have a "Sell by Date".....it helps if we figure it out ourselves and do the right thing.....but it is imperative the "System" works to ensure only the genuinely qualified get there in the first place.....and do not overstay their welcome!
Some systems are far too incestrous....with buddies checking buddies who turn around and checks.....the other buddy!
If this is true, he was either asleep or unwell or his bucket but of luck has just lasted an extraordinary long time.[/QUOTE]
We all have a "Sell by Date".....it helps if we figure it out ourselves and do the right thing.....but it is imperative the "System" works to ensure only the genuinely qualified get there in the first place.....and do not overstay their welcome!
Some systems are far too incestrous....with buddies checking buddies who turn around and checks.....the other buddy!
If this is true, he was either asleep or unwell or his bucket but of luck has just lasted an extraordinary long time.[/QUOTE]
We are condemning the captain without knowing all the facts. What if the antenna wire had been disconnected at the bottom and when the helicopter approached the downwash picked up the loose end and wrapped it around the tail rotor.
Neither of the pilots would have seen that. There was little or no wind so it wouldn't have blown about so the deck crew would not have noticed it either.
Neither of the pilots would have seen that. There was little or no wind so it wouldn't have blown about so the deck crew would not have noticed it either.
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FED if you look on page 1 of this thread, they crossed the deck way short in the undershoot and he hit a RADAR antennae not a whip aerial. Looking at those images I am sorry to say it was an appalling trajectory doomed from the outset.
iIF they had some flight control issue you could cut them some slack. But that's not been mentioned.
SAS - I think you have a valid point there.
iIF they had some flight control issue you could cut them some slack. But that's not been mentioned.
SAS - I think you have a valid point there.
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Like the Sumburgh or Irish CG crash I'd be looking at something more systemic rather than subscribe to the theory of only one bad pilot apple in the barrel. The training pilot must be well known in Brazil, qualified, trained and endorsed by the operator to conduct this kind of training and evaluation. The worldwide training system and worldwide SOP of a sophisticated, experienced operator allowed this situation to happen. The question is why?
Originally Posted by Outwest
Absolutely!! I always said " make sure the AEO landing is safe before worrying about the OEI one"
Nice, I'll remember that one...same applies to Captains of course, not just co-pilots.
Agreed. The pilot occupying the left seat, even if it was an entry-level junior co-pilot, should never over-look such an appalling trajectory. There are never any operational reasons, wind, weather, performance, or whatever, that would excuse such reckless operation. But I do understand brain-fade happens from time-to-time, which is the whole point of having 2 pilots up front. No point of having 2 pilots up front if one does nothing when the other has an episode of brain-fade, particularly during such a critical stage of flight.
