SAR S-92 Missing Ireland
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The cloud base was recorded as being around 300 feet that night, so a descent to 200 feet to gain sight of the surface was made. The terrain around the coast rises to over 2,000 feet in places, so descending over water presents the safest option, although not without a degree of risk, as you have pointed out.
Had the weather conditions been better, perhaps an approach would have been conducted from 500 feet, or Black Rock lighthouse would have been clearly visible. We almost certainly wouldn't be having this thread discussion.
Had the weather conditions been better, perhaps an approach would have been conducted from 500 feet, or Black Rock lighthouse would have been clearly visible. We almost certainly wouldn't be having this thread discussion.
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rotorspeed
Poor choice of terminology, nothing more, nothing less. I think the meaning is perfectly clear. The choice of route and the height at which it was flown was primarily dictated by the prevailing weather at the time. Flying the same route at 500 feet would clear the Black Rock lighthouse.
Poor choice of terminology, nothing more, nothing less. I think the meaning is perfectly clear. The choice of route and the height at which it was flown was primarily dictated by the prevailing weather at the time. Flying the same route at 500 feet would clear the Black Rock lighthouse.
Nobody outside the investigation team has heard the crew briefing, so whether there were shortcomings in the brief nobody here can say
I don't see anything redeeming for this flight crew in the transcript of that CVR. Both on what was said, and what was not said
So what is it that you have an issue with? I'm not following your selective snippets of forum posting. My point is, and remains, a transcript of the approach brief was not published in the preliminary report, so we don't know what was said, and so there is nothing further to say about it. The extract of the CVR transcript that was published, to me said a lot by what was not said. Too much silence. Silence in any language is bad CRM.
Rotorspeed - I think your post about numbers of callouts, East coast operational tempo and lack of recent familiarity is very valid and these will turn out to be important factors in their decision making process.
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Megan an Gullibell. I think you should put your handbags down now. Unless you want to share with the group why you seem to dislike each other!
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CRAB I hear your concerns but for me, this is a simple case of a very badly executed approach.
ALL safe IMC approaches contain the same 3 elements. A defined horizontal profile, a defined vertical profile (both designed to clear obstacles by the minimum criteria) and a point in space to aim for (DH, DA, MDH/MDH+MAPT.
It is now mandated that for NPAs the Operator shall specify a Constant Descent Final Approach, (CDFA) the principle being to stabilise the Descent AND to minimise the risks of unnecessary time spent tracking towards the MAPT at low height. Certainly ARAs in EASA land follow this principle.
In this case, from the information on the chart we have seen, this approach does not appear to include these essential elements.
Some have intimated in their posts, because it routes directly over the Blackrock, that the approach was not designed to be flown in IMC. If this is true then for what possible purpose was the approach even documented. Noise abatement??? Because if you are VMC you do not need to follow all those waypoints to get to Blacksod.
The changes that need to be considered are first and foremost, the assessment, design and approval of ALL approaches in IMC to required SAR operational sites.
The clear distinction between when an IFR approach is deployed to a fixed, known location such as Blacksod AND when a RADAR letdown is deployed.
Mandating CDFAs for all descents below MSA.
What also stands out in this thread is the intimation that SAR is different from all other operations and is therefore either immune to some risks or incapable of complying with some basic principles.
However, the hazards and risks associated with the action of descending from MSA to a point in space where flight can continue by visual references, is identical for all operations.
Given the extra equipment, extra crew, significant training budget/opportunities afforded to CIVSAR and the considerable standby time available to hone the paperwork and procedures; compared to all other operations, this accident should never have occurred and is incomprehensible.
What may lie at the heart of this is the culture of SAR operations and CIVSAR Crews.
ALL safe IMC approaches contain the same 3 elements. A defined horizontal profile, a defined vertical profile (both designed to clear obstacles by the minimum criteria) and a point in space to aim for (DH, DA, MDH/MDH+MAPT.
It is now mandated that for NPAs the Operator shall specify a Constant Descent Final Approach, (CDFA) the principle being to stabilise the Descent AND to minimise the risks of unnecessary time spent tracking towards the MAPT at low height. Certainly ARAs in EASA land follow this principle.
In this case, from the information on the chart we have seen, this approach does not appear to include these essential elements.
Some have intimated in their posts, because it routes directly over the Blackrock, that the approach was not designed to be flown in IMC. If this is true then for what possible purpose was the approach even documented. Noise abatement??? Because if you are VMC you do not need to follow all those waypoints to get to Blacksod.
The changes that need to be considered are first and foremost, the assessment, design and approval of ALL approaches in IMC to required SAR operational sites.
The clear distinction between when an IFR approach is deployed to a fixed, known location such as Blacksod AND when a RADAR letdown is deployed.
Mandating CDFAs for all descents below MSA.
What also stands out in this thread is the intimation that SAR is different from all other operations and is therefore either immune to some risks or incapable of complying with some basic principles.
However, the hazards and risks associated with the action of descending from MSA to a point in space where flight can continue by visual references, is identical for all operations.
Given the extra equipment, extra crew, significant training budget/opportunities afforded to CIVSAR and the considerable standby time available to hone the paperwork and procedures; compared to all other operations, this accident should never have occurred and is incomprehensible.
What may lie at the heart of this is the culture of SAR operations and CIVSAR Crews.
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First page AAUI report
In accordance with the provisions of Annex 131 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Regulation (EU) No 996/20102 and Statutory Instrument No. 460 of 20093,
"investigations are in no case concerned with apportioning blame or liability."
They are independent of, separate from and without prejudice to any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability. The sole objective of this safety investigation and Final Report is the prevention of accidents and incidents.
Accordingly, it is inappropriate that AAIU Reports should be used to assign fault or blame or determine liability, since neither the safety investigation nor the reporting process has been undertaken for that purpose.
"investigations are in no case concerned with apportioning blame or liability."
They are independent of, separate from and without prejudice to any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability. The sole objective of this safety investigation and Final Report is the prevention of accidents and incidents.
Accordingly, it is inappropriate that AAIU Reports should be used to assign fault or blame or determine liability, since neither the safety investigation nor the reporting process has been undertaken for that purpose.
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Too much time watching telly in the crewroom? Is that what you think DB?
For years, the relative lack of training hours in civsar compared to the military has been the subject of discussion on pprune. How much time do you think can be devoted to radar letdowns in rocky coastlines when the vast majority of training time is spent trying to find a vessel that is motoring in a direction that will give you sufficient performance to live winch? Then you also have cliffs, wet winching, drums etc, day and night. Radar practice takes a lot of time out of a limited training budget.
For years, the relative lack of training hours in civsar compared to the military has been the subject of discussion on pprune. How much time do you think can be devoted to radar letdowns in rocky coastlines when the vast majority of training time is spent trying to find a vessel that is motoring in a direction that will give you sufficient performance to live winch? Then you also have cliffs, wet winching, drums etc, day and night. Radar practice takes a lot of time out of a limited training budget.
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CRAB I hear your concerns but for me, this is a simple case of a very badly executed approach.
ALL safe IMC approaches contain the same 3 elements. A defined horizontal profile, a defined vertical profile (both designed to clear obstacles by the minimum criteria) and a point in space to aim for (DH, DA, MDH/MDH+MAPT.
It is now mandated that for NPAs the Operator shall specify a Constant Descent Final Approach, (CDFA) the principle being to stabilise the Descent AND to minimise the risks of unnecessary time spent tracking towards the MAPT at low height. Certainly ARAs in EASA land follow this principle.
In this case, from the information on the chart we have seen, this approach does not appear to include these essential elements.
Some have intimated in their posts, because it routes directly over the Blackrock, that the approach was not designed to be flown in IMC. If this is true then for what possible purpose was the approach even documented. Noise abatement??? Because if you are VMC you do not need to follow all those waypoints to get to Blacksod.
The changes that need to be considered are first and foremost, the assessment, design and approval of ALL approaches in IMC to required SAR operational sites.
The clear distinction between when an IFR approach is deployed to a fixed, known location such as Blacksod AND when a RADAR letdown is deployed.
Mandating CDFAs for all descents below MSA.
What also stands out in this thread is the intimation that SAR is different from all other operations and is therefore either immune to some risks or incapable of complying with some basic principles.
However, the hazards and risks associated with the action of descending from MSA to a point in space where flight can continue by visual references, is identical for all operations.
Given the extra equipment, extra crew, significant training budget/opportunities afforded to CIVSAR and the considerable standby time available to hone the paperwork and procedures; compared to all other operations, this accident should never have occurred and is incomprehensible.
What may lie at the heart of this is the culture of SAR operations and CIVSAR Crews.
ALL safe IMC approaches contain the same 3 elements. A defined horizontal profile, a defined vertical profile (both designed to clear obstacles by the minimum criteria) and a point in space to aim for (DH, DA, MDH/MDH+MAPT.
It is now mandated that for NPAs the Operator shall specify a Constant Descent Final Approach, (CDFA) the principle being to stabilise the Descent AND to minimise the risks of unnecessary time spent tracking towards the MAPT at low height. Certainly ARAs in EASA land follow this principle.
In this case, from the information on the chart we have seen, this approach does not appear to include these essential elements.
Some have intimated in their posts, because it routes directly over the Blackrock, that the approach was not designed to be flown in IMC. If this is true then for what possible purpose was the approach even documented. Noise abatement??? Because if you are VMC you do not need to follow all those waypoints to get to Blacksod.
The changes that need to be considered are first and foremost, the assessment, design and approval of ALL approaches in IMC to required SAR operational sites.
The clear distinction between when an IFR approach is deployed to a fixed, known location such as Blacksod AND when a RADAR letdown is deployed.
Mandating CDFAs for all descents below MSA.
What also stands out in this thread is the intimation that SAR is different from all other operations and is therefore either immune to some risks or incapable of complying with some basic principles.
However, the hazards and risks associated with the action of descending from MSA to a point in space where flight can continue by visual references, is identical for all operations.
Given the extra equipment, extra crew, significant training budget/opportunities afforded to CIVSAR and the considerable standby time available to hone the paperwork and procedures; compared to all other operations, this accident should never have occurred and is incomprehensible.
What may lie at the heart of this is the culture of SAR operations and CIVSAR Crews.
I think you should put your handbag down as well! You seem to be Mr. Perfect, who shows quite arrogant attitude towards SAR Operators and CIVSAR Crews without knowing their current practices!
DB - the reasoning for CDFA for FW is that there are less trim and attitude changes required compared to having to level off at MDA/H and then reconfigure for landing if you get visual.
Being able to come in at MDA/H in a helicopter is often the difference between getting in and not since a small gap in the cloudbase can give you the required references to convert to visual approach and land.
For exactly the same reasons, SAR approaches do not need to be CDFA, although the transdown to 200' or whatever is selected is, in essence, exactly that.
If you get visual before 200' you have the option of converting to visual flight, if you don't, you can continue in at 200' until you get visual with the target/coast whatever you are letting down to.
200' gives a good compromise between getting visual beneath the cloud and keeping clear of most obstacles (buoys, small rocks small vessels etc) and gives a good radar picture as well. In addition, you have at least some height to play with in the event of a malfunction.
Try to understand that your offshore procedures do not give the operational flexibility required for SAR.
Being able to come in at MDA/H in a helicopter is often the difference between getting in and not since a small gap in the cloudbase can give you the required references to convert to visual approach and land.
For exactly the same reasons, SAR approaches do not need to be CDFA, although the transdown to 200' or whatever is selected is, in essence, exactly that.
If you get visual before 200' you have the option of converting to visual flight, if you don't, you can continue in at 200' until you get visual with the target/coast whatever you are letting down to.
200' gives a good compromise between getting visual beneath the cloud and keeping clear of most obstacles (buoys, small rocks small vessels etc) and gives a good radar picture as well. In addition, you have at least some height to play with in the event of a malfunction.
Try to understand that your offshore procedures do not give the operational flexibility required for SAR.
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I think DB is making an important point here, and it's one I tried to make in #1547 also. Although Corporate, O&G, and SAR have very different ways of doing their specific thing, some operations (eg. visiting an onshore fuelling site) are identical in whichever field you are operating in. The SOPs ought to recognise that.
So how would O&G or corporate crews conduct an IMC letdown to Blacksod at night with a 300' cloudbase?
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It is now mandated that for NPAs the Operator shall specify a Constant Descent Final Approach, (CDFA) the principle being to stabilise the Descent AND to minimise the risks of unnecessary time spent tracking towards the MAPT at low height. Certainly ARAs in EASA land follow this principle.
In order to follow the guideline that the procedure should not generate an unacceptably high workload for the flight crew, the required actions of levelling at MDH, changing heading at the offset initiation point (OIP), and turning away at MAPt should not be planned to occur at the same NM time from the destination
ARAs as currently flown most certainly fit with your statement that:
ALL safe IMC approaches contain the same 3 elements. A defined horizontal profile, a defined vertical profile (both designed to clear obstacles by the minimum criteria) and a point in space to aim for (DH, DA, MDH/MDH+MAPT.
Questions for S92 operatorsor others; is it possible to fly a parallel offset track/descent profile ie 1/4/,1/2 nm left or right of a canned procedure..?
Is the radar `stabilised` once the tilt has been set manually ,during a descent/transition -down` to look at the same `picture,whilst taking account of changes in aircraft pitch attitudes...? or is that still manual..?
Is the radar `stabilised` once the tilt has been set manually ,during a descent/transition -down` to look at the same `picture,whilst taking account of changes in aircraft pitch attitudes...? or is that still manual..?
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
So how would O&G or corporate crews conduct an IMC letdown to Blacksod at night with a 300' cloudbase?
The point is that nobody outside the SAR world (and at least some within it, it seems) would even consider the approach profile taken by this flight, and if they had been given the APBSS chart they would have stored it in the VFR section of their flight bag if not the round file next to their desk. But because they could, they did.
Last edited by puntosaurus; 30th Apr 2017 at 11:26.
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I believe the night minima is normally 300 feet above deck height. If the cloudbase was 300 feet then you would need to conduct the standard MAP at 0.75nm based on the radar image of the target.
G.
I believe the night minima is normally 300 feet above deck height. If the cloudbase was 300 feet then you would need to conduct the standard MAP at 0.75nm based on the radar image of the target.
G.