SAR S-92 Missing Ireland
A serious question as an outsider.
What difference would NVG have made to driving a S-92 into a lighthouse at night, a structure whose sole purpose is to warn seafarers that there is a a bit of land that is a hazard to navigation?
Thanks
What difference would NVG have made to driving a S-92 into a lighthouse at night, a structure whose sole purpose is to warn seafarers that there is a a bit of land that is a hazard to navigation?
Thanks
Because you can see it - even if the light isn't working.
Primarily because you are flying visually and using the nav kit and AFCS to take you where you can see.
Instead, they appear to have been flying in an IFR manner with minimal lookout and concentrating on the screens. Even that would have been safer if they had used the radar as their primary terrain avoidance and had the FLIR facing forward as a backup.
Primarily because you are flying visually and using the nav kit and AFCS to take you where you can see.
Instead, they appear to have been flying in an IFR manner with minimal lookout and concentrating on the screens. Even that would have been safer if they had used the radar as their primary terrain avoidance and had the FLIR facing forward as a backup.
Exactly. So what’s being discussed here re NVG is relevant to the accident discussion. Also the question of who has or is providing whatever training is ongoing, now rumoured halted but unknown why, has relevance to culture, lack of oversight, safety etc.
Now that Norunway has revealed he’s on the inside of Irish SAR would he like to answer the question re NVG and his assertion about why a highly experienced SAR captain and NVG instructor left? Given he decided to state the persons initials openly.
Also why did an ex navy S92 SAR TRE leave Irish SAR for a contractor organisation flying SeaKings? He did also have NVG experience although being over 15 years ago that’s academic anyway as you couldn’t teach peers with such a lack of recency.
Now that Norunway has revealed he’s on the inside of Irish SAR would he like to answer the question re NVG and his assertion about why a highly experienced SAR captain and NVG instructor left? Given he decided to state the persons initials openly.
Also why did an ex navy S92 SAR TRE leave Irish SAR for a contractor organisation flying SeaKings? He did also have NVG experience although being over 15 years ago that’s academic anyway as you couldn’t teach peers with such a lack of recency.
Still strange why they descended so early if they weren’t aware of the lighthouse. Scud-running usually only brings trouble - especially if you’re still flying as if IFR.
’contributory factors’ in an accident report always irks me.
Yes, some important stuff in there but nothing that should not have been completed/aware before the flight. Whilst responsibilities for such ‘errors’ can be directed throughout the Irish SAR establishment, basic flying /navigation / CRM skills were not evident.
Despite the number of individuals on board there appears never to have been a functioning crew onboard.
I wonder how many previous ‘near misses’ were overlooked.
tragedy.
’contributory factors’ in an accident report always irks me.
Yes, some important stuff in there but nothing that should not have been completed/aware before the flight. Whilst responsibilities for such ‘errors’ can be directed throughout the Irish SAR establishment, basic flying /navigation / CRM skills were not evident.
Despite the number of individuals on board there appears never to have been a functioning crew onboard.
I wonder how many previous ‘near misses’ were overlooked.
tragedy.
Last edited by EESDL; 31st Dec 2019 at 14:14.
Nav.database was incorrect as well,..?
.... relying on an old S-61 procedure that doesn't seem to have been checked or updated for years is just poor airmanship when you have such a well-equipped aircraft.
Who....by name and position.....ignored the Iceberg and ordered full speed ahead?
Please do not point a single finger at the Crew without including everyone that assisted in setting up the environment that led to this tragedy....that would be very unfair and narrow minded.
Exactly. Culture and training are central to how crews operate in a large multinational company such as CHC or Bristow. Rearcrew lack of involvement won’t be their decision alone, they will act professionally according to their training, or lack thereof.
When previously reading about this accident, I had assumed that the helipad at Black Rock was near sea level.
After careful reading of the Preliminary Report, I see that the Route Guidance map shows the pad elevation as 262’ and the adjacent lighthouse at 310’. What would induce them to fly at 200’ towards a landing site adjacent to an obstacle that was 110’ above them?
After careful reading of the Preliminary Report, I see that the Route Guidance map shows the pad elevation as 262’ and the adjacent lighthouse at 310’. What would induce them to fly at 200’ towards a landing site adjacent to an obstacle that was 110’ above them?
Now that Norunway has revealed he’s on the inside of Irish SAR would he like to answer the question re NVG and his assertion about why a highly experienced SAR captain and NVG instructor left? Given he decided to state the persons initials openly.
Also why did an ex navy S92 SAR TRE leave Irish SAR for a contractor organisation flying SeaKings? He did also have NVG experience although being over 15 years ago that’s academic anyway as you couldn’t teach peers with such a lack of recency.
When previously reading about this accident, I had assumed that the helipad at Black Rock was near sea level.
After careful reading of the Preliminary Report, I see that the Route Guidance map shows the pad elevation as 262’ and the adjacent lighthouse at 310’. What would induce them to fly at 200’ towards a landing site adjacent to an obstacle that was 110’ above them?
After careful reading of the Preliminary Report, I see that the Route Guidance map shows the pad elevation as 262’ and the adjacent lighthouse at 310’. What would induce them to fly at 200’ towards a landing site adjacent to an obstacle that was 110’ above them?
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Indeed, Blacksod, 10nm east, was. But the question still remains as to why the crew thought being at 200ft in poor vis at night, for a 10nm approach to Blacksod, was the best method.
Final report?
Why would it take this long for a final report? Politics?
almost 3 years since this tragic event that shook many around the world. It’s seems bizarre to have to wait this long.
almost 3 years since this tragic event that shook many around the world. It’s seems bizarre to have to wait this long.
Indeed, Blacksod, 10nm east, was. But the question still remains as to why the crew thought being at 200ft in poor vis at night, for a 10nm approach to Blacksod, was the best method.
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The publication of an Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) report into the 2017 crash of Irish Coast Guard Rescue 116 helicopter has been delayed pending a new review.
The AAIU circulated a 333-page draft final report in November and was expected to publish its final report on the accident this month.
The AAIU circulated a 333-page draft final report in November and was expected to publish its final report on the accident this month.
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Report late by 2 years soon.
It is interesting reading the January RTE article.
As I understand it AAIU has no less then 73 findings and are now finally ready to publish the report.
A report we are all looking forward to so we can learn from this tragic accident.
But somehow one of the stakeholders see fit to drag this out more.
Tragic!
As I understand it AAIU has no less then 73 findings and are now finally ready to publish the report.
A report we are all looking forward to so we can learn from this tragic accident.
But somehow one of the stakeholders see fit to drag this out more.
Tragic!
Sort of understandable if the report is critical of the crew members who aren't here to defend themselves.
The crew knew there was a blob in front of them yet did not take timely action to avoid it, so yes, in my world, that falls on the captain’s broad shoulders. Same responsibility as if they were to deviate from an SOP because of an on-the-spot assessment - like Sully did.
Anyway, lots of blame to go around, especially management. Crew selection, command assessment, SOP’s appropriate for avionics and location....looking forward to the report. Though I think ppruner’s work will be cut out for them to assign the correct weigh of each finding to the tragedy.
Anyway, lots of blame to go around, especially management. Crew selection, command assessment, SOP’s appropriate for avionics and location....looking forward to the report. Though I think ppruner’s work will be cut out for them to assign the correct weigh of each finding to the tragedy.