June AAIB - wrong deck landing
The reason these events happen, particularly at night is because there are no visible identification markings on the rig until you are pretty much committed.
Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.
Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.
Thread Starter
The reason these events happen, particularly at night is because there are no visible identification markings on the rig until you are pretty much committed.
Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.
Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.
I'm not convinced the lack of a green strobe would stop us landing as effectively as a red strobe when not cleared to land - I realise there would be complaints about a near permanently flashing light but perhaps a bit of proximity technology could switch it on when a helicopter sized object comes within 50m
TeeS
TeeS
The controller on the next manned platform should be able to switch on a green light.
I experienced on the de Dutch shelf at least one oil company which played loud music over the PA on a NUI to scare away the seagulls on the heli deck. This was switched on from a nearby platform.
Strange to hear Andre Hazes coming through your ear defenders above the engine noise.
But it definitely worked. Hazes scares away everybody who is not from Amsterdam. His music corrodes the copper wiring in you stereo!
Okay i have to hide for incoming fire from Amsterdam.
Cheers SLB
I experienced on the de Dutch shelf at least one oil company which played loud music over the PA on a NUI to scare away the seagulls on the heli deck. This was switched on from a nearby platform.
Strange to hear Andre Hazes coming through your ear defenders above the engine noise.
But it definitely worked. Hazes scares away everybody who is not from Amsterdam. His music corrodes the copper wiring in you stereo!
Okay i have to hide for incoming fire from Amsterdam.
Cheers SLB
Join Date: May 2012
Location: Aer
Posts: 431
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So is it your contention that the oil companies have no duty to minimise distraction to the pilots in flight? If so, you are part of the problem. A big part.
If the rig or vessel calls the helicopter for a change at a time when the crew is busy, what is wrong with saying "standby or wait"? It's what being an aircraft Captain is all about.
What a shame that that oil companies and passengers are seen as an inconvenience to pilots.
I don't think many would argue with most of your first sentence TM; however, us humans are designed to make mistakes. I've done a fair few deck landings and luckily have never landed on the wrong one, I've got a few personal processes that I use to minimise the risk because I've got the sort of brain that just screws up if I give it the slightest chance. I have never said 'It won't happen to me' in fact I know it would happen to me if I carried on long enough!
So, on the basis pilots tend to think 'Bugger, that's embarrassing, I've landed on the wrong helideck' the OIM might well think 'Jesus!! that idiot landed on my helideck while I've got scaffolders over the side and was just about to cold flare - we could have been blown to smithereens and lost men over the side'! Isn't it the responsibility of everyone to minimise the risk?
Cheers
TeeS
So, on the basis pilots tend to think 'Bugger, that's embarrassing, I've landed on the wrong helideck' the OIM might well think 'Jesus!! that idiot landed on my helideck while I've got scaffolders over the side and was just about to cold flare - we could have been blown to smithereens and lost men over the side'! Isn't it the responsibility of everyone to minimise the risk?
Cheers
TeeS
there was me remembering the Bristow S61 who took off from ESB on its way to Sumburgh, slaved it 180 degrees out, no gross error check against an NDB, standby compass, or the BBC, or the Sun even, and ended up landing in Bergen.
The reason these events happen, particularly at night is because there are no visible identification markings on the rig until you are pretty much committed.
Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.
Oil companies need to start spending on green light strobes on the deck after you've been given landing clearance. No green strobe, no landing.
Crew can see the change from red to green and get a visual confirmation they are at the right deck.
Can't be that difficult.
Join Date: Jan 2015
Location: Europe
Posts: 111
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I can understand how an low paid offshore worker who gets given heliadmin as an additional duty with inadequate training and minimal supervision might not realise they are becoming a distraction.
I am disappointed that highly paid ex-aviators sitting in plush onshore oil company offices, who should know better and frequently will boast they do, quickly play the 'pilot error' 'captain's responsible' card to avoid any work for themselves or cost to their employer.
I am disappointed that highly paid ex-aviators sitting in plush onshore oil company offices, who should know better and frequently will boast they do, quickly play the 'pilot error' 'captain's responsible' card to avoid any work for themselves or cost to their employer.
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: home and abroad
Posts: 582
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I noticed that both reports are about Line Training flights. Perhaps part of the problem is that the crews tried too hard to be expedient and customer friendly rather than taking some extra time to ensure that everything was as it should be and as they expected it.
There is no shame in taking a few extra minutes to get and stay organised. That is why it is a training flight. And the customers should not complain as it is the only way we can ensure the continued delivery of the service: new people need to be properly trained for the job.
On the S92 case: it would have been so much easier for the LTC to have the trainee fly the machine and just take control for landing. In my experience all pilots assigned to line training can fly the machine, it is the rest that is confusing and overwhelming at first. Don't try to do the one-armed paper hangar trick.
The confusing information from the R/O certainly did not help the crew. I just wonder if the R/Os are trained to understand the workload of a shuttle crew and when it is best to be quiet? Somehow, I don't think so..
As for the deck identification: not always easy to read, especially in poor wx. And there is a tendency to see what one expects to see. So any way to improve identification at larger distance would be welcomed.
There is no shame in taking a few extra minutes to get and stay organised. That is why it is a training flight. And the customers should not complain as it is the only way we can ensure the continued delivery of the service: new people need to be properly trained for the job.
On the S92 case: it would have been so much easier for the LTC to have the trainee fly the machine and just take control for landing. In my experience all pilots assigned to line training can fly the machine, it is the rest that is confusing and overwhelming at first. Don't try to do the one-armed paper hangar trick.
The confusing information from the R/O certainly did not help the crew. I just wonder if the R/Os are trained to understand the workload of a shuttle crew and when it is best to be quiet? Somehow, I don't think so..
As for the deck identification: not always easy to read, especially in poor wx. And there is a tendency to see what one expects to see. So any way to improve identification at larger distance would be welcomed.
Thread Starter
Rubbish HC. It's the Pilot's responsibility to operate the aircraft, fly the flight safely and to perform the commercial job for which the aircraft is tasked, which includes changing customer requirements. This is called managing the flight.
If the rig or vessel calls the helicopter for a change at a time when the crew is busy, what is wrong with saying "standby or wait"? It's what being an aircraft Captain is all about.
What a shame that that oil companies and passengers are seen as an inconvenience to pilots.
If the rig or vessel calls the helicopter for a change at a time when the crew is busy, what is wrong with saying "standby or wait"? It's what being an aircraft Captain is all about.
What a shame that that oil companies and passengers are seen as an inconvenience to pilots.
Join Date: May 2012
Location: Aer
Posts: 431
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Au contraire HC.
How is the big bad oil company Radio Operator meant to know when to call the helicopter crew with information? Make an appointment perhaps?
I have flown some offshore based tasks where the whole routing and payload was given over the radio at a suitable time. A normal change in payload or routing radio call should not be a hazardous flight safety event to any helicopter crew and neither should it be an excuse for a wrong deck landing.
Its how you manage to twist and blame the customer for every mistake which is "breathtaking". Ensuring that the aircraft lands at the correct destination is surely the Commander's responsibility.
How is the big bad oil company Radio Operator meant to know when to call the helicopter crew with information? Make an appointment perhaps?
I have flown some offshore based tasks where the whole routing and payload was given over the radio at a suitable time. A normal change in payload or routing radio call should not be a hazardous flight safety event to any helicopter crew and neither should it be an excuse for a wrong deck landing.
Its how you manage to twist and blame the customer for every mistake which is "breathtaking". Ensuring that the aircraft lands at the correct destination is surely the Commander's responsibility.
Wrong Deck Landings - Aerossurance
It will be interesting to see how comprehensive the HeliOffshore guidelines are and whether they find their way into IOGP 390. Given that the current and past Chairs of the IOGP Aviation Committee are members of HO, I assume they will.
I don't see a single cure, as there is not a single cause......
It will be interesting to see how comprehensive the HeliOffshore guidelines are and whether they find their way into IOGP 390. Given that the current and past Chairs of the IOGP Aviation Committee are members of HO, I assume they will.
I don't see a single cure, as there is not a single cause......
Thread Starter
Au contraire HC.
How is the big bad oil company Radio Operator meant to know when to call the helicopter crew with information? Make an appointment perhaps?
I have flown some offshore based tasks where the whole routing and payload was given over the radio at a suitable time. A normal change in payload or routing radio call should not be a hazardous flight safety event to any helicopter crew and neither should it be an excuse for a wrong deck landing.
Its how you manage to twist and blame the customer for every mistake which is "breathtaking". Ensuring that the aircraft lands at the correct destination is surely the Commander's responsibility.
How is the big bad oil company Radio Operator meant to know when to call the helicopter crew with information? Make an appointment perhaps?
I have flown some offshore based tasks where the whole routing and payload was given over the radio at a suitable time. A normal change in payload or routing radio call should not be a hazardous flight safety event to any helicopter crew and neither should it be an excuse for a wrong deck landing.
Its how you manage to twist and blame the customer for every mistake which is "breathtaking". Ensuring that the aircraft lands at the correct destination is surely the Commander's responsibility.
As you say, a single change in payload should not be a particularly hazardous event if timed reasonably. For example, not when the crew are in flight in a shuttle nor within say 5 mins of ETA. Since you like to compare with fixed wing, do you imagine airlines allow their staff to witter on to pilots on approach to Heathrow about Mrs Bloggs who needs a wheelchair?
If you actually listen to some of the chat on the radio offshore especially with more than 1 aircraft on frequency, there can a lot of waffle and inefficiency and unclear comms. Not always, of course, some are better than others. But it is the constant barrage of waffle both on the rig frequency, and the ATC frequency - endless stream of people people having to be told and read back that "you are identified deconfliction service, SSR only to 80 miles, limited cover from below due to altitude" and probably what the controller is having for tea (since that information is just as useful) - that wears one down.
Anyway if the oil companies can't work out who is to fly home, and who is staying offshore, with less than 5 minutes to run, I suggest they might be better off opening a knitting shop and selling wool. They are clearly not competent to be messing around with oil and gas.
Thread Starter
Wrong Deck Landings - Aerossurance
It will be interesting to see how comprehensive the HeliOffshore guidelines are and whether they find their way into IOGP 390. Given that the current and past Chairs of the IOGP Aviation Committee are members of HO, I assume they will.
I don't see a single cure, as there is not a single cause......
It will be interesting to see how comprehensive the HeliOffshore guidelines are and whether they find their way into IOGP 390. Given that the current and past Chairs of the IOGP Aviation Committee are members of HO, I assume they will.
I don't see a single cure, as there is not a single cause......
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: Somerset
Age: 77
Posts: 24
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Helicomparator
Thinking back I can highlight two of my best fails , one significant and one maybe more illuminating. Remember the (Laybarge 234?) Had a deck with side flaps that had to be raised like a gateleg table. Not knowing that (long before helideck manuals and diagrams became the norm) and on my first flight to it after it arrived, we got there to see this rectangular and long but narrow helideck which we promptly landed on, or rather along, unloading and loading through the cargo door as the airstair door was unusable due to edge proximity!.... Only later did we hear that they had raisable side flaps, we had been given landing clearance and thought that was just the way it was. The transit crew expected us to call for the flaps if necessary, but they had only been used to much smaller beasts that the S61. Its companion laybarge was even worse with the deck being between the various structures and the only approach was at right angles to the heading of the barge.
On deck identification, after a short notice request by Ekofisk to do an inter rig shuttle for them on a day long ad-hoc trip, we spent a lot of time and fuel looking for the 'Henry Gibson' as Ekofisk got more and more frustrated with our inability to see it, until the penny dropped it was the 'Henrick Ibsen' and we just didn't connect the name ...... Red faces all round. The final touch on that trip was a landing back into Aberdeen off the ILS in a reported 300 meters RVR (which was our limit at the time - hand flown, no holds, no autopilots ) and then literally having to follow the taxi lines to find the apron. Some trips you never forget.
Thinking back I can highlight two of my best fails , one significant and one maybe more illuminating. Remember the (Laybarge 234?) Had a deck with side flaps that had to be raised like a gateleg table. Not knowing that (long before helideck manuals and diagrams became the norm) and on my first flight to it after it arrived, we got there to see this rectangular and long but narrow helideck which we promptly landed on, or rather along, unloading and loading through the cargo door as the airstair door was unusable due to edge proximity!.... Only later did we hear that they had raisable side flaps, we had been given landing clearance and thought that was just the way it was. The transit crew expected us to call for the flaps if necessary, but they had only been used to much smaller beasts that the S61. Its companion laybarge was even worse with the deck being between the various structures and the only approach was at right angles to the heading of the barge.
On deck identification, after a short notice request by Ekofisk to do an inter rig shuttle for them on a day long ad-hoc trip, we spent a lot of time and fuel looking for the 'Henry Gibson' as Ekofisk got more and more frustrated with our inability to see it, until the penny dropped it was the 'Henrick Ibsen' and we just didn't connect the name ...... Red faces all round. The final touch on that trip was a landing back into Aberdeen off the ILS in a reported 300 meters RVR (which was our limit at the time - hand flown, no holds, no autopilots ) and then literally having to follow the taxi lines to find the apron. Some trips you never forget.
... ... In the UK we have ridiculous arse covering radio waffle with ATC. No only have they invented a whole layer of complexity to do with ATSOCAS which no other country seems to need, but for the sole benefit of ATC there is endless reading out and reading back of types of service and their limitations which sometimes go in for several sentences. All completely pointless and having no bearing on the flight, just arse covering in case someone at NATS might get sued. Have a listen to the offshore frequencies sometime and work out how much of the comms is useful or has any bearing on the safe conduct of the flight. About 50% or less, I'd say.
In the light of the position of the European Parliament and the existence of EMSA, the purpose of the Coastguard is to create a purpose for the Coastguard.
Howcanwebeexpectedtoflylikeeagles
whensurroundedbyturkeys
There are those who have and those who are going to to.
In my career, only one wrong deck landing and one close one.
1. Detached at short notice to southern North Sea in a Bolkow 105. Sent out to the Viking field with one "mother" manned platform and god knows how many unmanned satellites labelled A to X (or something similar). Was sent over to a satellite to pick up a work team on a murky evening, landed and waited. No one appeared so called the mother platform and said "I'm on the X and no one has appeared". "Standby" was the reply followed shortly thereafter by "your passengers are on the X and there is no helicopter there". Embarrassed pause while I tried to re-read the platform name through the the layers of guano. "Oops, will be there in two minutes". Laughs all round, no big deal.
2. Departed from Aberdeen on a two hour flight to a stationary small ship with a bow helideck. Last thing we did before departure was get an updated position and fed it into the FMS. Arrived on location at dusk with little light, vessel exactly on location according to the FMS, exactly the right shape according to the rig plate, heading as previously described, couldn't see any name due to light conditions etc but helideck landing clearance obtained and as we came over the helideck I noticed a bow mounted mast protruding above the helideck perilously close to the helideck. As PNF, I called "go around". Subsequent radio calls established that during the time since our departure from Aberdeen the ship we were supposed to go to had swapped position with her sister ship. Our correct destination was now about 20 miles from her originally reported position.
In a previous life as a Chief Pilot, I once had to write a letter of defence to a major oil company aviation manager (who I will call ********) for one of my pilots who had a wrong deck landing when flying for this oil company. This manager, who had previously been a Bristow pilot for many years, said he wasn't accepting my letter and that he "wanted blood". Well, he never got blood and when I subsequently recounted this story to a senior Bristow pilot who had known him, I was told that "********" had been involved in many similar events during his time with Bristow and would probably have been sacked had he not left.
1. Detached at short notice to southern North Sea in a Bolkow 105. Sent out to the Viking field with one "mother" manned platform and god knows how many unmanned satellites labelled A to X (or something similar). Was sent over to a satellite to pick up a work team on a murky evening, landed and waited. No one appeared so called the mother platform and said "I'm on the X and no one has appeared". "Standby" was the reply followed shortly thereafter by "your passengers are on the X and there is no helicopter there". Embarrassed pause while I tried to re-read the platform name through the the layers of guano. "Oops, will be there in two minutes". Laughs all round, no big deal.
2. Departed from Aberdeen on a two hour flight to a stationary small ship with a bow helideck. Last thing we did before departure was get an updated position and fed it into the FMS. Arrived on location at dusk with little light, vessel exactly on location according to the FMS, exactly the right shape according to the rig plate, heading as previously described, couldn't see any name due to light conditions etc but helideck landing clearance obtained and as we came over the helideck I noticed a bow mounted mast protruding above the helideck perilously close to the helideck. As PNF, I called "go around". Subsequent radio calls established that during the time since our departure from Aberdeen the ship we were supposed to go to had swapped position with her sister ship. Our correct destination was now about 20 miles from her originally reported position.
In a previous life as a Chief Pilot, I once had to write a letter of defence to a major oil company aviation manager (who I will call ********) for one of my pilots who had a wrong deck landing when flying for this oil company. This manager, who had previously been a Bristow pilot for many years, said he wasn't accepting my letter and that he "wanted blood". Well, he never got blood and when I subsequently recounted this story to a senior Bristow pilot who had known him, I was told that "********" had been involved in many similar events during his time with Bristow and would probably have been sacked had he not left.