EC225 crash near Bergen, Norway April 2016
Mitchaa, a prefect post, your spot on with you comments, couldn't have said it better.
SLF3, I suggest you do A LOT more research and re-post your comment. I know for a fact that the UK isn't the highest cost base for offshore oil and gas, there's another part of the world were that price is at least twice and in some cases, three times the of the North Sea and it has a large oil and gas base. (A hint.....it's not Norway)
ITI
SLF3, I suggest you do A LOT more research and re-post your comment. I know for a fact that the UK isn't the highest cost base for offshore oil and gas, there's another part of the world were that price is at least twice and in some cases, three times the of the North Sea and it has a large oil and gas base. (A hint.....it's not Norway)
ITI
Moderator
Referring only to the photos and drawings provided in this thread ('cause I know little about this type). The rod with the eye end can be seen projecting up behind the rotor blade. The eye end is obviously not connected to anything in the photo, and does not display damage [from separation].
The drawing, and photos in posts 200 & 212, show the transmission attaching rods, as they are installed. These rods show a connection from the top deck of the fuselage to the upper case of the transmission. They show that the eye end of the rod attaches to the transmission, while the fork end attaches to the deck.
If the photo of the rotor with the rod projecting up were showing us a disconnected transmission rod, the disconnection has happened at the transmission, because that's the end with the eye? If the rod had disconnected at the deck, we'd be seeing the fork end in the photo, if it were that rod?
If we are seeing the eye end of the transmission rod in the photo on the ground, that would mean that the rod got to that location with the transmission and deck, or there were two disconnects, and we are seeing only one end. But the chances that the rod disconnected at both ends, and then ended up there, seem extremely low to me. If that rod disconnected from the top of the transmission by force upon ground contact, having fallen with it, I would expect it to look much more damaged than it appears.
No speculation as to what happened on my part, just considering what appears to me in the photos. I would expect that the investigators have much more on this already, having more than we can see in the photo.
The drawing, and photos in posts 200 & 212, show the transmission attaching rods, as they are installed. These rods show a connection from the top deck of the fuselage to the upper case of the transmission. They show that the eye end of the rod attaches to the transmission, while the fork end attaches to the deck.
If the photo of the rotor with the rod projecting up were showing us a disconnected transmission rod, the disconnection has happened at the transmission, because that's the end with the eye? If the rod had disconnected at the deck, we'd be seeing the fork end in the photo, if it were that rod?
If we are seeing the eye end of the transmission rod in the photo on the ground, that would mean that the rod got to that location with the transmission and deck, or there were two disconnects, and we are seeing only one end. But the chances that the rod disconnected at both ends, and then ended up there, seem extremely low to me. If that rod disconnected from the top of the transmission by force upon ground contact, having fallen with it, I would expect it to look much more damaged than it appears.
No speculation as to what happened on my part, just considering what appears to me in the photos. I would expect that the investigators have much more on this already, having more than we can see in the photo.
Works for everyone except Bristow! Hmmm?
Much loved around the O&G industry by all those who understand nothing about its performance!
Mi-171 - ...WAHOOOUUUU
AW101 - ...A bad copy of NH-90 but why not why not 'depend of the price (a 225 is 23Meuros)
NH90 - ...Never certificate for civilian, you can buy 10 H175 with the price of 1 NH90
I read something about L2 (i don't know where) but Bond use 4 L2 for pax and 2 L2 for SAR... and i'm not surprised if the L2 return to flight during this week....
For the questions about the H215e the main gear box is the same of 332L1 or 332L2...
About the MGB of NH90 we don't talk about the same thing for the design and the size...
And for the return of 225 if this tragedy result of maintenance problem you see certainly again this aircraft in the sky of north sea because is certainly the more economic with the best performance...you can take off with full pax full fuel and with the additional tank (it was alone a this price).....Remember actually with the low price of barrel all the company search the services with Lowest cost....
AW101 - ...A bad copy of NH-90 but why not why not 'depend of the price (a 225 is 23Meuros)
NH90 - ...Never certificate for civilian, you can buy 10 H175 with the price of 1 NH90
I read something about L2 (i don't know where) but Bond use 4 L2 for pax and 2 L2 for SAR... and i'm not surprised if the L2 return to flight during this week....
For the questions about the H215e the main gear box is the same of 332L1 or 332L2...
About the MGB of NH90 we don't talk about the same thing for the design and the size...
And for the return of 225 if this tragedy result of maintenance problem you see certainly again this aircraft in the sky of north sea because is certainly the more economic with the best performance...you can take off with full pax full fuel and with the additional tank (it was alone a this price).....Remember actually with the low price of barrel all the company search the services with Lowest cost....
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I agree, the only possibility I can think of ( though hard to believe) is that the rod end we are seeing sticking up was attached until ground impact. The lower end (hidden) is the fork fitting and is jammed into the ground. The eye end punched out of its pin and clip assembly on impact. A straight sheer force from directly below might not deform the rod but hard to imagine all the variables lining up to produce this.
Neat that you noticed this ....
Neat that you noticed this ....
Last edited by TylerMonkey; 2nd May 2016 at 01:28.
Who overhauled the components installed on this helicopter? Does Heli-One perform all this work for CHC, or is some of it performed by Airbus? Not that I suggest any particular relevance to this, just wondering?
"What about the 332 and 725?"
I think that AH statement on Friday only referred to the H225. Not sure if there was a later one.
The SIN does seem very unequivocal. But leaving aside deliberate sabotage or wilful misconduct, something that can go wrong, will go wrong. An engineering / maintenance error may likely still lead to some change either procedural or component design, to ensure there could never be a repetition.
At least it sounds as if we will be hearing more sooner rather than later. This uncertainly and speculation (by us as much as anyone) is doing no good to the industry or the shattered confidence of our passengers.
I think that AH statement on Friday only referred to the H225. Not sure if there was a later one.
The SIN does seem very unequivocal. But leaving aside deliberate sabotage or wilful misconduct, something that can go wrong, will go wrong. An engineering / maintenance error may likely still lead to some change either procedural or component design, to ensure there could never be a repetition.
At least it sounds as if we will be hearing more sooner rather than later. This uncertainly and speculation (by us as much as anyone) is doing no good to the industry or the shattered confidence of our passengers.
The first one carries no formal instruction to ground the aircraft. All it does is inform readers of the accident and "allies" Airbus with the decision to put all commercial 225 flights on hold. This cannot be construed as a technical grounding of the aircraft by Airbus.
The second SIN really says nothing more of any significance. My interpretation of it is that Airbus have so far found nothing which gives them any reason to suspend the Type Certificate of the aircraft for technical reasons but they "continue to stand by the decision of the Norwegian and UK authorities to put commercial EC225 flights on hold"
Over the last five years or so, there has been a subtle change in the oil and gas industry to move towards the military practice of grounding an aircraft type after an unexplained accident until such time the cause has been established and "cured". Civilian practice had always been (and still is in the fixed wing world) not to ground an aircraft until evidence has been found that there is an intrinsic airworthiness defect which is likely to affect other serial numbers of the same product.
Imagine the chaos in the air travel industry if Boing 737s were all grounded every time there was a fatal accident involving that type. It is only because of the high profile of the North Sea that the 225's have been grounded. Had this tragic accident happened to a EC 725 (a military version of the EC225) in Outer Mongolia, the North Sea 225s would still be flying.
Another consideration to take into account is the Contract conditions between the helicopter operator and the Oil & Gas customers. I suspect that if there is a mandatory grounding of the helicopter, the Customer may still be required to continue to pay any monthly standing charge. It is therefore in the helicopter operators' interest to persuade their aviation authority to ground the aircraft under these circumstances before the Customer has a chance to suspend the contract.
Irrespective of my thoughts on grounding protocols described above, my innermost thoughts are with the families of the deceased and those in the industry who have to deal with and live through the aftermath of this tragic accident. Very difficult times for you all.
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Mitchaa, a prefect post, your spot on with you comments, couldn't have said it better.
SLF3, I suggest you do A LOT more research and re-post your comment. I know for a fact that the UK isn't the highest cost base for offshore oil and gas, there's another part of the world were that price is at least twice and in some cases, three times the of the North Sea and it has a large oil and gas base. (A hint.....it's not Norway)
ITI
SLF3, I suggest you do A LOT more research and re-post your comment. I know for a fact that the UK isn't the highest cost base for offshore oil and gas, there's another part of the world were that price is at least twice and in some cases, three times the of the North Sea and it has a large oil and gas base. (A hint.....it's not Norway)
ITI
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The drawing, and photos in posts 200 & 212, show the transmission attaching rods, as they are installed. These rods show a connection from the top deck of the fuselage to the upper case of the transmission. They show that the eye end of the rod attaches to the transmission, while the fork end attaches to the deck.
If the photo of the rotor with the rod projecting up were showing us a disconnected transmission rod, the disconnection has happened at the transmission, because that's the end with the eye? If the rod had disconnected at the deck, we'd be seeing the fork end in the photo, if it were that rod?
If the photo of the rotor with the rod projecting up were showing us a disconnected transmission rod, the disconnection has happened at the transmission, because that's the end with the eye? If the rod had disconnected at the deck, we'd be seeing the fork end in the photo, if it were that rod?
Not saying this rod has, but very often these eye ends have a spherical bearing in there too.
None from me either.
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The rod end in the picture is a side view of the fork end, probably complete with attaching hardware. The end with the bearing is most likely still attached to the mast.
From the IPC picture above it would appear to be the LH suspension bar.
From the IPC picture above it would appear to be the LH suspension bar.
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Hope the picture I posted in post 275 is clear for you.
What can be said from this picture is that on the norwegian crash picture neither the head of the pin, with two flat cuts nor the two safety pins are visible.
The question then is why ?
Gone as a result of the MGB explosion : possible
Gone as a result of a maintenance flaw : possible
Just one thing: the pin are tight fit, with no play in the vertical (lift) axis, they are not rotating parts, thus, I think that a lack of safety pin would not be noticed by a vibration monitoring system.
What can be said from this picture is that on the norwegian crash picture neither the head of the pin, with two flat cuts nor the two safety pins are visible.
The question then is why ?
Gone as a result of the MGB explosion : possible
Gone as a result of a maintenance flaw : possible
Just one thing: the pin are tight fit, with no play in the vertical (lift) axis, they are not rotating parts, thus, I think that a lack of safety pin would not be noticed by a vibration monitoring system.
Airliners crash relatively often, and airlines do not normally ground the machines. BUT, if an A380 had its wings fall off on short final to Heathrow, killing 450 people...you'd probably see a grounding. Offshore is a business-to-business operation, with the passengers highly organised and unionised. AIRBUS have not issued a grounding, which means nothing. If the offshore companies/pax don't want to travel in the EC225, then the machine will not be used for offshore. End of story. Bring me another helicopter, Mr CHC.
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The two Safety Information Notices regarding this accident issued by Airbus was distributed to operators of 332's and 225's, military and civil.
The first one carries no formal instruction to ground the aircraft. All it does is inform readers of the accident and "allies" Airbus with the decision to put all commercial 225 flights on hold. This cannot be construed as a technical grounding of the aircraft by Airbus.
The second SIN really says nothing more of any significance. My interpretation of it is that Airbus have so far found nothing which gives them any reason to suspend the Type Certificate of the aircraft for technical reasons but they "continue to stand by the decision of the Norwegian and UK authorities to put commercial EC225 flights on hold"
Over the last five years or so, there has been a subtle change in the oil and gas industry to move towards the military practice of grounding an aircraft type after an unexplained accident until such time the cause has been established and "cured". Civilian practice had always been (and still is in the fixed wing world) not to ground an aircraft until evidence has been found that there is an intrinsic airworthiness defect which is likely to affect other serial numbers of the same product.
Imagine the chaos in the air travel industry if Boing 737s were all grounded every time there was a fatal accident involving that type. It is only because of the high profile of the North Sea that the 225's have been grounded. Had this tragic accident happened to a EC 725 (a military version of the EC225) in Outer Mongolia, the North Sea 225s would still be flying.
Another consideration to take into account is the Contract conditions between the helicopter operator and the Oil & Gas customers. I suspect that if there is a mandatory grounding of the helicopter, the Customer may still be required to continue to pay any monthly standing charge. It is therefore in the helicopter operators' interest to persuade their aviation authority to ground the aircraft under these circumstances before the Customer has a chance to suspend the contract.
Irrespective of my thoughts on grounding protocols described above, my innermost thoughts are with the families of the deceased and those in the industry who have to deal with and live through the aftermath of this tragic accident. Very difficult times for you all.
The first one carries no formal instruction to ground the aircraft. All it does is inform readers of the accident and "allies" Airbus with the decision to put all commercial 225 flights on hold. This cannot be construed as a technical grounding of the aircraft by Airbus.
The second SIN really says nothing more of any significance. My interpretation of it is that Airbus have so far found nothing which gives them any reason to suspend the Type Certificate of the aircraft for technical reasons but they "continue to stand by the decision of the Norwegian and UK authorities to put commercial EC225 flights on hold"
Over the last five years or so, there has been a subtle change in the oil and gas industry to move towards the military practice of grounding an aircraft type after an unexplained accident until such time the cause has been established and "cured". Civilian practice had always been (and still is in the fixed wing world) not to ground an aircraft until evidence has been found that there is an intrinsic airworthiness defect which is likely to affect other serial numbers of the same product.
Imagine the chaos in the air travel industry if Boing 737s were all grounded every time there was a fatal accident involving that type. It is only because of the high profile of the North Sea that the 225's have been grounded. Had this tragic accident happened to a EC 725 (a military version of the EC225) in Outer Mongolia, the North Sea 225s would still be flying.
Another consideration to take into account is the Contract conditions between the helicopter operator and the Oil & Gas customers. I suspect that if there is a mandatory grounding of the helicopter, the Customer may still be required to continue to pay any monthly standing charge. It is therefore in the helicopter operators' interest to persuade their aviation authority to ground the aircraft under these circumstances before the Customer has a chance to suspend the contract.
Irrespective of my thoughts on grounding protocols described above, my innermost thoughts are with the families of the deceased and those in the industry who have to deal with and live through the aftermath of this tragic accident. Very difficult times for you all.
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Hope the picture I posted in post 275 is clear for you.
What can be said from this picture is that on the norwegian crash picture neither the head of the pin, with two flat cuts nor the two safety pins are visible.
The question then is why ?
Gone as a result of the MGB explosion : possible
Gone as a result of a maintenance flaw : possible
Just one thing: the pin are tight fit, with no play in the vertical (lift) axis, they are not rotating parts, thus, I think that a lack of safety pin would not be noticed by a vibration monitoring system.
What can be said from this picture is that on the norwegian crash picture neither the head of the pin, with two flat cuts nor the two safety pins are visible.
The question then is why ?
Gone as a result of the MGB explosion : possible
Gone as a result of a maintenance flaw : possible
Just one thing: the pin are tight fit, with no play in the vertical (lift) axis, they are not rotating parts, thus, I think that a lack of safety pin would not be noticed by a vibration monitoring system.