Bristow S76 Ditched in Nigeria today Feb 3 2016

[Copterline 103]

@ericferret
What formula?
How is this "formula" defined?

This "formula" is a S76 series helicopter's upper (deck) cowling. This term is used by the factory and e.g. Flight Safety, Florida. The profile of upper deck cowling separately looks likes a formula car profile.

[John Eacott]

Originally Posted by Copterline 103

This "formula" is a S76 series helicopter's upper (deck) cowling. This term is used by the factory and e.g. Flight Safety, Florida. The profile of upper deck cowling separately looks likes a formula car profile.

Never, ever heard it called that: it's been known as the 'race car' for as long as I've been S76 qualified. About 1980.

[Copterline 103]

@gulliBell
I'd be more interested in exploring what may have happened electrically that may have suckered the crew into thinking they had a mechanical problem.

I looks that your knowledge is limited. I have had a possibility to see behind the curtains (60.000 non-public documents). For me this is like a mathematical formula where the mathematical outcome is already known by me. Now I have to put the pieces together to verify what happen and to see what will come to happen.

Let’s keep your (gulliBell) lead also to be open but let’s keep also the focus on the airworthiness issues. The sentence what you wrote that “as a pilot I don't care about this” is like to a statement “It can’t happen to me”. Working in the aviation and working in the helicopter industry needs to have an attitude where everybody is focused to do the work carefully. The reality is that even you have made your duties well yesterday. It doesn't help, the sun is raising again in the morning and once again everyone have to do their duties 100 % focused to the safety, reliability and efficiency.

The helicopter industry’s 100 % safety will be achieved by global fleet grounding. The reality is that this world needs to have helicopters to be flying. By developing and improving the helicopters safety and reliability the helicopters could remain to be certified.

The helicopter operation should reach at least the level of accepted risk (vs. safety). In the helicopter industry we are dealing with the risk daily.

We have seen in the industry what happen to the fleet of EC225. Quite a number of accidents were taken place and too many innocent people have to lose their lives before the fleet was globally grounded. This global fleet grounding and re-certification process took more than a year. Now the EC225 are airworthy again and flying safely and with high reliability. This is the common industrial practices to ensure the crews and passengers safety.

“Out there” is still thousands S76 pilots and technicians who are working daily with the S76 series helicopters. They have very limited knowledge of the reality what stays behind the curtains. I understand that they have to right to know what a f… is going on out there….

My opinion of these two latest accidents: If the negligent are the flight crews or the Bristow’s technicians. Then we have had already seen a front page news with a colored picture to show how those who are responsible have already been hanged to the first suitable tree branch. This is the practice in the world where the money will be always number one and the safety number zero. This assertion seems to be behind the Bristow’s slogan “Target Zero” ?

[industry insider]

We have seen in the industry what happen to the fleet of EC225. Quite a number of accidents were taken place and too many innocent people have to lose their lives before the fleet was globally grounded.

Rubbish Copterline. I am not aware of a fatal accident anywhere in the offshore industry in an EC225. The fleet was only grounded by statute in certain places.

According to you, every S-76 accident is caused by a servo problem. You are wrong and I am getting a bit fed up reading your posts which show little or no objectivity. You are looking for every accident to fit your pre-conceived theory.

[Copterline 103]

Rubbish Copterline. I am not aware of a fatal accident anywhere in the offshore industry in an EC225. The fleet was only grounded by statute in certain places.

According to you, every S-76 accident is caused by a servo problem. You are wrong and I am getting a bit fed up reading your posts which show little or no objectivity. You are looking for every accident to fit your pre-conceived theory.

@industry insider
The most likely you are the one who works behind the curtains. Please, read your hidden and non-public documents and think. If the airworthiness is ok there would be nothing to hide?

Regarding your statement of the EC225 (marketing name of different version of Puma's) "I am not aware of a fatal accident anywhere in the offshore industry in an EC225. The fleet was only grounded by statute in certain places."

This is very strange opinion. When the whole fleet of different version of Puma helicopters were globally grounded, there was a real reason for it! It was the main gearbox lubrication issue. You shoud read and study these accident reports and also the EC's statement how to fix the problem and what they did.

I have been waiting that you will show up behind the curtain. Are you ready for the truth? I'm ready.

I'm finishing to wrote a book which is named "The truth and nothing but the truth". In the book is "a fictive story" what f... is going behind the curtains.

[squib66]

Another slice of fruitcake vicar?

"The truth and nothing but the truth": was that a deliberate choice to name your book after a Jerry Springer show?

[gulliBell]

@Copterline 103: I am a training Captain on the S76. Our clients are primarily offshore S76 operators who send their pilots to us to do initial and recurrent training on C++. I also do recurrent training for VVIP corporate clients as well. So I have a reasonable understanding of the aircraft and the common mistakes pilots make.

The VVIP pilots are usually at a good standard, both in technical knowledge and flight manoeuvre technique. The offshore guys much less so, particularly technical knowledge and CRM, although their hand flying is generally OK. Utter confusion usually reigns when we get to some particular malfunctions, including AFCS, use of the autopilot and flight director modes, and avionics/electrical malfunctions.

Time and time again I've seen pilots get themselves so utterly confused with a relatively minor malfunction that the safety of the aircraft is put in jeopardy. I see pilots attempt the same solution to a problem 5 or 6 times over before I tell them to think of something else. If a solution doesn't work first time (e.g. reset an AP), why would trying the same thing 5 or 6 times over yield a different result? This is what I'm seeing in the Bristow FDR data, AP2 reset attempted 7 times during the course of the flight. This is telling me they were short on other ideas. I see it all the time.

The flight control malfunctions are generally handled much better. With "whether to land immediately" decision making in response to a malfunction, a bad decision to keep flying is probably made 99 times to every un-neccessary decision to land/ditch immediately. So in this instance, if in hindsight the crew made a wrong decision to ditch, that would be out of character. Because, as I say, if there is a bad decision, it's usually to keep flying when they shouldn't.

With this experience in mind, and piecing together the little we know about what happened, I strongly suspect something electrical happened that suckered the crew into thinking they had a flight control malfunction that necessitated ditching. There is no electrical malfunction in the 76 that requires "land immediately", except for an electrical fire that can't be extinguished. I would be very surprised if the problem was hydraulic or flight control binding/jam/interference, but I shall keep an open mind until they work it out.

[212man]

Regarding your statement of the EC225 (marketing name of different version of Puma's) "I am not aware of a fatal accident anywhere in the offshore industry in an EC225. The fleet was only grounded by statute in certain places."

This is very strange opinion. When the whole fleet of different version of Puma helicopters were globally grounded, there was a real reason for it! It was the main gearbox lubrication issue. You shoud read and study these accident reports and also the EC's statement how to fix the problem and what they did

Yet again you show your ignorance (I'm being polite!) The majority of 225s were grounded by the operators/customers (O&G companies). Some authorities banned flights overwater but not overland. Some operators continued to fly without restrictions e.g. in SE Asia. All 725s remained in operations. There were no fatal 225 accidents.

I think you'll find that Industry Insider knows his facts - it's a pity you don't

[pilot and apprentice]

I agree you are on the right track Gullibell. It is an unfortunate fact that flying in Nigeria, getting regular Trim lights and issues is just another day at the office. With experience it is just an annoyance. The daily CVR/FDR test is done but if one called it off every time a light stayed on one would be shown the door. Try a reset post-flight or MEL it...

I have also seen crews that look at the possibility of conducting even a VMC trip with degraded automation with extreme trepidation. This isn't entirely their fault. The sim sessions conducted by Bristow Nigeria are extremely limited and the time has to be carefully weighed. Understanding the automation first, then hands and feet skills if you can.

Copterline: You speak a lot about what could not possibly happen, what must be happening because it is in the European regs, etc. Clearly, you have not worked in the environment where these accidents happened. The recent rapid nationalization has happened to maintenance as well. Good intentions are great but it takes time and exposure for engineers, just like pilots, to get really good at the job. I absolutely do not believe anyone made a deliberate error, or cut a corner, but the system is desperate to move people up in the chain with a bare minimum of experience. I've been there (in Nigeria and an apprentice elsewhere) and I can't believe the pace of staff change that is happening.

Confirmation bias is what I think is happening. I understand you have an issue with the 76 but I have seen it put through a brutal torture test in another incident a few years ago and it stood up incredibly well. We rely on many systems to keep us alive on the job. The people are usually the weak link and will continue to be.

After all this, I'm wishing HC and Crab were back at it on here :-)

[Copterline 103]

@212man
I think you'll find that Industry Insider knows his facts - it's a pity you don't

These whom are working in behind of the curtains are to be paid that they will lead the attention to the area of their interest. They are not the first one whom are willing to have FDR data or HUMS data to be published. It is very relevant information to know how the helicopter's has behaved during the last half an hour. They are not the entity whom is willing to publish the status of hydraulic fluid contamination or non-contamination.

Let's keep all options open and let's hope that the truth will be released to the industry in timely manner. Hope that NAIB will release further information of 12th August, 2015 accident like FDR recording if still available and information of the fluid contamination or non-contamination of these both accident cases.

[Copterline 103]

@pilot and apprentice
I agree you are on the right track Gullibell. It is an unfortunate fact that flying in Nigeria, getting regular Trim lights and issues is just another day at the office. With experience it is just an annoyance. The daily CVR/FDR test is done but if one called it off every time a light stayed on one would be shown the door. Try a reset post-flight or MEL it...

Very hard to believe that the one of the biggest helicopter company, a listed company could be so low? I can't belive it. If this is the truth the the case is not any more a civil court case? Sorry, I don't believe this.

[gulliBell]

What does the condition of the hydraulic fluid have to do with the 12th August accident? The control rod came undone, doesn't matter how clean or dirty the hydraulic fluid was, or how full the hydraulic module reservoir was, once that control rod comes undone it's game over. As a matter of thoroughness I guess all the fluids would get tested as part of an accident investigation. In the S76 the hydraulic pressure filter is not a bypass type, so any dirt should remain on the upstream side of the filter until eventually the filter gets totally blocked with the accumulation of further dirt. Unless of course the source of the dirt is in the servo, which if it is making particles then you're potentially in a spot of bother. The hydraulic filter on the downstream side of the servo is a bypass type, but that is for a different reason (you don't want that filter blocking because the pressure across the servo will equalise causing the piston to lock).

[HLCPTR]

Unfortunately, all this talk of "behind the curtain" is starting to look too much like a conspiracy theory. It serves no purpose to speculate, especially when hints of hidden agendas are mentioned.


To each his own.

[Copterline 103]

@HLCPTR
Unfortunately, all this talk of "behind the curtain" is starting to look too much like a conspiracy theory. It serves no purpose to speculate, especially when hints of hidden agendas are mentioned.

In the court proceedings between the parties, it is possible “to get to see behind the curtains”. The procedure is defined in US law and the name of the procedure is a Discovery. This Discovery Order will be given by the Court.

Discovery, in the law of the United States and other countries, is a pre-trial procedure in a lawsuit in which each party, through the law of civil procedure, can obtain evidence from the other party or parties by means of discovery devices such as a request for answers to interrogatories, request for production of documents, request for admissions and depositions.

Under the law of the United States, civil discovery is wide-ranging and can involve any material which is "reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence." This is a much broader standard than relevance, because it contemplates the exploration of evidence which might be relevant, rather than evidence which is truly relevant.

In practice, this means that the both parties have to hand over to the opposite party all of its own internal and external documents, memos, e-mails, reports that directly or indirectly may be related to be a lead to the evidence or to be a evidence in this case. The Discovery material must be complete (without leaving anything out) for documentaries, under penalty of perjury.

I have had possibility to read the discovery material and to see behind the curtains.

This Discovery material are normally in aviation cases manufacture’s internal reports, internal emails, internal memos, internal notes, internal test reports, internal accident reports and findings, emails and the letters between manufacture – aviation authority, manufacture – national safety board or internal documents between manufacture and its subcontractors ect.

The Discovery process will give very good understanding of the counter party’s real knowledge or e.g. hidden non-public documents, if any.

I have had possibility to read 60.000 different documents and to create good understanding what is the public knowledge and "the internal knowledge with hidden issues”, if any.

This is not a conspiracy theory and there is no conspiracy. The truth maybe still out there but the all facts are already well known.

[John Eacott]

Originally Posted by Copterline 103

This is not a conspiracy theory and there is no conspiracy. The truth maybe still out there but the all facts are already well known.

Yet to most of us here, that is what you are persistently posting that you believe a conspiracy is preventing everyone but you seeing your truths.

Not only that, but you certainly appear not to be a helicopter professional, nor even a pilot or engineer. It matters not how many of the 60,000 documents you have read, it seems that you have a shallow understanding of offshore ops and an even shallower understanding of flying or maintaining the S76.

[Copterline 103]

Not only that, but you certainly appear not to be a helicopter professional, nor even a pilot or engineer. It matters not how many of the 60,000 documents you have read, it seems that you have a shallow understanding of offshore ops and an even shallower understanding of flying or maintaining the S76.

Maybe I'm slow and not as smart. Just a humble TRI/TRE deeply involved in the issue during the last couple decades and so far I have done quite well.

In professional Forum I appreciate to discuss in professional manner. My main concern is flight safety, noting more nothing less.

[HLCPTR]

Then may I respectfully suggest that if you have a point to make, that you make it clearly and specifically. Multiple rambling posts, hinting at unseen/hidden agendas and issues which only you understand add nothing to the discussion.

[Copterline 103]

@gulliBell
What does the condition of the hydraulic fluid have to do with the 12th August accident?.....The hydraulic filter on the downstream side of the servo is a bypass type, but that is for a different reason (you don't want that filter blocking because the pressure across the servo will equalise causing the piston to lock).

My focus is not like yours. The issue of the Servo Actuator's is not related to filters or filter’s bypass. The issue is the Servo Actuator design. When the Servo Actuator's and its spool valve's C3 return port or both of the ports are blocked. If this will happen then the Servo Actuator will be jammed or fully extended. This will cause that the helicopter will come immediately unflyable and no single caution is addressed to the crew. If the blockage is partial or temporary then the situation could be that the controllability has been lost temporarily.

Let's wait until that we have more precise information like FDR data of 12th August, 2015 accident or when we have information of the fluid contamination or non-contamination.

[gulliBell]

The servo design can't be expected to accommodate a manufacturing defect, like what happened in the Copterline accident. The pressure filter is there to stop particles from the hydraulic pump getting to the servo should the pump fail. Gross contamination of the servo due to the servo itself failing isn't a design point, in terms of fail-safe, past what the bypass spool is supposed to do. The only way to counter an un-commanded extension/retraction of a servo is to depressurization the system at the servo inlet, which is the purpose of the servo shutoff valve.

As far as I know, in the Copterline accident the crew didn't switch off the servo when its power piston went to full extension. I don't think they knew they were faced with a hydraulic problem. In any event, switching off the servo might not have saved them because both servos had a problem, and as we all know, you can't switch off both servo shutoff valves at the same time (which is a design point). Again, as far as I know, if the after start hydraulic system check had been done properly then the Copterline crew should have realized there was a problem with the servo. But that was a different accident. I doubt that anything relevant to that accident, in terms of flight control system problems, can be applied to either Bristow accident.

[Copterline 103]

@gulliBell
The pressure filter is there to stop particles from the hydraulic pump getting to the servo should the pump fail.

Let's be precise. Between the Servo Actuator pistons and the spool valve there is no any filter. All the particles and debris what are removing from the pistons or piston rings will have a direct routing to the C3 return ports. The design issue (the design point) is the spool valve's C3 return (fluid) ports and the Servo Actuator structure. If the return port blockage occurs the helicopter will lose its controllability immediately.

gulliBell, this is the first issue what I can fully agree with you. The only way to get the helicopter to be flyable again (if the helicopter will come immediately unflyable) is to switch or #1 hydraulic OFF. This will release (expected) affected #1 Servo channel off (depressurized). If switching off #1 doesn't help then the next step is select the #2 hydraulic OFF. This will release (expected) affected #2 Servo channel off (depressurized). The most likely the second attempt will release affected servo channel and the helicopter will be a steerable and a flyable helicopter again.

The major challenge is: due to the servo system design the helicopter caution system won't make any cautions to the crew. The crew can't identify what is the failure. There is no warning or any cautions. The RFM doesn't have any emergency procedures how the crew should proceed if this emergency scenario will happen.

I doubt that anything relevant to that accident, in terms of flight control system problems, can be applied to either Bristow accident.

For sure, its too early to me or you to make any conclusions what has happen or what hasn't happen (these two Bristow accidents).

It's nice to see that you have a good understanding of the hydraulics and the flight control systems. Sorry, I made earlier a wrong conclusion of your capability and your knowledge due to your FCR/CVR comment which was little bit confusing as your earlier posts #521, #523 and #529.