Bristow S76 Ditched in Nigeria today Feb 3 2016
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Actually no, nationalisation wasn't Akin's big plan. It's Nigerian law and the Nigerian Content Monitoring Board requires all companies involved in the oil and gas industry to show what they're doing to replace non-Nigerians with Nigerians and make it very difficult for companies like Bristow to get work and residence permits for the likes of ungrateful expatriates like you.Every Managing Director of Bristow has had to work to expatriate quotas set by the Federal Government and make a case for employing numpties like you. It's one of the reasons that Bristow has been training Nigerian pilots abroad for many years in UK, SA and USA there being almost no facilities for doing so in Nigeria. Akin was being politic and trying to conform with government pressure to employ more locals in the company.
Yes Akin is working in Houston now. I guess Bristow would not have promoted him and sent him to a position there if there were any truth behind your libellous accusations about missing money. I'm amazed the moderators have allowed your libellous statements to remain on here when both you and PPruNe could (and should) be taken to court over them
Yes Akin is working in Houston now. I guess Bristow would not have promoted him and sent him to a position there if there were any truth behind your libellous accusations about missing money. I'm amazed the moderators have allowed your libellous statements to remain on here when both you and PPruNe could (and should) be taken to court over them
Who's libellous? Is that the name of your tribe's leader?
And what do I have to be grateful for? Being treated like a peace of s***t by my Nigerian bosses for being a white boy while my Nigerian colleague pilots get the favor treatment?
Or perhaps because after paying for my own training and many years experience (including single P and multi P) I was given a shot at Command? Just like my Nigerian pilot colleagues who after just 4 years from day 1 and after being rushed to a flight school to fly traffic patterns at night in a schwizer to fulfill the minimum ATPL requirents get promoted to Comand? All free of charge??
Or perhaps I should be grateful I still have a job while our ex HR director Femi was caught stealing, yet he was given 2 mill $ to go "quietly and peacefully"?
Or perhaps I should be grateful (like the passengers of BQJ) for ending up swimming in the ocean and not dead because the hero Captain managed to safely "land on water" a perfecly flyable helicopter. Jeez! After all these years I never knew you could LAND on water!!
John, it was just a jibe at the two manualflightfascists who happened to be antipodeans, one in particular who was insulting many pilots including myself. Don't take it to heart!
If you read my posts you will see that I did not denigrate manual flying skills, I merely said that they were not the be all and end all and actually, in the context of an airline-type offshore role, other aspects were a more important target for training when you consider that having gained your licence you are supposed to be able to fly, whereas you have had no practical training in MCC/CRM or automation.
As to this accident being down to a lack of manual flying skills that seems a most improbable cause to anyone except a manualflightfascist because AIUI they retained control of helicopter throughout and made a satisfactory landing on water with no significant injuries. To me that suggests that their manual flying skills were adequate. What may or may not have been an issue is their technical knowledge of the aircraft systems and ability to make the best decision when presented with a malfunction (but of course we don't actually know yet). What has that got to do with "manual flying skills"?
If you read my posts you will see that I did not denigrate manual flying skills, I merely said that they were not the be all and end all and actually, in the context of an airline-type offshore role, other aspects were a more important target for training when you consider that having gained your licence you are supposed to be able to fly, whereas you have had no practical training in MCC/CRM or automation.
As to this accident being down to a lack of manual flying skills that seems a most improbable cause to anyone except a manualflightfascist because AIUI they retained control of helicopter throughout and made a satisfactory landing on water with no significant injuries. To me that suggests that their manual flying skills were adequate. What may or may not have been an issue is their technical knowledge of the aircraft systems and ability to make the best decision when presented with a malfunction (but of course we don't actually know yet). What has that got to do with "manual flying skills"?
Aaaa truth hurts, doesn't it?
Who's libellous? Is that the name of your tribe's leader?
And what do I have to be grateful for? Being treated like a peace of s***t by my Nigerian bosses for being a white boy while my Nigerian colleague pilots get the favor treatment?
Or perhaps because after paying for my own training and many years experience (including single P and multi P) I was given a shot at Command? Just like my Nigerian pilot colleagues who after just 4 years from day 1 and after being rushed to a flight school to fly traffic patterns at night in a schwizer to fulfill the minimum ATPL requirents get promoted to Comand? All free of charge??
Or perhaps I should be grateful I still have a job while our ex HR director Femi was caught stealing, yet he was given 2 mill $ to go "quietly and peacefully"?
Or perhaps I should be grateful (like the passengers of BQJ) for ending up swimming in the ocean and not dead because the hero Captain managed to safely "land on water" a perfecly flyable helicopter. Jeez! After all these years I never knew you could LAND on water!!
Who's libellous? Is that the name of your tribe's leader?
And what do I have to be grateful for? Being treated like a peace of s***t by my Nigerian bosses for being a white boy while my Nigerian colleague pilots get the favor treatment?
Or perhaps because after paying for my own training and many years experience (including single P and multi P) I was given a shot at Command? Just like my Nigerian pilot colleagues who after just 4 years from day 1 and after being rushed to a flight school to fly traffic patterns at night in a schwizer to fulfill the minimum ATPL requirents get promoted to Comand? All free of charge??
Or perhaps I should be grateful I still have a job while our ex HR director Femi was caught stealing, yet he was given 2 mill $ to go "quietly and peacefully"?
Or perhaps I should be grateful (like the passengers of BQJ) for ending up swimming in the ocean and not dead because the hero Captain managed to safely "land on water" a perfecly flyable helicopter. Jeez! After all these years I never knew you could LAND on water!!
HC, I haven't referred to "manual flying skills", my comments were about "basic" skills and "basic" flying skills which (to me) incorporate the essentials of good decision making and a sound understanding of the aircraft that you are flying.
I'd also suggest that your overuse of deliberate insults about manualflightfascists could equally be used against you as an automatedflightfascist, and would be just as meaningless. Neither dogma adds to the debate, simply showing a base level of poor discussion skills.
I'd also suggest that your overuse of deliberate insults about manualflightfascists could equally be used against you as an automatedflightfascist, and would be just as meaningless. Neither dogma adds to the debate, simply showing a base level of poor discussion skills.
I see ATP offshore helicopter pilots who, if you fail the GPS, get lost. And what's worse, they have no idea how to get found again. I've seen ATP offshore pilots, give them a minor technical malfunction in the traffic pattern, they get totally pre-occupied with it, lose SA and fly downwind for 15 miles, bust their ATC clearance, and eventually realise they are lost and have no idea how to get back to the 7000' long runway they took off from 10 minutes earlier. I've seen ATP offshore helicopter pilots fly 60 minutes out to a platform and then decide the wind is coming from the wrong direction so they can't land, and then fly 60 minutes back to the starting point.
And I've seen many ATP offshore helicopter pilots hit the GA button in a 76 at (or more often after) the DH in IMC on an OEI ILS approach, and the outcome is virtually certain from that point. Airspeed bleeds off, climb performance bleeds off, helicopter pitches up, then heads tail first towards the ground. They have a final big clue to help them out, the gear up warning audio comes on. What do you think they do most of the time? Nothing but cancel the audio, and then both crew thinking "what do I do now". Relying on the magic button to do all the work for them doesn't work in this flight critical situation, because it's not designed to do what they're asking it to do. The systems knowledge is just not there. These are the things I see in the simulator, if the same malfunction happened in real life do you think the outcome would be the same? Something is fundamentally wrong here with the training that they've undertaken to get to that point.
Of all the hair-brain things I've seen helicopter pilots do in the simulator, I've never seen a crew put a 76 in the water in response to an AFCS malfunction. With regards to a ditching decision for whatever reason, I don't remember a situation where a crew ditched a helicopter un-necessarily. The vast majority of bad decisions are made in continuing to fly when they should be ditching. So I would be staggered if it turned out this crew ditched un-neccessarily, because I just don't see this outcome in training.
I find the guys who've had some solid single pilot time, generally, can at least fly a compass heading if the GPS goes belly up, and they can read a map, and if they happen to find themselves temporarily geographically unaware they have the savvy to come up with a plan to get themselves found again. Because when you're flying alone you have to be able to do all this by yourself. This is the sort of airmanship and skill sets that builds a solid foundation for the button pushing offshore airline environment. Because a lot of multi-crew flying I see, neither pilot has any idea once a deviation from plan vanilla becomes necessary.
And I've seen many ATP offshore helicopter pilots hit the GA button in a 76 at (or more often after) the DH in IMC on an OEI ILS approach, and the outcome is virtually certain from that point. Airspeed bleeds off, climb performance bleeds off, helicopter pitches up, then heads tail first towards the ground. They have a final big clue to help them out, the gear up warning audio comes on. What do you think they do most of the time? Nothing but cancel the audio, and then both crew thinking "what do I do now". Relying on the magic button to do all the work for them doesn't work in this flight critical situation, because it's not designed to do what they're asking it to do. The systems knowledge is just not there. These are the things I see in the simulator, if the same malfunction happened in real life do you think the outcome would be the same? Something is fundamentally wrong here with the training that they've undertaken to get to that point.
Of all the hair-brain things I've seen helicopter pilots do in the simulator, I've never seen a crew put a 76 in the water in response to an AFCS malfunction. With regards to a ditching decision for whatever reason, I don't remember a situation where a crew ditched a helicopter un-necessarily. The vast majority of bad decisions are made in continuing to fly when they should be ditching. So I would be staggered if it turned out this crew ditched un-neccessarily, because I just don't see this outcome in training.
I find the guys who've had some solid single pilot time, generally, can at least fly a compass heading if the GPS goes belly up, and they can read a map, and if they happen to find themselves temporarily geographically unaware they have the savvy to come up with a plan to get themselves found again. Because when you're flying alone you have to be able to do all this by yourself. This is the sort of airmanship and skill sets that builds a solid foundation for the button pushing offshore airline environment. Because a lot of multi-crew flying I see, neither pilot has any idea once a deviation from plan vanilla becomes necessary.
Last edited by gulliBell; 29th Feb 2016 at 11:55.
To tgvbhy15
Given that every one of your 27 posts to date have added absolutely nothing of value to this forum, why don't you take your racist, extreme and obnoxious opinions elsewhere. They certainly are not welcome here and I suspect you would not be welcome in Bristow if you openly demonstrate those kind of opinions and attitudes.
A word of advice - it's a very small industry, be careful who you upset
Given that every one of your 27 posts to date have added absolutely nothing of value to this forum, why don't you take your racist, extreme and obnoxious opinions elsewhere. They certainly are not welcome here and I suspect you would not be welcome in Bristow if you openly demonstrate those kind of opinions and attitudes.
A word of advice - it's a very small industry, be careful who you upset
As to the rest, just giving as good as I get (not from you).
...which of course is a really useful skill for an offshore pilot. "Ooh look, there's a wave, see if you can find it on the map and they we will know where we are"
Hmmmmm, anyway there are incompetent pilots of many flavours - the ones you describe plus the ones who alienate their copilots by being knowall "When I were a lad we did it properly, like this..." (and then majorly departs for SOPs), want to disengage the automation because they don't understand how it works or how best to use it (and then stuff up), insist on getting bogged down with trivia and fatuous things like map reading offshore because it puts them back in their comfort zone (seen a HUGE amount of that in my time as a copilot). etc etc.
Hmmmmm, anyway there are incompetent pilots of many flavours - the ones you describe plus the ones who alienate their copilots by being knowall "When I were a lad we did it properly, like this..." (and then majorly departs for SOPs), want to disengage the automation because they don't understand how it works or how best to use it (and then stuff up), insist on getting bogged down with trivia and fatuous things like map reading offshore because it puts them back in their comfort zone (seen a HUGE amount of that in my time as a copilot). etc etc.
@HC: In the context of my discussion, being able to read a map points to a much wider and useful skill set also being available in the pilot, it has nothing to do with the competence at reading a map when flying over 8/8ths of water.
And for the record, my only criticism of co-pilots is when they allow the PIC to crash a helicopter, not having said or done anything to alter the outcome. Unfortunately I see that all the time. The reasons for this are very complex, and it's not something I understand. Cultural aspects certainly play a part.
And for the record, my only criticism of co-pilots is when they allow the PIC to crash a helicopter, not having said or done anything to alter the outcome. Unfortunately I see that all the time. The reasons for this are very complex, and it's not something I understand. Cultural aspects certainly play a part.
Last edited by gulliBell; 29th Feb 2016 at 12:01.
It points to a wider and yet redundant skill set cluttering up the mind of a pilot living in a past role, not the current one. Some skills that you seem to set store by are not relevant in some roles. Therefore in fact no store should be set by them in that context. I liken it to the amount of effort I expended learning how to maintain the rotor rpm of the Bell 47 I learnt to fly on with the twist grip throttle. I now (used to) fly a helicopter type with absolutely zero manual throttle control, so that is a completely obsolete and redundant skill. Manually flying an ILS on that type was nearly, though not quite, and equally redundant skill. Skill sets move on, some folk get left behind. Don't be one of them!
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It's just like UFC here ...... one knockout, one submission - Ultimate Flying Club!
I have seen excellent 4 year captains emerge from the OGP Ab-Initio scheme. As ever it all depends upon initial background, suitability, their selection, initial training, IR training, sufficient simulator exposure, offshore role training, LOFT - and of course the necessary grooming on-line, training and checking, yet more effective role training and checking.
It behoves the OGP auditors to approve the program, monitor it (if they have a pilot on the ops side!), and grant the eventual command. So a huge part of this is the extensive operator's training program to cover all situations for the offshore role and the execution thereof by competent and honest instructors. On-line grooming from all PIC's following SOP's is essential to help the process.
This brings us to culture where pressures from pilots' unions, customer and authorities can make things extremely awkward and delicate, requiring great diplomacy, to faithfully produce the required article. Perhaps this is where we need to concentrate any remedial actions if we are to believe things stated here.
As for gulliBell - I am a mere spring chicken with only 10,000 offshore - but have had nothing remotely untoward as described by you. I do not know whether to put that down to luck, or choice of employer, his aircraft and his maintenance team!!
I have seen excellent 4 year captains emerge from the OGP Ab-Initio scheme. As ever it all depends upon initial background, suitability, their selection, initial training, IR training, sufficient simulator exposure, offshore role training, LOFT - and of course the necessary grooming on-line, training and checking, yet more effective role training and checking.
It behoves the OGP auditors to approve the program, monitor it (if they have a pilot on the ops side!), and grant the eventual command. So a huge part of this is the extensive operator's training program to cover all situations for the offshore role and the execution thereof by competent and honest instructors. On-line grooming from all PIC's following SOP's is essential to help the process.
This brings us to culture where pressures from pilots' unions, customer and authorities can make things extremely awkward and delicate, requiring great diplomacy, to faithfully produce the required article. Perhaps this is where we need to concentrate any remedial actions if we are to believe things stated here.
As for gulliBell - I am a mere spring chicken with only 10,000 offshore - but have had nothing remotely untoward as described by you. I do not know whether to put that down to luck, or choice of employer, his aircraft and his maintenance team!!
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Ah, map reading.
In the days when portable GPS units were still to be found in company helicopters in Nigeria, had one die on me while on deck the platform offshore while the new-in-country (but otherwise experienced) expat copilot was outside supervising the deck activities. This was somewhere offshore Andoni or thereabouts if memory serves. Once he clambered back aboard I shared these glad tidings.
However were we to get back?
I proposed if we were to take up a compass heading West by Nor by West or thereabouts we might find ourselves with a panoramic view of the Nigerian Coast presently where we might identify say Bonny, and thence Cawthorne Channel or summat and pick our way up to Samki and thence to the aerodrome where we might have a word with the greenies about the state of the GPS. We might even tune up the POT VOR or an ADF or some such for confirmation if the things were working.
When I later brought up this cautionary tale about the precarious battery life of the portable GPS, several pilots in the crew lounge looked at me as if I were a sorcerer... or worse.
In the days when portable GPS units were still to be found in company helicopters in Nigeria, had one die on me while on deck the platform offshore while the new-in-country (but otherwise experienced) expat copilot was outside supervising the deck activities. This was somewhere offshore Andoni or thereabouts if memory serves. Once he clambered back aboard I shared these glad tidings.
However were we to get back?
I proposed if we were to take up a compass heading West by Nor by West or thereabouts we might find ourselves with a panoramic view of the Nigerian Coast presently where we might identify say Bonny, and thence Cawthorne Channel or summat and pick our way up to Samki and thence to the aerodrome where we might have a word with the greenies about the state of the GPS. We might even tune up the POT VOR or an ADF or some such for confirmation if the things were working.
When I later brought up this cautionary tale about the precarious battery life of the portable GPS, several pilots in the crew lounge looked at me as if I were a sorcerer... or worse.
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It points to a wider and yet redundant skill set cluttering up the mind of a pilot living in a past role, not the current one. Some skills that you seem to set store by are not relevant in some roles. Therefore in fact no store should be set by them in that context. I liken it to the amount of effort I expended learning how to maintain the rotor rpm of the Bell 47 I learnt to fly on with the twist grip throttle. I now (used to) fly a helicopter type with absolutely zero manual throttle control, so that is a completely obsolete and redundant skill. Manually flying an ILS on that type was nearly, though not quite, and equally redundant skill. Skill sets move on, some folk get left behind. Don't be one of them!
These skill sets may be, as you stated, approaching redundancy on the 225 in the NS, but they are by no means redundant for the vast majority of offshore pilots.
First, outside that highly regimented environment, from an employment perspective, even if the rest of us manage to get onto a very highly automated type there is a high possibility that soon we will be back on something older (ie 76) where we will again be working with less technology. The basic skill set should still be with us and ready to have the rust shaken off.
Second, in the environment where the incident in this thread happened any pilot who cannot read a map should be grounded. Beyond map-reading as a broad skill it encompasses so many finer skills and pieces of basic knowledge that I can only assume that you denigrating the skill itself either to make a point, or because you have learned it so long ago that you no longer recognize how much of 'airmanship' and 'situational awareness' is dependant on these basic skills. Like Gullibell, I have failed the one GPS source on a line check and watched mayhem ensue. This is a realistic and benign fault!
Just read your response tistisnot, and I agree. I leads into mine. The issue the bigots on here are missing about Nigeria, cadet programs, and the rest is that it is not a question of race, it is a question of industry culture. Many of the expats working in companies that are running strong nationalization programs are in an environment completely foreign to how their career progressed. They are in developing countries to start. Without a domestic aerial work industry the big single-pilot hours aren't going to happen. And on the maintenance side the new techs will not get to experience keeping an aircraft healthy cut off from the world.
Back in the USA, Canada, OZ, NZ, Europe, etc there was a huge component of competition to getting started in the industry. Getting a licence was just the first step and with each rung of the ladder not everyone made it through. Some didn't have the technical skills, or the drive, or the diplomacy. If one didn't work hard, tow the line, learn, and grow he/she was weeded out.
In the nationalization programs this is very likely to be politically difficult so it doesn't happen. The weak candidates progress along with strong. The bad attitudes are not shown the door, they are tolerated and it poisons all the relationships. The same can often be said of the expat who was so expensive to bring on staff in the first place. I've sat in the crew room at NAF base (yes Bristow) and looked around and was amazed at was tolerated of both Nigerians AND Expats. Cadets who have less than 100 hours on the 76 but felt they already knew it all and captains who used the system slide by with minimum effort, complaining not mentoring. The massively bigotted comments came from both sides and had no place in any work environment.
What does this have to do with this accident? Maybe nothing, I don't now what happened yet. Clearly anything written on here is so tainted with hate it must be ignored. But having been there, flown with the crews in both recent accidents, and seen the changes that have gone on on the maintenance side, I know where I would be looking!
I know very well that the job I had, as an expatriate in Nigeria (or anywhere else), was to train the person who would take my job. I was and am OK with that. Too many have lost sight of this. They need to be shown the door!
At the same time, it was my job to tell management, the training system, and the copilots I worked with, what needed to be fixed, what was going well, and who shouldn't be in the job. When they refuse to listen, and I feel safety is being compromised, it is time for me to go. So with disappointment, I did.
I flew with Nigerian copilots who were as sharp (sharper!) than some I fly with now, but the opposite was true too. 90% wanted to learn. When the system recognizes that the 10% who won't, and any who can't, must be shown the door then Nigeria will have the safety record of anywhere else.
Yes, I'd hold the captains, of any nationality, to the same standard.
P&A on the first bit, as I keep saying the pilot skill set needs to match the role. If you can afford the luxury of expending training time on skills sets not appropriate to the role then that is fine provided it doesn't reduce the training and competence in the skill set that is appropriate. The trouble is that both human psyche and training budgets are limited, and so to fill them will irelevant though no doubt "worthy" stuff would be a mistake.
It's interesting that you point out that certain skills should be maintained just in case the pilot has to go back onto a lower-tech type, whilst you don't suggest that a pilot on a lower tech type should maintain the skills of operating an aircraft with advanced automation just in case they have to go back to the advanced type. Hmmm, what is at the root of that is the thought process (am I allowed to say paradigm?) that use of automation is cheating and not "proper flying". A bolt on extra which is not important and can be dispensed with.
There is the root of the problem of oldies being in charge of modern fleets.
It's interesting that you point out that certain skills should be maintained just in case the pilot has to go back onto a lower-tech type, whilst you don't suggest that a pilot on a lower tech type should maintain the skills of operating an aircraft with advanced automation just in case they have to go back to the advanced type. Hmmm, what is at the root of that is the thought process (am I allowed to say paradigm?) that use of automation is cheating and not "proper flying". A bolt on extra which is not important and can be dispensed with.
There is the root of the problem of oldies being in charge of modern fleets.
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P&A on the first bit, as I keep saying the pilot skill set needs to match the role. If you can afford the luxury of expending training time on skills sets not appropriate to the role then that is fine provided it doesn't reduce the training and competence in the skill set that is appropriate. The trouble is that both human psyche and training budgets are limited, and so to fill them will irelevant though no doubt "worthy" stuff would be a mistake.
It's interesting that you point out that certain skills should be maintained just in case the pilot has to go back onto a lower-tech type, whilst you don't suggest that a pilot on a lower tech type should maintain the skills of operating an aircraft with advanced automation just in case they have to go back to the advanced type. Hmmm, what is at the root of that is the thought process (am I allowed to say paradigm?) that use of automation is cheating and not "proper flying". A bolt on extra which is not important and can be dispensed with.
There is the root of the problem of oldies being in charge of modern fleets.
There is the root of the problem of oldies being in charge of modern fleets.
But yes, I will try to exercise my button pushing as often as my stick wiggling when workload permits. I do find that some SOP's make it a challenge these days to practice much outside the sim or the normal ops.
It's more work to do it this way, but it is how I prefer to keep myself sharp.
Being able to read a map is like learning to ride a bike, once it's done there is no need for on-going training. So I don't quite get your point @HC.
The crux of the problem that I see is, those who can't read a map etc are also the ones who push the wrong buttons in the advanced automated cockpit. Those who lack the basics also lack the advanced stuff.
The crux of the problem that I see is, those who can't read a map etc are also the ones who push the wrong buttons in the advanced automated cockpit. Those who lack the basics also lack the advanced stuff.
Being able to read a map is like learning to ride a bike, once it's done there is no need for on-going training. So I don't quite get your point @HC.
The crux of the problem that I see is, those who can't read a map etc are also the ones who push the wrong buttons in the advanced automated cockpit. Those who lack the basics also lack the advanced stuff.
The crux of the problem that I see is, those who can't read a map etc are also the ones who push the wrong buttons in the advanced automated cockpit. Those who lack the basics also lack the advanced stuff.
I think I can summarise what you are saying above as "there are some pretty crap pilots out there" - a sentiment with which I agree. Fortunately they are in the minority.
Filling-in
All good points and maybe completely irrelevant to the latest Bristow accident - seems like we're all shooting the breeze and waiting for the report to come out - and there are probably quite a few of us who do not believe the report will be published in a credible and useful format .........
PS - on the subject of map reading, whilst there is little use of a paper map 'offshore' the skill-set and ability to form the 'big picture' comes from such a basic skill.
I have been sat on a deck visual with our next destination - confirmed by approximate heading and distance blah blah - whilst co had been delaying checks to update gps of next location - laudable but we were on the fuel line and had just come from there!
I just hope that more ap work is mandated in OPCs etc - rather than rushing through the box-ticking and catching the last flight home........
The trouble is - until the proverbial hits the fan - no one knows how good your training has been
PS - on the subject of map reading, whilst there is little use of a paper map 'offshore' the skill-set and ability to form the 'big picture' comes from such a basic skill.
I have been sat on a deck visual with our next destination - confirmed by approximate heading and distance blah blah - whilst co had been delaying checks to update gps of next location - laudable but we were on the fuel line and had just come from there!
I just hope that more ap work is mandated in OPCs etc - rather than rushing through the box-ticking and catching the last flight home........
The trouble is - until the proverbial hits the fan - no one knows how good your training has been