Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub: final AAIB report
Well, it appears there are entities with quite a different view:
Originally Posted by AAIB Final Report 3-2015_G-SPAO.pdf
It was calculated that, as the helicopter approached Bothwell, the
low fuel warnings began. The pilot was presented with an intermittent
low fuel 1 warning, which became permanent, and a low fuel 2 warning.
The warnings were accompanied by aural attention-getters, which should have been
heard by all members of the crew. The warnings were acknowledged and, once permanent,
continued to illuminate for the remainder of the flight.
low fuel warnings began. The pilot was presented with an intermittent
low fuel 1 warning, which became permanent, and a low fuel 2 warning.
The warnings were accompanied by aural attention-getters, which should have been
heard by all members of the crew. The warnings were acknowledged and, once permanent,
continued to illuminate for the remainder of the flight.
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one of which holds more fuel than the other so that both engines don't run dry at the same time.
Where in the check list for a double engine flame out does it say switch the SHED BUS to emergency - if you can find it?
DV
Like I care about that damn switch when both engines have quit!
So why is my question about the reason for deviation of the RTB into a hover over the Pub being ignored? What instructions to the crew regarding that instruction were given? And did the crew point out the critical fuel situation? It's a simple request. What is the answer?
TF
TF
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That so called ‘damn’ switch was pretty important for a night auto. It turned on the rad alt and landing light
It turned on the rad alt and landing light
True....and at a hover or while at very low altitude....you will be awfully busy with the those things called "Flight Controls" and finding that "damn switch" is not something you will have the leisure to hunt for.
This is yet another example of poor engineering in the 117/135.
This is yet another example of poor engineering in the 117/135.
Tigerfish,
I think you make a good point about the degree of granularity concerning the police communications, but I do not know where you have picked up the idea that the aircraft elected to hover over the pub. As I read the AAIB report, everything which took place over the pub could be described as involuntary. The diversion referred to during RTB took place further east, and my own pet theory is that they became involved in a vehicle pursuit, as the track of flight matches the motorway network closely. Quite why there is no insight provided from the police communications channel , I do not know, but it does seem odd when contrasted with the details provided re the earlier search of the railway line, which clearly had no bearing on the eventual tragedy.
I think you make a good point about the degree of granularity concerning the police communications, but I do not know where you have picked up the idea that the aircraft elected to hover over the pub. As I read the AAIB report, everything which took place over the pub could be described as involuntary. The diversion referred to during RTB took place further east, and my own pet theory is that they became involved in a vehicle pursuit, as the track of flight matches the motorway network closely. Quite why there is no insight provided from the police communications channel , I do not know, but it does seem odd when contrasted with the details provided re the earlier search of the railway line, which clearly had no bearing on the eventual tragedy.
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Perhaps, as happens, they just saw something worth a look. Maybe an ambulance, maybe a fire engine. Just some blue lights, and a wee quick peek to see what's going on as they passed by. Under such circumstances they might well be listening to the radio, but would not be talking to anyone on it.
As has been said many times. We will never know.
As has been said many times. We will never know.
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Air police,
whatever it was, it wasn’t a “peek”; they flew, from memory, orbits of three separate motorway roundabouts. While below MLA fuel. Even overlooking the fact the fuel was in the wrong tank, this seems questionable behaviour.. radio silence throughout seems highly improbable, to me at least.
whatever it was, it wasn’t a “peek”; they flew, from memory, orbits of three separate motorway roundabouts. While below MLA fuel. Even overlooking the fact the fuel was in the wrong tank, this seems questionable behaviour.. radio silence throughout seems highly improbable, to me at least.
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
That so called ‘damn’ switch was pretty important for a night auto. It turned on the rad alt and landing light
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as well as in the 155 and even in the 145 the Emer Shed Switch is in the autorotation checklist
First two are very straight forward, the following, if you have height and time I guess 😉
Its always better to switch the switches after an successful emergency landing than crashing doing the switches 😉
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Flying Bull - As a TRI/TRE, its important to teach the items that provide the very best possible outcome to any emergency situation. The Certification requirements centred around preserving battery life in the event of a double generator failure, require the OEMs to make harsh decisions as to what electrical services should be shed when the second generator fails. It is for this reason, and this reason only, that the RADALT and Landing Light are lost (along with many other electrical consumers) when both Generators fail. It is the "Default" condition with no generators on line.
Following such a condition, the pilot has the option to override certain default load shed items. In the EC135 series, this is accomplished by overriding the automatic shedding of the emergency bus by lifting the guard and making the switch. In the EC135. this switch provides power back to the Landing Light and RADALT along with a number of other important items. In open flight with the engines operating normally, the pilot can then opt to remove certain items to manage his battery life to a successful landing.
In this accident, the generators dropped off line as they are driven by the engines. It was dark. Clearly the RADALT and the Landing Light would greatly add value to an EOL conducted at night OR a relight managed by reference to the RADALT (although at the height he was in this case, this option was technically impossible).
Therefore, understanding the importance of the switch is the first aim. The second is to facilitate a greater understanding of what is important should an EOL become imminent.
As such, you are correct, the first action is to successfully enter autorotation. This can only really be achieved if proper and appropriate training has been given to overcome the startle effect and generate resilience to the pilots response. There is simply no substitute for repetitive training leading to scenarios where the Double Engine failure is unexpected with the aim of provoking a well rehearsed set of muscles memory actions to get into autorotation.
Key to this first aim, is when one engine has failed, the pilot monitors appropriately. This MUST be by reference to the NR Gauge ONLY and not the VMS or other engine instruments. The reason for this is if the muscle memory reactions (collective down) has been carried out, and speed maybe reducing or increasing as required, the remaining engine indications are in constant motion leading to confusion. If the pilot is well practiced in doing all these OEI handling techniques whilst his eyes are fixed on the NR gauge, he stands the best possible chance of reacting to the second engine failing.
After autorotation has been successfully achieved, the priorities of what he does next are really important.
A RELIGHT consideration is number 1. If a relight is not appropriate due to Height etc. Now the aircraft must be prepared for the EOL.
The RADALT will always help day and night (BUS SHED OVRD SWITCH), the Landing Light good to have at night but nowhere near as important as the RADALT.
All fuel pumps must be OFF to reduce the risks of post impact fire.
Should we waste time securing engines which have already failed...………..I remain unconvinced.
Understanding and sound TKI knowledge are important. If Dave's accident is not to be in vain, we should learn from it without prejudice or criticism of his individual performance.
I say this as my thought processes, my understanding and the teaching and training I now deliver are heavily influenced by what happened to Dave that night. I spend a lot more time with recurrent candidates developing resilience to a sudden double engine failure and a lot more time getting them to make a successful EOL by reference to the RADALT and AI until the final cushion.
Following such a condition, the pilot has the option to override certain default load shed items. In the EC135 series, this is accomplished by overriding the automatic shedding of the emergency bus by lifting the guard and making the switch. In the EC135. this switch provides power back to the Landing Light and RADALT along with a number of other important items. In open flight with the engines operating normally, the pilot can then opt to remove certain items to manage his battery life to a successful landing.
In this accident, the generators dropped off line as they are driven by the engines. It was dark. Clearly the RADALT and the Landing Light would greatly add value to an EOL conducted at night OR a relight managed by reference to the RADALT (although at the height he was in this case, this option was technically impossible).
Therefore, understanding the importance of the switch is the first aim. The second is to facilitate a greater understanding of what is important should an EOL become imminent.
As such, you are correct, the first action is to successfully enter autorotation. This can only really be achieved if proper and appropriate training has been given to overcome the startle effect and generate resilience to the pilots response. There is simply no substitute for repetitive training leading to scenarios where the Double Engine failure is unexpected with the aim of provoking a well rehearsed set of muscles memory actions to get into autorotation.
Key to this first aim, is when one engine has failed, the pilot monitors appropriately. This MUST be by reference to the NR Gauge ONLY and not the VMS or other engine instruments. The reason for this is if the muscle memory reactions (collective down) has been carried out, and speed maybe reducing or increasing as required, the remaining engine indications are in constant motion leading to confusion. If the pilot is well practiced in doing all these OEI handling techniques whilst his eyes are fixed on the NR gauge, he stands the best possible chance of reacting to the second engine failing.
After autorotation has been successfully achieved, the priorities of what he does next are really important.
A RELIGHT consideration is number 1. If a relight is not appropriate due to Height etc. Now the aircraft must be prepared for the EOL.
The RADALT will always help day and night (BUS SHED OVRD SWITCH), the Landing Light good to have at night but nowhere near as important as the RADALT.
All fuel pumps must be OFF to reduce the risks of post impact fire.
Should we waste time securing engines which have already failed...………..I remain unconvinced.
Understanding and sound TKI knowledge are important. If Dave's accident is not to be in vain, we should learn from it without prejudice or criticism of his individual performance.
I say this as my thought processes, my understanding and the teaching and training I now deliver are heavily influenced by what happened to Dave that night. I spend a lot more time with recurrent candidates developing resilience to a sudden double engine failure and a lot more time getting them to make a successful EOL by reference to the RADALT and AI until the final cushion.
In this accident, the generators dropped off line as they are driven by the engines. It was dark. Clearly the RADALT and the Landing Light would greatly add value to an EOL conducted at night OR a relight managed by reference to the RADALT (although at the height he was in this case, this option was technically impossible).
Therefore, understanding the importance of the switch is the first aim. The second is to facilitate a greater understanding of what is important should an EOL become imminent.
Therefore, understanding the importance of the switch is the first aim. The second is to facilitate a greater understanding of what is important should an EOL become imminent.
This reliance upon a RADALT for Engine off landings is not necessarily a good thing....if you are looking out the windows while doing them.
Offshore at night....for sure it is a valuable tool....but onshore over a well lit city....not so much.
If the Landing Light is pointed in the right place....at night that is a real bonus.
In this accident....if the Pilot could not remember the Transfer Switches....what chance he would have had to think of the Load Shed Switch....AND get it shifted and turn on the landing light from the height he was above ground?
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SAS all good points you make. I believe there is enough evidence to suggest Dave was startled by the first failure and probably did not react correctly to the second one which I recall was about 32 seconds after the first engine fails.
I take your point about being visual for an EOL and the appropriate use of the landing light. However, I am now convinced that if you can teach a guy to rely on the RADALT and manage the flare by numbers he has a ready ,made solution for Night, Over water and IMC EOLs. It works well if it is well taught in the FSTD.
In regards the Landing lights, I have long accepted that without extremely versatile thumbs on the Landing Light coolly hat, its use in an EOL is minimised by the changes in nose pitch angles during the flare and level off. Even with plenty of practice, trying to add the value at the critical stage proves very difficult. Incidentally, watching an experienced pilot complete a night CAT A rotation leads to some interesting attempt to manage the landing light.
Taken holistically, building a procedure on the RADALT and AI, especially when the RADALT information is on the AI as in the EC modern EFIS cockpits, provides a simple set of numbers for the pilot to remember and build upon.
What is everyone else doing in the FSTD in this respect?
I take your point about being visual for an EOL and the appropriate use of the landing light. However, I am now convinced that if you can teach a guy to rely on the RADALT and manage the flare by numbers he has a ready ,made solution for Night, Over water and IMC EOLs. It works well if it is well taught in the FSTD.
In regards the Landing lights, I have long accepted that without extremely versatile thumbs on the Landing Light coolly hat, its use in an EOL is minimised by the changes in nose pitch angles during the flare and level off. Even with plenty of practice, trying to add the value at the critical stage proves very difficult. Incidentally, watching an experienced pilot complete a night CAT A rotation leads to some interesting attempt to manage the landing light.
Taken holistically, building a procedure on the RADALT and AI, especially when the RADALT information is on the AI as in the EC modern EFIS cockpits, provides a simple set of numbers for the pilot to remember and build upon.
What is everyone else doing in the FSTD in this respect?