Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub: final AAIB report
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Drink girls, I believe what he means is the presence of a CVR in this case would not have made any difference to the outcome. Of course as AAIB point it it may have provided better insight to the circumstances leading up to the accident. Don't let your emotion cloud your reading skills!
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If we need to turn fuel pumps off there is a feature for that, it's called a circuit breaker.
Operable switches for flight critical components need two positions only: AUTO / ON.
If there's a light to tell you when the pumps run dry there's an Auto feature available right there, and ON is the only sensible override. OFF override would be via the CBs which gives you a good clue you're doing something that's special circumstances only.
Unless you value the lifespan of the fuel pumps over the lifespan of the people inside, what else makes sense?
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On that dark, wet night over Strathclyde all the holes in the swiss cheese - lined up
nice views over x-mas ready illuminated Glasgow.
perhaps a bit to dreamy, the conditions?
and it was Friday. Was it their last job? with the head half way on the way to the pup?
Just speculations, no CVR would tell us Dave's thoughts as it has been made clear. Thanks for the posts SASless and FH 1100. Nail on the head, I had goose skin afterwards. It's such sad story for a place which does not need accidents like this, especially if the good ones disappear.
As to a CVR helping....oh yes indeed it would.
If all crew stations were monitored and we had the last thirty minutes of conversations amongst the Crew....we would know a great deal about their thinking re Tasking and any discussion the Crew about them.
I am quite sure there was some discussion by the Crew during the Flight and it would certainly give us far more insight into decisions made by the Crew that night.
We pretty much know "What" happened....but we are far from knowing "Why".
We would also know of any discussion about Warning/Cautions or fuel state.
We would have an audio record of any discussion about Emergency Actions such as landing out or diverting to a safe landing area.
Very adamantly I support the noting that a CVR would have provided much information that would go towards answering the "Why" part of this Investigation.
If all crew stations were monitored and we had the last thirty minutes of conversations amongst the Crew....we would know a great deal about their thinking re Tasking and any discussion the Crew about them.
I am quite sure there was some discussion by the Crew during the Flight and it would certainly give us far more insight into decisions made by the Crew that night.
We pretty much know "What" happened....but we are far from knowing "Why".
We would also know of any discussion about Warning/Cautions or fuel state.
We would have an audio record of any discussion about Emergency Actions such as landing out or diverting to a safe landing area.
Very adamantly I support the noting that a CVR would have provided much information that would go towards answering the "Why" part of this Investigation.
But even with all logging and recording equipment imaginable,
what we still won't know is why the pilot lacked a helicopter pilot's basic
skill: autorotation.
That's not a beauty contest, but there's lot in between a 100G impact and a successful AR.
This was not pitch dark countryside, it was Glasgow at 10pm, lots of illuminated tarmac.
It certainly doesn't have to be perfect, even dropping the ac from 20ft with 0 rrpm would have them walk away.
Hell, an EC135 can even fall down 7 stories from a hospital's helipad and all survive:
http://versa.bmvit.gv.at/uploads/med...bericht_03.pdf
(Sound like Cabriesque safety to me.)
If I were the CAA,
I'd mandate annunal demonstration of all engine-at-idle autorotations to 10ft skid height.
If you can't do that in all ships you were issued a TR go back to flight school.
And of course I'd threaten to rest all EC135 airworthyness until they get the zero attention fuel pump switches I was outlining before or the BO105 fuel pumps SASless was describing.
And not having essential electronics (rrpm, ias, radalt) driven by battery and generator, an ac's night VFR certification would be voided.
what we still won't know is why the pilot lacked a helicopter pilot's basic
skill: autorotation.
That's not a beauty contest, but there's lot in between a 100G impact and a successful AR.
This was not pitch dark countryside, it was Glasgow at 10pm, lots of illuminated tarmac.
It certainly doesn't have to be perfect, even dropping the ac from 20ft with 0 rrpm would have them walk away.
Hell, an EC135 can even fall down 7 stories from a hospital's helipad and all survive:
http://versa.bmvit.gv.at/uploads/med...bericht_03.pdf
(Sound like Cabriesque safety to me.)
If I were the CAA,
I'd mandate annunal demonstration of all engine-at-idle autorotations to 10ft skid height.
If you can't do that in all ships you were issued a TR go back to flight school.
And of course I'd threaten to rest all EC135 airworthyness until they get the zero attention fuel pump switches I was outlining before or the BO105 fuel pumps SASless was describing.
And not having essential electronics (rrpm, ias, radalt) driven by battery and generator, an ac's night VFR certification would be voided.
Last edited by Reely340; 26th Oct 2015 at 16:25.
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This was a tragic event. In my limited amount of time on board four aircraft types over twelve years I dont ever recall being in such a "low fuel" situation.
Whilst the enquiry seems to point directly at pilot error, I cannot let it pass that the all of the pilots I flew with were consumate dilligent professionals, and its thanks to them that I have been drawing my pension, unlike the two officers on board that evening.
Thank you guys.
Whilst the enquiry seems to point directly at pilot error, I cannot let it pass that the all of the pilots I flew with were consumate dilligent professionals, and its thanks to them that I have been drawing my pension, unlike the two officers on board that evening.
Thank you guys.
"If I were the CAA,
I'd mandate annunal demonstration of all engine-at-idle autorotations to 10ft skid height.
If you can't do that in all ships you were issued a TR go back to flight school."
What do think happens during an LPC? And an OPC for that matter.
I'd mandate annunal demonstration of all engine-at-idle autorotations to 10ft skid height.
If you can't do that in all ships you were issued a TR go back to flight school."
What do think happens during an LPC? And an OPC for that matter.
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What do think happens during an LPC? And an OPC for that matter.
Or briefed that double engine failure will never happen so just practice OEI procedure?
I got flamed for mentioning this previously in this thread but for those in the know, they understand where I am coming from. It may be a language issue:
This particular pilot hadn't done an EOL auto for possibly decades.
In his time prior to becoming a police pilot (UK) he flew Chinooks. I believe (stand corrected) he flew them for 13 years?
Chinook pilots don't practice switching all engines off and having to physically fly tons of inert metal down onto the ground. In fact 'almost' all mil pilots no longer exercise this luxury - it's too expensive to train like this in the event of a mistake.
Then he joined the police (maybe AS355) and flew the Ec135 twin.
NO police pilots fly EOL's to land.
Almost ALL mil and police pilots practice autos (and my definition of an auto is bringing both engines back to FI, flying the profile and then recovering to a set minimum height with both engines constantly 'on tap' throughout ANY mishandling of Nr during the descent. It is an OK process, captures most issues, most of the time. BUT it is not the same as a proper E.O. descent where all engines are removed from flight and unavailable throughout - Nr takes on a totally different trajectory. Lose it below Nrmin at your peril.
I think - overall, David was not only shocked/surprised when both donks stopped (the silence must have been very spooky, possibly frightening) but when Nr then went walk about on a spectrum he was unfamiliar with - he didnt have time left to 'get accustomed' to an old regime he probably saw and recognised 20+ years ago.
Add to that no rad alt or L lamp, wet rooftops and road surfaces and before you know it - Nr< 60-70. Goodbye Vienna.
This particular pilot hadn't done an EOL auto for possibly decades.
In his time prior to becoming a police pilot (UK) he flew Chinooks. I believe (stand corrected) he flew them for 13 years?
Chinook pilots don't practice switching all engines off and having to physically fly tons of inert metal down onto the ground. In fact 'almost' all mil pilots no longer exercise this luxury - it's too expensive to train like this in the event of a mistake.
Then he joined the police (maybe AS355) and flew the Ec135 twin.
NO police pilots fly EOL's to land.
Almost ALL mil and police pilots practice autos (and my definition of an auto is bringing both engines back to FI, flying the profile and then recovering to a set minimum height with both engines constantly 'on tap' throughout ANY mishandling of Nr during the descent. It is an OK process, captures most issues, most of the time. BUT it is not the same as a proper E.O. descent where all engines are removed from flight and unavailable throughout - Nr takes on a totally different trajectory. Lose it below Nrmin at your peril.
I think - overall, David was not only shocked/surprised when both donks stopped (the silence must have been very spooky, possibly frightening) but when Nr then went walk about on a spectrum he was unfamiliar with - he didnt have time left to 'get accustomed' to an old regime he probably saw and recognised 20+ years ago.
Add to that no rad alt or L lamp, wet rooftops and road surfaces and before you know it - Nr< 60-70. Goodbye Vienna.
Just curious here, I am essentially a VFR single engine pilot. Any sudden yaw to the left ( normally fly US machines ) has my left hand about to punch the lever down. This has become muscle memory and in grained over 7000 hours of flying. When doing my first twin rating found it very hard not to put the lever down when having one donk put back to idle even though my brain knew there was another keeping us flying ( well just in an F2 355 !!)
Now the pilot in Glasgow flew twin engines for almost all his career so was it the reverse of my case that happened, i.e. one donk goes pull the lever up second goes natural reaction pull the lever up. Hence the Nr almost nil ???
Might go and find my bone dome and hide in a trench from the incoming
Now the pilot in Glasgow flew twin engines for almost all his career so was it the reverse of my case that happened, i.e. one donk goes pull the lever up second goes natural reaction pull the lever up. Hence the Nr almost nil ???
Might go and find my bone dome and hide in a trench from the incoming
Thomas coupling, my hat is off to that honest statement of yours! 
It is perfectly in sync with what a freind of mine told me (then HEMS in BO105, now HEMS in EC135 in winter and long lining in AS350 in summer, FI for both BO and EC):
"One doesn't practice engine-idle autos to 10fr skid height like you newbies in S-300C. Reason: too expensive when something with reapplying power gos foul and this szenario is deemed so extremely unlikely."
So my take is that an unknown but quite sizable amount of non-pprune CPL in service quite probably have no recent experience of idle engine autorotations.
A) If we fix dangerous user interfaces (overhead switch vs. NVG stowed, tactile differences of controls) of the machines and remove unnecessary but potetially dangerous setups (like non dry-run safe fuel pumps) we actually could leave the recency of experience requirements as they currently are. Manufacturer "pays" the cost.
B) Or we go the long way and make sure that every helo pilot does know how to safely autorotate to safe height. Then we all pay the cost via insurance premiums/higher lease rates.
W/o wanting to sound atrocious, both regimes can be argued in favour of, but implementing none of those two options is unacceptable.
It is perfectly in sync with what a freind of mine told me (then HEMS in BO105, now HEMS in EC135 in winter and long lining in AS350 in summer, FI for both BO and EC):
"One doesn't practice engine-idle autos to 10fr skid height like you newbies in S-300C. Reason: too expensive when something with reapplying power gos foul and this szenario is deemed so extremely unlikely."
So my take is that an unknown but quite sizable amount of non-pprune
CPL in service quite probably have no recent experience of idle engine autorotations. A) If we fix dangerous user interfaces (overhead switch vs. NVG stowed, tactile differences of controls) of the machines and remove unnecessary but potetially dangerous setups (like non dry-run safe fuel pumps) we actually could leave the recency of experience requirements as they currently are. Manufacturer "pays" the cost.
B) Or we go the long way and make sure that every helo pilot does know how to safely autorotate to safe height. Then we all pay the cost via insurance premiums/higher lease rates.
W/o wanting to sound atrocious, both regimes can be argued in favour of, but implementing none of those two options is unacceptable.
Last edited by Reely340; 26th Oct 2015 at 19:13.
I find it difficult to comprehend the argument that the pilot didn't have the skills, or presence of mind to enter and sustain autorotation.
The report makes mention that the variation of Nr above and below 97% corresponding to a reduction in speed shows an attemp to enter autorotation. Flare might well have made the initial recovery of Nr possible but then after flare effect diminished, it became unsustainable.
I can't find any mention in the report of a check of collective control rigging.
Also, what about snagging the collective? I've not flown the 135 or indeed know what is carried in the cockpit but could a foreign object have found its way under the lever and stopped it being lowered fully? It wouldn't be the first such accident in helicopters.
The report makes mention that the variation of Nr above and below 97% corresponding to a reduction in speed shows an attemp to enter autorotation. Flare might well have made the initial recovery of Nr possible but then after flare effect diminished, it became unsustainable.
I can't find any mention in the report of a check of collective control rigging.
Also, what about snagging the collective? I've not flown the 135 or indeed know what is carried in the cockpit but could a foreign object have found its way under the lever and stopped it being lowered fully? It wouldn't be the first such accident in helicopters.
Chopjock, you will, I am quite sure, be aware that simulators are used for "real" autorotations in twins. They do a very good job of this and for crews who havent got much of an experience base in autos, allow errors to be made without the consequences being ruiningly expensive.
I think the reaction time from flying twins is an important point. SE pilots get drilled to react quickly. My guess is that pilots flying twins regularly react less quickly. This is not always a disadvantage as things can go wrong with the engine or fuel system which wont be helped one bit by lowering the lever quickly without a quick diagnosis of whats wrong.
Practicing autos in big expensive aircraft is loaded with risks of overspeed and mismanaged landings. Personal opinion is that any operator putting their entire flight crew through real aircraft EOL training would be quite barmy. And it is probably no coincidence that they are not required to and dont.
I seem to recall that 25% of all helicopter accidents in the US are practice autos gone wrong.
Did Dave get regular (annual?) sim sessions?
I think the reaction time from flying twins is an important point. SE pilots get drilled to react quickly. My guess is that pilots flying twins regularly react less quickly. This is not always a disadvantage as things can go wrong with the engine or fuel system which wont be helped one bit by lowering the lever quickly without a quick diagnosis of whats wrong.
Practicing autos in big expensive aircraft is loaded with risks of overspeed and mismanaged landings. Personal opinion is that any operator putting their entire flight crew through real aircraft EOL training would be quite barmy. And it is probably no coincidence that they are not required to and dont.
I seem to recall that 25% of all helicopter accidents in the US are practice autos gone wrong.
Did Dave get regular (annual?) sim sessions?
If I were the CAA,
I'd mandate annunal demonstration of all engine-at-idle autorotations to 10ft skid height.
If you can't do that in all ships you were issued a TR go back to flight school.
I'd mandate annunal demonstration of all engine-at-idle autorotations to 10ft skid height.
If you can't do that in all ships you were issued a TR go back to flight school.
Heard a rumour that the transfer pumps create interference with the camera or its downlink and it is considered normal to turn them off - this would explain why an experienced pilot cancelled the low fuel warnings several times.
Crab
"Heard a rumour that the transfer pumps create interference with the camera or its downlink and it is considered normal to turn them off - this would explain why an experienced pilot cancelled the low fuel warnings several times."
Surely if this was the case, the investigation would have unearthed it?
"Heard a rumour that the transfer pumps create interference with the camera or its downlink and it is considered normal to turn them off - this would explain why an experienced pilot cancelled the low fuel warnings several times."
Surely if this was the case, the investigation would have unearthed it?