EC155 incident, SNS, 6 Nov 2013
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This is one of the most interesting and informative threads I've ever seen, on any subject.
Overshadowing all the fascinating detail is the need for culture change. I promise you this scenario is not limited to offshore heli operations, but in most cases it does not have the grave effects we have seen here. The culture change has to be taken seriously by the line pilots but most especially by the senior management - as the line pilots will continue not to be invited to events like this until the management do take it seriously, and fully realise what 'culture change' means. I wonder if it would help to cite this thread in making it happen.
Sorry to butt in - please carry on.
Overshadowing all the fascinating detail is the need for culture change. I promise you this scenario is not limited to offshore heli operations, but in most cases it does not have the grave effects we have seen here. The culture change has to be taken seriously by the line pilots but most especially by the senior management - as the line pilots will continue not to be invited to events like this until the management do take it seriously, and fully realise what 'culture change' means. I wonder if it would help to cite this thread in making it happen.
Sorry to butt in - please carry on.
...
I am guessing there are some Mea Culpa's due out of some Senior folks if the content of the Symposium is to be taken to heart by all. You reckon that will happen? Will anyone stand up and admit to being a naughty boy for being a part of the system that has gotten us to the situation we find ourselves confronting?
We are all part of the system, but it's not easy to point to individuals who are primarily to blame. Many have done their best to bring about the necessary changed culture and yes, some have been obstructive in that process but they did that out of ignorance, not malice.
?.. The culture change has to be taken seriously by the line pilots but most especially by the senior management - as the line pilots will continue not to be invited to events like this until the management do take it seriously, and fully realise what 'culture change' means.
The subject has ramifications across the industry, as you've pointed-out, hence my interest.
I must say that I'm glad we've moved-on from blaming pax reactions to sudden upsets resulting in skill-fade. Understandable, but not particularly helpful. Hopefully, training departments will find some hours to fill with SCT, and some willing ballast to accompany you.
I must say that I'm glad we've moved-on from blaming pax reactions to sudden upsets resulting in skill-fade. Understandable, but not particularly helpful. Hopefully, training departments will find some hours to fill with SCT, and some willing ballast to accompany you.
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Now that the Cat is out of the Bag, shall we see marked change by those holding lofty perches upon the greasy pole of management?
Will they "see the light" and join arms and start to sing choruses of Kumbaya while effecting a march towards the Truth?
Where does that begin and who should lead the charge within each segment of the Industry?
Any signs of a ground swell towards improving the environment yet?
Will they "see the light" and join arms and start to sing choruses of Kumbaya while effecting a march towards the Truth?
Where does that begin and who should lead the charge within each segment of the Industry?
Any signs of a ground swell towards improving the environment yet?
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HC
One of the most informative discussions there has been for a long time. The 225 trim release issue is of great interest to me as we have been criticised for using it in this manner, as it turns out, it seems the correct way to operate.
One of the most informative discussions there has been for a long time. The 225 trim release issue is of great interest to me as we have been criticised for using it in this manner, as it turns out, it seems the correct way to operate.
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.... it overlaps itself .....
the sad bottom line is that beans counters have much more influence in decissions in this industry tan people working in ops ... that should be the first change of mind in managemente ... and so far it is not happening .... at least in my field of view ....
the sad bottom line is that beans counters have much more influence in decissions in this industry tan people working in ops ... that should be the first change of mind in managemente ... and so far it is not happening .... at least in my field of view ....
The report (from the principal conference organiser) was intended to summarise - and put into context - the presentations, distil out the main points and set out a list of issues to be discussed/addressed outside of the conference - as we are now doing in PPRune and on other bulletin boards.
The conference was funded by operators (including PHI) and Shell – approval coming from the CEOs who personally endorsed it (this was coordinated by the European Helicopter Operators Committee (EHOC)). The video replays were supplied by a Cougar who agreed not to hold back on detail (the Operations Director and I spent more than a month discussing and shaping the videos to get the best effect from them). We did not shrink from the ‘reveal’ which was hard-hitting and to the point.
No-one refused to present, even though the invitations were addressed at individuals and not organisations. Almost all presenters were open in their approach to the conference; messages came from the experience of individuals or from research undertaken prior to the day. Presenters were encouraged to provide their own views – most were not pre-aligned with the operator.
What I am trying to say is that this was a genuine attempt by all to get to the bottom of the automation problem and not to hide facts or blame someone/something. Reading the summary and the list of issues raised should confirm that.
There is a Joint Operators Committee (JOC); they are working together to address the issues but a number are deep-seated and difficult: the somewhat dysfunctional training regulations, the lack of appropriate rules in certification (which are already in the fixed-wing code) and the out-of-date nature of simulator approval are three that require appropriate movement from EASA.
The JOC have had extensive discussions with the manufacturers on the provision of FCOMs addressing the automation issues and procedures – there is already movement in this area and it is likely to lead to output similar to that provide by Boeing and Airbus for their communities.
That EASA did not attend the conference was something of a disappointment; the same is true for North Sea Fringe State operators (with the exception of Norway). PHI flew a number of attendees over from the US. There were line pilots at the conference – I talked to one-or-two.
It did not take the EC155 report to start this dialogue; the debate had started in three other threads: firstly the EC332 accident in Sumburgh (it should have been Bond ETAP but we had not really thought about it then and confined our discussions to approach profiles); the second with respect to CAP 1145; and the other, the UK Parliamentary Committee.
What is really important is what we now do about the issues raised in the conference; the RAeS have already agreed to provide a position paper - distilling the findings from the conference and turning them into a series of follow-up actions addressed at the relevant parties (it is difficult for them to do more than that).
I have discussed making the presentations/audio feed/papers more widely available but it is unlikely to happen; like most of you, I question this policy because it inhibits the informing of the debate on a matter of public safety. The policy (probably) stems from a period more than a decade ago when ‘proceedings’ were published and sold. It appears less relevant now that we no longer have proceedings.
In committee we constantly debate the amount that is charged to attendees – it is set at a level to ensure that the RAeS (a charity) can wipe its face. Even though the fees are high (and above a level that can be afforded by an interested party) we still have to find outside sponsorship for catering.
Anyway, enough of the background – on with the debate!
The conference was funded by operators (including PHI) and Shell – approval coming from the CEOs who personally endorsed it (this was coordinated by the European Helicopter Operators Committee (EHOC)). The video replays were supplied by a Cougar who agreed not to hold back on detail (the Operations Director and I spent more than a month discussing and shaping the videos to get the best effect from them). We did not shrink from the ‘reveal’ which was hard-hitting and to the point.
No-one refused to present, even though the invitations were addressed at individuals and not organisations. Almost all presenters were open in their approach to the conference; messages came from the experience of individuals or from research undertaken prior to the day. Presenters were encouraged to provide their own views – most were not pre-aligned with the operator.
What I am trying to say is that this was a genuine attempt by all to get to the bottom of the automation problem and not to hide facts or blame someone/something. Reading the summary and the list of issues raised should confirm that.
There is a Joint Operators Committee (JOC); they are working together to address the issues but a number are deep-seated and difficult: the somewhat dysfunctional training regulations, the lack of appropriate rules in certification (which are already in the fixed-wing code) and the out-of-date nature of simulator approval are three that require appropriate movement from EASA.
The JOC have had extensive discussions with the manufacturers on the provision of FCOMs addressing the automation issues and procedures – there is already movement in this area and it is likely to lead to output similar to that provide by Boeing and Airbus for their communities.
That EASA did not attend the conference was something of a disappointment; the same is true for North Sea Fringe State operators (with the exception of Norway). PHI flew a number of attendees over from the US. There were line pilots at the conference – I talked to one-or-two.
It did not take the EC155 report to start this dialogue; the debate had started in three other threads: firstly the EC332 accident in Sumburgh (it should have been Bond ETAP but we had not really thought about it then and confined our discussions to approach profiles); the second with respect to CAP 1145; and the other, the UK Parliamentary Committee.
What is really important is what we now do about the issues raised in the conference; the RAeS have already agreed to provide a position paper - distilling the findings from the conference and turning them into a series of follow-up actions addressed at the relevant parties (it is difficult for them to do more than that).
I have discussed making the presentations/audio feed/papers more widely available but it is unlikely to happen; like most of you, I question this policy because it inhibits the informing of the debate on a matter of public safety. The policy (probably) stems from a period more than a decade ago when ‘proceedings’ were published and sold. It appears less relevant now that we no longer have proceedings.
In committee we constantly debate the amount that is charged to attendees – it is set at a level to ensure that the RAeS (a charity) can wipe its face. Even though the fees are high (and above a level that can be afforded by an interested party) we still have to find outside sponsorship for catering.
Anyway, enough of the background – on with the debate!
Don't Kumbaya
One of those 'Fringe Operators' enquired about attending further meetings as the first they heard about it was at the last Oil & Gas soirée but was politely informed that their input was not required at this stage.
Something to do with level of disclosure/input from the 'Big 3'.
So more a case of "don't Kumbaya" I'm afraid.
Something to do with level of disclosure/input from the 'Big 3'.
So more a case of "don't Kumbaya" I'm afraid.
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CYCLIC - there are 5 ways to fly an EC225 in AT&T mode. That is to say UNCOUPLED. They are:
1 - Hover Follow Up Trim
2 - Cyclic Trim
3 - Cyclic Stick Imput Followed by Trim
4 - Flying Through
5 - Cyclic Trim Release
I have listed them in order of priority based on 1 providing maximum stability and 5 the least. The manual makes a statement that with the trim release pressed there is SAS stabilisation engaged but seeing as the pilot is invariably moving the cyclic it is albeit unnoticeable.
WHY are there 5 methods and which is the most appropriate use at any one time? The answer is based on the "Required Rate of change of Attitude"
Cruising in AT&T mode IMC (and why would we ever need to do this), however, trimming into the turns etc provides maximum stability as the AP is always in the loop providing not only long term attitude retention but also controlling the rate of change of attitude as the trim switch is operated. The argument for pushing against the force trim has long gone with digital ATT and a GA-GA function that rolls wings level when the lateral channel is uncommanded.
At the other end of the scale, VMC landing on a helideck and the turbulence defeats the hover follow up trim, pressing the trim release provides the most rapid change of attitude to stay safely clear of obstacles. Flying through may also help but of course you would want to follow up with a trim release action to prevent the helicopter trying to readopt the previous attitude once stick pressure is released.
These methods should happen instinctively in response to attitude and environmental cues. However, pressing the Trim Release is only correct when used in appropriate circumstances. The methods described need to be taught and practiced during Type Rating Training and the relevance and limitations of each method highlighted.
I am only describing flight in AT&T mode. Pressing Trim Release in Coupled Mode is already an indication that the coupled flight path selected by the pilot is incorrect or misunderstood OR the pilot thinks he can fly it better than a serviceable AP. both behaviours need to be briefed and trained out early in the pilots relationship with the aircraft.
1 - Hover Follow Up Trim
2 - Cyclic Trim
3 - Cyclic Stick Imput Followed by Trim
4 - Flying Through
5 - Cyclic Trim Release
I have listed them in order of priority based on 1 providing maximum stability and 5 the least. The manual makes a statement that with the trim release pressed there is SAS stabilisation engaged but seeing as the pilot is invariably moving the cyclic it is albeit unnoticeable.
WHY are there 5 methods and which is the most appropriate use at any one time? The answer is based on the "Required Rate of change of Attitude"
Cruising in AT&T mode IMC (and why would we ever need to do this), however, trimming into the turns etc provides maximum stability as the AP is always in the loop providing not only long term attitude retention but also controlling the rate of change of attitude as the trim switch is operated. The argument for pushing against the force trim has long gone with digital ATT and a GA-GA function that rolls wings level when the lateral channel is uncommanded.
At the other end of the scale, VMC landing on a helideck and the turbulence defeats the hover follow up trim, pressing the trim release provides the most rapid change of attitude to stay safely clear of obstacles. Flying through may also help but of course you would want to follow up with a trim release action to prevent the helicopter trying to readopt the previous attitude once stick pressure is released.
These methods should happen instinctively in response to attitude and environmental cues. However, pressing the Trim Release is only correct when used in appropriate circumstances. The methods described need to be taught and practiced during Type Rating Training and the relevance and limitations of each method highlighted.
I am only describing flight in AT&T mode. Pressing Trim Release in Coupled Mode is already an indication that the coupled flight path selected by the pilot is incorrect or misunderstood OR the pilot thinks he can fly it better than a serviceable AP. both behaviours need to be briefed and trained out early in the pilots relationship with the aircraft.
DB, needless to say I strongly disagree with you on 2 points:
Firstly, your assertion that the order you have presented the different modes of flying in ATT is also the order of stability. Do you have any "proof" of that, or it supposition?
Then again, it depends on what you mean by "stability". Your mode 2 is very stable but also too slow for most uses. Mode 3 is quite unstable whilst you are doing the "push" bit, it only become stable after you have done the "beep" bit. I don't like this mode anyway because it brings the cyclic into the non-linear break-out force region as trimmed position is approached, and risks cock-up if an upper mode is engaged (beeping the datum, not the stick).
Mode 4 is the least stable on an EC225 (though quite stable on a 332L)
Mode 5 is the best for manual flying since the heli is moderately stable and as soon as pilot action ceases (ie pilot takes his hand off the cyclic) the current attitude is held. What's not to like about that?
I will also confess to not being a fan of your mode 1 other than when wanting to hold a hover and already being in the hover. I just don't like to feel the breakout region interfering with my control inputs during eg lifting into the hover.
My second strong point of disagreement is your last para regarding flying through an upper mode. It does depend on circumstances but for example a SAR pilot flying through HOV mode to finely adjust the position during winching is surely normal? And when you think about it, the basic autopilot gives you ATT which is effectively an "upper mode" of attitude holding. HOV is an upper mode designed to hold position. The new GTC mode is an upper mode designed to hold longitudinal ground speed (and definitely designed to be flown through).
So it is with GA - an upper mode that is designed to make the heli fly up and away - so if you want to fly it manually on departure but want an underlying mode that will get you out of the poo, why have a mode designed to hold a now-wrong attitude (ATT) when you have a mode that will save your bacon when you get confused (GA)?
The EC225 is quite happy to have you fly through any upper mode, whilst pressing the trim releases, and once you let go, it quietly, progressively and smoothly resumes doing what it was designed to do. Marc Salesse's team spent lots of programming hours making it do that, why not use it!
The problems arise if you fly through some upper modes without pressing the trim release, end up with the controls in a new an un-trimmed position, then let go and allow the stick to jump back to some old and now inappropriate position.
Firstly, your assertion that the order you have presented the different modes of flying in ATT is also the order of stability. Do you have any "proof" of that, or it supposition?
Then again, it depends on what you mean by "stability". Your mode 2 is very stable but also too slow for most uses. Mode 3 is quite unstable whilst you are doing the "push" bit, it only become stable after you have done the "beep" bit. I don't like this mode anyway because it brings the cyclic into the non-linear break-out force region as trimmed position is approached, and risks cock-up if an upper mode is engaged (beeping the datum, not the stick).
Mode 4 is the least stable on an EC225 (though quite stable on a 332L)
Mode 5 is the best for manual flying since the heli is moderately stable and as soon as pilot action ceases (ie pilot takes his hand off the cyclic) the current attitude is held. What's not to like about that?
I will also confess to not being a fan of your mode 1 other than when wanting to hold a hover and already being in the hover. I just don't like to feel the breakout region interfering with my control inputs during eg lifting into the hover.
My second strong point of disagreement is your last para regarding flying through an upper mode. It does depend on circumstances but for example a SAR pilot flying through HOV mode to finely adjust the position during winching is surely normal? And when you think about it, the basic autopilot gives you ATT which is effectively an "upper mode" of attitude holding. HOV is an upper mode designed to hold position. The new GTC mode is an upper mode designed to hold longitudinal ground speed (and definitely designed to be flown through).
So it is with GA - an upper mode that is designed to make the heli fly up and away - so if you want to fly it manually on departure but want an underlying mode that will get you out of the poo, why have a mode designed to hold a now-wrong attitude (ATT) when you have a mode that will save your bacon when you get confused (GA)?
The EC225 is quite happy to have you fly through any upper mode, whilst pressing the trim releases, and once you let go, it quietly, progressively and smoothly resumes doing what it was designed to do. Marc Salesse's team spent lots of programming hours making it do that, why not use it!
The problems arise if you fly through some upper modes without pressing the trim release, end up with the controls in a new an un-trimmed position, then let go and allow the stick to jump back to some old and now inappropriate position.
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The diversity of views between 2 people, 1 of whom was recently a Training Captain on the 225 and another who I don't know but flies the 225 highlights the problem of standardising training and procedures.
It is from Training Captains that many pilots get their training and that OM Part Bs are written. Do these 2 companies train pilots so differently as shown in the views of HC and DB? OEMs don't know much about real operations (it's changing slowly) but when they do, hopefully the training part of the offshore helicopter industry will adopt more of an FCOM type approach.
Part of the problem is also that helicopter pilots come from such non standard backgrounds performing a variety of tasks in very basic aircraft so providing a standard pilot "product" at the end is complex.
HC, I have mostly flown the trim release like you and I generally agree with your comments on DB's various modes.
It is from Training Captains that many pilots get their training and that OM Part Bs are written. Do these 2 companies train pilots so differently as shown in the views of HC and DB? OEMs don't know much about real operations (it's changing slowly) but when they do, hopefully the training part of the offshore helicopter industry will adopt more of an FCOM type approach.
Part of the problem is also that helicopter pilots come from such non standard backgrounds performing a variety of tasks in very basic aircraft so providing a standard pilot "product" at the end is complex.
HC, I have mostly flown the trim release like you and I generally agree with your comments on DB's various modes.
TM - DB and I are both experienced pilots / trainers with a strong desire to improve the current situation. I have a lot of respect for DB in many areas including his promotion of the use of automation on the 225 which, amazingly, was in general spurned by the other operators (including DB's former employer) or at the very least, not used optimally and side-lined in training and operating procedures. So in many areas we agree. However in the area of trim release and the concept of flying through an upper mode, it seems we disagree.
Of course the trouble is that we both absolutely KNOW that we are right. And when you know you are right, why would you contemplate adopting the other's views? It would be a traitorous act when best practice is your goal.
Faced with this sort of disagreement over a relatively minor (though important) way to fly the aircraft, what hope is there that the 3 main (and a few more minor) operators and the OEM could be dragged screaming into some sort of consensus on the best way to operate this type, even in the N Sea never mind worldwide!
When the EC225 was introduced into Bristow Norway roughly 6 years after its introduction in Aberdeen, they declined to adopt Bristow Aberdeen's way of operating and instead wrote their own checklists etc which were at odds with the philosophy on this side of the N Sea (although to be fair, certainly adopting some aspects of it). So a Bristow pilot from Aberdeen crossing the sea would have had to adapt to the Bristow Norway way of operating - different SOPs and checklists - and that is within the same company!
Of course the trouble is that we both absolutely KNOW that we are right. And when you know you are right, why would you contemplate adopting the other's views? It would be a traitorous act when best practice is your goal.
Faced with this sort of disagreement over a relatively minor (though important) way to fly the aircraft, what hope is there that the 3 main (and a few more minor) operators and the OEM could be dragged screaming into some sort of consensus on the best way to operate this type, even in the N Sea never mind worldwide!
When the EC225 was introduced into Bristow Norway roughly 6 years after its introduction in Aberdeen, they declined to adopt Bristow Aberdeen's way of operating and instead wrote their own checklists etc which were at odds with the philosophy on this side of the N Sea (although to be fair, certainly adopting some aspects of it). So a Bristow pilot from Aberdeen crossing the sea would have had to adapt to the Bristow Norway way of operating - different SOPs and checklists - and that is within the same company!
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It would seem that some Hat Size's need to be re-aligned. I do not refer to HC and DB per se but rather at the Industry which tolerates, condones, ignores, or in any way countenances such Turf Protection and Empire Building.
The aircraft in question is the EC-225.
HC and DB both have extensive experience in that particular type of aircraft and we see a marked difference in their views on the "Only" way to fly the machine.
Knowing both of them, they are quite secure in their individual beliefs.
The question I pose to both of them and the audience in general is "How do we arrive at an Industry Best Practice for flying the 225 (in this case) and each aircraft type used by each of the Operators in similar tasking?
We have to consider the various Authorities impose different standards and rules on Operators depending upon what locale the aircraft are being flown.
What does not change is the OEM and its views on the operation of their Aircraft, and the ultimate goal which should be achieving the safest and most appropriate use of the the Aircraft systems.
Plainly, it requires compromise by everyone involved and that means being "honest" and "forthright" when discussing issues.
Is that possible in light of the announced need to do so?
I would suggest DB and HC attempt to do so and see how it turns out.
Lord knows if they can then there is Hope for the Industry writ large.
The aircraft in question is the EC-225.
HC and DB both have extensive experience in that particular type of aircraft and we see a marked difference in their views on the "Only" way to fly the machine.
Knowing both of them, they are quite secure in their individual beliefs.
The question I pose to both of them and the audience in general is "How do we arrive at an Industry Best Practice for flying the 225 (in this case) and each aircraft type used by each of the Operators in similar tasking?
We have to consider the various Authorities impose different standards and rules on Operators depending upon what locale the aircraft are being flown.
What does not change is the OEM and its views on the operation of their Aircraft, and the ultimate goal which should be achieving the safest and most appropriate use of the the Aircraft systems.
Plainly, it requires compromise by everyone involved and that means being "honest" and "forthright" when discussing issues.
Is that possible in light of the announced need to do so?
I would suggest DB and HC attempt to do so and see how it turns out.
Lord knows if they can then there is Hope for the Industry writ large.
Simple - just do it my way!
(smiley grudgingly added
)Anyway, as I have said before DB and I agree on far more than we disagree on which gives us a head start compared with say Bristow vs CHC vs Bond (Avincis - how DO you pronounce that?).
However, let us please get away from the idea that the OEM has the answers. They do not, since do not operate multi-pilot (they operate with 1 pilot and 1 flight engineer), nor much IFR and certainly not offshore. Fortunately and to their credit the OEM seems happy to accept that, and is keen to merely be a facilitator in arriving at best practice.
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HC - firstly we are more aligned than you think. Secondly they are not "My" modes. It's the way the system is set up.
I do not disagree with you BUT a pilot who finds it necessary to "Fly Through" the upper modes by pressing the trim release is simply defeating the object of engaging them in the first place. I absolutley agree that if the flight path becomes unsafe, coupled, one quick method to correct is to trim release, but I personally prefer to correct the origin of such errors by ensuring the pilot understands the behaviour of the upper modes in first place.
It is a nonsense to engage upper modes and then disable the autopilot by pressing the trim release. This is not in any manual not recommended by the OEM.
Stick and Trim I agree completely and in fact never use this myself but I show pilots it is there and add my views as to its relevance. Nevertheless it is a recognised method of attitude modulation.
HC - the bit I struggle to understand is why you believe holding the cyclic trim depressed is a stable condition, especially if IMC. It has a role VMC but in IMC it effectively sacks four digital lanes of ATT feeding off two AHRS in favour of the pilot and his skills. Surely we have by now accepted how limited those skills are if we explore the sticky bits of the flight envelope.
This should not be a debate about what can be done or indeed how we all do it. It should be a debate on the " Optimum" use of the AP. with the Trim pressed only SAS remains and that can never be regarded as optimum. The training mission is to develop CONSISTANT behaviours that will serve us well when we are tired, in the dark and maybe a little distracted. Maximum use of ATT and coupled modes. Planned and executed correctly there should be no requirement to interfere with the AP as it delivers the commanded flight path.
One more point. This OEM does have the expertise in Offshore Operations. There are four of us at least with a combined total of 80 years offshore experience amongst other environments. We certainly do not have all the answers but we are determined to provide the best information and guidance we can on the optimum use of the products.
I do not disagree with you BUT a pilot who finds it necessary to "Fly Through" the upper modes by pressing the trim release is simply defeating the object of engaging them in the first place. I absolutley agree that if the flight path becomes unsafe, coupled, one quick method to correct is to trim release, but I personally prefer to correct the origin of such errors by ensuring the pilot understands the behaviour of the upper modes in first place.
It is a nonsense to engage upper modes and then disable the autopilot by pressing the trim release. This is not in any manual not recommended by the OEM.
Stick and Trim I agree completely and in fact never use this myself but I show pilots it is there and add my views as to its relevance. Nevertheless it is a recognised method of attitude modulation.
HC - the bit I struggle to understand is why you believe holding the cyclic trim depressed is a stable condition, especially if IMC. It has a role VMC but in IMC it effectively sacks four digital lanes of ATT feeding off two AHRS in favour of the pilot and his skills. Surely we have by now accepted how limited those skills are if we explore the sticky bits of the flight envelope.
This should not be a debate about what can be done or indeed how we all do it. It should be a debate on the " Optimum" use of the AP. with the Trim pressed only SAS remains and that can never be regarded as optimum. The training mission is to develop CONSISTANT behaviours that will serve us well when we are tired, in the dark and maybe a little distracted. Maximum use of ATT and coupled modes. Planned and executed correctly there should be no requirement to interfere with the AP as it delivers the commanded flight path.
One more point. This OEM does have the expertise in Offshore Operations. There are four of us at least with a combined total of 80 years offshore experience amongst other environments. We certainly do not have all the answers but we are determined to provide the best information and guidance we can on the optimum use of the products.
HC - firstly we are more aligned than you think. Secondly they are not "My" modes. It's the way the system is set up.
I do not disagree with you BUT a pilot who finds it necessary to "Fly Through" the upper modes by pressing the trim release is simply defeating the object of engaging them in the first place. I absolutley agree that if the flight path becomes unsafe, coupled, one quick method to correct is to trim release, but I personally prefer to correct the origin of such errors by ensuring the pilot understands the behaviour of the upper modes in first place.
It is a nonsense to engage upper modes and then disable the autopilot by pressing the trim release. This is not in any manual not recommended by the OEM.
Stick and Trim I agree completely and in fact never use this myself but I show pilots it is there and add my views as to its relevance. Nevertheless it is a recognised method of attitude modulation.
HC - the bit I struggle to understand is why you believe holding the cyclic trim depressed is a stable condition, especially if IMC. It has a role VMC but in IMC it effectively sacks four digital lanes of ATT feeding off two AHRS in favour of the pilot and his skills. Surely we have by now accepted how limited those skills are if we explore the sticky bits of the flight envelope.
This should not be a debate about what can be done or indeed how we all do it. It should be a debate on the " Optimum" use of the AP. with the Trim pressed only SAS remains and that can never be regarded as optimum. The training mission is to develop CONSISTANT behaviours that will serve us well when we are tired, in the dark and maybe a little distracted. Maximum use of ATT and coupled modes. Planned and executed correctly there should be no requirement to interfere with the AP as it delivers the commanded flight path.
One more point. This OEM does have the expertise in Offshore Operations. There are four of us at least with a combined total of 80 years offshore experience amongst other environments. We certainly do not have all the answers but we are determined to provide the best information and guidance we can on the optimum use of the products.
I do not disagree with you BUT a pilot who finds it necessary to "Fly Through" the upper modes by pressing the trim release is simply defeating the object of engaging them in the first place. I absolutley agree that if the flight path becomes unsafe, coupled, one quick method to correct is to trim release, but I personally prefer to correct the origin of such errors by ensuring the pilot understands the behaviour of the upper modes in first place.
It is a nonsense to engage upper modes and then disable the autopilot by pressing the trim release. This is not in any manual not recommended by the OEM.
Stick and Trim I agree completely and in fact never use this myself but I show pilots it is there and add my views as to its relevance. Nevertheless it is a recognised method of attitude modulation.
HC - the bit I struggle to understand is why you believe holding the cyclic trim depressed is a stable condition, especially if IMC. It has a role VMC but in IMC it effectively sacks four digital lanes of ATT feeding off two AHRS in favour of the pilot and his skills. Surely we have by now accepted how limited those skills are if we explore the sticky bits of the flight envelope.
This should not be a debate about what can be done or indeed how we all do it. It should be a debate on the " Optimum" use of the AP. with the Trim pressed only SAS remains and that can never be regarded as optimum. The training mission is to develop CONSISTANT behaviours that will serve us well when we are tired, in the dark and maybe a little distracted. Maximum use of ATT and coupled modes. Planned and executed correctly there should be no requirement to interfere with the AP as it delivers the commanded flight path.
One more point. This OEM does have the expertise in Offshore Operations. There are four of us at least with a combined total of 80 years offshore experience amongst other environments. We certainly do not have all the answers but we are determined to provide the best information and guidance we can on the optimum use of the products.
"Flying through" - I still think you don't quite get the point of having an underlying mode during manual flying. You are used to having an underlying mode of attitude retention, you might be used to having an underlying HOV mode if you flew SAR, you would be used to having an underlying GTC mode if you flew the 175 and updated 225. Thus GA is just another such underlying mode appropriate for departure. Whilst flying manually none of the above-mentioned modes do anything, but when you let go they each provide some sort of flight attitude or path control. I can't see any reason for not choosing one that fits the flight phase.
"Holding trim release down" - I can't remember if you flew the 225 when you worked offshore, but if you did you will surely have found that when operating against the trim, the aircraft is very unsteady. For example if you want to hold a steady bank angle against the trim, it is quite difficult. If you want to hold a steady bank angle with the trim release pressed, it is a doddle. Ditto for a nose down attitude eg for a rig takeoff. Surely this is an easy thing to prove, not to me, but to yourself by trying the two ways in the aircraft. I commend you to try it. Quite why the software is less stable when against the springs than with trim released pressed I don't know, you would have to ask AH's autopilot folks.
I suppose possibly there is no difference in the software (though I still think there is) and the difference is due to the ergonomics of having to hold a steady but light force on the cyclic (FTR not pressed) vs being able to relax completely with FTR pressed (or of course release the button at the desired bank angle). Such a difference does, after all, make a fundamental difference to the propensity for biometric oscillations on the collective on ground, as we know to our cost!
Your comment about "only SAS remains" is valid whether or not you press the trim release - although as mentioned, the flavour of SAS when against the springs is less stable than with FTR pressed (for one reason or another). In the former case, when you let go the stick jumps back to some previous position which might or might not reflect a desirable attitude, in the latter the current attitude is held.
All the above is despite the fact that in general (as I think we both agree) the best way to fly it is to select the appropriate upper modes and let it get on with it!
As to the OEM's experience, sorry, I was discounting ECUK (or is it AHUK yet?). I don't know how much "input" you get to the factory but certainly as recently as a year ago, it didn't seem to be much. Yes I am told AH France now has a real live offshore pilot on its payroll, but I have no idea of whether he is of sound judgement, what his background is and how much influence he might have - one voice amongst 9000 (?) employees doesn't seem a lot. I have said it before many times (to EC/AH) but it would be a very good idea if the AH experimental test pilots were seconded to the N Sea for a few months. Flight Test engineers too if they could be allowed to sit in the Jump Seat (after all, it is the FTE's who are the real bosses under the French system!). It would transform thinking at the factory! Just the one non-rev night offshore flight I had with Herve made a difference I think.
You only have to look at the standard offerings of centre console layouts to see that AH don't understand the 2 crew concept - eg they have the "pilot radio" and the "copilot radio". They don't get the simple concept of the PM being the one to work both radios! Each time we had a new batch of helicopters, they wanted to revert to radios at the LH and RH of the console, and I had to get them put back in the middle where both pilots could easily reach both radios. Latterly and amusingly, I had to get this change approved by an EC experimental test pilot - who of course routinely flew single pilot!
Edit: just re-reading your post, I am not advocating pressing the FTR in IMC. There is only one standard way (ie malfunctions excepted) to operate in IMC and that is by use of the upper modes. To fly it manually is to degrade safety and that seems inexcusable when pax are carried. It is not a feasible malfunction to have ATT mode working but other modes such as ALT, HDG, IAS not working so there is absolutely no point in wasting training time for it either.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 20th Jul 2014 at 09:21.