AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
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G550
Ok, see what you mean! But then is the 5(3)(a) requirement not to damage persons on the ground, or any persons? And secondly, what exactly constitutes "property"? Are natural features (field/trees/hedge) property?
Ok, see what you mean! But then is the 5(3)(a) requirement not to damage persons on the ground, or any persons? And secondly, what exactly constitutes "property"? Are natural features (field/trees/hedge) property?
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Absolutely loads of photos out there now of great accidents highlighting reasons not to get airborne in marginal conditions. Stick them on your iPads and show them to your corporate bosses when next faced with that decision...
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NRDK
I agree, the image of G-LBALs cabin reduced to confetti should certainly remind any passenger that a change to method of transport is far more sensible than pressing on with the original plan if the pilot says no.
I agree, the image of G-LBALs cabin reduced to confetti should certainly remind any passenger that a change to method of transport is far more sensible than pressing on with the original plan if the pilot says no.
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AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
It's a simple call. Safe to go or not? If the forecast is for more of the same then take an alternative mode if transport. Gethomeitis ?
Surely the moral of this accident is that if you are going to fly without adequate visual references (or run the risk of doing so) get your basic IF scan going straight away.
Even if you allow for some somatogravic illusion affecting the pilot's inner ear, 25 degrees nose down is difficult to achieve or ignore if you are actually looking at the AI.
Even if you allow for some somatogravic illusion affecting the pilot's inner ear, 25 degrees nose down is difficult to achieve or ignore if you are actually looking at the AI.
Why always after the event?
What puzzles me with this type of thread (quite aside from the bun fighting) is that ultimately we all happily conclude that the pilot fired the machine up and so it all rests with him. Running out of fuel, bad weather decisions, poor maintenance, poor skill level, out of currency - whatever it might be - nothing anyone could have done because in the end the law, the rules say its all down to the pilot.
Maybe that sits well with purists who don't want or don't think anyone should interfere but as we can see even the best pilots can shunt. In fact the Mull Chinook crash is a case in point. Which ever way you believe this aircraft met its demise its clear that there was a degree of discomfort making the flight in that aircraft.
In this case the owners attitude has been put into question. That's not just based upon comments post this accident but upon reflection of many years of prior postings on this very site. The detail around such "issues" remains (at least to me) a mystery because actually no one has come out and said - perhaps that's further evidence of commercial pressures? Who knows.
What I don't understand however is that whilst there is no effective union for helicopter pilots there are a number of effective and respected organisations that either align themselves or suggest they represent the professional pilot. Could they not do more or assist when presented with or finding cases such as this? (I'm talking about doing more in respect to getting involved with the business over what would seem to be a multi year complaint about an owner with questionable history that includes one previous fatal accident).
Maybe that sits well with purists who don't want or don't think anyone should interfere but as we can see even the best pilots can shunt. In fact the Mull Chinook crash is a case in point. Which ever way you believe this aircraft met its demise its clear that there was a degree of discomfort making the flight in that aircraft.
In this case the owners attitude has been put into question. That's not just based upon comments post this accident but upon reflection of many years of prior postings on this very site. The detail around such "issues" remains (at least to me) a mystery because actually no one has come out and said - perhaps that's further evidence of commercial pressures? Who knows.
What I don't understand however is that whilst there is no effective union for helicopter pilots there are a number of effective and respected organisations that either align themselves or suggest they represent the professional pilot. Could they not do more or assist when presented with or finding cases such as this? (I'm talking about doing more in respect to getting involved with the business over what would seem to be a multi year complaint about an owner with questionable history that includes one previous fatal accident).
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High Spirits,
Can't speak for everyone but ,on this side of the Pond, more and more civilian operators require running a risk assessment matrix, on paper, prior to a flight. Every element of the flight is awarded a number.For instance ,pilot experience in type: if less than 100 hours ,gets a higher value.Similar values are awarded for weather, route, fuel planning, maintenance issues ,time of day, ,NVG non NVG etc.If the total number exceeds a certain value, the PIC is required to call his next level of supervision and get clearance.
Looks good on paper but,I suspect, behavior is modified and pilots change values around to avoid calling the next level.So,like every other paper driven exercise, the compliance is more honored in the breach than in the observance.Still, it is a start and there are plenty of level headed guys out there who actually understand the value of a risk assessment and take it seriously.
Not sure how it would work in a single owner/ corporate world but,like I said, it is a start and maybe regulators and operators need to look at it seriously.
Alt 3.
Can't speak for everyone but ,on this side of the Pond, more and more civilian operators require running a risk assessment matrix, on paper, prior to a flight. Every element of the flight is awarded a number.For instance ,pilot experience in type: if less than 100 hours ,gets a higher value.Similar values are awarded for weather, route, fuel planning, maintenance issues ,time of day, ,NVG non NVG etc.If the total number exceeds a certain value, the PIC is required to call his next level of supervision and get clearance.
Looks good on paper but,I suspect, behavior is modified and pilots change values around to avoid calling the next level.So,like every other paper driven exercise, the compliance is more honored in the breach than in the observance.Still, it is a start and there are plenty of level headed guys out there who actually understand the value of a risk assessment and take it seriously.
Not sure how it would work in a single owner/ corporate world but,like I said, it is a start and maybe regulators and operators need to look at it seriously.
Alt 3.
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AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
Risk assessment- is what every pilot does before any flight. If it's paper based then it demonstrates that someone has actually done the math and concluded that on balance it's safe to fly. However, objectivity is required and it is easy to input values which give the result you require. If a proper, objective RA is completed prior to flight then this would demonstrate the exercise of reasonable care and diligence. Where the values ascribed to variables had been manipulated to reach a desired outcome the opposite may be true. The difficulty with this process is the human factor. Perception if risk is subjective, the requirement to ascribe values to each of many variables may not actually achieve the correct outcome. One man's pea souper is another's low cloud with marginal vis. It does come back to the old vs bold factor.
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Munnyspinner,
You hit the nail on the head. From whichever angle you look at things, it all comes down to the nut behind the wheel.
You can have an ultra sophisticated aircraft, reams of paperwork and yards of regulations to protect pilots and their passengers. However, the nasty little human factors pops its head up at every stage and nullifies everything.
The military squadron concept mitigates this a bit. There are supervisors, mentors and peers looking over one's shoulder,always on the ready to castigate one for a poor decision. In the civilian single pilot world,not so much.
When I am on shift for twelve hours,I AM my company.Operations, safety, business development,public relations,maintenance and so on. That can be intimidating at times, especially when you are new to the game.That is where good human factors research and knowledge would help.From the time of recruitment to retirement.No amount of legislation will help.
As we all know, one cannot legislate human behavior.
Alt3.
You hit the nail on the head. From whichever angle you look at things, it all comes down to the nut behind the wheel.
You can have an ultra sophisticated aircraft, reams of paperwork and yards of regulations to protect pilots and their passengers. However, the nasty little human factors pops its head up at every stage and nullifies everything.
The military squadron concept mitigates this a bit. There are supervisors, mentors and peers looking over one's shoulder,always on the ready to castigate one for a poor decision. In the civilian single pilot world,not so much.
When I am on shift for twelve hours,I AM my company.Operations, safety, business development,public relations,maintenance and so on. That can be intimidating at times, especially when you are new to the game.That is where good human factors research and knowledge would help.From the time of recruitment to retirement.No amount of legislation will help.
As we all know, one cannot legislate human behavior.
Alt3.
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AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
Alt3, so true. I have seen the military model at work and you are correct. However, even that is not infallible. I have also flown with and worked with single pilot ops/ small charter organisations. Despite the pressures most make the right call most of the time- thankfully.
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It might be there in the 25 pages of posts but I haven't seen it.
The minimum instrument speed for this helicopter is 50 knots.
the expectation of being in instrument conditions at low speed should be a big enough red flag IMO to prevent flight.
The minimum instrument speed for this helicopter is 50 knots.
the expectation of being in instrument conditions at low speed should be a big enough red flag IMO to prevent flight.
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Under US FAA Rules, the type Take Off being done by the 139 Crew would require the Aircraft to maintain VMC until achieving Vmini which is said to be 50 KIAS.
Does the UK CAA require the same?
If so, how does One do that with Visibility in the Tens of Meters as reported by the AAIB?
Does the UK CAA require the same?
If so, how does One do that with Visibility in the Tens of Meters as reported by the AAIB?
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Camp Freddie;
Good post, there are a lot of other questions like yours to be asked either about this take-of, or others done in similar style/conditions.
SND
Good post, there are a lot of other questions like yours to be asked either about this take-of, or others done in similar style/conditions.
SND
Camp Freddie raises an interesting point with respect to Flight Manual (RFM) Limitations.
In the US, the requirement to observe the limitations of the RFM are embodied in FAR 91.9(a) for all helicopters (thus, for those helicopters with more than 9 seats, the HV diagram is a limitation). For commercial operations in Europe (up to October), the same requirement is contained in JAR-OPS 3.005(c). Both of these regimes have appropriate alleviations under controlled conditions.
Up to October in Europe with respect to GA/private flight, the status of the RFM limitations is unclear (it depends upon the State's regulations). From October, the requirement to observe the limitations of the RFM is contained in the Basic Requirements - i.e. it becomes law and it applies to all. Unfortunately, the authors did not have the foresight to (or did not understand why they should) put a reference to applicable alleviations contained in the implementation rules (as is done in FAR 91).
Whether there was a requirement to observe the RFM limitations in this case (or others) will be a matter of reference to the ANO. Is it in the ANO or not?
Jim
In the US, the requirement to observe the limitations of the RFM are embodied in FAR 91.9(a) for all helicopters (thus, for those helicopters with more than 9 seats, the HV diagram is a limitation). For commercial operations in Europe (up to October), the same requirement is contained in JAR-OPS 3.005(c). Both of these regimes have appropriate alleviations under controlled conditions.
Up to October in Europe with respect to GA/private flight, the status of the RFM limitations is unclear (it depends upon the State's regulations). From October, the requirement to observe the limitations of the RFM is contained in the Basic Requirements - i.e. it becomes law and it applies to all. Unfortunately, the authors did not have the foresight to (or did not understand why they should) put a reference to applicable alleviations contained in the implementation rules (as is done in FAR 91).
Whether there was a requirement to observe the RFM limitations in this case (or others) will be a matter of reference to the ANO. Is it in the ANO or not?
Jim
Avoid imitations
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Jim, as far as I can tell, it's not. But it has always seemed to me that failing to comply with the RFM in any way contravenes the principle of good airmanship. Apart from the obvious, insurance companies require it to be complied with and in the event of any insurance claim, I have no doubts about them trying to find good reason not to pay out.
However, discussion over this tragic accident has shown that some might believe that flying to performance Class A/1 (or whatever the fashionable term might be this year) is mandatory for all flights. For private operations it isn't. An alternative departure profile may be safer in conditions of very low visibility, especially from a confined area. In other words, blind adherence to alleviate one perceived risk (engine failure) may increase risk in another way (bumping into something).
However, discussion over this tragic accident has shown that some might believe that flying to performance Class A/1 (or whatever the fashionable term might be this year) is mandatory for all flights. For private operations it isn't. An alternative departure profile may be safer in conditions of very low visibility, especially from a confined area. In other words, blind adherence to alleviate one perceived risk (engine failure) may increase risk in another way (bumping into something).
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ANO Part 14 Operating Minima for Aerial Work And Private Aircraft:
109(2)(b) An aircraft operating for aerial work or privately shall not take off if the relevant RVR is less than 150m, unless in accordance with an approval from the country of registration.
I've edited the above part because I couldn't get it to cut and paste. The AAIB reports visibility in "tens of metres", Carl and Lee had a legal get out, They could have quoted Part 14 and if disciplined would have had the law on their side. Let alone no formal RVR reporting.
It comes back again to the fact that "Captaincy" isn't just pulling the levers and a thorough knowledge of the task you are on, you must have the facts available to protect yourself from the pressures you can come under.
SND
109(2)(b) An aircraft operating for aerial work or privately shall not take off if the relevant RVR is less than 150m, unless in accordance with an approval from the country of registration.
I've edited the above part because I couldn't get it to cut and paste. The AAIB reports visibility in "tens of metres", Carl and Lee had a legal get out, They could have quoted Part 14 and if disciplined would have had the law on their side. Let alone no formal RVR reporting.
It comes back again to the fact that "Captaincy" isn't just pulling the levers and a thorough knowledge of the task you are on, you must have the facts available to protect yourself from the pressures you can come under.
SND
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SND
Quite agree, thorough knowledge is required so you can back up an unpopular decisions !
I think you're saying 109(2)(b) is not an issue as RVR was not reported. (and converted met viz does not apply for take-off). But I take it, you're not suggesting that this alone is the only go/ no-go factor to consider?
Accidents like this are dreadful, but if the industry can learn from this and make a re-occurrence less likely, then that's got to be beneficial.
Many factors could be at play here, for instance;
1. Crew experience
2. Crew training with respect site selection, performance, take-off profiles, weather minima, etc
3. Company culture
3. CRM - crew - crew and pax, etc
Quite agree, thorough knowledge is required so you can back up an unpopular decisions !
I think you're saying 109(2)(b) is not an issue as RVR was not reported. (and converted met viz does not apply for take-off). But I take it, you're not suggesting that this alone is the only go/ no-go factor to consider?
Accidents like this are dreadful, but if the industry can learn from this and make a re-occurrence less likely, then that's got to be beneficial.
Many factors could be at play here, for instance;
1. Crew experience
2. Crew training with respect site selection, performance, take-off profiles, weather minima, etc
3. Company culture
3. CRM - crew - crew and pax, etc
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G550;
The actual list is far too long for on here. But that one ANO article gave them a legal get out with the owner. If he had really thrown his toys after that then I'm pretty sure a court (employment tribunal) would have found in favour of the crew.
I don't know the 139, but I bet the RFM has a pretty long list of limits/restrictions any number of which would have been on the side of the crew.
SND
The actual list is far too long for on here. But that one ANO article gave them a legal get out with the owner. If he had really thrown his toys after that then I'm pretty sure a court (employment tribunal) would have found in favour of the crew.
I don't know the 139, but I bet the RFM has a pretty long list of limits/restrictions any number of which would have been on the side of the crew.
SND