AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk

[madflyer26]

Very sobbering reading adding to an already weighted statistic.
Regards
MF 26

[jayteeto]

Thanks, I haven't flown the type and am corrected.

[OnandOffshore]

A professional pilot must recognise the limitations of his experience, currency and training (I know, easier said that done you may say - but true nevertheless).
Being one of those KOSs, I have had a number of occasions in the past when over-confident & very forceful passengers have insisted in attempting landings at private sites below limits, 'finding a hole in the fog', etc, etc, and the only answer is to politely decline the unsuitable request.
We must try and find a way to get the message across to those who have not yet had the chance to accumulate the experience & confidence that goes with it (and in a few cases of those who have the experience & should know better) to stand up to unreasonable demands from passengers.
The whole industry is greatly damaged by wholly preventable accidents such as this, together with the enormous distress to the families and friends of all those involved.
Thorough IF training and regular recurrency is a must if you are going to fly in poor weather. The helicopters are fully capable these days and so must be the pilots.

[Lonewolf_50]

The only protection against this in IMC is rock solid instrument flying skills.

That, and having practiced the maneuver correctly a few times previously. Looks like what was being attempted was a combination "obstacle clearance takeoff" and "instrument take off."

I note from the initial findings that the passengers were late. Granted, in a private deal, it may be that the discretion of actual take off time is in their hands. I'll edit this post when I recheck the time of sunset. The original take off time versus actual had more than one change in the environment.
EDIT:

The helicopter was scheduled to depart Gillingham Hall for Coventry Airport at 1830 hrs but the passengers were not ready to depart until around 1920 hrs. By this time, night had fallen and dense fog had developed; witnesses described visibility in the order of tens of metres.

From this language, my understanding is that the departure was intended to be prior to dark, though given the time of year, was it twilight at 1830?

I am reminded of a well publicized (on this side of the pond) accident in a privately owned aircraft. (Not a professional pilot at the controls). Initial flight was intended for Day/VFR, but the two passengers were late, by about three hours (pilot's wife and her sister) so they took off after sunset. Pilot (FW PPL) was not Instrument qualified, though he was working on it.
Ends up flying at night, hazy, no horizon, crash, ends in tears.
JFK, Jr. Late take off changed flight from day flight to night flight.

Back to this case, with two professional pilots to hand, one would expect that they re-briefed and adapted to the changing conditions ... or had that as their plan.

[Tandemrotor]

Lomewolf_50

The extract you took from my post is more correctly summarised with a longer quote:

more likely is a somatogravic effect? This is a very powerful, and widely understood phenomenon which would have seen him push the nose down more than required. The only protection against this in IMC is rock solid instrument flying skills.

Somatogravic illusion kills even when the associated manouvre has been practiced countless times. Far more frequent in FW accidents, it is a depressingly frequent contributor to CFIT. Which is precisely what this accident would appear to have been?

Only robust instrument flying techniques offer any protection when electing to fly manually.

[Lonewolf_50]

Fair point, TR, my underlying point is the old saw about currency and proficiency. Apologies if I misrepresented your meaning, I think we are in general agreement.

[chopjock]

So if I understand this correctly, there was a perfectly adequate and functioning AP and the pilot decided to over ride and fly manually and then crashed the aircraft?.

[Art of flight]

Chopjock,

The report refers to the force trim release switches being held in (depressed) to enable full manual control, nothing to do with the AP. There is no AP designed to be capable of carrying out a take-off profile from the ground, but setting up and using the stability aids such as stick trim can greatly aid getting away from the ground and flying a pre-planned profile. The use of helicopter APs are limited by the relevant AFM to certain limits such as not below a certain speed or height. Of course it is prudent and good airmanship to pre-select/arm hdg and alt holds prior to take off in these circumstances.

[Tandemrotor]

Art hi.

I'm not type rated on this a/c but I thought someone who is, suggested to me G-LABL may have had doppler derived auto hover as a feature of the autopilot? In other words it could have maintained a fixed ground position, even in IMC, as the aircraft climbed vertically?

Of course that may not be correct?

[Non-PC Plod]

Chop jock is correct. Art of Flight - I think you are confusing yourself between the APs and the flight director (I know terminology is different from type to type).
On the AW139, the APs allow the attitude hold to do exectly that - hold the selected attitude unless you press the cyclic FTR button, overriding the clever system and converting the aircraft into a very expensive R22. The FD is the piece of kit which (subject to being within design parameters), will allow you to select altitude, heading and airspeed holds etc., and on more advanced models allow coupled transitions to and from the hover.

[Art of flight]

Thanks PC, no confusion on my part, just trying to respond in a general way to a question of why the pilot was apparently overriding the AP during takeoff phase.

[Boudreaux Bob]

Seems a Circular discussion going on here.

Was bad Decision Making that caused the Crash or a Loss of Control during the Takeoff?

It appears to me the situation needs to be parceled out into several lanes of discussion.

One relates to the Weather and Darkness and being at an unlit off airport departure point.

Then we ought to consider the Take Off Procedure.

Also we ought to discuss use of the Force Trim, Auto Pilot, and Flight Director. Is this another indication of a Crew not understanding how to best utilize the capabilities of the Aircraft Systems?

We cannot get away from hashing out what rules, regulations, orders, directives, instructions, and advisories pertained and how they were dealt with.

There is no way to point a single extended digit and identify the exact single cause of the Crash as there were many factors, causes, and failures to be able to isolate the cause to a single thing.

One question I would ask is whether the two Pilots were victims to a system that set them up for this tragic event by loading them down with concerns that diverted their attention from the basic requirement of just flying the machine.

Had they been so influenced by all sorts of profiles, SOP's, and rigid adherence to Procedures that they really were not able to just fly the machine. Had the Crew become to indoctrinated in Standard Procedures they could not realize it was a non-Standard situation that required a different method for Take Off and they were unable to figure one out that might not necessarily comport with the Standard Procedures?

They were products of a training and certification system that claims to prepare and ensure Pilots are capable. They were in a very new and sophisticated twin engine helicopter. The maneuver they were performing should not have been beyond their abilities although not one they did on a regular basis.

It is not just the Pilots that need to be critiqued here, but also the system that put them in that situation. The Pilots made some mistakes certainly but they sure had a lot of help in that happening.

[handysnaks]

Bob, you have probably picked the worst possible example to try and prove your theory that we 'stiff assed Brits' are overly regulated and procedurally retentive. The CAA have very little authority to regulate private operations like the one involved in this unfortunate accident. It doesn't prove anything other than the well known fact that if you want to create a situation where something might go horribly wrong, throwing a human being or two into the mix is a pretty sure fire way of achieving eventual success

[rotorspeed]

B Bob

I think you're over complicating the situation. I think the pilots flew beyond their competency level, no doubt succumbing to owner pressure they should have resisted.

[Munnyspinner]

Rotor speed, the ability to manage client expectation and owner pressure may be the core competency that let them down. It's a circular argument but was the decision made to fly because they felt able and competent to handle the conditions, which were below sensible minimums, or simply because they couldn't say no?

[G0ULI]

Apart from the persons on board was there anything else loaded that might have influenced the need to take off in atrocious weather conditions?

[Fareastdriver]

Having flown for some time when there were not so many rules as there are now I have done scores of IMC take offs during the day and night. The conditions have ranged from blowing or laying snow, Norway and the UK; blowing or enveloping dust, Cyprus, Middle East and Australia; heavy rain, Australia and the South Pacific and Fog, Everywhere.

The golden rule is: Do Not Look Out of the Cockpit until you are established in the climb.

The visible snow, dust, raindrops and mist swirling around the cockpit will create an overwhelming impression that the aircraft is going the wrong way. At night the stuff going through the landing light beam will double it. If one does not ignore this than the situation can get out of hand so the only safe course of action is not to look.

Whether this effect had any bearing on this case I will not speculate but if somebody remembers that rule in the future then that is enough.

[ShyTorque]

Remind us all what the icing clearance was for the Mk.2 Chinook at the time.

We're at risk of going over very old and long-tread ground here, but apart from the lack of an icing clearance, the aircraft type didn't even have a valid release to service. The MOD (test pilot) department responsible for producing it had refused to fly their example of the type, out of general safety concerns. The "Mull" pilots could possibly have been Court Martialled if they had refused to fly the sortie as ordered on the day; they would have been fully aware of this fact because as far as the military were concerned it was an operational theatre, albeit not publicised as such for political reasons.

At least civilian pilots don't have that pressure put on them from above, but they could lose their job over a refusal to fly, especially if the man paying your salary is your passenger. Disregarding that, there is always a personal desire to get the job done whatever, but as I've said here before, it can be a very fine line to tread.

[jellycopter]

Gentlemen,

Respectfully, can we get back to thread?

JJ

[ShyTorque]

JJ, the point is, the above diversification of the main topic shows that even with a rule book in place, aircraft captains can, and do, come under intense pressure to do something they might not ideally wish to do.

If that pressure is to do something outside of the rules, or outside of common sense, the pilot will always be made responsible for his actions, whatever he does on the day.