BK117 crash Baltic Sea
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KJ - the thread has drifted from discussion of this event to something different. As ever, the posts in that 'drift' sub-thread tell you more about the poster's personality and outlook than they do about the thread topic. Tracing back you can see who has 'raw nerves' and where they stick out (not just this thread drift, all of them).
In that vein, this post (drifting the drift) discloses mine I suppose.
John
In that vein, this post (drifting the drift) discloses mine I suppose.
John
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Very sad indeed!!! RIP
I have no idea what could have happened. I doubt it was a missing autohover. Night over water is a hostile environment and there is not much space for errors (technical or human). I just hope the accident investigation team finds out soon, what caused the crash.
As for some of the replies (on this and other threads), can´t you guys take your personal fight somewhere else. As much as I like to follow the rumours und ideas of what might have caused something, it really annoys me to read through all the bashing. As a native speaker that might be easy, for readers that are not as eloquently as you are, it is not.
sky
I have no idea what could have happened. I doubt it was a missing autohover. Night over water is a hostile environment and there is not much space for errors (technical or human). I just hope the accident investigation team finds out soon, what caused the crash.
As for some of the replies (on this and other threads), can´t you guys take your personal fight somewhere else. As much as I like to follow the rumours und ideas of what might have caused something, it really annoys me to read through all the bashing. As a native speaker that might be easy, for readers that are not as eloquently as you are, it is not.
sky
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
Sasless;
Sid.....go back and try to find where I said anything remotely like that and get back with us will you.
To save you the time and effort which I doubt you would take.....here is exactly what I said.
Sid.....go back and try to find where I said anything remotely like that and get back with us will you.
To save you the time and effort which I doubt you would take.....here is exactly what I said.
Thread Starter
I just hope the accident investigation team finds out soon, what caused the crash.
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skadi
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Just from what i read and "heard" (which-btw-is NO "insider-knowledge"!), it seems to me that the pilots did something…..lets say "stupid"..
I hope i am completely wrong with this…..but it seems to me that they were trying to do some "tight and low turns" to say "Good Bye"…..maybe overturned it (you all know the "tight right turn & collective"-stories)..
I do NOT say it was a pilots error…just my feeling from the articles, the "witnesses stories" and experience from previous accidents give me this impression…...
I hope i am completely wrong with this…..but it seems to me that they were trying to do some "tight and low turns" to say "Good Bye"…..maybe overturned it (you all know the "tight right turn & collective"-stories)..
I do NOT say it was a pilots error…just my feeling from the articles, the "witnesses stories" and experience from previous accidents give me this impression…...
Would that not require "Right Hand Orbits" for an overturning event due to the collective-cyclic situation BO and BK's (and 135's and 145's too I guess) are known for? Misapplication of controls could result in a similar but different situation for Left Hand Turns if I remember correctly.
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Something stupid
@hueyracer
I belong to the DRF offshore unit and I had a very similar night trainingsflight 10 days ago with the trainingscaptain, who unfortunately died in this accident.
At the time being I do not have any Insider knowledge of what had happened. So far there are no official nor unofficial facts about this fatal crash.
But I can tell how this Captain acted in my trainingsflight.
As PICUS on the left seat (BK117 has the hoist on the left side) I had been on the controls during the winch ex at the vessel and transferred the controls for the departure from the vessel. During the departure (me not on the controls) I did a radio call to inform the vessel about our departure.
In the debriefing the trainingscaptain argued that it was unsafe to do the radio call and not being "attentive hands off" (to backup the PIC) during the departure. He made pretty clear that both pilots should concentrate exclusively on the departure until reaching a safe altitude.
With this experience in mind I doubt that there was any room for "stupid things" under his command.
As it was said earlier our unit is no maritime SAR outfit. We do Offshore HEMS. Our operation is limited to winch operation on ships/vessels or wind farms.
We don't do winch rescues out of the water. Especially not at night.
Most of our crew members are Ex mil mainly with maritime SAR background ( as ex Army I am an exception). We regularly get training from active maritime SAR crew members.
I hope we get answers soon, so that we can learn from it.
I belong to the DRF offshore unit and I had a very similar night trainingsflight 10 days ago with the trainingscaptain, who unfortunately died in this accident.
At the time being I do not have any Insider knowledge of what had happened. So far there are no official nor unofficial facts about this fatal crash.
But I can tell how this Captain acted in my trainingsflight.
As PICUS on the left seat (BK117 has the hoist on the left side) I had been on the controls during the winch ex at the vessel and transferred the controls for the departure from the vessel. During the departure (me not on the controls) I did a radio call to inform the vessel about our departure.
In the debriefing the trainingscaptain argued that it was unsafe to do the radio call and not being "attentive hands off" (to backup the PIC) during the departure. He made pretty clear that both pilots should concentrate exclusively on the departure until reaching a safe altitude.
With this experience in mind I doubt that there was any room for "stupid things" under his command.
As it was said earlier our unit is no maritime SAR outfit. We do Offshore HEMS. Our operation is limited to winch operation on ships/vessels or wind farms.
We don't do winch rescues out of the water. Especially not at night.
Most of our crew members are Ex mil mainly with maritime SAR background ( as ex Army I am an exception). We regularly get training from active maritime SAR crew members.
I hope we get answers soon, so that we can learn from it.
The silence is deafening. Rumour has it that there is a lot to talk about.
I personally found the reaction to Aser’s comments a bit tight, even if he was mistaken on some details. The accident he refers to was a grave lesson in how not to do offshore operations; namely, on-the cheap. And if he had first-hand knowledge of that operation then his concern to shout up the need to do things properly is understandable.
There is a trend in German Bight and Baltic right now for operators who have had their traditional experience base in the onshore world to try and get a slice of the offshore windpark pie. In fact, that's almost a direct quote from the OLT/NHC boss who said (whilst referring to a desire to expand beyond the current HEMS/rescue service they are offering, into future personnel transfers) "The cake is big".
Is it? I heard a different: That contracts are short-term; that there is considerable market uncertainty, and that there is very strong competition on price - with one operator offering the AW139 at less than €50 a minute (for personnel transfer to platforms). Now I'm no bean counter, but that sounds unsustainably (laughably?) cheap to finance offshore operations for all they entail. How big will that cake be if it is a race to the bottom (no pun intended) just to get market share?
So how can you save money and be competitive on price? You can fly single pilot; you can fly with two pilots up front but only one of whom has a type rating; you can employ people for buttons (or nothing!) who want offshore experience, or make offset deals on the type-rating; you can employ military pilots “moonlighting with approval”; you can accept that bankruptcy is part of the game, re-shell your company, and start again.
I thought these kind of tactics were common parlance (and part of the endemic weakness) in the onshore sector, but that the North Sea sector was largely spared such de-stabilising and dangerous nonsense.
Perhaps the LBA and contract providers should conduct due diligence of all potential bidders, including their pricing structure, financial sustainability, employment practices, adherence to operational minima, maximum take-off weights, performance planning, proper scrutiny of duty and rest periods and so forth.
With respect to this accident, it is awful and my condolences go to the families and colleagues. As an important provider of HEMS services, you should expect that DRF had a properly type-rated, IFR qualified, operationally experienced and current crew. As to the BK117 being suitable for only a bit offshore, the lack of a gear-up warning system was probably the final nail in the coffin.
TT
I personally found the reaction to Aser’s comments a bit tight, even if he was mistaken on some details. The accident he refers to was a grave lesson in how not to do offshore operations; namely, on-the cheap. And if he had first-hand knowledge of that operation then his concern to shout up the need to do things properly is understandable.
There is a trend in German Bight and Baltic right now for operators who have had their traditional experience base in the onshore world to try and get a slice of the offshore windpark pie. In fact, that's almost a direct quote from the OLT/NHC boss who said (whilst referring to a desire to expand beyond the current HEMS/rescue service they are offering, into future personnel transfers) "The cake is big".
Is it? I heard a different: That contracts are short-term; that there is considerable market uncertainty, and that there is very strong competition on price - with one operator offering the AW139 at less than €50 a minute (for personnel transfer to platforms). Now I'm no bean counter, but that sounds unsustainably (laughably?) cheap to finance offshore operations for all they entail. How big will that cake be if it is a race to the bottom (no pun intended) just to get market share?
So how can you save money and be competitive on price? You can fly single pilot; you can fly with two pilots up front but only one of whom has a type rating; you can employ people for buttons (or nothing!) who want offshore experience, or make offset deals on the type-rating; you can employ military pilots “moonlighting with approval”; you can accept that bankruptcy is part of the game, re-shell your company, and start again.
I thought these kind of tactics were common parlance (and part of the endemic weakness) in the onshore sector, but that the North Sea sector was largely spared such de-stabilising and dangerous nonsense.
Perhaps the LBA and contract providers should conduct due diligence of all potential bidders, including their pricing structure, financial sustainability, employment practices, adherence to operational minima, maximum take-off weights, performance planning, proper scrutiny of duty and rest periods and so forth.
With respect to this accident, it is awful and my condolences go to the families and colleagues. As an important provider of HEMS services, you should expect that DRF had a properly type-rated, IFR qualified, operationally experienced and current crew. As to the BK117 being suitable for only a bit offshore, the lack of a gear-up warning system was probably the final nail in the coffin.
TT
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Torquetalk you are right. The problem is that there are only short term contracts for Offshore - HEMS at the german coast at the moment.
Therefore at the time being there is no big interest from the traditional Offshore-Operators to provide this service in germany.
Without longterm contracts it seems not possible to provide state of the art helicopter equipment to this kind of operation.
In addition HEMS operations in the offshore context means a lot of training and currency flights but low hours of paid flight time.
On Wind-Offshore manager told me that his company estimates 3-4 accidents per year where a helo is needed. With this number in mind it is easy to understand, that managers tend to accept the risk of "cheap"-services.
It would be different, when personal is transfered regulary to offshore sites. In this case the employes actually see the standards every day.
In HEMS operation the provided service is invisible most of the time.
It might change in the future, but due to the political situation in germany investments in offshore wind operation are at least delayed and presently there is no "big cake".
Therefore at the time being there is no big interest from the traditional Offshore-Operators to provide this service in germany.
Without longterm contracts it seems not possible to provide state of the art helicopter equipment to this kind of operation.
In addition HEMS operations in the offshore context means a lot of training and currency flights but low hours of paid flight time.
On Wind-Offshore manager told me that his company estimates 3-4 accidents per year where a helo is needed. With this number in mind it is easy to understand, that managers tend to accept the risk of "cheap"-services.
It would be different, when personal is transfered regulary to offshore sites. In this case the employes actually see the standards every day.
In HEMS operation the provided service is invisible most of the time.
It might change in the future, but due to the political situation in germany investments in offshore wind operation are at least delayed and presently there is no "big cake".
BK117 Crash Baltic Sea
Reported today 03 April 2014 by BFU that 117 had no technical defect - I understand that the No 2 pilot has gone to a lawyer. Statement may follow in 2 weeks
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The report is out.
Unimpressive mission readiness.
Unimpressive mission readiness.
Immediate Causes:
•Little experience of the crew regarding the applicable procedures at night over sea
•The approach deviated from the described approach procedure
•In regard to the altitude, the airspeed, and the rate of descent the approach was not stabilised
•The descent was commenced prior to being on final approach and without visual contact with the ship
•Insufficient monitoring of the flight instruments
•Loss of situational awareness in combination with loss of control
•Non-reaction to visual and audio altitude warnings of the radio altimeter
Systemic Causes:
•Insufficient descriptions of tasks and procedures regarding the flight-safety improving crew cooperation particularly for the offshore scenario
•Insufficient company specifications for the use of the flight attitude stabilising functions of the autopilot system during approaches and departures and in traffic circuits above sea
•Lack of go-around criteria for a non-stabilised approach
•Lack of aviation regulations for offshore helicopter flight operations in Germany
•Insufficient assessment of the operator’s procedures by the responsible supervising authority
•Insufficient understanding for the characteristics of offshore helicopter operations by the responsible supervising authority
•Little experience of the crew regarding the applicable procedures at night over sea
•The approach deviated from the described approach procedure
•In regard to the altitude, the airspeed, and the rate of descent the approach was not stabilised
•The descent was commenced prior to being on final approach and without visual contact with the ship
•Insufficient monitoring of the flight instruments
•Loss of situational awareness in combination with loss of control
•Non-reaction to visual and audio altitude warnings of the radio altimeter
Systemic Causes:
•Insufficient descriptions of tasks and procedures regarding the flight-safety improving crew cooperation particularly for the offshore scenario
•Insufficient company specifications for the use of the flight attitude stabilising functions of the autopilot system during approaches and departures and in traffic circuits above sea
•Lack of go-around criteria for a non-stabilised approach
•Lack of aviation regulations for offshore helicopter flight operations in Germany
•Insufficient assessment of the operator’s procedures by the responsible supervising authority
•Insufficient understanding for the characteristics of offshore helicopter operations by the responsible supervising authority
