Entering autos: discussion split from Glasgow crash thread
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JOHN EACOTT
John,
I have apologised to you for being rude. That was not my intention. However, Hendra was not promoting the use of 60% Nr he was specifically questioning that value.
JD brought up that value. You added another (69%) Nice number!!
You confused Hendras post and defended JDs position.
This is exactly the kind of confusion that arises when people start quoting inappropriate values.
The only ones that matter are those printed in the RFM - If this is wrong I am willing to be corrected!!
You accuse me of contributing nothing. Fair enough. However, on the basis of the above just what did you achieve with you posts other than to confuse Hendra by not reading his post and add another confusing number to the mix that yet again does not feature in flight manual I have read.
Once again I did not intend to be rude.
DB
I have apologised to you for being rude. That was not my intention. However, Hendra was not promoting the use of 60% Nr he was specifically questioning that value.
JD brought up that value. You added another (69%) Nice number!!
You confused Hendras post and defended JDs position.
This is exactly the kind of confusion that arises when people start quoting inappropriate values.
The only ones that matter are those printed in the RFM - If this is wrong I am willing to be corrected!!
You accuse me of contributing nothing. Fair enough. However, on the basis of the above just what did you achieve with you posts other than to confuse Hendra by not reading his post and add another confusing number to the mix that yet again does not feature in flight manual I have read.
Once again I did not intend to be rude.
DB
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SASLESS - I agree with every single word of your last post. In regards to details of training flights - I claim Patient/Doctor immunity...as I am sure you would understand.
If it helps - I am finally on the same page as you!! Apologies for being so tardy!!
Dare I say "Cyclic Aft (but only if appropriate)"
Best Regards
If it helps - I am finally on the same page as you!! Apologies for being so tardy!!
Dare I say "Cyclic Aft (but only if appropriate)"
Best Regards
Let's read what Brother Dixon had to say.....I am quoting from his Post. The Bold Print is mine and I have split up his post into individual sentences to make it easier for some to read and comprehend.
Now let's read what Nick Lappos had to say. Again the bold print and highlighting is my work as is splitting some of his paragraphs.
No one should be insulted by what was said by either of the guys. They both said to operate within the Limits set by the RFM. Brother Dixson clearly is warning against operating outside the established Limits and Nick says the same thing as a Real Helicopter Pilot talks.
I see absolutely nothing wrong with what they said or how they said it.
That is their words pulled from earlier posts.
The aero guys at SA in answer to an internal query on an accident investigation some decades ago, did some simulation and opined that there is an Nr number, where at least from the lift vector and angle of attack calculations, the Nr can reach a point where the decay is unrecoverable, and hence ( and this was assumed at full low collective ) you need to put the throttle(s) forward or use your chute.
That Number was in the 60% range.
So there is some margin between where the qualification test crews operate and the point at which the situation turns really dangerous.
With an Nr decay rate of 10%/second, though, one does not have all day.
Since either the FAA or the cognizant military test organization gets copies or witnesses all of this testing, the actual Nr behavior is anything but a " deep dark secret ".
As to the H-V subject, I think Nick has said it all.
Hard to comment on other manufacturers/models H-V diagrams, but I and Nick have more than a passing relationship with the UH-60, SH-60, all S-76 models and the S-92 models, and for those, I will pass on that the H-V tests were flown to the required structural limits of the machine by pilots who had experience doing that stuff.
If one wants to ignore their validity, as at least one poster suggests, have at it, but do have an adequate supply of band-aids on hand.
That Number was in the 60% range.
So there is some margin between where the qualification test crews operate and the point at which the situation turns really dangerous.
With an Nr decay rate of 10%/second, though, one does not have all day.
Since either the FAA or the cognizant military test organization gets copies or witnesses all of this testing, the actual Nr behavior is anything but a " deep dark secret ".
As to the H-V subject, I think Nick has said it all.
Hard to comment on other manufacturers/models H-V diagrams, but I and Nick have more than a passing relationship with the UH-60, SH-60, all S-76 models and the S-92 models, and for those, I will pass on that the H-V tests were flown to the required structural limits of the machine by pilots who had experience doing that stuff.
If one wants to ignore their validity, as at least one poster suggests, have at it, but do have an adequate supply of band-aids on hand.
Now let's read what Nick Lappos had to say. Again the bold print and highlighting is my work as is splitting some of his paragraphs.
This is a great thread, as it makes us think. Why I weighed in is very simple: Today especially there exists a certain kind of distrust of some of the fundamentals of our existence, think born out of the intellectual freedom the web excites (a very good and powerful thing!)
This thinking that goes something like this:
"Those idiots who make XXX (insert a term like: vaccines, evolution textbooks, public laws, medical procedures, missions to the moon, reports on assassinations, flight manual procedures, investigations of 911 acts. ......) are all YYY (insert a term like: too stupid, on the take, drunk with power, ......) and I know because ZZZ (insert term like: I saw a youtube video, my cousin's Aunt's brother told me, a great web site proves otherwise, Glenn Beck told me,....).
The thing that makes me laugh is that within 100 meters of my desk are world class experts who have spent 20 years of so studying, designing, building and testing helicopter stuff. They (like their peers in France, Russia, Texas, Philadelphia, and Yeovil) have become very expert in ways that operators cannot fathom, any more than they can appreciate what a night rig approach is like.
When I read of a person who basically says "that page in the operating limits section of the flight manual is just bull****, do it this way and you will be so happy you will pee your pants!" I react.
Ppruners, do what you will, but while you do, please respect the flight manual, and those who wrote it. Trust them, they know so much more than you can fathom about the machine, because it is their job. That is not an arrogant statement, it is a simple fact. It take nothing away from your expertise, it is a simple statement of how we are a team, and that we rely on each other to stay safe and productive.
This thinking that goes something like this:
"Those idiots who make XXX (insert a term like: vaccines, evolution textbooks, public laws, medical procedures, missions to the moon, reports on assassinations, flight manual procedures, investigations of 911 acts. ......) are all YYY (insert a term like: too stupid, on the take, drunk with power, ......) and I know because ZZZ (insert term like: I saw a youtube video, my cousin's Aunt's brother told me, a great web site proves otherwise, Glenn Beck told me,....).
The thing that makes me laugh is that within 100 meters of my desk are world class experts who have spent 20 years of so studying, designing, building and testing helicopter stuff. They (like their peers in France, Russia, Texas, Philadelphia, and Yeovil) have become very expert in ways that operators cannot fathom, any more than they can appreciate what a night rig approach is like.
When I read of a person who basically says "that page in the operating limits section of the flight manual is just bull****, do it this way and you will be so happy you will pee your pants!" I react.
Ppruners, do what you will, but while you do, please respect the flight manual, and those who wrote it. Trust them, they know so much more than you can fathom about the machine, because it is their job. That is not an arrogant statement, it is a simple fact. It take nothing away from your expertise, it is a simple statement of how we are a team, and that we rely on each other to stay safe and productive.
No one should be insulted by what was said by either of the guys. They both said to operate within the Limits set by the RFM. Brother Dixson clearly is warning against operating outside the established Limits and Nick says the same thing as a Real Helicopter Pilot talks.
I see absolutely nothing wrong with what they said or how they said it.
That is their words pulled from earlier posts.
Last edited by SASless; 16th Dec 2013 at 15:06.
DB, please read again, without hurry, John Dixon's posts. Neither he, nor John E, advocate letting Nr decay to the point of no return. I am grateful for John's joining our discussion. The back and forth between he and henra raise again the issue of what the AoA and the loading on the rotor blades becomes. Their discussion reminds me again of the wisdom of what I was taught: Control Nr.
That's the prime directive.
As to Pete and Cyclic Back as a memory aid:
Pete, if you oversimplify something you may create negative reinforcement. There was a time when we called that "negative training." Your "cyclic back" mantra is no better a simple maxim than the "lower collective" mantra since neither works in isolation.
Unlike our fixed wing brethren, the left and right hand don't influence different flight controls. They influence the same ones!
(G0ULI, work with us here, it's OK! 
) EDIT to clarify: FW even the right hands left/right stick and fore/aft stick operate different flight control surfaces, while L/H operates power (and often the flaps ...) while in RW both hands end up influencing the flight controls rotating overtop one's head.
Pete, it isn't either / or. As a helicopter pilot and instructor with your deep experience I am convinced that you know better than to teach that those are independent of each other.
False dichotomy.
You have two hands.
You can do two things.
Helicpter pilots work both hands and their feet with some frequency, particularly when flying below translational lift, but that skill set does not magically disappear when flying above translational lift.
Control Nr.
Thank you, for qualifying the previous point you were making.
It's what I was taught by Navy and Marine Corps instructor pilots over thirty years ago. No big secret. Granted, IIRC all of the birds I flew were "high inertia rotor heads." My carping above aside, I appreciate your energetic crusade on Nr maintenance / restoration. It is much more time critical for the lower inertia head birds.
There are two hands on every pilot. Step 1: control Nr.
If the instructional community teach how to control Nr, (you have two hands!!!!), and pilots learn to prioritize that and then get on with the rest, then that nasty region of decayed Nr where the jig is up will hopefully be prevented, and more people will walk away from, rather than be carried away from, accidents where it all goes wrong in a hurry.
SASless:
FWIW, we learned how to auto by doing run on landings to grass fields at Spencer Field, Whiting, back in the early 80's in the Jet Ranger. I think that's still in the syllabus. I don't remember doing full autos in the Huey ... I draw a blank each time I reach for that memory. I think they used to do full autos in the Huey at Rucker, but again, memory banks have lost that data. Been a few beers since our conference with the Army on that stuff ... hell, a lot of beers.
That's the prime directive.
As to Pete and Cyclic Back as a memory aid:
Pete, if you oversimplify something you may create negative reinforcement. There was a time when we called that "negative training." Your "cyclic back" mantra is no better a simple maxim than the "lower collective" mantra since neither works in isolation.
Unlike our fixed wing brethren, the left and right hand don't influence different flight controls. They influence the same ones!
(G0ULI, work with us here, it's OK! ) EDIT to clarify: FW even the right hands left/right stick and fore/aft stick operate different flight control surfaces, while L/H operates power (and often the flaps ...) while in RW both hands end up influencing the flight controls rotating overtop one's head. Pete, it isn't either / or. As a helicopter pilot and instructor with your deep experience I am convinced that you know better than to teach that those are independent of each other.
When something happens to your helicopter that you did not purposely initiate, do two things as quickly as you can. 1. Start the cyclic moving aft, and 2. Start the collective (or “lever” as I'm learning to say on this forum!) down towards the bottom. This must be a gut reaction, not a thought-out move on the pilot's part. DON'T take time to troubleshoot the situation before moving the flight controls.
You have two hands.
You can do two things.
Helicpter pilots work both hands and their feet with some frequency, particularly when flying below translational lift, but that skill set does not magically disappear when flying above translational lift.
Control Nr.
One can take any procedure and find faults with it. Is Cyclic Back needed every time no matter what the mode of flight? Of course not
I am going to use your example of trading airframe velocity for rotor rpm. You are so right.
There are two hands on every pilot. Step 1: control Nr.
If the instructional community teach how to control Nr, (you have two hands!!!!), and pilots learn to prioritize that and then get on with the rest, then that nasty region of decayed Nr where the jig is up will hopefully be prevented, and more people will walk away from, rather than be carried away from, accidents where it all goes wrong in a hurry.
SASless:
FWIW, we learned how to auto by doing run on landings to grass fields at Spencer Field, Whiting, back in the early 80's in the Jet Ranger. I think that's still in the syllabus. I don't remember doing full autos in the Huey ... I draw a blank each time I reach for that memory. I think they used to do full autos in the Huey at Rucker, but again, memory banks have lost that data. Been a few beers since our conference with the Army on that stuff ... hell, a lot of beers.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 16th Dec 2013 at 15:15.
During my time at Rucker/Hunter....we did Touchdown autorotations on and off the airfields in the Huey.....lots and lots and lots of them. We did them Solo and with the Instructors. We did them with ballasted aircraft as well as empty. We did "Normal", "180", "Whatever it Takes", "Zero Ground Run"....and when the IP's were not looking ......competitions for the longest ground run.
But that was when we were all headed off to tropical climes where that "Skill" would be needed without a doubt and paid off with many lives saved and aircraft left able to be put back into service.
Times have changed since then I am sure.
That was back in '67-'68.
But that was when we were all headed off to tropical climes where that "Skill" would be needed without a doubt and paid off with many lives saved and aircraft left able to be put back into service.
Times have changed since then I am sure.
That was back in '67-'68.
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SASless, thank you for your post taking the time and effort to attempt to decypher previous comments made by Double Bogey. You are a gentleman.
Peter Gillies
STATEMENT - stated that the unrecoverable NR happens at a certain value from nominal.
MOTIVATION - to help pilots realise just how little time available and the best source of energy to recover - the flare. He hopes this might save someone's life.
Test Pilots
STATEMENT - The Test pilots pop up to discredit Peters claim and state that almost twice as much time is available and back up this claim with lots of data. Read JDs post again. It specifically states Peter is wrong!
MOTIVATION
?????
I find the basis for this comparison to be somewhat dysfunctional.
A statement was made by one person and a counter statement made by another. Both are entitled to express their view. What is more, both these perspectives would appear to have originated from the personal experiences of each individual and, so it would seem, each of them is willing to stand by their statements.
If John Dixon states that during the course of his test flying he has encountered Nr values in the 80's range, then he is simply conveying the facts of his experience.
The facts and the truth should never be discouraged.
Professional pilots are meant to be trained so that they will consistently deliver their duty of flying - with skill, discipline and accuracy. If, by making a pilot aware that there may be greater room for manoeuvre in certain emergency situations, his response is immediately to attempt to flout the prescriptions of the RFM, then we are no longer talking about a professional but a rebel and a cowboy, in other words, a non-professional.
John Dixon's relaying of his personal test flying experience was and is not (as far as I understand it) an invitation to depart from the parameters published by the manufacturer and I find suggestions to that effect to be fallacious.
Peter Gillies
STATEMENT - stated that the unrecoverable NR happens at a certain value from nominal.
MOTIVATION - to help pilots realise just how little time available and the best source of energy to recover - the flare. He hopes this might save someone's life.
Test Pilots
STATEMENT - The Test pilots pop up to discredit Peters claim and state that almost twice as much time is available and back up this claim with lots of data. Read JDs post again. It specifically states Peter is wrong!
MOTIVATION
?????
A statement was made by one person and a counter statement made by another. Both are entitled to express their view. What is more, both these perspectives would appear to have originated from the personal experiences of each individual and, so it would seem, each of them is willing to stand by their statements.
If John Dixon states that during the course of his test flying he has encountered Nr values in the 80's range, then he is simply conveying the facts of his experience.
The facts and the truth should never be discouraged.
Professional pilots are meant to be trained so that they will consistently deliver their duty of flying - with skill, discipline and accuracy. If, by making a pilot aware that there may be greater room for manoeuvre in certain emergency situations, his response is immediately to attempt to flout the prescriptions of the RFM, then we are no longer talking about a professional but a rebel and a cowboy, in other words, a non-professional.
John Dixon's relaying of his personal test flying experience was and is not (as far as I understand it) an invitation to depart from the parameters published by the manufacturer and I find suggestions to that effect to be fallacious.
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I feel like im jumping into a fight amongst experts here but I will add something. I have done full downs in the R-22, R-44, S300, Bell 47, Hughes 500, and Bell 206. I've been through factory school for the R-22 and the 500. 95% of the auto entries were between 50-80 knots or fairly close to vy. I have done a few at high speeds inthe R-22 and the 500 and it was scary how fast RPM decayed even with quick reaction on the collective. I cant imagine school out there is doing training autos at 90 knots in an R-22 at max power. As stated in the Robinson trianing course it is 1.1 seconds before RPM reaches an unrecoverable point which was stated to be below 80% plus 1% per 1000' (as other have susggested, I'm sure there is a margin there, but it is better that the average pilot not know what that is.
My point is is the training autos most of us have done dont adiquately prepare us for a worst case scenario (high power, high speed, particularly in high speed ships that have low rotor inertia)
SAS, a 212 clipping along at 100knots in cruise is never going 2x vy and has a considerable abount of rotor inertia. So I wouldn't expect Pete's experiences to be the same as yours.
Fly something fast with a low inrtia rotor (like the EC135) and do some autos at high speeds. I think you will see that Pete's advice become quite appropriate.
I dont like how some of you guys are saying "maintian attitude" if you are in a S76 at a 140 knot attitude (or in a 500 for that mattter) you sure as heck dont want to maintain that.
Adjust your attitude to approx. vy. if you are exceeding it would be more correct.
My point is is the training autos most of us have done dont adiquately prepare us for a worst case scenario (high power, high speed, particularly in high speed ships that have low rotor inertia)
SAS, a 212 clipping along at 100knots in cruise is never going 2x vy and has a considerable abount of rotor inertia. So I wouldn't expect Pete's experiences to be the same as yours.
Fly something fast with a low inrtia rotor (like the EC135) and do some autos at high speeds. I think you will see that Pete's advice become quite appropriate.
I dont like how some of you guys are saying "maintian attitude" if you are in a S76 at a 140 knot attitude (or in a 500 for that mattter) you sure as heck dont want to maintain that.
Adjust your attitude to approx. vy. if you are exceeding it would be more correct.
If you will read back through my posts you will see that I advocate using the Flight Controls appropriate to the situation you find yourself confronted with.
I have flown a few Helicopters over my career....and seemed to have survived despite some very serious attempts at killing myself.
The one thing I did that worked towards keeping me around at the end of the day to enjoy a few cold Beers was understanding there was no way to predict what your initial reactions to a sudden emergency would be as very few of us are clairvoyant and thus can see into the future very far.
I agree with Pete, DB, HC, Nick, John, John, and a bunch of others when we talk of using Aft Cyclic as part of the process of regaining lost Main Rotor RPM following a sudden loss of Engine drive to the Rotors.
Where I differ from Pete is I do not see that Cyclic movement as being absolutely necessary every single time as there are a great many situations where it does not apply. I also said moving the Cyclic aft in most cases would do no harm either but would not be very useful.
Airspeed is just one of the factors that affect Rotor RPM in Autorotation. One example is the Bell 206 with its Vne Autorotation Speed marked in Blue not he Airspeed Indicator.
Other Airspeeds that apply are those for Minimum ROD and Max Range.
You are absolutely correct when you say "Practice" EOL's do not compare to the "Real" thing.....and for a number of reasons beyond that you note.
Please don't include me in the "Maintain Attitude" crowd....as I equate that mindset as having the exact same Fallacy that the "Always move the Cyclic Aft" theory....as it does not fit EVERY situation that one might encounter.
If you were doing a Spray Turn and had the Nose of the aircraft well up or well down....and the engine quit.....keeping the same Attitude would prove rather terminal (just choosing one example).
Your comment about adjusting your Pitch Attitude to about Vy is sound.....in most cases but again.....not in all cases.
That is the danger of making "Boiler Plate" statements about helicopter flying....One has to be very careful not to paint yourself into an uncomfortable corner by doing so.
Think back over this discussion we have had.....is that not the case....affirmative statements that did not with stand a critical review and the reaction to those who were challenged?
If you take that same EC-135 you are talking about and do your EOL from Vy....in descending flight....say with about a 1,000 FPM ROD....would you really be hard pressed to survive without the use of a large amount of Aft Cyclic? The honest answer is "No" as you are already in a good descent, at the right airspeed, both the amount and rate of Rotor Droop would be minimal provided you completely lowered the Collective in a timely manner.
Brother Dixson suggested a Droop Rate of about 10% NR per Second....so we can visualize the difference between a 1-2 Second hesitation....as compared to a 3-4 Second hesitation.
Alter the situation to what you describe....Collective up under your armpit....screaming along like a Raped Ape....at MAUW.....have that complete loss of Engine Drive....then hesitate 3-4 seconds before you take any action? Reckon the outcome would be unattractive?
Now put yourself in the other extreme.....HOGE....pitch up under your armpit....lots of pedal in counteracting TR Torque.....and have that loss of engine power. You reckon that aft cyclic is going to do a lot for you?
We have to stay away from absolutes when we talk about flying helicopters....there are too many variables that we have to consider that affect what we do.
I have flown a few Helicopters over my career....and seemed to have survived despite some very serious attempts at killing myself.
The one thing I did that worked towards keeping me around at the end of the day to enjoy a few cold Beers was understanding there was no way to predict what your initial reactions to a sudden emergency would be as very few of us are clairvoyant and thus can see into the future very far.
I agree with Pete, DB, HC, Nick, John, John, and a bunch of others when we talk of using Aft Cyclic as part of the process of regaining lost Main Rotor RPM following a sudden loss of Engine drive to the Rotors.
Where I differ from Pete is I do not see that Cyclic movement as being absolutely necessary every single time as there are a great many situations where it does not apply. I also said moving the Cyclic aft in most cases would do no harm either but would not be very useful.
Airspeed is just one of the factors that affect Rotor RPM in Autorotation. One example is the Bell 206 with its Vne Autorotation Speed marked in Blue not he Airspeed Indicator.
Other Airspeeds that apply are those for Minimum ROD and Max Range.
You are absolutely correct when you say "Practice" EOL's do not compare to the "Real" thing.....and for a number of reasons beyond that you note.
Please don't include me in the "Maintain Attitude" crowd....as I equate that mindset as having the exact same Fallacy that the "Always move the Cyclic Aft" theory....as it does not fit EVERY situation that one might encounter.
If you were doing a Spray Turn and had the Nose of the aircraft well up or well down....and the engine quit.....keeping the same Attitude would prove rather terminal (just choosing one example).
Your comment about adjusting your Pitch Attitude to about Vy is sound.....in most cases but again.....not in all cases.
That is the danger of making "Boiler Plate" statements about helicopter flying....One has to be very careful not to paint yourself into an uncomfortable corner by doing so.
Think back over this discussion we have had.....is that not the case....affirmative statements that did not with stand a critical review and the reaction to those who were challenged?
If you take that same EC-135 you are talking about and do your EOL from Vy....in descending flight....say with about a 1,000 FPM ROD....would you really be hard pressed to survive without the use of a large amount of Aft Cyclic? The honest answer is "No" as you are already in a good descent, at the right airspeed, both the amount and rate of Rotor Droop would be minimal provided you completely lowered the Collective in a timely manner.
Brother Dixson suggested a Droop Rate of about 10% NR per Second....so we can visualize the difference between a 1-2 Second hesitation....as compared to a 3-4 Second hesitation.
Alter the situation to what you describe....Collective up under your armpit....screaming along like a Raped Ape....at MAUW.....have that complete loss of Engine Drive....then hesitate 3-4 seconds before you take any action? Reckon the outcome would be unattractive?
Now put yourself in the other extreme.....HOGE....pitch up under your armpit....lots of pedal in counteracting TR Torque.....and have that loss of engine power. You reckon that aft cyclic is going to do a lot for you?
We have to stay away from absolutes when we talk about flying helicopters....there are too many variables that we have to consider that affect what we do.
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I want to comment about the "dead mans curve" as some of you have called it.
We happen to fly 500s doing poweline work, so I keep very close stats on all of the accidents within our industry.
In the 35 years our industry has been operating there have been 17 power losses by powerline construction/repair contractors on the line (either on patrol, below 200feet or in several cases in a hover on the line. In at least 3 cases they were bonded to the wire. All were Hueges 500s, essentialy the only ship used for this type of work in the US. 2 Accients were listed were AUS, the rest are USA.
Pilot Inuries Accident Reference
Minor WPR12LA022
Serious WRP12LA328
None NoReport – Aircraft not substantially damaged
None NoReport – Aircraft not substantially damaged
None NoReport – Aircraft not substantially damaged
Serious SEA07LA135
None MIA93LA055
Serious NYC88LA083
Serious See ATSB Report
None NYC99LA055
None LAX99LA245
Serious MIA99FA158
Minor CEN13FA075
None CHI00FA110
None CHI96 FA099
None No Report – Aircraft not substantially damaged
Minor CEN13FA075
These accidents are literally a worst case scenario for engine failure 100-200' agl low or no airspeed and tons of obstructions, yet in every case the pilot survived.
5 serious injuries
3 minor injuries
9 no injuries
(There were a couple fatalities of lineman on the platform, or carried has HEC)
Also as you can see, in at least 4 cases, they didn't even bend tin.
Please stop perpetuating the theory that a engine failure in the avoid curve is certain death or serious injures.
We happen to fly 500s doing poweline work, so I keep very close stats on all of the accidents within our industry.
In the 35 years our industry has been operating there have been 17 power losses by powerline construction/repair contractors on the line (either on patrol, below 200feet or in several cases in a hover on the line. In at least 3 cases they were bonded to the wire. All were Hueges 500s, essentialy the only ship used for this type of work in the US. 2 Accients were listed were AUS, the rest are USA.
Pilot Inuries Accident Reference
Minor WPR12LA022
Serious WRP12LA328
None NoReport – Aircraft not substantially damaged
None NoReport – Aircraft not substantially damaged
None NoReport – Aircraft not substantially damaged
Serious SEA07LA135
None MIA93LA055
Serious NYC88LA083
Serious See ATSB Report
None NYC99LA055
None LAX99LA245
Serious MIA99FA158
Minor CEN13FA075
None CHI00FA110
None CHI96 FA099
None No Report – Aircraft not substantially damaged
Minor CEN13FA075
These accidents are literally a worst case scenario for engine failure 100-200' agl low or no airspeed and tons of obstructions, yet in every case the pilot survived.
5 serious injuries
3 minor injuries
9 no injuries
(There were a couple fatalities of lineman on the platform, or carried has HEC)
Also as you can see, in at least 4 cases, they didn't even bend tin.
Please stop perpetuating the theory that a engine failure in the avoid curve is certain death or serious injures.
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Grenville I had to look up the definition of "Fallacious" as it had me slightly concerned. Apologies but I'm the product of a Secondary comprehensive education.
Just as soon as I had done this I had to do the same for Lonewolfs "Dichotomy"
Are we still on an Aviation forum??
I appreciate the outpouring of support for our industries finest but note that JD has declined to comment. Now it may be that such exchanges (being challenged) is beneath him or it may be he hates conflict. However I suspect it is because there is no motivation justifiable for challenging Peters assertion that NR decay is far worse than most of suspect in high speed cruise as it is a "Fallacious Dichotomy" to risk ones life to prove limits that we all need and then to promote the "extra" bit available in the safety margin.
Having said that I think we have made progress. I now know how to get into Auto (thanks TC).
As an aside, in UK, operations requiring prolonged hovering in a single (such as filming) used to be supported by the Hover SEOL exercise in the OPC specifically because the cyclic input has to be reversed to stand much chance of survival.
Is this exercise included in MEH Police OPCs today. It was not in my time??
DB
Just as soon as I had done this I had to do the same for Lonewolfs "Dichotomy"
Are we still on an Aviation forum??
I appreciate the outpouring of support for our industries finest but note that JD has declined to comment. Now it may be that such exchanges (being challenged) is beneath him or it may be he hates conflict. However I suspect it is because there is no motivation justifiable for challenging Peters assertion that NR decay is far worse than most of suspect in high speed cruise as it is a "Fallacious Dichotomy" to risk ones life to prove limits that we all need and then to promote the "extra" bit available in the safety margin.
Having said that I think we have made progress. I now know how to get into Auto (thanks TC).
As an aside, in UK, operations requiring prolonged hovering in a single (such as filming) used to be supported by the Hover SEOL exercise in the OPC specifically because the cyclic input has to be reversed to stand much chance of survival.
Is this exercise included in MEH Police OPCs today. It was not in my time??
DB
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500 Guy - 5 Serious Injuries and two dead Line Men. How can this not be serious?? It's utterly fallacious. I liked your previous post. The last one sucked!!
DB
DB
Nick's post back about #135, the one with the two HV Charts (R-22 and B-206)....when viewed carefully show the Annotation "Avoid Operation in the Shaded Area". That is a far cry from stating certain death and destruction will occur.
The Charts are generally described by Manufactuers as setting forth parameters where "Safe Landings" cannot be assured. Which does not mean "No Safe Landings Are Possible".
I do believe 500 Guy's short list of events proves that without a doubt.
The Charts are generally described by Manufactuers as setting forth parameters where "Safe Landings" cannot be assured. Which does not mean "No Safe Landings Are Possible".
I do believe 500 Guy's short list of events proves that without a doubt.
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We have pages of theories and counter theories, but no one has mentioned the basics. There is no argument about lowering the collective in the event of engine failure but plenty about the subsequent action ie. cyclic aft, forward, maintain attitude, all we need is shake it all about and we have a full house.
Why don't we just say "control the aircraft". With the engine failure and a lowering of the collective there is going to be an element of yaw, roll and pitch, the response will be to correct the attitude which will require a correction in roll and pitch and of course yaw. This should be instinctive now the thought process begins, do I need to slow down, accelerate or turn. The aircraft is now stabilised, what you do with the cyclic now depends on speed or lack off to set up the EOL.
Having had three, one of which was at night this worked for me.
Why don't we just say "control the aircraft". With the engine failure and a lowering of the collective there is going to be an element of yaw, roll and pitch, the response will be to correct the attitude which will require a correction in roll and pitch and of course yaw. This should be instinctive now the thought process begins, do I need to slow down, accelerate or turn. The aircraft is now stabilised, what you do with the cyclic now depends on speed or lack off to set up the EOL.
Having had three, one of which was at night this worked for me.
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I did not say it was not serious. I said it was not certain death.
the linemen died because they were outside of the aircraft.
As far as the pilots go, and the five serious injuries, one is a friend of mine and he would be the first to tell you that a broken wrist (the FAA clasifies any broken bone as a serious injury) is very different form death.
the linemen died because they were outside of the aircraft.
As far as the pilots go, and the five serious injuries, one is a friend of mine and he would be the first to tell you that a broken wrist (the FAA clasifies any broken bone as a serious injury) is very different form death.
"Just a pilot"
SASless:
A semantic quibble-In most cases it's NOT an "instinctive" reaction when one responds to a situation without conscious consideration. It's situational awareness, prioritizing potential reactions and anticipating the most likely and dangerous problems. Example- flight check w/instructor, one might be a little more aware of wind direction and forced landing areas because you will have at least one power chop with critique. There's a lot of low-effort semi-conscious intellectual contextual analysis proceeding during a flight if you're ahead of the machine. If one is forcing that attention to that decision making process, you're task saturated.
Mr Gillies:
Thank you for refreshing certain theoretical points on residual thrust. It makes a difference in descent rate and angle, but huge change at cushion/pitch pull versus training.
Thoughts on turns to load the disk and increase NR if one was having a really, really bad day?
A semantic quibble-In most cases it's NOT an "instinctive" reaction when one responds to a situation without conscious consideration. It's situational awareness, prioritizing potential reactions and anticipating the most likely and dangerous problems. Example- flight check w/instructor, one might be a little more aware of wind direction and forced landing areas because you will have at least one power chop with critique. There's a lot of low-effort semi-conscious intellectual contextual analysis proceeding during a flight if you're ahead of the machine. If one is forcing that attention to that decision making process, you're task saturated.
Mr Gillies:
Thank you for refreshing certain theoretical points on residual thrust. It makes a difference in descent rate and angle, but huge change at cushion/pitch pull versus training.
Thoughts on turns to load the disk and increase NR if one was having a really, really bad day?
Thoughts on turns to load the disk and increase NR if one was having a really, really bad day?
Lowering the lever first will NEVER be a bad thing (unless you are in a low hover - the exception to prove the rule) because it will prevent further Nr Decay.
Flaring while you lower the lever can often be a good thing but NOT ALWAYS.
Therefore advocating Aft Cyclic as an immediate action for all entries to auto is disingenuous (another one for you DB
) to the low timers here.
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The debate about exactly when the main rotor rpm will fall to a point where it is irrecoverable is impossible to resolve because all stalls, fixed wing or rotary wing are the subject of chaotic behaviour. Put simply, given identical failures on two separate days, one day you will get away with it, another day, you won't. The exact point that a stall occurs is dependant on the angle of attack, air density, humidity, temperature levels, wind gust levels and a dozen other factors that could vary. The manuals and red lines painted on the instruments may give some latitude, but they are the values that have been tested and proven to work reliably for the "average pilot".
I remember years ago expessing surprise at seeing the police helicopter refuelling at a local flying club and doing a rolling takeoff. Apparently with the temperature hovering around 30 degrees centigrade, they couldn't take off from their base, only about 250 feet higher but needing a vertical departure with the tanks more than a quarter full. So clearly the weather can have huge effects on performance and I have to conclude that rotor stall would occur at a higher rotational speed in hot weather than on a cold day as just a single practical example of the variables that have to be taken into account.
Naturally fixed wing aircraft have similar limitations, but they are generally along the lines of make sure you have enough runway to get airborne!
I remember years ago expessing surprise at seeing the police helicopter refuelling at a local flying club and doing a rolling takeoff. Apparently with the temperature hovering around 30 degrees centigrade, they couldn't take off from their base, only about 250 feet higher but needing a vertical departure with the tanks more than a quarter full. So clearly the weather can have huge effects on performance and I have to conclude that rotor stall would occur at a higher rotational speed in hot weather than on a cold day as just a single practical example of the variables that have to be taken into account.
Naturally fixed wing aircraft have similar limitations, but they are generally along the lines of make sure you have enough runway to get airborne!
500guy/SASless:
As devil 49 succinctly put it, there is a lot of mental agility and subsequent dexterity ongoing when the donk stops. We all agree the collective goes down.
Might I suggest that instinctively and in that first 10th of a second, the pilot should/would hold the attitude - why: because he/she is trained to maintain that which is known to reduce the effects of that which is not known (moving the attitude). THEN and only then does the pilot make the next decision which may be a new cyclic position appropriate for that solution.
The transfer from donk stop to moving the cyclic to its final position might appear (a) instant and (b) instinctive but I bet you, the pilot subconciously maintained attitude initially.
Thus (500) K.I.S.S. Keep it simple - lower lever, maintain attitude and then we haven't got to worry about Vy, 2 x Vtoss, half Vmin squared for each damn a/c
[SAS: Don't demean others by disassociating yourself from the 'maintain attitude' fraternity...its trite and unbecoming of you].
Dead Man's curve:
Afraid to say 500, you didnt just shoot yourself in the foot with that post about H/V eol's.....you blew your damned leg off
How about this:
"...As a consequence of ignoring sound technical advice as shown in the FRM, Operations and Limitations Sections, the following were injured and millions was spent repairing damaged helicopters due to prolonged operations in the H/V curve..." Thank God no-one was killed......
Talk about glass half full..............
As devil 49 succinctly put it, there is a lot of mental agility and subsequent dexterity ongoing when the donk stops. We all agree the collective goes down.
Might I suggest that instinctively and in that first 10th of a second, the pilot should/would hold the attitude - why: because he/she is trained to maintain that which is known to reduce the effects of that which is not known (moving the attitude). THEN and only then does the pilot make the next decision which may be a new cyclic position appropriate for that solution.
The transfer from donk stop to moving the cyclic to its final position might appear (a) instant and (b) instinctive but I bet you, the pilot subconciously maintained attitude initially.
Thus (500) K.I.S.S. Keep it simple - lower lever, maintain attitude and then we haven't got to worry about Vy, 2 x Vtoss, half Vmin squared for each damn a/c
[SAS: Don't demean others by disassociating yourself from the 'maintain attitude' fraternity...its trite and unbecoming of you].
Dead Man's curve:
Afraid to say 500, you didnt just shoot yourself in the foot with that post about H/V eol's.....you blew your damned leg off
How about this:
"...As a consequence of ignoring sound technical advice as shown in the FRM, Operations and Limitations Sections, the following were injured and millions was spent repairing damaged helicopters due to prolonged operations in the H/V curve..." Thank God no-one was killed......
Talk about glass half full..............
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The chopper I saw had full landing gear. I hadn't considered the case with just skids. But it only goes to prove the point, every aircraft is different and has its own little foibles. What works in one, doesn't necessary apply to another.