Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
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Cattletruck, I've no experience with FADEC helos, but in other types with hydromechanical FCUs (S61 & BV234) an engine surging and banging as you describe can cause the most confusing signals as the good engine tries to compensate. You can get N1 & EGT see-sawing violently, one engine up, one down and vv which can make diagnosis of the bad one very tricky unless you rationalise it correctly.
However, in that situation you know you are in danger of selecting the wrong one and act accordingly with great care.
I'm with TC in this, and of the opinion that double engine failure in a twin is regarded so unlikely it builds a mindset that it "can't" happen - and the level of confusion and sheer disbelief when a donk stops following a red fuel warning (surmising here) when there is clear indication of fuel in tanks would leave anyone in a state of momentary stasis. Follow that with a second engine failure, perhaps when beginning to deal with the first one and the couple of seconds of "Oh no! Oh Christ! Oh sh!t! Oh dear! might well be enough to lose the Nr to a point beyond recovery. Once that has happened (at what, 80%Nr or so?) the drag on the stalled blades plus the induced airflow angle from the increased r.o.d. would slow them very fast indeed.
Two things are certain. Engines and rotor stopped.
This can only happen in certain ways. Power is either lost by malfunction or by pilot action. Can't be anything else.
Nr is lost by insufficient power to drive the transmission, so either by power loss and too much pitch retained (because if pitch is reduced autorotation occurs) or the power was robbed by a seizure etc - and we believe it wasn't the latter because the drivetrain appears able to turn and MGB intact.
It's hard to see an alternative to "something" causing a power loss but autorotation not being established leading to catastrophic Nr loss and subsequent loss of control. With the best will in the world it is equally hard to see what can cause such a loss of Nr except the pilot not reducing pitch enough, or quickly enough, or not keeping it reduced.
The questions to answer are "what?" and "Why?"
However, in that situation you know you are in danger of selecting the wrong one and act accordingly with great care.
I'm with TC in this, and of the opinion that double engine failure in a twin is regarded so unlikely it builds a mindset that it "can't" happen - and the level of confusion and sheer disbelief when a donk stops following a red fuel warning (surmising here) when there is clear indication of fuel in tanks would leave anyone in a state of momentary stasis. Follow that with a second engine failure, perhaps when beginning to deal with the first one and the couple of seconds of "Oh no! Oh Christ! Oh sh!t! Oh dear! might well be enough to lose the Nr to a point beyond recovery. Once that has happened (at what, 80%Nr or so?) the drag on the stalled blades plus the induced airflow angle from the increased r.o.d. would slow them very fast indeed.
Two things are certain. Engines and rotor stopped.
This can only happen in certain ways. Power is either lost by malfunction or by pilot action. Can't be anything else.
Nr is lost by insufficient power to drive the transmission, so either by power loss and too much pitch retained (because if pitch is reduced autorotation occurs) or the power was robbed by a seizure etc - and we believe it wasn't the latter because the drivetrain appears able to turn and MGB intact.
It's hard to see an alternative to "something" causing a power loss but autorotation not being established leading to catastrophic Nr loss and subsequent loss of control. With the best will in the world it is equally hard to see what can cause such a loss of Nr except the pilot not reducing pitch enough, or quickly enough, or not keeping it reduced.
The questions to answer are "what?" and "Why?"
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ref post 1026 fuel tank layout.
The EC-135 has three fuel tanks. Main and two supply. The engines are supplied from the supply tanks by suction and can easy run on either engine driven driven fuel pump (accessory part of engine).
The FWD and AFT Transfer pumps job is to transfer fuel from Main tank to Supply. To help out the job there are also two overflow holes too allow for free overflow to the supply tank.
As a lot of the flying PD does is hover, it is not uncommen to turn of the aft pump when light appears. But what if the FWD transf. is us? No fuel is then transfered to supply tanks.
The overflow holes are quite high and not at any help at such low level. This means that there are no fuel transfer from Main to supply tanks. The main fuel level in main is still showing reasonable fuel amount and can easily be mistaken for not starting on final reserve fuel, while Supply tanks are nearing empty. This may explain why amber caution light never comes on (inside Main tank), while they probably got Warning Low Level at very late stage.
That said, there are warning light on us pumps, if the system worked..
The EC-135 has three fuel tanks. Main and two supply. The engines are supplied from the supply tanks by suction and can easy run on either engine driven driven fuel pump (accessory part of engine).
The FWD and AFT Transfer pumps job is to transfer fuel from Main tank to Supply. To help out the job there are also two overflow holes too allow for free overflow to the supply tank.
As a lot of the flying PD does is hover, it is not uncommen to turn of the aft pump when light appears. But what if the FWD transf. is us? No fuel is then transfered to supply tanks.
The overflow holes are quite high and not at any help at such low level. This means that there are no fuel transfer from Main to supply tanks. The main fuel level in main is still showing reasonable fuel amount and can easily be mistaken for not starting on final reserve fuel, while Supply tanks are nearing empty. This may explain why amber caution light never comes on (inside Main tank), while they probably got Warning Low Level at very late stage.
That said, there are warning light on us pumps, if the system worked..
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Quote "To help out the job there are also two overflow holes too allow for free overflow to the supply tank."
these 'holes' are incorporated to allow fuel to spill back from the supply tanks into the main tank. The Transfer pumps have a rate of flow greater than the the engine driven pumps to deliberately prevent the supply tanks from emptying whilst the main is transfering. There is a 'trick' where a nose high attitude will spill fuel from the main (at certain levels) into the supply tanks without transfer pumps on.
Not sure what amber caution from the main tanks you are on about, the only caution from the main tank sensors will be quantity discrepancy driven, loss of sensing, and transfer pump dry or inoperative. Certainly nothing to do with low fuel quantity...that is from the supply tank systems.
Should both transfer pumps become inoperative due to failure, lack of fuel to transfer, or switch selection/CB failure. the engines will continue to draw fuel from the supply tanks. Should an engine driven pump fail, the supply tanks prime pump should be selected on to feed the engine.
Others have explained the supply tank low fuel warning systems very well....there are 2 independant systems....both have had their problems in the past but the likleyhood of 4 cautions and warnings failling in the same sortie at the same time as the pilot misreading 3 seperate fuel qty indications or taking no action would seem unlikely. I certainly included fuel as part of my regular scan procedure.
As aircraft and units have been withdrawn from the new National service fuel has become a critical factor in task profiles, it is burning a hole in the mind of all police pilots during the sortie. 95 ltrs of fuel was drained from this aircraft, if it is being suggested that it was 'stuck' in the main tank, the pilot and crew would have had to ignore so many visual and audio warnings unless again it is suggested that all of these systems failed on the same flight.
these 'holes' are incorporated to allow fuel to spill back from the supply tanks into the main tank. The Transfer pumps have a rate of flow greater than the the engine driven pumps to deliberately prevent the supply tanks from emptying whilst the main is transfering. There is a 'trick' where a nose high attitude will spill fuel from the main (at certain levels) into the supply tanks without transfer pumps on.
Not sure what amber caution from the main tanks you are on about, the only caution from the main tank sensors will be quantity discrepancy driven, loss of sensing, and transfer pump dry or inoperative. Certainly nothing to do with low fuel quantity...that is from the supply tank systems.
Should both transfer pumps become inoperative due to failure, lack of fuel to transfer, or switch selection/CB failure. the engines will continue to draw fuel from the supply tanks. Should an engine driven pump fail, the supply tanks prime pump should be selected on to feed the engine.
Others have explained the supply tank low fuel warning systems very well....there are 2 independant systems....both have had their problems in the past but the likleyhood of 4 cautions and warnings failling in the same sortie at the same time as the pilot misreading 3 seperate fuel qty indications or taking no action would seem unlikely. I certainly included fuel as part of my regular scan procedure.
As aircraft and units have been withdrawn from the new National service fuel has become a critical factor in task profiles, it is burning a hole in the mind of all police pilots during the sortie. 95 ltrs of fuel was drained from this aircraft, if it is being suggested that it was 'stuck' in the main tank, the pilot and crew would have had to ignore so many visual and audio warnings unless again it is suggested that all of these systems failed on the same flight.
As a lot of the flying PD does is hover, it is not uncommen to turn of the aft pump when light appears.
BTW, its not uncommon to turn the relevant pump off, its procedure according to ECL.
But after departure and commencing cruise attitude, the aft pump will illuminate ( assuming main tank is almost empty ) , because the fuel will then be in the forward section.
And now you forget to switch on the FWD pump again. Guess what happpens....
skadi
I'll guess. Fuel doesn't transfer to the supply tanks.
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SKADI - could you complete your story.......both main tank pump have now been switched off. What would then happen? Is it:
1. Supply tank content indications start to decrease......
2. Time ?.....AMBER FUEL LOW Illuminates for each Supply Tank....Time??
3. .....RED FUEL LOW illuminates for each Supply Tank...........Aproximatley 8 minutes (?) to first flame-out.
1. Supply tank content indications start to decrease......
2. Time ?.....AMBER FUEL LOW Illuminates for each Supply Tank....Time??
3. .....RED FUEL LOW illuminates for each Supply Tank...........Aproximatley 8 minutes (?) to first flame-out.
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Transfer Pumps
Page 56 post 1102 questioned the use of the transfer pumps and changes in pitch with speed change. I am fixed wing only but sensed a great deal of unease regarding tranfer pumps.
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Robin 400,
Helicopters tend to have more attitude changes than fixed wing especially those with rigid type rotorheads.
The system on the EC135 is well proven and employed on many similar types. One big longitudinal placed tank feeding two independant supply tanks using a "Full-Feeder" tank principle incorporating "overflow" connections at the top of the suplly tanks feeding back into the main tank.
As the fuel level gets down to the lower levels, significant changes in longitudinal attitude require some carefull management of the fuel transfer system. This is normal and ussually the pilots that fly these types are fully appraised of the system operation and limitations and how to manage the situations as they arise from say, prolonged hovering.
Failures create warnings. Low Level indications are nearly always independant from contents indications (as in the case of the RED LOW FUEL caption in the EC135).
Ultimatley, providing the crew are alert and the checklist is correctly formatted, a landing should take place as soon as possible (nearest safe site) if the backstop (RED) LOW FUEL warning illuminates, regardless of any other contradictory or misunderstood indications.
I would go as far to say that the system is as robust and simple as it can be while employing more than sufficient redundancy in indications and warnings to enable a safe landing to be made under all conditions provided the RFM actions are complied with.
Of course in the case of this accident we do not yet know if any of this is relevant or significant but it is noticeable that the 95 Litres recovered from the fuel system so stated in the AAIB report is similar to the KG value that could get trapped in the main tank as unuseable fuel under certain failure/switch selections.
It is also worth noting that the EC135 worldwide fleet has completed over 2.8m flight hours.
Helicopters tend to have more attitude changes than fixed wing especially those with rigid type rotorheads.
The system on the EC135 is well proven and employed on many similar types. One big longitudinal placed tank feeding two independant supply tanks using a "Full-Feeder" tank principle incorporating "overflow" connections at the top of the suplly tanks feeding back into the main tank.
As the fuel level gets down to the lower levels, significant changes in longitudinal attitude require some carefull management of the fuel transfer system. This is normal and ussually the pilots that fly these types are fully appraised of the system operation and limitations and how to manage the situations as they arise from say, prolonged hovering.
Failures create warnings. Low Level indications are nearly always independant from contents indications (as in the case of the RED LOW FUEL caption in the EC135).
Ultimatley, providing the crew are alert and the checklist is correctly formatted, a landing should take place as soon as possible (nearest safe site) if the backstop (RED) LOW FUEL warning illuminates, regardless of any other contradictory or misunderstood indications.
I would go as far to say that the system is as robust and simple as it can be while employing more than sufficient redundancy in indications and warnings to enable a safe landing to be made under all conditions provided the RFM actions are complied with.
Of course in the case of this accident we do not yet know if any of this is relevant or significant but it is noticeable that the 95 Litres recovered from the fuel system so stated in the AAIB report is similar to the KG value that could get trapped in the main tank as unuseable fuel under certain failure/switch selections.
It is also worth noting that the EC135 worldwide fleet has completed over 2.8m flight hours.
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Totally agree with you that is why after reading the 135 training manual many days ago my interest in the failure of the Nrv valves or a loose connection caused me concern.
The supply tanks ceased being refilled with fuel remaing in the main tank.
Engines have different fuel flow depending on many things, is is remotely possible that both supply tanks exhausted at approximately the same time.
The supply tanks ceased being refilled with fuel remaing in the main tank.
Engines have different fuel flow depending on many things, is is remotely possible that both supply tanks exhausted at approximately the same time.
SKADI - could you complete your story.......both main tank pump have now been switched off. What would then happen? Is it:
1. Supply tank content indications start to decrease......
2. Time ?.....AMBER FUEL LOW Illuminates for each Supply Tank....Time??
3. .....RED FUEL LOW illuminates for each Supply Tank...........Aproximatley 8 minutes (?) to first flame-out.
1. Supply tank content indications start to decrease......
2. Time ?.....AMBER FUEL LOW Illuminates for each Supply Tank....Time??
3. .....RED FUEL LOW illuminates for each Supply Tank...........Aproximatley 8 minutes (?) to first flame-out.
2. normally yes, but according to the published SIN could be after #3 in the worst case
3. RED FUEL LOW on, ECL says to be on the ground within 8 or 10 min ( depends on the installed fuel tanks ), so first flameout after that time.
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Many things are remotely possible, however 3 crew ignoring 4 warnings and 3 fuel quantity readings doesn't find its way onto my radar. Now, this might be remotely possible.....an undiagnosed TR control or drive problem occurring in cruise flight, that only manifests itself when AS reduces on approach to landing (the fin becomes much less effective at around 65/70 kts). Those that fly 135 will attest to the large pedal movement required at around that speed. IF, and it's a big IF, this occurred whilst AS is reducing and landing checks are being carried out, COULD result in an undemanded rotation and nose high attitude with further rapid reduction in AS leaving little if any time to get the thing into auto whilst getting rid of the power.
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ROBIN 400
Dealing only with know facts......there is a slight difference in the contents of one supply tank from the other. I beleive this equates to about 1-2 minutes of cruise endurance. Some on this thread have inferred from this fact that, as the Supply Tank contents decrease towards zero, one engine will definitley flame out first...followed some time later by the second engine flaming out.
The reality is that at the point the main tank feed stopped (for whatever reason):
1. AC attitude (especially lateral) may cause the supply tanks contents to be slightly different.
2. Despite both engines being FADEC controlled, slight difference in fuel burn may be apparent.
Therefore, in answer to your question, yes, in theory it could be possible for both engines to flame-out at the same time. However the chance of this happening would be statistically very small.
More significantly, the chance of the events coming close together is more probable than simple comparing the differences in static supply tank useable contents and assuming a definitive time based split in the events occurring.
Hope this makes some sense.
is it remotely possible that both supply tanks exhausted at approximately the same time
The reality is that at the point the main tank feed stopped (for whatever reason):
1. AC attitude (especially lateral) may cause the supply tanks contents to be slightly different.
2. Despite both engines being FADEC controlled, slight difference in fuel burn may be apparent.
Therefore, in answer to your question, yes, in theory it could be possible for both engines to flame-out at the same time. However the chance of this happening would be statistically very small.
More significantly, the chance of the events coming close together is more probable than simple comparing the differences in static supply tank useable contents and assuming a definitive time based split in the events occurring.
Hope this makes some sense.
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Hi Paracrap
It's a shame my piece on BBC News was so cringeworthy for you Paracrap. You see I called in to the BBC because I (yes....I....not a pilot, not even in my capacity as a tech...just in my capacity as a normal, caring person)....I was getting really upset! I'm sorry I made you cringe but my intentions were nothing but honest and noble.
I was getting really upset because BBC News were basically pinning it on your brother pilot. It felt to me that he was being hung, drawn and quartered by the Beeb by inference and above all that NO-ONE was offering any facts of substance passed, 'Should the pilot have done this? Should the pilot have done that'. Why didn't he...etc. Basically they didn't have a clue.
I'm not for a second saying that I do....but I am AWARE how these machines work both fixed and rotary and NEVER claimed to be an expert. Yeah I got it wrong. But so ******* what? It was about informing the BBC that thisd guy was maybe under soooo much pressure and still had a job to do e.g. save his charges and try not to hurt anyone when he landed. Poor soul.
So I phoned up to tell them that. Based on two small eye witness accounts as reported by the Beeb and on analysis of the pics (upright / intact nature of airframe and other details....no crater) I knew I could provide something of SOME substance that would HOPEFULLY stop the ridiculous statements the Beeb were making and maybe add some perspective to what kind of pressures the pilot was under.
Having worked on sims I've sat off-console during sorties and flew untutored for maybe 300 hours (had to test the system once it was repaired etc). Simulators are all about procedure and I know that you guys get put through your paces and put under INTENSE pressure during a sim sortie. I've witnessed pilots under incredible pressure perform with aplomb. This kind of training is ALL FOR THE GOOD. I have nothing but respect for you guys. Enough respect to ensure that the pilot in question wasn't proven guilty before the AAIB even managed to catch a train to Glasgow. Yeah mate, if it wasn't bad enough that all those poor folks were hurt / killed the 24 hour rolling crud service had to fill the airtime with some rubbish. Well theirs was just insulting. At least I could proffer some possibilities based on my LIMITED knowledge. Which I did. Fortunately they had a trainee helicopter pilot (I think) on a short time after me adding a lot more substance. Which was great! At no point did I pretend to be something I was not.
So what did you do, Paracrap? Did you just sit there and cringe? Did you not get so hacked off with my off-target assessment that you reached for the phone to help add clarity? Help exonerate your pilot brother before the Beeb pinned it all on him. No, you just decided to sit their and moan about it and criticise those who weren't coming up to scratch? You could have provided so much clarity, Paracrap (and the others who didn't lift a finger to provide profession guidance to the BBC...and you had the knowledge), but you decided to become just another faceless internet asshole and pass judgement....just like the Beeb were doing to your brother pilot by inference.
Your Sincerely
Andy Dixon
[email protected]
I was getting really upset because BBC News were basically pinning it on your brother pilot. It felt to me that he was being hung, drawn and quartered by the Beeb by inference and above all that NO-ONE was offering any facts of substance passed, 'Should the pilot have done this? Should the pilot have done that'. Why didn't he...etc. Basically they didn't have a clue.
I'm not for a second saying that I do....but I am AWARE how these machines work both fixed and rotary and NEVER claimed to be an expert. Yeah I got it wrong. But so ******* what? It was about informing the BBC that thisd guy was maybe under soooo much pressure and still had a job to do e.g. save his charges and try not to hurt anyone when he landed. Poor soul.
So I phoned up to tell them that. Based on two small eye witness accounts as reported by the Beeb and on analysis of the pics (upright / intact nature of airframe and other details....no crater) I knew I could provide something of SOME substance that would HOPEFULLY stop the ridiculous statements the Beeb were making and maybe add some perspective to what kind of pressures the pilot was under.
Having worked on sims I've sat off-console during sorties and flew untutored for maybe 300 hours (had to test the system once it was repaired etc). Simulators are all about procedure and I know that you guys get put through your paces and put under INTENSE pressure during a sim sortie. I've witnessed pilots under incredible pressure perform with aplomb. This kind of training is ALL FOR THE GOOD. I have nothing but respect for you guys. Enough respect to ensure that the pilot in question wasn't proven guilty before the AAIB even managed to catch a train to Glasgow. Yeah mate, if it wasn't bad enough that all those poor folks were hurt / killed the 24 hour rolling crud service had to fill the airtime with some rubbish. Well theirs was just insulting. At least I could proffer some possibilities based on my LIMITED knowledge. Which I did. Fortunately they had a trainee helicopter pilot (I think) on a short time after me adding a lot more substance. Which was great! At no point did I pretend to be something I was not.
So what did you do, Paracrap? Did you just sit there and cringe? Did you not get so hacked off with my off-target assessment that you reached for the phone to help add clarity? Help exonerate your pilot brother before the Beeb pinned it all on him. No, you just decided to sit their and moan about it and criticise those who weren't coming up to scratch? You could have provided so much clarity, Paracrap (and the others who didn't lift a finger to provide profession guidance to the BBC...and you had the knowledge), but you decided to become just another faceless internet asshole and pass judgement....just like the Beeb were doing to your brother pilot by inference.
Your Sincerely
Andy Dixon
[email protected]
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Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
Cabby,
I tend to agree with you re engine out and pan call to Glasgow. The absence of any reported call only adds weight to suspicion that whatever occurred it was a very rapid deterioration. There were 2 other crew each with police radio access. This surely is a case of being pecked to bits by a flock of ducks, as opposed to being eaten by a crocodile!
Eurocopter are working with AAIB with various component manufacturers, as is normal. Any indication if a fleet wide problem would be reported as soon as can be verified.
I tend to agree with you re engine out and pan call to Glasgow. The absence of any reported call only adds weight to suspicion that whatever occurred it was a very rapid deterioration. There were 2 other crew each with police radio access. This surely is a case of being pecked to bits by a flock of ducks, as opposed to being eaten by a crocodile!
Eurocopter are working with AAIB with various component manufacturers, as is normal. Any indication if a fleet wide problem would be reported as soon as can be verified.
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AoF, thanks for filling in my blanks as I was to quick. There are no caution for us pumps. Only when swithced off.
What I´m saying is the overflow (both ways) correctly fills up the supply up to a point when transfer pumps are off or check valve us. As you know the pumps have a dry operating time of Approx. 20min. Multiple dryruns could have damaged the pumps over time. Anyway, this means it will still be fuel left in the main tank even if supply tanks are running empty.
AC attitude does of course make a difference, but if for whatever reason both transfer tanks are off, what is then transfering fuel to the supply tanks?
Prime pumps are in the supply tanks and makes no difference if supply tanks are empty.
I know this is a long shot, and it is unlikely, but system failure do occur and is a possible explanation to something happening so quick.
What I´m saying is the overflow (both ways) correctly fills up the supply up to a point when transfer pumps are off or check valve us. As you know the pumps have a dry operating time of Approx. 20min. Multiple dryruns could have damaged the pumps over time. Anyway, this means it will still be fuel left in the main tank even if supply tanks are running empty.
AC attitude does of course make a difference, but if for whatever reason both transfer tanks are off, what is then transfering fuel to the supply tanks?
Prime pumps are in the supply tanks and makes no difference if supply tanks are empty.
I know this is a long shot, and it is unlikely, but system failure do occur and is a possible explanation to something happening so quick.
Safety Flight,
"There are no caution for us pumps. Only when swithced off".
That is incorrect. There are cautions and they are driven by an "Amps monitor".
Essentially, if the pump is functioning normally then it should be drawing 1.5 to 6 Amps of current. If it pulling less than 1.5 amps then it has no fuel to pump and the caption will appear after 2 mins - the delay is to stop it cycling. If it is drawing no amps, it has failed or has been switched off - caption appears. If it is drawing more than 6 Amps then the fuel line is blocked, the caption appears.
"There are no caution for us pumps. Only when swithced off".
That is incorrect. There are cautions and they are driven by an "Amps monitor".
Essentially, if the pump is functioning normally then it should be drawing 1.5 to 6 Amps of current. If it pulling less than 1.5 amps then it has no fuel to pump and the caption will appear after 2 mins - the delay is to stop it cycling. If it is drawing no amps, it has failed or has been switched off - caption appears. If it is drawing more than 6 Amps then the fuel line is blocked, the caption appears.
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It is with great apprehension I make my first post on this incredible forum.
In my capacity of newby and recently qualified PPL(h) I have read and been glued to this entire conversation. I am amazed by the interaction between professionals, speculators and all other inputs equally.
The tragedy that occurred on that fateful evening has touched me and given me much to reflect on.
I have no theories and certainly no hidden agenda.
I might add that I had the misfortune of a fuel related engine failure during my training(not suggesting this is the cause) and the events that unfolded were indeed very quick to occur, entirely without warning and the severity of it took a few days to sink in.
My thoughts and condolences go out to everybody affected by this tragic event, and sincerely hope that any findings can bring about any relevant improvements to safety in the future.
Thank you P A
In my capacity of newby and recently qualified PPL(h) I have read and been glued to this entire conversation. I am amazed by the interaction between professionals, speculators and all other inputs equally.
The tragedy that occurred on that fateful evening has touched me and given me much to reflect on.
I have no theories and certainly no hidden agenda.
I might add that I had the misfortune of a fuel related engine failure during my training(not suggesting this is the cause) and the events that unfolded were indeed very quick to occur, entirely without warning and the severity of it took a few days to sink in.
My thoughts and condolences go out to everybody affected by this tragic event, and sincerely hope that any findings can bring about any relevant improvements to safety in the future.
Thank you P A