Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
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Semantics! Unless you are legally married to the woman you have been living with for 30 years, the mother of your children, she is not your wife. Or is she?
One thing everybody on board a 135 could know: If the engine(s) stop shout, "Turn the transfer pumps on". (Or wait for definitions of CRM.)
One thing everybody on board a 135 could know: If the engine(s) stop shout, "Turn the transfer pumps on". (Or wait for definitions of CRM.)
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another good result
Last edited by AnFI; 12th Mar 2014 at 21:11. Reason: trying to fix youtube embedding - fail
Notice the Collective Position!
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If a helicopter effectively runs out of fuel. Or indeed the fuel is mismanaged such that does not reach the engines, the sole responsibility for this rests with the authorised Flight Crew. The Pilot(s).
However, to accept that happened in this case we have to accept that this pilot flew on. Past the point when the helicopter gave clear warning of impending doom. The other crew may well have been aware of those warnings but they will generally follow and support the pilot in his actions, sometimes even when those actions are flawed. This also happens up front, between two trained pilots when one is assigned as the clear leader. It is a very complex and difficult phenomenon. A few promising and otherwise competant co-pilots have had their careers cut tragically short, often posthumously, for this very reason.
Overexposure to the onset of the hazardous condition. Risky Shift. Is one explanation for this. In the case of this accident it may be that the crew were reasonably familiar with flying with low fuel warnings with fuel clearly in the wrong place, such that on this night nothing seemed overly wrong until the first engine flamed out.
Our only protection from these conditions is strict adherence and compliance to the rules, regulations and operating requirements. In this case, despite the fact that system knowledge may have been poor, there were two clear safety break points afforded by compliance. The onset of MLA and the Red Low Fuel Warnings. Both conditions requiring a fundamental response from the pilot that would in both cases have avoided this accident.
In my view this is the lesson and the legacy we take from this accident.
DB
However, to accept that happened in this case we have to accept that this pilot flew on. Past the point when the helicopter gave clear warning of impending doom. The other crew may well have been aware of those warnings but they will generally follow and support the pilot in his actions, sometimes even when those actions are flawed. This also happens up front, between two trained pilots when one is assigned as the clear leader. It is a very complex and difficult phenomenon. A few promising and otherwise competant co-pilots have had their careers cut tragically short, often posthumously, for this very reason.
Overexposure to the onset of the hazardous condition. Risky Shift. Is one explanation for this. In the case of this accident it may be that the crew were reasonably familiar with flying with low fuel warnings with fuel clearly in the wrong place, such that on this night nothing seemed overly wrong until the first engine flamed out.
Our only protection from these conditions is strict adherence and compliance to the rules, regulations and operating requirements. In this case, despite the fact that system knowledge may have been poor, there were two clear safety break points afforded by compliance. The onset of MLA and the Red Low Fuel Warnings. Both conditions requiring a fundamental response from the pilot that would in both cases have avoided this accident.
In my view this is the lesson and the legacy we take from this accident.
DB
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
I can quite understand and agree with what DB is saying in that last post, and given the environment in which the unit operates, perhaps the condition of low fuel levels was indeed one that they were used to. Why would that night have been any different?
Was/is there a refuelling arrangement at Edinburgh?
They did a 35 minute task in Glasgow before flying 20 mins to Dalkeith for a 4 minute task. Leaving the task with less than 110kgs in the main, with another 20 minute transit back to Glasgow, surely must have rang some bells? Do they never get tasked while airborne?
Edinburgh is a 24h airfield, how often does the unit use the facilities? Is there an arrangement with them for fuel? Is the fuel there expensive?
EGPH - Edinburgh
I would suggest that with the company frf of 85kgs at night, the crews up in Glasgow were/are accustomed to flying having both transfer pumps off and the cautions illuminated, if it was 90 kgs for example, they wouldn't be so. I assume it is the same for the Air Ambulance up there.
Risky Shift
If one is used to seeing a caution on the CAD, especially with the light levels turned down (possibly for the transit over a large dark area) do you read the words or see the words? "PRIME PUMP, PRIME PUMP, F PUMP AFT, F PUMP FWD .... there's a caution on, it's a pump, it's normal ....... and this is where I agree with DB's risky shift reference.
Lessons and Legacies, certainly!
I'd wager that we're all flying around with a different frame of mind these days.
Was/is there a refuelling arrangement at Edinburgh?
They did a 35 minute task in Glasgow before flying 20 mins to Dalkeith for a 4 minute task. Leaving the task with less than 110kgs in the main, with another 20 minute transit back to Glasgow, surely must have rang some bells? Do they never get tasked while airborne?
Edinburgh is a 24h airfield, how often does the unit use the facilities? Is there an arrangement with them for fuel? Is the fuel there expensive?
EGPH - Edinburgh
I would suggest that with the company frf of 85kgs at night, the crews up in Glasgow were/are accustomed to flying having both transfer pumps off and the cautions illuminated, if it was 90 kgs for example, they wouldn't be so. I assume it is the same for the Air Ambulance up there.
Risky Shift
If one is used to seeing a caution on the CAD, especially with the light levels turned down (possibly for the transit over a large dark area) do you read the words or see the words? "PRIME PUMP, PRIME PUMP, F PUMP AFT, F PUMP FWD .... there's a caution on, it's a pump, it's normal ....... and this is where I agree with DB's risky shift reference.
Lessons and Legacies, certainly!
I'd wager that we're all flying around with a different frame of mind these days.
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It's a good point that a small difference in the operator mandated MLA can mean having to get used to monitoring the level in the supply tanks or always landing (at night) before that becomes a factor.
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...and why were the warning lights not acted upon, well its towards the end of the shift and the warning lights are often on. Seems more obvious now we've thought it through.
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A couple of things, if you ask questions of others on here it might be as well not to bite the hand that's feeding you the answers, wether you like the answers or not. Personal challenges to flying ability won't help.
Do we know that the crew were near the end of their shift? In my little part of the world the 'late' shift finishes at 0400hrs.
Do we know that the crew were near the end of their shift? In my little part of the world the 'late' shift finishes at 0400hrs.
DAPT,
Yes.....have made a couple of very real Mayday Calls....but also know there are times that Call is the last thing I was concerned about for a while as I and the Crew were coping with some very difficult circumstances.
Try sitting in a cockpit that is on fire, the fire is hot enough and big enough to melt the sheet metal of the fuselage 30 feet aft of the fire, while you are IMC in mountainous terrain, with a Yaw Pedal shot out from under your foot and a bullet wound in your leg....seeing your clothes burn off....the skin on your hands bubble up and burst after the gloves burn off....and all the while deal with the loss of systems, and maintaining control of the aircraft and crew.......yes....we did not put out a Mayday Call immediately as we had other fish to fry and telling the World what was going on was not going to help one damn bit.
So....do wind your f@cking neck in will you?
Yes.....have made a couple of very real Mayday Calls....but also know there are times that Call is the last thing I was concerned about for a while as I and the Crew were coping with some very difficult circumstances.
Try sitting in a cockpit that is on fire, the fire is hot enough and big enough to melt the sheet metal of the fuselage 30 feet aft of the fire, while you are IMC in mountainous terrain, with a Yaw Pedal shot out from under your foot and a bullet wound in your leg....seeing your clothes burn off....the skin on your hands bubble up and burst after the gloves burn off....and all the while deal with the loss of systems, and maintaining control of the aircraft and crew.......yes....we did not put out a Mayday Call immediately as we had other fish to fry and telling the World what was going on was not going to help one damn bit.
So....do wind your f@cking neck in will you?
SASless - Get a life you old codger. Climb down from your own backside and stop bullying anyone who disagrees with you - prat.
And Perleeeeeze move on from the Vietnam war - most on here were born after it ended.
One's views are always welcome.
And Perleeeeeze move on from the Vietnam war - most on here were born after it ended.
One's views are always welcome.
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
SS the recent video gives a excellent example of proper mayday call with position report from low altitude.
Are you and SAS incapable of performing that call?
Are you and SAS incapable of performing that call?
As they had just that minute lifted from Stinson, wouldn't he be on the airfield frequency, or are you suggesting that he changed frequency in order to put out the Mayday on the Police channel as opposed to the air traffic channel already selected?
I would suggest that it was the non handling pilot doing the shouting, leaving the handling pilot to deal with the situation i.e. flying the aircraft.
If you believe it was the handling pilot giving the call, why at the beginning of the incident was he shouting, '"Come on auto! Come on auto! and why at the end did he shout, "Flare!, Flare!". Kind of suggests it was the non handling pilot doing the talking don't you think?
Looking at the end of the video that you refer to, I'd personally like to be a bit better set up for the touchdown, then put out the call; Rather than get the call out, and arrive in the way that they did …. via the power lines ...!
I wonder what might have happened in the case of 'my Mayday incident', if I gave out the call as the priority, rather than fly the aircraft, open the windows, turn off the heating, warn the passengers and go for a landing site ... as the cockpit was filling with smoke!
As it happened the call was made, but only once the condition was under control!
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
I think the Professional Mayday call was made by the flying pilot! The shouting by the non flying crew member.
Maybe the non handling had to shout 'Flare!' as the handling pilot was too busy with the radio call and checking the reply, to remember to actually flare at the bottom, which the last part of the video might indicate as they hammer into the ground and skid across the parking lot in a shower of sparks!
Hey ho, we all have our differing opinions on the same thing.
Anyone found a link to the report to this San Antonio 'Eagle' incident??
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SASLESS........that last post of yours had me laughing my socks off.....for all the right reasons. I feel almost sorry for DAPT having suffered such a withering response to his churlish post.
I would give my right arm for a war story like that one. Pure PPRUNE gold. That's what this forum should be about!! If you've got the scars you've earned their right tell the story. Come on TC enjoy it for what it is. A first class yarn tell your grand kids!!
Well trousered Sir!!
I think we should have a thread on war stories. Sadly I do not have any but would love to hear everyone's else's.
I would give my right arm for a war story like that one. Pure PPRUNE gold. That's what this forum should be about!! If you've got the scars you've earned their right tell the story. Come on TC enjoy it for what it is. A first class yarn tell your grand kids!!
Well trousered Sir!!
I think we should have a thread on war stories. Sadly I do not have any but would love to hear everyone's else's.
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which is the MAYDAY?
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Please could all pilots make a mayday call. It might make someone feel better.
Please could the AAIB clarify that when a report states X litres of fuel was drained that it means the remaining fuel was removed and measured. If it's too simple it leads to confusion...
Please could the AAIB clarify that when a report states X litres of fuel was drained that it means the remaining fuel was removed and measured. If it's too simple it leads to confusion...
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
I remember the days when there was a point in the brief where we used to say, 'in the event of an emergency, the handling pilot will carry out the immediate actions, the non handling pilot will carry out the subsequent actions in accordance with the frc's.'
Even to this day, I've not seen a radio call as part of an immediate action
Even to this day, I've not seen a radio call as part of an immediate action
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
How do you know that it wasn't?
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
The San Antonio Incident, not Glasgow
Just out of interest, for those that are interested;
Paste - FTW04GA076
Into the 'accident number' box at NTSB Aviation Database Query Page
and you'll get the report
Interesting that the observer is on the report as a passenger!
Paste - FTW04GA076
Into the 'accident number' box at NTSB Aviation Database Query Page
and you'll get the report
During the autorotation, he "pulled up on the collective" to avoid striking power lines. The helicopter impacted power lines, landed hard on the parking lot surface and came to rest upright.
The pilot-rated observer reported that he heard the engine surge and felt the helicopter yaw to the left. He immediately looked at the torque gauge and noted the torque needle "in the red" and told the pilot to watch the torque.
The pilot-rated observer reported that he heard the engine surge and felt the helicopter yaw to the left. He immediately looked at the torque gauge and noted the torque needle "in the red" and told the pilot to watch the torque.
