Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
Not trying to wind you up.....am asking for answers that might be useful to other folks here....and you appear to be able to answer questions about the 135.
Those answers would clarify how the 135 Fuel Transfer system operates and thus allow those not familiar with the aircraft to better understand the situation.
I do not have a 135 Training manual so I need to ask questions of those that do and can provide accurate information.
Those answers would clarify how the 135 Fuel Transfer system operates and thus allow those not familiar with the aircraft to better understand the situation.
I do not have a 135 Training manual so I need to ask questions of those that do and can provide accurate information.
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awblain:
As I explained earlier:
The FAI I sat through lasted four weeks. I am familiar with the process. I sat through every day, and still refer to that transcript from time to time.
It's theatre which hopefully the sheriff is able to see through. Certainly it's very much more than simply "seeking to find the cause of death." (A post mortem tells you that.) And there absolutely IS jeopardy involved, since subsequent claims might be based upon it's findings. There are other things in your post about which I am very doubtful. How familiar are you with FAIs, and their interaction with the AAIB?
As I have said, the AAIB will make no attempt whatsoever to apportion 'blame'. (whatever that means) Their report will simply lay out the facts, as best they can be known.
I'd say that the FAI/inquest is a little less theatrical than a trial, since the sheriff/coroner is seeking to find the cause of death without any direct monetary or criminal jeopardy hanging over the process. He/she can control which witnesses testify, and who is allowed to question them. Individuals' styles of managing the process vary, and the atmosphere can be very different from case to case.
I suspect I am at least as familiar as you with the precise role of the AAIB in such a case as this. Having listened to many days of their evidence at another Fatal Accident Inquiry into a high profile helicopter crash, in which there was similarly no evidence from CVR, FDR, or survivors.
It's theatre which hopefully the sheriff is able to see through. Certainly it's very much more than simply "seeking to find the cause of death." (A post mortem tells you that.) And there absolutely IS jeopardy involved, since subsequent claims might be based upon it's findings. There are other things in your post about which I am very doubtful. How familiar are you with FAIs, and their interaction with the AAIB?
As I have said, the AAIB will make no attempt whatsoever to apportion 'blame'. (whatever that means) Their report will simply lay out the facts, as best they can be known.
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 15th Feb 2014 at 17:39.
Can some of you 135 Pilots tell us what would have been seen on the Caution Panel and other indications as the full level began to decrease towards empty in the Supply Tanks. Isn't there a Warning Horn that sounds at some point and either you disable it for a few minutes with a push of a button or you have to listen to it bleat away? Even if Disabled....doesn't it return over and over again until the aircraft is shutdown?
If I am understanding what I am being told....there are lots of indications that would give One every encouragement to land the Helicopter...including one engine flaming out within (in theory) three to four minutes before the last engine flamed out due to lack of Fuel.
If so....confronted with all of those indications....would not a precautionary landing be one of the proper options?
If I am understanding what I am being told....there are lots of indications that would give One every encouragement to land the Helicopter...including one engine flaming out within (in theory) three to four minutes before the last engine flamed out due to lack of Fuel.
If so....confronted with all of those indications....would not a precautionary landing be one of the proper options?
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
Art, I must say I liked your post 2081, especially the penultimate paragraph pretty spot on 
I totally understand your feeling on post 2135, you'll see similar activity throughout this and other threads!
Anyhoo, back to the subject;
Thanks for the gen on the sensor/probe 'substance.
So, if the fuel was uncontaminated, sensor/probes uncontaminated, no reason to be looking at SHED EMER , no mechanical problems, no fuel line problems, sufficient fuel in the system to be providing flight, Warning panel working correctly in respect of the LOW FUEL indications and the gong working correctly, everything as it should be apart from the PRIME and TRANSFER pump switches being in the wrong positions (for normal flight) we must surely be looking at the CPDS or HF.
The CAD part of the CPDS should have been displaying 2x PRIME PUMP, 2x FUEL, F PUMP FWD & F PUMP AFT along with PITOT HTR
With everyone of those individual cautions, there should have been the master caution light and the warning beeps should have been going off within the i/c, that need to be physically cancelled.
The lower half of the CPDS should have been displaying 01kg 76kg 00kg
If you don't have those indications, you cannot be aware of what is really going on.
If all those indications were there, I find it hard to believe that the pilot and 2 observers did nothing about it.
I totally understand your feeling on post 2135, you'll see similar activity throughout this and other threads!
Anyhoo, back to the subject;
Thanks for the gen on the sensor/probe 'substance.
So, if the fuel was uncontaminated, sensor/probes uncontaminated, no reason to be looking at SHED EMER , no mechanical problems, no fuel line problems, sufficient fuel in the system to be providing flight, Warning panel working correctly in respect of the LOW FUEL indications and the gong working correctly, everything as it should be apart from the PRIME and TRANSFER pump switches being in the wrong positions (for normal flight) we must surely be looking at the CPDS or HF.
The CAD part of the CPDS should have been displaying 2x PRIME PUMP, 2x FUEL, F PUMP FWD & F PUMP AFT along with PITOT HTR
With everyone of those individual cautions, there should have been the master caution light and the warning beeps should have been going off within the i/c, that need to be physically cancelled.
The lower half of the CPDS should have been displaying 01kg 76kg 00kg
If you don't have those indications, you cannot be aware of what is really going on.
If all those indications were there, I find it hard to believe that the pilot and 2 observers did nothing about it.
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
SASless;
Sless, a pic from the depths of this thread!
What you should have in the Glasgow situation is the CAD caution advisory display (upper part of CPDS) displaying as previously mentioned in my last post.
The lower screen would be displaying 1 in the left supply tank with a thin blue line, 76 in the main tank with the blue box somewhere around 1/4 way down, and the right supply tank would be displaying 0 with no blue in the box.
The pic above is the ac shutdown at MLA night, taken not long before I originally posted it.
At these sort of levels in flight, the aft transfer pump would be off, with the fwd pump on.
When commencing the final approach (change of ac attitude) the rear pump would be switched on and forward switched off.
Of course the pumps can be left as they are (rear off, front on) with the expectation of the master caution light coming on, the beeps sounding and the FUEL PUMP FWD advisory display on the CAD.
Can some of you 135 Pilots tell us what would have been seen on the Caution Panel and other indications as the full level began to decrease towards empty in the Supply Tanks.
What you should have in the Glasgow situation is the CAD caution advisory display (upper part of CPDS) displaying as previously mentioned in my last post.
The lower screen would be displaying 1 in the left supply tank with a thin blue line, 76 in the main tank with the blue box somewhere around 1/4 way down, and the right supply tank would be displaying 0 with no blue in the box.
The pic above is the ac shutdown at MLA night, taken not long before I originally posted it.
At these sort of levels in flight, the aft transfer pump would be off, with the fwd pump on.
When commencing the final approach (change of ac attitude) the rear pump would be switched on and forward switched off.
Of course the pumps can be left as they are (rear off, front on) with the expectation of the master caution light coming on, the beeps sounding and the FUEL PUMP FWD advisory display on the CAD.
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If I could just say, you flyers and mechanics have done a good job of explaining the fuel system, its operation and what the sensors annunciation and when.
I understand them, having never been in a helicopter, just from reading the thread. I do actually know a bit about the biological fouling, as it's not something that's exclusive to aviation fuels.
I understand your frustration in explaining the fuel system umpteen times in the thread.
I understand them, having never been in a helicopter, just from reading the thread. I do actually know a bit about the biological fouling, as it's not something that's exclusive to aviation fuels.
I understand your frustration in explaining the fuel system umpteen times in the thread.
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
Sycamore;
If I may, blue is purely the graphical display of fuel quantity on the CPDS, as seen in the above pic.
CAD indications are amber, (apart from PITOT being displayed green when they're switched on). There is also a Master Caution warning light in front of the pilot that illuminates each time a caution comes up on the CAD. This also creates the beeping tone through the I/c. These are extinguished by pressing the cancel on the cyclic..
All the reds are on the Warning panel, which is at the top of the instrument panel.
If I may, blue is purely the graphical display of fuel quantity on the CPDS, as seen in the above pic.
CAD indications are amber, (apart from PITOT being displayed green when they're switched on). There is also a Master Caution warning light in front of the pilot that illuminates each time a caution comes up on the CAD. This also creates the beeping tone through the I/c. These are extinguished by pressing the cancel on the cyclic..
All the reds are on the Warning panel, which is at the top of the instrument panel.
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
For some light bedtime reading, a more detailed 'official' description of the warning/caution systems is given in this report from an unrelated T2 incident, starting on page 37 under the heading Helicopter Description;
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...RC%2009-08.pdf
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...RC%2009-08.pdf
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IF we assume there was no significant, relevant failure of the CPDS, is it generally agreed that:
according to predicted fuel burn, initial quantity and flight duration the acft was within 3 minutes of needing to declare a fuel emergency when the pilot requested permission to enter the Glasgow CTR to GCH, several miles away
the supply tank fuel level indications would have been well below full at this time
it should have looked concerning to see the main tank with 75kgs + yet supply tank quantity below full
amber low fuel warnings would have been displayed before engine flame out
red low fuel warnings would have been later displayed and before flame out
according to the AAIB report the immediately previous tasks were non-urgent?
according to predicted fuel burn, initial quantity and flight duration the acft was within 3 minutes of needing to declare a fuel emergency when the pilot requested permission to enter the Glasgow CTR to GCH, several miles away
the supply tank fuel level indications would have been well below full at this time
it should have looked concerning to see the main tank with 75kgs + yet supply tank quantity below full
amber low fuel warnings would have been displayed before engine flame out
red low fuel warnings would have been later displayed and before flame out
according to the AAIB report the immediately previous tasks were non-urgent?
I keep seeing comments about "Pilot Incapacitation"....yet we are confronted with evidence that shows the aircraft engines ran out of fuel and quit running.
If you think the Pilot was incapacitated at the same time the aircraft is running out fuel.....that would seem a huge coincidence indeed.
Stick to the facts and work from there.
Why did the Engines stop getting fuel?
Why did the Pilot fail to take effective action following the second engine failure?
Lowering the Collective Lever is not that difficult....is something we all know to do....but yet in this tragedy....it appears not to have happened.
Focus on that....as it was the last link in the chain but yet the most simple, most logical, and the single most important reaction to situation. Done properly, the outcome might have been a very bad landing....but at least one that would have provided for a better outcome than that which occurred.
All this discussion about pink paste, sequence of caution/warning lights is fine...but does not get to the basic issues.
A very qualified, experienced, well trained Pilot did not take the one action that everything hinged upon.....maintaining Rotor RPM.
That resulted in the Fatal Crash....everything else just set the chain of events into action to force the situation that required that action by the Pilot.
Since there was no CVR or other recordings of conversations in the aircraft....or Data Recorders to show control movements and other useful data....we shall never know exactly what happened. The AAIB will not be able to state with clarity what actually transpired in regard to the Pilot's actions or in-action and will in all likelihood state something like "Pilot failed to maintain Rotor RPM." as part of their Final Report.
We know that already....the physical evidence confirms that.
The "Incapacitation" I see is a failure to realize the aircraft was running out of fuel and a failure to properly react to the indications.....and upon the second engine quitting....a failure to carry out an EOL landing procedure.
I want to know "Why" the Pilot did not respond to what was clearly an Emergency Situation when the first Engine flamed out. When you are getting Low Fuel cautions and then an Engine quits....how much more "Waving Red Flags" does One need to understand the severity of the Situation?
If you think the Pilot was incapacitated at the same time the aircraft is running out fuel.....that would seem a huge coincidence indeed.
Stick to the facts and work from there.
Why did the Engines stop getting fuel?
Why did the Pilot fail to take effective action following the second engine failure?
Lowering the Collective Lever is not that difficult....is something we all know to do....but yet in this tragedy....it appears not to have happened.
Focus on that....as it was the last link in the chain but yet the most simple, most logical, and the single most important reaction to situation. Done properly, the outcome might have been a very bad landing....but at least one that would have provided for a better outcome than that which occurred.
All this discussion about pink paste, sequence of caution/warning lights is fine...but does not get to the basic issues.
A very qualified, experienced, well trained Pilot did not take the one action that everything hinged upon.....maintaining Rotor RPM.
That resulted in the Fatal Crash....everything else just set the chain of events into action to force the situation that required that action by the Pilot.
Since there was no CVR or other recordings of conversations in the aircraft....or Data Recorders to show control movements and other useful data....we shall never know exactly what happened. The AAIB will not be able to state with clarity what actually transpired in regard to the Pilot's actions or in-action and will in all likelihood state something like "Pilot failed to maintain Rotor RPM." as part of their Final Report.
We know that already....the physical evidence confirms that.
The "Incapacitation" I see is a failure to realize the aircraft was running out of fuel and a failure to properly react to the indications.....and upon the second engine quitting....a failure to carry out an EOL landing procedure.
I want to know "Why" the Pilot did not respond to what was clearly an Emergency Situation when the first Engine flamed out. When you are getting Low Fuel cautions and then an Engine quits....how much more "Waving Red Flags" does One need to understand the severity of the Situation?
It really is extraordinary how some people seem able to absolutely deny the possibility of pilot error even when it is unarguably the case. I personally prefer to stick with the normal principles of professional integrity, logic and honesty and where a pilot appears to have made a mistake to admit to it, rather than take the extraordinary, blinkered and utterly bigoted approach that no pilot (especially one so well thought of, such a fine fellow and so. so professional) could not possibly have made a mistake.
Right. I've now made myself a target for all sorts of shyte. I know that. But why? When we know that 75% of accidents are caused by human factors is it so wrong to admit this is the likely cause?
The facts here are that after a series of possibly confusing (since when was that ever an excuse in the sim??) fuel warnings a sequential engine failure occurred and the pilot failed to react in the most fundamental manner by lowering the collective. Now, I don't care how much you liked him, no much how he was a popular guy. no much how he was so professional that he couldn't have done that the fact is that he did. Mr. the helicopter expert Tobias seems to think "not having time" to lower the collective in time after an engine failure is an acceptable action. I, however, as a mere career Professional helo pilot beg to differ, as would every QHI I've ever flown a base check with but I gather he knows better. What an extraordinary statement! Not enough time? I've never heard that excuse for dying before but I gather tobias knows better! Simply staggering! The failure to maintain Nr in the event of an engine failure is the first, primary and most fundamental requirement of a helo pilot. I gather that Tobias seems to think that there is a flexible timescale attached to this action and that failure to retain useable Nr is an excusable event. The mind boggles. Given a series of albeit confusing fuel cautions it seems inconceivable that a pilot would not react appropriately to the sequential engine failures that followed yet that seems to be what happened.
Rather than taking all this self evident information an excuse for wailing about running down the poor pilot - which it clearly is not - (this is merely accepting the reality of what happened) - and we know it could have happened to any of us - we'd do far better to accept the apparently unthinkable yet statistically unassailable fact that 80% of aircraft accidents are down to human failures.
This blind, fanatical and messianic (tandemrotor) unwillingness to accept that humans failed when the evidence points to that and to nothing else whatsoever (here at least the poor fellow seems to have had confusing fuel indications - at least we know that, as opposed to the Chinook that flew into the M Of K apparently and with no suggestions otherwise entirely serviceable)
People make mistakes.
This bizarre and irrational politically (in)correct fanaticism to refuse to accept any possible fault in a dead driver is simply dishonest. It may not be palatable but we know that the vast majority of accidents are caused by human factors, and trying to absolve the humans by inventing the most ludicrously unlikely excused for their accident does them no honour. Just let it be accepted that even the nicest bloke, the finest pilot, the best buddy can screw up. I can. You can. Why can't they? Why is it such a problem to accept that the dead could have made a mistake?
As to the the reasons leading to the mistake - another matter .
There are clearly problems in the design of the fuel system which I'm sure will be resolved, but the reasons why a well trained and experienced pilot failed to take the most basic, fundamental actions after an engine failure are unlikely to be determined. This is in NO WAY a reflection on the pilot, he was a human being just like the rest of us and subject to the same faults and falibilities. Poor bloke clearly didn't gat it right for whatever reason. Why? Guess we'll never know, but let's not blame him for that. let's try to learn for the future.
We don't know.
And Wageslave, have you done much helicopter flying since your interview with Sooty? Much as airline flying will have shaped your current mindset I read between the lines that you may not have a thorough grasp of modern helicopter operations and the complexities of police ops. Especially at night, on goggs, with an ever changing ops scenario and then faced with an unimagined set of failures.
We are still surmising what happened, and should be cautious in our responses until the AAIB have a more definitive report. There would seem to be a number of issues still to be resolved.
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The AAIB couldn't say whether the Mull a/c was serviceable prior to the accident. Which is partially why the pilots have been totally exonerated. Of course one of the reasons the AAIB would never have made such a claim is because 70% of ZD576 was destroyed in the post impact fire! The fact that there was no CVR, no FDR, no survivors, no eye witnesses, no radar traces, and no radio calls prior to the accident may also have prevented them making such a claim?
The fact that that particular aircraft was an absolute disgrace, and not in any sense airworthy may of course also played a part?
The president of the BOI (now Chief of the Air Staff!) said it was impossible to recreate the sequence of events leading up to the accident. However YOU seem to know better!
Do try to know your facts before spouting off, eh. We fought ignoramuses like you for years, but now the truth is out! You and your like were wrong! That is a matter of record now. Your 'opinions' on the matter are worthless. Just like your 'opinion' on this?
People like you, pronouncing causes with virtually no information, whilst calling themselves professionals, make me sick!
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Wageslave / Tandemrotor
Great stuff .... you are just the reasons I chose my handle! Irritable, childish postulations!! Still that's democracy for you! I am right and you is wrong.
Great stuff .... you are just the reasons I chose my handle! Irritable, childish postulations!! Still that's democracy for you! I am right and you is wrong.
Cattle Truck,
If I thought I was running out of Fuel....the last thing I would do is turn off the Transfer Pumps and Turn on the Prime Pumps. I would want the Pumps to transfer every bit of fuel they could....and they can only do that while running.
I might turn the Prime Pumps On having left the Transfer Pumps on....but I doubt the Prime Pumps would do you any good as the Engine Driven Pumps would pull whatever fuel is left. The Prime Pumps might help if you got a burp of air then more fuel but i doubt it would do any better than the Engine Driven Pump.
As to pulling off all the Rotor RPM as a result of picking a bad spot.....given the pavement and open areas including a River in the area of the Pub....a Pub Roof is the exact last place I would have picked for an EOL.
Have we determined the approximate location of the aircraft when the Fuel Low Lights would have illuminated and if a safe landing area had been over flown after they had come on?
If I thought I was running out of Fuel....the last thing I would do is turn off the Transfer Pumps and Turn on the Prime Pumps. I would want the Pumps to transfer every bit of fuel they could....and they can only do that while running.
I might turn the Prime Pumps On having left the Transfer Pumps on....but I doubt the Prime Pumps would do you any good as the Engine Driven Pumps would pull whatever fuel is left. The Prime Pumps might help if you got a burp of air then more fuel but i doubt it would do any better than the Engine Driven Pump.
As to pulling off all the Rotor RPM as a result of picking a bad spot.....given the pavement and open areas including a River in the area of the Pub....a Pub Roof is the exact last place I would have picked for an EOL.
Have we determined the approximate location of the aircraft when the Fuel Low Lights would have illuminated and if a safe landing area had been over flown after they had come on?
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Sorry SAS, I deleted my post while you were composing yours as although it was a good post on pressonitits it had one major flaw in its arguement (i.e. remaining fuel) which didn't add anything worthwhile to this discussion - I realised it too late.
Re switching off the transfer pumps, the deleted post touched on going to the edge of the fuel envelope and getting away with it a few times before and the bad habits it produces. Anyways, my post was irrelevant because there was fuel remaining when the donks stopped.
At least one worthwhile opinion from my deleted post:
Judging from the nature of the damage my feeling is that the 2t machine did not freefall from 1000 ft.
Re switching off the transfer pumps, the deleted post touched on going to the edge of the fuel envelope and getting away with it a few times before and the bad habits it produces. Anyways, my post was irrelevant because there was fuel remaining when the donks stopped.
At least one worthwhile opinion from my deleted post:
Judging from the nature of the damage my feeling is that the 2t machine did not freefall from 1000 ft.