Review into North Sea offshore helicopter operations announced by CAA
It is going to be interesting observing how a second summer of reduced maintenance levels, unaddressed mooring issues, increased overstays and so on will influence safety overall. Maybe there will be a thread about this in 2024.
second summer of reduced maintenance levels, unaddressed mooring issues, increased overstays
More flying hours = more maintenance, not reduced maintenance levels.
VL,
I assume he is referring to the platforms, in which case he has a very valid point.
I assume he is referring to the platforms, in which case he has a very valid point.
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Someone hit the sweet spot right now. Reduction in pax in the cabin will for sure result in more flights. More flighthours is equal to more accidents and incidents if you look at the statisics worldwide (helis, fixed wings etc).
But...
There are no really good replacement for helicopter offshore transportation, in regards to getting people offshore and onshore again, if you don't want to use weeks transporting people. So it will be a bad alternative to just let them sit on the ground to prevent accidents and incidents.
Also, when did a helicopter in north sea operation last ditch because it was fully loaded with pax? The actions and recommendations in the CAP 1145 safety review, does concentrate on preventing people from dying after the ditching, but I think the primary focus should be preventing ditching at all!
The review also state that the statistics available is not significant. Okey, but it is all we have. Should we just sit down and wait for more statistics, before we act?
And in regards to unions and relatives speaking up after horrible accidents, the stakeholders of professional aviation industry, should not accept the CAA's attempt to silence the masses, by producing a review with such shallow content.
But if you look between the lines, it's really easy to explain. There have been to many accidents and incidents for british operations the last years, and people have been feeling bad after the loss of their loved ones, so a action needed to be performed. And performed really fast.
Because of this, it's easy to make a review close to what people want to hear, but not to dig to deep into the real problem.
If the CAA really would find the cause, the question should be really simple:
There have been more accidents in British operations than in Norwegian operations for the last years. Of course some of them could have happened in Norwegian operations, but they did not. WHY?
If they could find the answer to that question, and implement actions and recoomendations mitigating the reason I think this would impact the flight safety in a more serious way than recommendations and actions from CAP 1145 does!
But...
There are no really good replacement for helicopter offshore transportation, in regards to getting people offshore and onshore again, if you don't want to use weeks transporting people. So it will be a bad alternative to just let them sit on the ground to prevent accidents and incidents.
Also, when did a helicopter in north sea operation last ditch because it was fully loaded with pax? The actions and recommendations in the CAP 1145 safety review, does concentrate on preventing people from dying after the ditching, but I think the primary focus should be preventing ditching at all!
The review also state that the statistics available is not significant. Okey, but it is all we have. Should we just sit down and wait for more statistics, before we act?
And in regards to unions and relatives speaking up after horrible accidents, the stakeholders of professional aviation industry, should not accept the CAA's attempt to silence the masses, by producing a review with such shallow content.
But if you look between the lines, it's really easy to explain. There have been to many accidents and incidents for british operations the last years, and people have been feeling bad after the loss of their loved ones, so a action needed to be performed. And performed really fast.
Because of this, it's easy to make a review close to what people want to hear, but not to dig to deep into the real problem.
If the CAA really would find the cause, the question should be really simple:
There have been more accidents in British operations than in Norwegian operations for the last years. Of course some of them could have happened in Norwegian operations, but they did not. WHY?
If they could find the answer to that question, and implement actions and recoomendations mitigating the reason I think this would impact the flight safety in a more serious way than recommendations and actions from CAP 1145 does!
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According to the document passengers will need to be sat next to "emergency exit push out windows" to be carried. The small windows in the L2 and all the windows in the S92 are not big enough to be classified as emergency exits, just escape windows. The plug doors on the L2 are emergency exits, as are the 4 emergency exits on the S92. The document uses the phrase above only mentioning push out window emergency exits.
Does the document intend to mean pax sat next to any push out window, or any emergency exit or any of the above? It will make a dramatic difference to the numbers carried.
Does the document intend to mean pax sat next to any push out window, or any emergency exit or any of the above? It will make a dramatic difference to the numbers carried.
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Tomcat - the CAA requirement to be either, sat next to a push out window OR be equipped with proper breathing equipment is designed to force stakeholders to address the safety equipment for offshore PAX.
If the Oil Companies and Operators decide simply to mount more flights, and therefore increase a perceived risk in doing so, it is juxtaposition to the overall goal. The seating restriction is, in effect, an alleviation to reduce risk to passengers in the short term allowing the Operators the time to research, source and procure better breathing equipment.
The UK CAA investigated the differential between both NS sectors. They could not identify any real differences in the Operations. Bear in mind the Helicopter Companies operate on both sides of the divide. However, this assessment continues by many stakeholders in an attempt to find something tangible that might make a difference.
I agree though with you that all of this, although essential, is secondary to the requirement to do everything possible to stay out of the sea.
Hope this helps.
If the Oil Companies and Operators decide simply to mount more flights, and therefore increase a perceived risk in doing so, it is juxtaposition to the overall goal. The seating restriction is, in effect, an alleviation to reduce risk to passengers in the short term allowing the Operators the time to research, source and procure better breathing equipment.
The UK CAA investigated the differential between both NS sectors. They could not identify any real differences in the Operations. Bear in mind the Helicopter Companies operate on both sides of the divide. However, this assessment continues by many stakeholders in an attempt to find something tangible that might make a difference.
I agree though with you that all of this, although essential, is secondary to the requirement to do everything possible to stay out of the sea.
Hope this helps.
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Let there be no doubt that the actions and recommendations concerning safety after ditching may be good in some situations.
I'm trying to highlight why the review does not look for a root cause for accidents and incidents.
Regarding the differences between UK and Norway, the CAA was not able to identify any differences. Yes, the review states that the operators, equipment, regulations and procedures are the same.
But as I have said earlier, the major part of the fatal accidents have taken place on the UK sector. Why? If everything is the same, why does it happen to UK operations? Culture diffenences?
And just for info; here in Norway the stakeholders of the industry are not satisfied with CAP1145.
Operators, pilots, technicians, pax (offshore workers), safety advisors and so on. The are skeptical to the result of this review. Basically because the review is written and investigated by a subjective part, and because it contains no "vision zero". As said earlier, the major actions and recommendations are reactive after an accident, but there are very few actions to prevent the accident to happen.
I'm trying to highlight why the review does not look for a root cause for accidents and incidents.
Regarding the differences between UK and Norway, the CAA was not able to identify any differences. Yes, the review states that the operators, equipment, regulations and procedures are the same.
But as I have said earlier, the major part of the fatal accidents have taken place on the UK sector. Why? If everything is the same, why does it happen to UK operations? Culture diffenences?
And just for info; here in Norway the stakeholders of the industry are not satisfied with CAP1145.
Operators, pilots, technicians, pax (offshore workers), safety advisors and so on. The are skeptical to the result of this review. Basically because the review is written and investigated by a subjective part, and because it contains no "vision zero". As said earlier, the major actions and recommendations are reactive after an accident, but there are very few actions to prevent the accident to happen.
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Double Bogey - Category A breathing aperatus is defined as a system that can be deployed under water. The Hybrid system we use in the North Sea CAN be deplyed under the water if necessary - so the new regs dont actually mean anything in my opinion. It depends on how they actually decide to class the Hybrid system because at the moment (according to their own literature) it is Class A - but they dont say that.... Probably to make it look like they are making steps to change when they are really not.
It is not normally going to be owner/operator crew/drilling/production guys. And it's not going to be the cook.
Much more likely that it is going to be the folks who are involved in periodic maintenance and inspection. "We need this inspected, but it doesn't have to be THIS week." That's fine this week but what if this stumbles on in one form or another for a year and a half and then gets worse?
Declaration of vested interest.
Getting bumped a lot.
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New post from the Rigzone magazine: RIGZONE - CAA Helicopter Safety Timeline Criticized
I see the CAA have changed the dates for implementation of the class A rebreathers so that non-window seats can be occupied until Sept. Very sensible, to avoid reduced safety from trying to stretch resources to out on more flights.
A bit of brinksmanship going on perhaps?
A bit of brinksmanship going on perhaps?
not that line - this line in the sand......
I guess the good news is that EBS for all on board has been brought forward to next year rather than 2016......
I will be;-) Indeed I might just pop off to the local scuba shop and buy myself a HEED3, pof to train with and use - no great mystery to it - just money.
Have to use that FRE on something.
don't tell me CAA are going to have to draw another line in the sand........
Have to use that FRE on something.
don't tell me CAA are going to have to draw another line in the sand........
Ha! Classic! I'll take my chances thanks ;-)
My own risk assessment overrides that of an accountant - especially as their office is on dry land and mine is shuttling around at night (do I put a LOL in here as well?)
Strikes me that people try to make this job too complicated !
All this re-drawing of lines in the sand reminds me of Gadaffi with his various ultimatums - we laughed at him then and I imagine some are smirking at the CAA now with their attitude - same attitude which has got us in this situation in the first place.
Great news that all to get a viable ebs in near future.......
My own risk assessment overrides that of an accountant - especially as their office is on dry land and mine is shuttling around at night (do I put a LOL in here as well?)
Strikes me that people try to make this job too complicated !
All this re-drawing of lines in the sand reminds me of Gadaffi with his various ultimatums - we laughed at him then and I imagine some are smirking at the CAA now with their attitude - same attitude which has got us in this situation in the first place.
Great news that all to get a viable ebs in near future.......
I guess the good news is that EBS for all on board has been brought forward to next year rather than 2016......
....the all occupants requirement remains as 1 April 2016 which in effect means that the crew will also require EBS by then
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So we are still nearly 2 years off getting EBS. We are next to an exit which you can only hope has not become bent or buckled and will still open/jettison. STASS is available now, the courses are available now, the jacket stowage is available now, why can't the companies start putting the crews through on renewal of their 3 yearly survival qualification?
So we are still nearly 2 years off getting EBS. We are next to an exit which you can only hope has not become bent or buckled and will still open/jettison. STASS is available now, the courses are available now, the jacket stowage is available now, why can't the companies start putting the crews through on renewal of their 3 yearly survival qualification?