AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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Bird strike cannot be discounted, if you remember the PHi S-76.
Press Release [November 24, 2010] - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
Press Release [November 24, 2010] - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
Electric failure ?
Didn't see anything in this thread about any elec failure, but according to svenska dagbladet website ( svd.se ) a Jim Nicholson, coordinator at RNLI did say something about total electrical failure ?
Might be only a wild guess or did he know facts before that statement ?
[Edit] Disregard. Found the same statement in English on another site, seems like Svenska Dagbladet took 'Loss of power' as loss of elec. guess they didn't do their homework.
Might be only a wild guess or did he know facts before that statement ?
[Edit] Disregard. Found the same statement in English on another site, seems like Svenska Dagbladet took 'Loss of power' as loss of elec. guess they didn't do their homework.
Last edited by AAKEE; 26th Aug 2013 at 11:34.
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During my short time working out of Denes into the SNS, where night shuttles, with their additional inherent dangers are common, one the pilots there, a long serving and experienced hand as well as a senior training Captain, observed that "if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they'd stop night shuttling!"
The reality is that if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they would be doing the research on this (higher level floats) and anything else that warranted it to further reduce the dangers of offshore travel themselves and implementing their findings without waiting for the regulators to impose it upon them.
Instead, costs are cut to the bone in the interests of maintaining profits (and, by extension, investor dividend) and, where the regulatory imperative to do so is weak or non-existent, the interest in change simply isn't there. It's very hard not to have the feeling that a certain amount of loss of life, like "collateral damage" can be tolerated.
Union officials who are quick to criticise perceived shortcomings in the existing levels and quality of service might more profitably (for the welfare of their members) address their concerns to those who pay for the service and who, ultimately by the amount they spend on it, control the quality of that service.
22
The reality is that if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they would be doing the research on this (higher level floats) and anything else that warranted it to further reduce the dangers of offshore travel themselves and implementing their findings without waiting for the regulators to impose it upon them.
Instead, costs are cut to the bone in the interests of maintaining profits (and, by extension, investor dividend) and, where the regulatory imperative to do so is weak or non-existent, the interest in change simply isn't there. It's very hard not to have the feeling that a certain amount of loss of life, like "collateral damage" can be tolerated.
Union officials who are quick to criticise perceived shortcomings in the existing levels and quality of service might more profitably (for the welfare of their members) address their concerns to those who pay for the service and who, ultimately by the amount they spend on it, control the quality of that service.
22
Its been brought to my attention that I made an uncalledfor sideswipe at CHC in an earlier post about OEI training. This was not my intention at all. My point was that, whereas previously we all conducted OEI training in the aircraft, we have all pretty much stopped doing that due to the increased use of Simulators. Its true that CHC stopped it completely whereas we didn't, but that differenc is trivial in the context of increased Sim usage. Some people should be less sensitive! Anyway, hopefully that entire point is a red herring.
Mitchaa, I think the point about the birdstrike was that it moved both engine control switches to idle. So a possibility, but unlikely on an L2 because:
The windscreen on the S76 was a plastic replacement non-bird-strike-proof one (for weight saving), the L2 windscreen is a plastic/glass laminate that is pretty tough, plus the aircraft was probably not going very fast.
The engine control switches on the S76 were not guarded or locked. On the L2 the levers are locked in a gate that requires sideways movement to unlock.
The windscreen on the S76 was a plastic replacement non-bird-strike-proof one (for weight saving), the L2 windscreen is a plastic/glass laminate that is pretty tough, plus the aircraft was probably not going very fast.
The engine control switches on the S76 were not guarded or locked. On the L2 the levers are locked in a gate that requires sideways movement to unlock.
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I have a sneaky suspicion that this one is down to pilot error as there was certainly no catastrophic failure of the gearbox. Double engine failure just does not happen (Unless it ran out of fuel) so kind of rules that one out too. It never lost its tail, passengers would have reported a spin, main blade failure would have been violent. Leaves a flight control restriction I guess.
Gearbox failures can be of many types. It doesn't necessarily mean the aircraft instantly becomes a flying brick. The pilot may well have sufficient time to ditch.
Double engine failure could well happen with fuel starvation to both engines. Unlikely, but can not be ruled out with possible fuel supply problem to both engines.
Loss of tail rotor at speed does not result in a spin until the aircraft slows to below around 40 knots. A Bristow Tiger had just such a loss of tail rotor in the 80's and only lost control on final approach at Aberdeen when the speed came below around 40 knots.
So there are still many possibilities.
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The engine control switches on the S76 were not guarded or locked. On the L2 the levers are locked in a gate that requires sideways movement to unlock.
Still agree its very unlikely though. Plus, if it was a birdstrike, I'm sure the pilots might have mentioned it by now (!) and we'd have heard from EC declaring loudly that this was not a technical failure.
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Bird Strike i think is a bit hard to swallow
due the debris guards that are fitted to these Aircraft.
Until the AAIB give a verdict we can only guess.
RIP to the lads who lost their lives and thoughts with the family.
due the debris guards that are fitted to these Aircraft.Until the AAIB give a verdict we can only guess.
RIP to the lads who lost their lives and thoughts with the family.
Last edited by aergid; 26th Aug 2013 at 12:12.
Loss of tail rotor at speed does not result in a spin until the aircraft slows to below around 40 knots. A Bristow Tiger had just such a loss of tail rotor in the 80's and only lost control on final approach at Aberdeen when the speed came below around 40 knots.
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a senior training Captain, observed that "if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they'd stop night shuttling!"
The reality is that if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they would be doing the research on this (higher level floats) and anything else that warranted it to further reduce the dangers of offshore travel themselves and implementing their findings without waiting for the regulators to impose it upon them.
Instead, costs are cut to the bone in the interests of maintaining profits (and, by extension, investor dividend) and, where the regulatory imperative to do so is weak or non-existent, the interest in change simply isn't there. It's very hard not to have the feeling that a certain amount of loss of life, like "collateral damage" can be tolerated.
The reality is that if the oil companies were really serious about safety, they would be doing the research on this (higher level floats) and anything else that warranted it to further reduce the dangers of offshore travel themselves and implementing their findings without waiting for the regulators to impose it upon them.
Instead, costs are cut to the bone in the interests of maintaining profits (and, by extension, investor dividend) and, where the regulatory imperative to do so is weak or non-existent, the interest in change simply isn't there. It's very hard not to have the feeling that a certain amount of loss of life, like "collateral damage" can be tolerated.
What can be done is to have some deep(er!) conversation about where the risks are, what can be done to prevent or mitigate, what the impacts of those are, and who pays. There are and will always be grey areas. At the end of these analyses, you're absolutely right, there is usually an "acceptable" residual risk, in deaths per 10,000 years (or whatever criterion). Who decides this, and are the guys in the seats behind the bulkhead involved?
There are also issues to me around the contracting of the flight service; the typical method in the industry generally is competitive tender around a specification; if that is the model for chopper service, then presumably that specification has a certain element of minimum safety requirements as perceived by the oilco. I feel that the oilcos and chopper operators all genuinely desire safer operations, but by definition they are operating in the grey area at a point of diminishing safety returns for each extra buck spent, and until a certain "acceptable" level of protection (whatever protective system or monitoring etc) is mandated by law, it is unlikely to happen.
The regulatory authorities have to impose these requirements (be interesting to know from anyone whether Norway has a tighter regulatory regime, regardless of which aircraft they use*), and the oil cos have to knuckle under and put their money where their mouth is. In Aberdeen we daily live with edicts such as holding the handrail, lids on cups of hot coffee, reverse parking etc, but whilst they have their place, these are cheap measures. Someone has to mandate the expensive ones, imho.
(* btw, on my one trip offshore Norway, the life jackets were under our seats ! This unsettled me totally.)
Last edited by LTNABZ; 26th Aug 2013 at 12:26.
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You would only be at 40 knots or less when over the runway at Sumburgh. Not two miles offshore where this was reported to have happened.
(* btw, on my one trip offshore Norway, the life jackets were under our seats ! This unsettled me totally.)
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Talking of regulators and their timely response to issues, did anyone hear the EASA chap on the Radio4 'Today' program being interviewed by John Humphrys this morning?
Was it just me or would anyone listening (who didn't know better of course) assume that EASA were a bit dithery, and out-of-the-loop on the whole business of Super Pumas and the North Sea?
Not sure anything about that interview would encourage me back on-board if I was feeling reluctant. Mr Humphrys was even in 'be nice' mode too!
Was it just me or would anyone listening (who didn't know better of course) assume that EASA were a bit dithery, and out-of-the-loop on the whole business of Super Pumas and the North Sea?
Not sure anything about that interview would encourage me back on-board if I was feeling reluctant. Mr Humphrys was even in 'be nice' mode too!
Last edited by fenland787; 26th Aug 2013 at 12:38.
Oil companies and their demands
Why is it that the same international O&G companies demand different operating standards depending on which country they operate in?
Like CAT A offshore above certain wave heights or at night; built in buoyancy
in passenger survival suits, etc.
Minimum experience levels for pilots, TCAS, EGWPS, all things off the shelf, but safety recommendations are not pushed for with any urgency.
Do they evaluate the cultural differences of different nationalities and see what they can get away with?
But maybe that's just too cynical.
Like CAT A offshore above certain wave heights or at night; built in buoyancy
in passenger survival suits, etc.
Minimum experience levels for pilots, TCAS, EGWPS, all things off the shelf, but safety recommendations are not pushed for with any urgency.
Do they evaluate the cultural differences of different nationalities and see what they can get away with?
But maybe that's just too cynical.
Surely its not unreasonable to have different standards according to global location, for example operations over hostile vs non-hostile terrain? Areas known for good weather, vs bad weather? Availability or not of all-weather SAR etc.
HC....I find your submission there is good reason to allow different standards in different locations around the World.
To the point most Days one can get by without Exposure Suits in the Gulf of Mexico or that one does not have to haul Fish in the baggage compartment on the North Sea.....I will agree with you on those kinds of issues.
However, when it comes to serious matters....Aircraft Performance, Survival Training, Simulator Training, Emergency Flotation, Engineering Practices, Flight Following, SAR.....I would suggest the Industry adopt an Industry Best Practices model and stick to it no matter where the Aircraft are being operated.
Just because one finds himself in Nigeria or Ghana....or Venezuela or any other place that does not require the same standards of safety....then the Operators and Oil Companies should import the higher standards.
It isn't about costs or sophistication....it is all about human lives.
Right now we sell ourselves too cheaply in that regard.
To the point most Days one can get by without Exposure Suits in the Gulf of Mexico or that one does not have to haul Fish in the baggage compartment on the North Sea.....I will agree with you on those kinds of issues.
However, when it comes to serious matters....Aircraft Performance, Survival Training, Simulator Training, Emergency Flotation, Engineering Practices, Flight Following, SAR.....I would suggest the Industry adopt an Industry Best Practices model and stick to it no matter where the Aircraft are being operated.
Just because one finds himself in Nigeria or Ghana....or Venezuela or any other place that does not require the same standards of safety....then the Operators and Oil Companies should import the higher standards.
It isn't about costs or sophistication....it is all about human lives.
Right now we sell ourselves too cheaply in that regard.
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It isn't about costs or sophistication....it is all about human lives.