AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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Helicomparator, in one of his excellent posts, says that oil companies have an obsesion with minimizing helicopter transport costs. So helicopter operators in the UK are competing with each other to win a contract. Low bid wins? If too many of UK aircraft are off line because of a possible defect, where will the oil companies find transport offshore? The UK operators may no longer be able to meet requirements.
Is there any reason they could not approach a Norwegian operator to provide this service?
Is there any reason they could not approach a Norwegian operator to provide this service?
Mary, I don't think there is any particular reason except that Norwegian services cost a lot more! Bear in mind of course that the Norwegians are the same companies (CHC and Bristow) flying the same types (Super Puma and S92) and will be struggling with the grounding of the Super Puma fleet just as we will.
Anyway, hopefully it will be determined that the accident was not as a result of an intrinsic failure in the Super Puma that has not surfaced until now (30 years after inception).
Anyway, hopefully it will be determined that the accident was not as a result of an intrinsic failure in the Super Puma that has not surfaced until now (30 years after inception).
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Unfortunately, in order not too scare the living daylights out of the work force, the dunker is a very gentle affair in a warm swimming pool. I can assure you the military version is much more realistic but half the workforce wouldn't pass the course. Where do you draw the line of realism against risk?
also - culturally road accidents are acceptable.
I think that was my point SD. You are quite right in your points, however this difference in cultural acceptability doesn't stand rational scrutiny.
Whatever came of the call for mounting float bags well up on the sides of the helicopter to ensure the aircraft does not go inverted during a ditching? Are there commonsense safety precautions that have not been pursued by the Authority, Operators, or the Manufacturer?
HC, Ref. your "Whilst I'm in rant mode" post, I totally agree. And any one who puts their head above the parapet and argues against the "modern" management lemmings get sidelined very quickly. A good organisation should encourage critical comment and argument from below in order that procedures and processes are thoroughly and intellectually tested. Too many companies have "top down" management where the senior management think that safety comes from the top when in fact it comes from the bottom.
Sasless, This was a crash not a ditching.
Sasless, This was a crash not a ditching.
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HUET realism and PAX survivablity in a controlled ditch
After having just recenty completed my HUET in the new S92 simulator, with stroking seats, windows that have to be opened when upside down, and a much faster capsize time albeit still in a warm pool, we are waiting for approval to use a cold pool and wave buoy to replicate more realistic conditions. The down side, many of us offshore workers would most likely fail this more intense level of offshore survival training.
We use HUEBA over here but do our refresher training separate from the HUET exercises due to risk of damage to the lungs if you forget to breath out when > 1 meter underwater and upside down.
The reason we got the HUEBA system "fast tracked" was partially due to Cougar 491, in that tragic accident the impact was so severe that all but one survivor drowned, the HUEBA may have saved one more PAX but we will never know.
My last MIS-BOSET was in Malaysia a few years ago, we had to use the air pocket plus in the HUET after the pool training exercises, not an easy thing to do. I don't know what the current OPITO HUET is like but I found the use of the rebreather in the HUET much more realistic.
My point here is that we cannot take out all the risk in offshore helo operations, there is a fine line between realistic survival training and too high a risk to be taken on board by the operators. However as a PAX I strongly believe that we should have the option to sign a waiver and perform more realistic exercises if we wish to do so. For those who do not wish to attempt these exercises then the current required participation needs to at least be maintained. At the end of the day you are responsible for your own safety, but in a crowded helo environment your actions will affect other people's chances of survival.
As a PAX I accept the risk every time I fly, I trust in the pilot who trusts the AMEs who trust the manufacturer and their company's safety and maintenance programmes.
I would love to see the addition of flotation devices that would prevent an offshore use helo capsizing in SS6 conditions, perhaps the recent loss of life regardless of the root cause will put more focus on this option. Everything is possible if there is enough momentum behind it.
Let's try and take something positive out of this tragedy in the same way that we addressed some of the S92 issues back in 2009. To not do so would be to accept the latest loss of life as yet another unfortunate fact of this chosen working environment.
Safe flying
Max
We use HUEBA over here but do our refresher training separate from the HUET exercises due to risk of damage to the lungs if you forget to breath out when > 1 meter underwater and upside down.
The reason we got the HUEBA system "fast tracked" was partially due to Cougar 491, in that tragic accident the impact was so severe that all but one survivor drowned, the HUEBA may have saved one more PAX but we will never know.
My last MIS-BOSET was in Malaysia a few years ago, we had to use the air pocket plus in the HUET after the pool training exercises, not an easy thing to do. I don't know what the current OPITO HUET is like but I found the use of the rebreather in the HUET much more realistic.
My point here is that we cannot take out all the risk in offshore helo operations, there is a fine line between realistic survival training and too high a risk to be taken on board by the operators. However as a PAX I strongly believe that we should have the option to sign a waiver and perform more realistic exercises if we wish to do so. For those who do not wish to attempt these exercises then the current required participation needs to at least be maintained. At the end of the day you are responsible for your own safety, but in a crowded helo environment your actions will affect other people's chances of survival.
As a PAX I accept the risk every time I fly, I trust in the pilot who trusts the AMEs who trust the manufacturer and their company's safety and maintenance programmes.
I would love to see the addition of flotation devices that would prevent an offshore use helo capsizing in SS6 conditions, perhaps the recent loss of life regardless of the root cause will put more focus on this option. Everything is possible if there is enough momentum behind it.
Let's try and take something positive out of this tragedy in the same way that we addressed some of the S92 issues back in 2009. To not do so would be to accept the latest loss of life as yet another unfortunate fact of this chosen working environment.
Safe flying
Max
Round,
Call it what you want...."Crash" or "Ditching".....the aircraft went into the water, wound up inverted, and as we both know.....survival rates are greatly diminished when the aircraft fails to remain upright and fills with water.
You also know Helicopters are particularly prone to roll over particularly if one of the standard float bags is damaged or fails to inflate.
The Hi-Side mounted Float Bags concept was proven to very effective preventing the Helicopter from doing just as this aircraft did.
At this point Round.....do we "know" it was a Crash? You suppose it was....but until we hear from the Pilots....are you quite certain it was not a Forced Ditching that turned out badly?
I should think you are being premature in casting a vote.
We all can have an opinion on this...but until we hear more....it is totally conjecture what happened.
Probably we can accept two causes are most likely......severe mechanical failure of some kind.....or CFIT....but only the Investigators will be able to tell us with definity what happened.
Call it what you want...."Crash" or "Ditching".....the aircraft went into the water, wound up inverted, and as we both know.....survival rates are greatly diminished when the aircraft fails to remain upright and fills with water.
You also know Helicopters are particularly prone to roll over particularly if one of the standard float bags is damaged or fails to inflate.
The Hi-Side mounted Float Bags concept was proven to very effective preventing the Helicopter from doing just as this aircraft did.
At this point Round.....do we "know" it was a Crash? You suppose it was....but until we hear from the Pilots....are you quite certain it was not a Forced Ditching that turned out badly?
I should think you are being premature in casting a vote.
We all can have an opinion on this...but until we hear more....it is totally conjecture what happened.
Probably we can accept two causes are most likely......severe mechanical failure of some kind.....or CFIT....but only the Investigators will be able to tell us with definity what happened.
Last edited by SASless; 25th Aug 2013 at 23:14.
Max,
I suspect our paths would have crossed. I know from your posts that we share a similar passion for safety, albeit from a different perspective (customer vs crew). I do hope our paths will cross again at some point so we can exchange viewpoints.
I would like to add to the current debate on the specifics of this incident, however......
I will offer one opinion. The thread running stating that Norwegian standards were superior to UK standards I believe to be false. As HC has stated, the two current operators on both sides of the median line operate to similar, if not identical Standard Operating Procedures. The biggest identifiable difference is that there are two operators in Norway, whereas due to commercial reasons (i.e. BP reintroducing a third operator) the UK sector now has greater competition and far cheaper rates. It would be interesting to hear the HSSG viewpoint on how safety is affected by the commercial "efficiency" the offshore helicopters operators have to introduce!
I am not saying that any operator deliberately introduces policies and procedures that introduce additional obvious risk, or take shortcuts. However there are commercial pressures to "trim" towards the basic regulations rather than build the "gold plated" standard.
None of this may be related to the current incident!
Finally, a word of caution regarding statistics. Shell have probably been the most proactive oil company over the last 30 years with regard to improving offshore helicopter safety. However if you were to look at which North Sea oil company has suffered the most fatalities in the N Sea, Shell is top of the list by a long way. There is no statistically valid reason for this and it would be easy to jump to the conclusion that Shell was a bad contract manager, etc. I use this as an example to demonstrate that low frequency events will sometimes produce odd statistics that should be categorised more to 'bad luck' rather than anything else. I would include in this category:
Norway vs UK
Super Puma variants vs S92 VS AW139
Bristow vs CHC vs Bond
OK, that's probably enough for now.
My thoughts are both with the individuals and families that have suffered a loss, as well as those that are making their own individual journey through the post-traumatic stress that this event has imposed on them both directly and indirectly.
This is not a good time for the industry and we need to pull together as one.
My last MIS-BOSET was in Malaysia a few years ago
I would like to add to the current debate on the specifics of this incident, however......
I will offer one opinion. The thread running stating that Norwegian standards were superior to UK standards I believe to be false. As HC has stated, the two current operators on both sides of the median line operate to similar, if not identical Standard Operating Procedures. The biggest identifiable difference is that there are two operators in Norway, whereas due to commercial reasons (i.e. BP reintroducing a third operator) the UK sector now has greater competition and far cheaper rates. It would be interesting to hear the HSSG viewpoint on how safety is affected by the commercial "efficiency" the offshore helicopters operators have to introduce!
I am not saying that any operator deliberately introduces policies and procedures that introduce additional obvious risk, or take shortcuts. However there are commercial pressures to "trim" towards the basic regulations rather than build the "gold plated" standard.
None of this may be related to the current incident!
Finally, a word of caution regarding statistics. Shell have probably been the most proactive oil company over the last 30 years with regard to improving offshore helicopter safety. However if you were to look at which North Sea oil company has suffered the most fatalities in the N Sea, Shell is top of the list by a long way. There is no statistically valid reason for this and it would be easy to jump to the conclusion that Shell was a bad contract manager, etc. I use this as an example to demonstrate that low frequency events will sometimes produce odd statistics that should be categorised more to 'bad luck' rather than anything else. I would include in this category:
Norway vs UK
Super Puma variants vs S92 VS AW139
Bristow vs CHC vs Bond
OK, that's probably enough for now.
My thoughts are both with the individuals and families that have suffered a loss, as well as those that are making their own individual journey through the post-traumatic stress that this event has imposed on them both directly and indirectly.
This is not a good time for the industry and we need to pull together as one.
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A quick analogy for those not familiar with statistics and the laws of chance.
There are 52 variables in a standard pack of cards - what are the chances of getting the same shuffle twice ?
If each shuffle takes 30 seconds there will be one identical repeat somewhere within about 5 billion years. The two identical shuffles could be 5 billion years apart or only a few minutes apart, we has no way of knowing this but we know that it will only happen once.
Aviation accidents are rare and the causes are diverse, each accident can involve multiple factors. We will never be able to predict them, we can only investigate causes and mitigate known risks. If two similar accidents occur in the same area this is essentially meaningless unless we can determine a precise common cause, anything else is just random chance.
There are 52 variables in a standard pack of cards - what are the chances of getting the same shuffle twice ?
If each shuffle takes 30 seconds there will be one identical repeat somewhere within about 5 billion years. The two identical shuffles could be 5 billion years apart or only a few minutes apart, we has no way of knowing this but we know that it will only happen once.
Aviation accidents are rare and the causes are diverse, each accident can involve multiple factors. We will never be able to predict them, we can only investigate causes and mitigate known risks. If two similar accidents occur in the same area this is essentially meaningless unless we can determine a precise common cause, anything else is just random chance.
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I'll drag you back to the point I made earlier.
UK helicopter ops have shown, beyond all reasonable doubt, that we can't do it as well as the Noggies.
Looking at the stats online, we have the same crash frequency as the Americans.
That is appalling.
(Given that the Americans use some single engine, single pilot configurations and almost exclusively in the UK it is heavy / medium twins with 2 crew)
The "average" bear these days will do 24 to 26 flights a year.
Back in the day we used to shuttle to work once offshore.
That would ramp it up to 3-400 flights a year.
Some of the crusty old guys in the back have spent more time in helicopters than the guys driving the bus.
Trying to explain to the bears that there are a myriad of different faults which could cause an incident just doesn't wash. They neither know nor care about gyroscopic presecion / or the new offshore QNH setting procedure.
The guys _Know_ the UK incident rate is terrible, they are yet to be convinced that UK helicopter operators know what they are doing.
All they see is a drive to get the Puma back online.
What they also see is a slew of them killing their buddies.
You can intelectually pontificate as to the cause of this latest prang all you like, but the bears are very, very, very unhappy.
If they feel that (and it looks like you are) rushing them back into SLF mode, you are likely to get their backs up further.
As to the HUET training, back in the day (again, I'm old, it happens if you are lucky) we used to routinely kill people in the pool doing their HUET training.
I'm impressed the Newfies are making it more realistic, but they'll end up killing people in the pool too.
Hence the reason the windows are huge in the huet trainers, the wave and wind machines have been switched off.
As to rebreathers . . . has anyone actually tried to get through a standard window wearing all that gear ? throw in a slightly larger framed bear possibly one who has a sedentary job offshore.
You are in a place where all the safety gear might be preventing the pax actually getting out of the aircraft.
UK helicopter ops have shown, beyond all reasonable doubt, that we can't do it as well as the Noggies.
Looking at the stats online, we have the same crash frequency as the Americans.
That is appalling.
(Given that the Americans use some single engine, single pilot configurations and almost exclusively in the UK it is heavy / medium twins with 2 crew)
The "average" bear these days will do 24 to 26 flights a year.
Back in the day we used to shuttle to work once offshore.
That would ramp it up to 3-400 flights a year.
Some of the crusty old guys in the back have spent more time in helicopters than the guys driving the bus.
Trying to explain to the bears that there are a myriad of different faults which could cause an incident just doesn't wash. They neither know nor care about gyroscopic presecion / or the new offshore QNH setting procedure.
The guys _Know_ the UK incident rate is terrible, they are yet to be convinced that UK helicopter operators know what they are doing.
All they see is a drive to get the Puma back online.
What they also see is a slew of them killing their buddies.
You can intelectually pontificate as to the cause of this latest prang all you like, but the bears are very, very, very unhappy.
If they feel that (and it looks like you are) rushing them back into SLF mode, you are likely to get their backs up further.
As to the HUET training, back in the day (again, I'm old, it happens if you are lucky) we used to routinely kill people in the pool doing their HUET training.
I'm impressed the Newfies are making it more realistic, but they'll end up killing people in the pool too.
Hence the reason the windows are huge in the huet trainers, the wave and wind machines have been switched off.
As to rebreathers . . . has anyone actually tried to get through a standard window wearing all that gear ? throw in a slightly larger framed bear possibly one who has a sedentary job offshore.
You are in a place where all the safety gear might be preventing the pax actually getting out of the aircraft.
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Common themes
If two similar accidents occur in the same area this is essentially meaningless unless we can determine a precise common cause, anything else is just random chance.
there are commercial pressures to "trim" towards the basic regulations rather than build the "gold plated" standard
a culture of not bothering too much
OEM briefings identified that torque settings were higher in the North Sea than in other areas of the world, so stress loads were higher
Last edited by satsuma; 26th Aug 2013 at 05:57.
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Non-UK Offshore pilot here, 1000's hours on the L's..
I have to say that I am surprised to see such an extreme level of anger, fear, despair and distrust expressed by the workforce,
particularly on the FB 'destroy the Super Puma' page and online petition.
At some point, the authorities will need to step back and look at the big picture.
Engaging the end user in a meaningful dialogue would be a start.
I have to say that I am surprised to see such an extreme level of anger, fear, despair and distrust expressed by the workforce,
particularly on the FB 'destroy the Super Puma' page and online petition.
At some point, the authorities will need to step back and look at the big picture.
Engaging the end user in a meaningful dialogue would be a start.
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How does offshore helicopter ops in uk stack up when it comes to 'deaths per 10,000 flying hours'? That's the statistic that was used to assess risk in military flying. It would probably make it look safe relative to airline travel, or using the roads etc
"Sudden catastrophic loss of power"
Witnesses reporting a sudden loss of power - whilst this should be taken with a pinch of salt in the short term, I was pondering possible causes.
In the DECU there are some bits of software whose sole purpose is to make the engine run down to idle under certain fault conditions. This came about following the Norwegian Norne accident mentioned earlier in this thread. I'm trying to remember (since I've been away from the L2 since 2006) what the triggers are:
Double Nf sensor failure
Faulty PPNg signal
Major DECU hardware failure
Anything else? I think there is, but can't remember. Anyone out there with their L2 groundschool notes?
Obviously it would need to happen to both engines simultaneously, so a common trigger would have to be involved which at first sight seems unlikely.
On the other hand, when one engine runs down, the other is put under the sort of stress it never normally sees, especially after CHC's policy of not conducting OEI training in the aircraft due to freewheel concerns.
As an aside, this is the sort of area where technological progress helps. On the 225, any of a double N1 sensor failure, double N2 sensor failure and pretty much any double failure you can think of, has no major impact on power. Even a complete governing failure (which has never happened) results in a fuel flow freeze, a much more benign failure than the engine running down to idle.
In the DECU there are some bits of software whose sole purpose is to make the engine run down to idle under certain fault conditions. This came about following the Norwegian Norne accident mentioned earlier in this thread. I'm trying to remember (since I've been away from the L2 since 2006) what the triggers are:
Double Nf sensor failure
Faulty PPNg signal
Major DECU hardware failure
Anything else? I think there is, but can't remember. Anyone out there with their L2 groundschool notes?
Obviously it would need to happen to both engines simultaneously, so a common trigger would have to be involved which at first sight seems unlikely.
On the other hand, when one engine runs down, the other is put under the sort of stress it never normally sees, especially after CHC's policy of not conducting OEI training in the aircraft due to freewheel concerns.
As an aside, this is the sort of area where technological progress helps. On the 225, any of a double N1 sensor failure, double N2 sensor failure and pretty much any double failure you can think of, has no major impact on power. Even a complete governing failure (which has never happened) results in a fuel flow freeze, a much more benign failure than the engine running down to idle.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 26th Aug 2013 at 08:16.
Over 800 Super Pumas built....more than 4.5 million flying hours.....operating in North Sea UK sector for more than 30 years....lead aircraft with more than 40,000 hours....and flying with 100 operators world wide.
Lets get real, ignore the crap, and put this in perspective.
Lets get real, ignore the crap, and put this in perspective.