AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
... I've never flown in an S92 - but those that do say they are similar to the old S61 in terms of space and comfort.
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I was not being Ironic. There are indeed a lot of very sensible and clever people working offshore, with good IQ levels, and I had not intention of demeaning any of my colleagues. But there are many who are not well educated and will not understand complex technical issues, and can be easily led and influenced by the opinions of those that make the most noise - this is my personal opinion based on my experience which will be very centred on a specific bunch of rigs. I have read some of the Facebook stuff - and emotions are even running high with some people I know are sensible and clever, and their posts surprise me.
But let's be clear - there is huge concern over the UK Sector safety record by everyone now in the workforce, with the super puma in particular, and by the workforce at all levels. So don't "dismiss" it because of some of the stuff and posts on Facebook. The very serious question of why are the statistics so different to the Norwegian sector needs to be answered.
I think the Helicopter Steering group have taken the correct action.
But let's be clear - there is huge concern over the UK Sector safety record by everyone now in the workforce, with the super puma in particular, and by the workforce at all levels. So don't "dismiss" it because of some of the stuff and posts on Facebook. The very serious question of why are the statistics so different to the Norwegian sector needs to be answered.
I think the Helicopter Steering group have taken the correct action.
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AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
Next there will be calls to bring back the S-61's and bell 212's.
Facebook is not helping already there is a page called Destroy all Super Puma's. scare mongering at its worse.
Facebook is not helping already there is a page called Destroy all Super Puma's. scare mongering at its worse.
The Petition
We the undersigned ask all Employers ,Scottish parliament,Helicopter operators ,Mps,Smp and all concerned with helicopter safety to listen to the workforce and concerned members of the public on the back of yet another ditching 24/8/13 . We dont want to fly and request that s92 or alternative route of transport offshore happen before we have another ditching.The workforce have concerns and ask for support on this matter.
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Echoing Mad Jock a few posts ago, can anybody summarise what it is about the way things are done in Norway that is so different or at least so significant?
Last edited by heliski22; 25th Aug 2013 at 10:30.
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Have a look at post number 125 on page 7 of this thread. From a Norwegian. I don't know how to verify the post, but no reason at all to doubt what he/she has posted. They have a few interesting posts on the thread, with links to the reports.
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AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
If a crew related error is detected as a root cause for a fatal accident, do you ground aa crews and request immediate replacement of all crews? Wozld judge this as stupid.
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Is it just my time of life or do I find myself increasingly living in a society who's views are shaped by hysterical headlines and Farcebook?
Re this tragic incident, from the Guardian :
So Mr Crow, presumably, knows exactly what happened, who was to blame, who deliberately allowed the flight to happen despite the knowledge that it would end in tragedy? I do wish he would share.
This is a sector of the industry I know little about and from posts here there seems to be a history of issues that deserve examination and analysis, but given Mr Crow and his colleagues state they have been trying to 're-build confidence' I can only assume up to last Friday they were happy everything was as safe as it could be?
When the facts are known, there may indeed be a cause for anger, I just feel it's premature and such language, at this time, is unhelpful to all concerned and, in particular, can do nothing to help those directly affected by the tragic event.
Re this tragic incident, from the Guardian :
Bob Crow, general secretary of offshore union RMT, said: "RMT and Unite have worked with all sectors of the industry to address the concerns of our members and rebuild that confidence. Last night's events have undone all of that work and we anticipate an outpouring of anger."
This is a sector of the industry I know little about and from posts here there seems to be a history of issues that deserve examination and analysis, but given Mr Crow and his colleagues state they have been trying to 're-build confidence' I can only assume up to last Friday they were happy everything was as safe as it could be?
When the facts are known, there may indeed be a cause for anger, I just feel it's premature and such language, at this time, is unhelpful to all concerned and, in particular, can do nothing to help those directly affected by the tragic event.
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Having seen there is petition out against the Super puma and the perminant grounding of all Super Pumas then how on earth are you going transport the bears with what capacity is left.
Can the operators cope finacially if this is going to be a long grounding?
I mean the operators have to find rescources from other areas to fill in the gaps of the Super Puma fleet, are we back to ferrying the bears with boats then?
We do not even know what happened Friday evening and everyone is getting to ahead of themselves lets wait and see what comes from the authorities.
It might not even be technical related and then what if this is the case the Super Puma has been seriously dented before we even knew what happend
I blame the media for scare mongering the bears and there families.
I have read people complaining about being crammped in the Super Puma there is more room in Super puma than the 139, 189 or 175.
The amount of BS I have read and heard since Friday then you have to ask yourself no wonder offshore workers are scared.
What about the safety record of the 139 has anybody looked at this before writing of the Super Puma
Ok lets fly them out using the miltary using Chinooks and Pumas.
Can the operators cope finacially if this is going to be a long grounding?
I mean the operators have to find rescources from other areas to fill in the gaps of the Super Puma fleet, are we back to ferrying the bears with boats then?
We do not even know what happened Friday evening and everyone is getting to ahead of themselves lets wait and see what comes from the authorities.
It might not even be technical related and then what if this is the case the Super Puma has been seriously dented before we even knew what happend
I blame the media for scare mongering the bears and there families.
I have read people complaining about being crammped in the Super Puma there is more room in Super puma than the 139, 189 or 175.
The amount of BS I have read and heard since Friday then you have to ask yourself no wonder offshore workers are scared.
What about the safety record of the 139 has anybody looked at this before writing of the Super Puma
Ok lets fly them out using the miltary using Chinooks and Pumas.
Last edited by pumaboy; 25th Aug 2013 at 10:44.
I for one won't be supporting this stupid petition (plus it's badly worded and misspelt).
To transfer to a single type (s92) is both impractical & unrealistic, There isn't enough of them worldwide to meet demand & what do you do until there are, tell the folks offshore to stay put? So, the only practical option available under the terms of the petition is to scrap helicopter travel.
No helicopters simply means everyone offshore has to go offshore by supply boat & transfer to the installation by man-riding basket, an inherently risky process in good weather. How many lives would be lost each winter if we had to go back to only boats & baskets?
My current job means that I don't have to travel offshore as often as I used to, but I am more than happy to get on a EC225 or 332 to do it.
To transfer to a single type (s92) is both impractical & unrealistic, There isn't enough of them worldwide to meet demand & what do you do until there are, tell the folks offshore to stay put? So, the only practical option available under the terms of the petition is to scrap helicopter travel.
No helicopters simply means everyone offshore has to go offshore by supply boat & transfer to the installation by man-riding basket, an inherently risky process in good weather. How many lives would be lost each winter if we had to go back to only boats & baskets?
My current job means that I don't have to travel offshore as often as I used to, but I am more than happy to get on a EC225 or 332 to do it.
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This post and the one above are entirely accurate. The S92 also has had problems.
Boat transfer in the North Sea in winter - the amount of time spent in a boat, and likely being seasick would eat into the leave days and soon the workforce would be asking for the helicopters.
I think most offshore workers know they have to travel in a helicopter, and that it will never have a 100% guarantee of being safe, but it should be a lot safer than it has been over the last 4 years. The trend is very worrying for the offshore workforce. I agree the Puma has had until recently a very good safety record - again the real question is why have they became less reliable - and again the recent incident we have to wait for the cause.
Boat transfer in the North Sea in winter - the amount of time spent in a boat, and likely being seasick would eat into the leave days and soon the workforce would be asking for the helicopters.
I think most offshore workers know they have to travel in a helicopter, and that it will never have a 100% guarantee of being safe, but it should be a lot safer than it has been over the last 4 years. The trend is very worrying for the offshore workforce. I agree the Puma has had until recently a very good safety record - again the real question is why have they became less reliable - and again the recent incident we have to wait for the cause.
Here is a key part of the Executive Summary of the Sintef HSS-3 report from Norway.
There are similarities to the approach to SAR that I have become familiar with. No magic wand. The essentials seem to be that they do joined up thinking very well and they look at the numbers. (And they spend the Krone.)
Para 5 is titled as follows.
They are also extremely frank about the commercial and international regulatory pressures that could threaten their safety regime.
1. There has been only one helicopter accident, with no fatalities, on the NCS during the period 1999–2009. This represents a significant reduction compared with the previous period 1990–1998 where there were 2.3 fatalities per one million passenger flight hours. For the whole 20 year period of 1990–2009, five accidents with 12 fatalities are recorded. These data result in a risk estimate of 0.9 fatalities per one million person flight hours and an accident rate of 0.4 accidents per million person flight hours.
2. The risk reduction on the NCS in the period 1999–2009 compared with 1990–1998 is estimated to be 16 % according to expert judgements. The most important contributing factors are as follows:
Gradual introduction of new helicopter types and the implementation of the latest generation helicopter technology
Improved use of systems for vibration monitoring in helicopters (Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) / Vibration Health Monitoring (VHM))
Increased pilot skill by added requirements regarding competence, experience and simulator training on NCS operations.
Improved flight operational procedures
Improved helideck design and operations through requirements and active use of the Norwegian Oil Industry Association's (OLF) helideck manual and guidelines
Improved emergency preparedness (such as improved emergency personal locator beacons, impact absorption and rescue suits, more rescue helicopters)
Introduction of Safety Management System (SMS)
The establishment of the Committee for Helicopter Safety on the Norwegian Continental Shelf has contributed to cooperation and promoted specific offshore safety related rules and recommendations specified in the Helicopter Safety on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
- Part 1: Organizing of the public authorities’ involvement (NOU 2001: 21) and
- Part 2: Trends, objectives, risk influencing factors and recommended measures (NOU 2002:17).
2. The risk reduction on the NCS in the period 1999–2009 compared with 1990–1998 is estimated to be 16 % according to expert judgements. The most important contributing factors are as follows:
Gradual introduction of new helicopter types and the implementation of the latest generation helicopter technology
Improved use of systems for vibration monitoring in helicopters (Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) / Vibration Health Monitoring (VHM))
Increased pilot skill by added requirements regarding competence, experience and simulator training on NCS operations.
Improved flight operational procedures
Improved helideck design and operations through requirements and active use of the Norwegian Oil Industry Association's (OLF) helideck manual and guidelines
Improved emergency preparedness (such as improved emergency personal locator beacons, impact absorption and rescue suits, more rescue helicopters)
Introduction of Safety Management System (SMS)
The establishment of the Committee for Helicopter Safety on the Norwegian Continental Shelf has contributed to cooperation and promoted specific offshore safety related rules and recommendations specified in the Helicopter Safety on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
- Part 1: Organizing of the public authorities’ involvement (NOU 2001: 21) and
- Part 2: Trends, objectives, risk influencing factors and recommended measures (NOU 2002:17).
Para 5 is titled as follows.
5. Improve interaction between the operators involved in offshore helicopter transport.
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The media isn't scaremongering, the NS rotary fleet are doing a good job all by themselves.
Last trip to NS platform from my son:
Trip out cancelled - a/c unserviceable.
5 hours later landed with replacement
Return cancelled 48 hours (always a really welcome announcement - not), aircraft developed in-flight fault diverted to another rig.
Eventual return flight my son, notices line of clear oil running down from cabin ceiling to floor. Radios pilot. Decision (probably only one available) 'let's keep going, too far to turn back'
I'm sure I don't need to confirm the make of helicopters involved...
Sorry, but if this was say, the London to Aberdeen commercial flight schedule statistics for 4 years, there would be outrage.
Last trip to NS platform from my son:
Trip out cancelled - a/c unserviceable.
5 hours later landed with replacement
Return cancelled 48 hours (always a really welcome announcement - not), aircraft developed in-flight fault diverted to another rig.
Eventual return flight my son, notices line of clear oil running down from cabin ceiling to floor. Radios pilot. Decision (probably only one available) 'let's keep going, too far to turn back'
I'm sure I don't need to confirm the make of helicopters involved...
Sorry, but if this was say, the London to Aberdeen commercial flight schedule statistics for 4 years, there would be outrage.
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My condoleances to all affected by the loss of their loved ones and friends.
We as an industry could well do without another tragedy.
But I do agree that there seems to be an increase of knee-jerk reactions to any incident and accident. Grounding all Super Pumas that among them have less in common than many would imagine, cannot be a decision based on rational thought. At least not technically rational.
It seems to be rational if one takes into account the irrational and highly emotional response to another accident, as a means of limiting the publicity damage to the company.
As a driver I would not get airborne in a helicopter that I did not trust 100%. My life, my reputation and my estate are on the line with every flight. As long as pilots are confident to fly, the passengers should be as well. After all, as long as the "bears" are happy to stay on a rig, I'm happy to land there 'cause it must be safe to do so.
Proper investigation takes time. Until then, every ground crew will check everything even more thoroughly than before, every flight crew will be even more critical than before, and nobody wants to be seen ar feel to be taken any chances. Having said that, there is no 100% risk free life.
I agree with the sentiment that there has been too much paper safety and not enough emphasis on the professionals doing a professional job using their professional judgement. This has led to the current climate in which people with only a limited knowledge of the real world scream for paper measures because they have been conditioned ito believing that they constitute real safety. WRONG.
What ensures your safety are the professionals that do a very good job, day in day out. More than any paper pusher behind an expensive desk can and will ever acchieve by producing more restrictions and procedures.
Occasionally professionals get it wrong, that is true. The AAIB will have to find out where this went wrong and come up with realistic recommendations to prevent it from reoccurring. Until then a grounding of a type will only introduce more risks to other types.
If I had to fly a SP load in my medium type I would need 3 flights instead of 1 on SP, which means 3 times the flight risks but spread over 8 PoB at a time instead of 20.
But how to calculate the knock on effect of splitting the load, flying more hours, having crews arriving and departing in a staggered time scale, how does THAT affect your total safety?
Having said that, having operated at Sumburgh I did wonder why there was only 1 full ILS available on what is clearly an important airport in the region. I would not wait for the investigation results to increase the number of precision approaches there, given the local weather. Although it may have nothing to do with this accident, it would give a greater safety margin overall.
We as an industry could well do without another tragedy.
But I do agree that there seems to be an increase of knee-jerk reactions to any incident and accident. Grounding all Super Pumas that among them have less in common than many would imagine, cannot be a decision based on rational thought. At least not technically rational.
It seems to be rational if one takes into account the irrational and highly emotional response to another accident, as a means of limiting the publicity damage to the company.
As a driver I would not get airborne in a helicopter that I did not trust 100%. My life, my reputation and my estate are on the line with every flight. As long as pilots are confident to fly, the passengers should be as well. After all, as long as the "bears" are happy to stay on a rig, I'm happy to land there 'cause it must be safe to do so.
Proper investigation takes time. Until then, every ground crew will check everything even more thoroughly than before, every flight crew will be even more critical than before, and nobody wants to be seen ar feel to be taken any chances. Having said that, there is no 100% risk free life.
I agree with the sentiment that there has been too much paper safety and not enough emphasis on the professionals doing a professional job using their professional judgement. This has led to the current climate in which people with only a limited knowledge of the real world scream for paper measures because they have been conditioned ito believing that they constitute real safety. WRONG.
What ensures your safety are the professionals that do a very good job, day in day out. More than any paper pusher behind an expensive desk can and will ever acchieve by producing more restrictions and procedures.
Occasionally professionals get it wrong, that is true. The AAIB will have to find out where this went wrong and come up with realistic recommendations to prevent it from reoccurring. Until then a grounding of a type will only introduce more risks to other types.
If I had to fly a SP load in my medium type I would need 3 flights instead of 1 on SP, which means 3 times the flight risks but spread over 8 PoB at a time instead of 20.
But how to calculate the knock on effect of splitting the load, flying more hours, having crews arriving and departing in a staggered time scale, how does THAT affect your total safety?
Having said that, having operated at Sumburgh I did wonder why there was only 1 full ILS available on what is clearly an important airport in the region. I would not wait for the investigation results to increase the number of precision approaches there, given the local weather. Although it may have nothing to do with this accident, it would give a greater safety margin overall.
SASless
A question that I keep asking.....why are these event happening on the UK side of the North Sea and not on the other side? Is it just my memory fails me or are we really not seeing any on the other side? I am not suggesting anything....so don't get your feathers ruffled.....honest question here.
If we are not having crashes and ditching on the east side....then what are the factors that might be in play that keeps them from having the same problem?
A question that I keep asking.....why are these event happening on the UK side of the North Sea and not on the other side? Is it just my memory fails me or are we really not seeing any on the other side? I am not suggesting anything....so don't get your feathers ruffled.....honest question here.
If we are not having crashes and ditching on the east side....then what are the factors that might be in play that keeps them from having the same problem?
If my memory serves me well, the vast majority of S-92 gearbox feet cracking occurrences a few years ago were detected in the North Sea, and I’m sure the OEM briefings identified that torque settings were higher in the North Sea than in other areas of the world, so stress loads were higher.
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For the poster "Hell"
It transpires the the photos you've have posted contain one of the victims strapped to his seat in row four. It might be an idea to take them down out of respect ?
At the risk of diverting off-topic...
As an offshore helicopter pilot who has worked in various far-flung places around the world, I'm just curious how it it is, say for example in Australia, where Esso helicopters have been operating in the Bass Strait oil fields for 40+ years and never had a single ditching or accident. Yet we are seeing, certainly in comparison, seemingly high accident rates in the UK offshore industry, and the Gulf of Mexico, and other places. What is it that they do down there differently to other places that the statistics tell us makes that an inherently safer operation?
I know there is not anywhere near the intensity of flight ops down there as in the NS or GoM, not anywhere near as many hours flown, different aircraft type, much fewer platforms, not as far off-shore, and other things. And bearing in mind they flew single engine, single pilot for several years, and twin-engine single pilot for many years. Perhaps the only similarity being ****e weather for 5 months of the year, I don't know. But how is it they can fly (guessing) 250,000+ hours over 40 years and not drop a single ship in the tide, but in the UK and other parts we're seeing a major accident every couple of years or so?
Is the standard of aircraft maintenance different (I wouldn't have thought so)? Are the flight standards of operating crews any different (again, I wouldn't have thought so)? Are their operating procedures any different/safer (can't imagine they would be)? Is the operating environment any different (probably not much, the platforms are built to international standards, and the weather down there can be as ****e as anywhere, although freezing is rarely an issue).
I mean, an accident rate of zero over 40 years, compared with what we see elsewhere, what is it that they do differently? I don't work for them and I'm not trying to blow their trumpet, but by any measure trying to account for long-term statistics versus reality there must be something different going on down there.
As an offshore helicopter pilot who has worked in various far-flung places around the world, I'm just curious how it it is, say for example in Australia, where Esso helicopters have been operating in the Bass Strait oil fields for 40+ years and never had a single ditching or accident. Yet we are seeing, certainly in comparison, seemingly high accident rates in the UK offshore industry, and the Gulf of Mexico, and other places. What is it that they do down there differently to other places that the statistics tell us makes that an inherently safer operation?
I know there is not anywhere near the intensity of flight ops down there as in the NS or GoM, not anywhere near as many hours flown, different aircraft type, much fewer platforms, not as far off-shore, and other things. And bearing in mind they flew single engine, single pilot for several years, and twin-engine single pilot for many years. Perhaps the only similarity being ****e weather for 5 months of the year, I don't know. But how is it they can fly (guessing) 250,000+ hours over 40 years and not drop a single ship in the tide, but in the UK and other parts we're seeing a major accident every couple of years or so?
Is the standard of aircraft maintenance different (I wouldn't have thought so)? Are the flight standards of operating crews any different (again, I wouldn't have thought so)? Are their operating procedures any different/safer (can't imagine they would be)? Is the operating environment any different (probably not much, the platforms are built to international standards, and the weather down there can be as ****e as anywhere, although freezing is rarely an issue).
I mean, an accident rate of zero over 40 years, compared with what we see elsewhere, what is it that they do differently? I don't work for them and I'm not trying to blow their trumpet, but by any measure trying to account for long-term statistics versus reality there must be something different going on down there.
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SteinarN - How is this power out-take measured and what parameters are defined for flight crews so as not to exceed this? Where also is the source for this procedure, is it part of the Sintef recommendations?