AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
Wizzard
See Post# 46.
Further from EC:
As a complement to the information provided on August 24th at 3.41 am (French time), please find the latest information made available to EC:
- The helicopter has sunk and is near the coast, recovery procedure has been launched and the wreckage may be on shore in the next 72 hours
- The 2 pilots are amongst the survivors, they will be interviewed today by the official investigation team
- It is confirmed that this 332 L2 aircraft was equipped with a Main Gear Box with a carburized vertical shaft, this shaft is not the nitrided shaft involved in the two EC225 ditching.
Eurocopter is dispatching immediately 3 experts who will be on site on Sunday August 25th. They will reinforce the local EC team who is already in contact with operators, press and authorities.
At this stage Eurocopter is not recommending AS332 L2 flight suspension without further details coming from the recovery of the aircraft and the official investigation.
See Post# 46.
Further from EC:
As a complement to the information provided on August 24th at 3.41 am (French time), please find the latest information made available to EC:
- The helicopter has sunk and is near the coast, recovery procedure has been launched and the wreckage may be on shore in the next 72 hours
- The 2 pilots are amongst the survivors, they will be interviewed today by the official investigation team
- It is confirmed that this 332 L2 aircraft was equipped with a Main Gear Box with a carburized vertical shaft, this shaft is not the nitrided shaft involved in the two EC225 ditching.
Eurocopter is dispatching immediately 3 experts who will be on site on Sunday August 25th. They will reinforce the local EC team who is already in contact with operators, press and authorities.
At this stage Eurocopter is not recommending AS332 L2 flight suspension without further details coming from the recovery of the aircraft and the official investigation.
Nothing has been ruled out yet.
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Malabo:
That depends on the brief. Normally it would be a coupled approach given it was not for training, and in the L2 that tends to take the form of a 3-axis, though this may vary between operators. It's flown on the Bar-Alt set to Sumburgh QNH.
APP would be in use to maintain the LOC, with an ALT acquire set about 50ft above MDH (as the L2 has the habit of dipping past the alt acquire and then climbing back up to capture), VS engaged and would be varied to maintain the glide profile.
The stage they were at the DH would be zero on both sides of the cockpit (though this is something that may vary between operators).
If they had opted for a 4-axis coupled the only variation is that IAS would be held and adjusted in tandem with VS, maintaining glide profile.
As I said, it depends on the brief... There is nothing to stop the crew agreeing to it being flown manually, , or with the flight director if they can justify it (for example: if the autopilot was playing up earlier in the flight).
As for where you are when you reach the end of the procedure: I believe it's around 0.5mile grom the threshold, though that is off the top of my head. So I'm open to be corrected in that.
That depends on the brief. Normally it would be a coupled approach given it was not for training, and in the L2 that tends to take the form of a 3-axis, though this may vary between operators. It's flown on the Bar-Alt set to Sumburgh QNH.
APP would be in use to maintain the LOC, with an ALT acquire set about 50ft above MDH (as the L2 has the habit of dipping past the alt acquire and then climbing back up to capture), VS engaged and would be varied to maintain the glide profile.
The stage they were at the DH would be zero on both sides of the cockpit (though this is something that may vary between operators).
If they had opted for a 4-axis coupled the only variation is that IAS would be held and adjusted in tandem with VS, maintaining glide profile.
As I said, it depends on the brief... There is nothing to stop the crew agreeing to it being flown manually, , or with the flight director if they can justify it (for example: if the autopilot was playing up earlier in the flight).
As for where you are when you reach the end of the procedure: I believe it's around 0.5mile grom the threshold, though that is off the top of my head. So I'm open to be corrected in that.
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Helicomparator
That's why the 139 RFM tells you to arm the floats ALL THE TIME when over water. Not a popular choice but this is a fine example of why such a policy is basically sound.
G.
G.
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...and the reality of it?
In response to the "permanent grounding of all Superpumas" -
An interesting stance and approach - one that has been raised elsewhere too.
However - it begs the question - what if a similar accident were to happen on an S92? Perhaps another tail rotor problem on an AW139?
Having set the high profile and attention given to current accidents and developments, one could argue that similar precautions would need to take place on other aircraft as well, in case of technical issues. A fellow member has rightly stated that is is simply too early to say; and, the variants in the Superpuma fleet have indeed some significant differences in some of the systems. We just don't know yet. Statistics can be deceiving - indeed, there were 4 major Superpuma incidents in the UK Northsea recently. But remember to relate this always to the number of flight hours too, not just the type.
So if an S92 technical problem were to develop - would we halt all support to the Oil and Gas industry? Think also deepwater, long-distance, etc. What about business continuity, the impact on Oil and Gas, the price of fuel you pay at the pump?
OEMs simply could not produce enough airframes to make up for the grounding of ALL Superpumas, and there are very little alternatives when it comes to bad-weather, long range and payload. Sure, fill up a 139 with fuel - you will have the range, but only carry 6 passengers!
Safety Management will always be about a right balance based on risk management. Accident, even incidents where everybody survives will always be tragic. As tragic as they are, we have to accept that we can never be risk free. There are many things we can do to reduce risk, but it is all based on a management process. Shot-gun approaches, like the suggested permanent grounding of all Superpumas, just don't work. They are unrealistic and don't really add value to the Safety of Operations, neither to the business of operators and customers alike. Indeed, nobody will ever die again in a Superpuma crash offshore, but you will shift the statistics simply to other types. Let's see how the AW 189, B525, EC175, etc. will score in the future.
The other thing you do not see on forums is that, despite the lack of fatal accident, you don;t really know how many "close calls" other types have had.
So perhaps it is best to refrain from hurried statements and let the process take it's shape.
An interesting stance and approach - one that has been raised elsewhere too.
However - it begs the question - what if a similar accident were to happen on an S92? Perhaps another tail rotor problem on an AW139?
Having set the high profile and attention given to current accidents and developments, one could argue that similar precautions would need to take place on other aircraft as well, in case of technical issues. A fellow member has rightly stated that is is simply too early to say; and, the variants in the Superpuma fleet have indeed some significant differences in some of the systems. We just don't know yet. Statistics can be deceiving - indeed, there were 4 major Superpuma incidents in the UK Northsea recently. But remember to relate this always to the number of flight hours too, not just the type.
So if an S92 technical problem were to develop - would we halt all support to the Oil and Gas industry? Think also deepwater, long-distance, etc. What about business continuity, the impact on Oil and Gas, the price of fuel you pay at the pump?
OEMs simply could not produce enough airframes to make up for the grounding of ALL Superpumas, and there are very little alternatives when it comes to bad-weather, long range and payload. Sure, fill up a 139 with fuel - you will have the range, but only carry 6 passengers!
Safety Management will always be about a right balance based on risk management. Accident, even incidents where everybody survives will always be tragic. As tragic as they are, we have to accept that we can never be risk free. There are many things we can do to reduce risk, but it is all based on a management process. Shot-gun approaches, like the suggested permanent grounding of all Superpumas, just don't work. They are unrealistic and don't really add value to the Safety of Operations, neither to the business of operators and customers alike. Indeed, nobody will ever die again in a Superpuma crash offshore, but you will shift the statistics simply to other types. Let's see how the AW 189, B525, EC175, etc. will score in the future.
The other thing you do not see on forums is that, despite the lack of fatal accident, you don;t really know how many "close calls" other types have had.
So perhaps it is best to refrain from hurried statements and let the process take it's shape.
Last edited by tiltrotor; 25th Aug 2013 at 06:12.
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Quote:
That is staggering, over 12,500 people in 15hrs, and going up by 50/min.
Only a handful of whom were listening when they were at school.
There is a limited role for facts on Facebook.
That is staggering, over 12,500 people in 15hrs, and going up by 50/min.
Only a handful of whom were listening when they were at school.
There is a limited role for facts on Facebook.
The UK helicopter operators have demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt that they can't operate any variant of the Puma safely.
I'd be prepared to bet that you won't be allowed to operate this type in the UK Sector for much longer.
The bears (me being one) just won't put up with this any more.
If it comes to a stand off between the bears and the helicopter operators, I know who's going to win that one.
I'd look at getting another type rating under your belt if you currently drive one in the UK.
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Well said tiltrotor! Do a google search on all types and you will find a accident and most a incident as well over the last 5 years and please remember the Super Puma consist of 4 different types. Now it gets interesting if you do the math adding fleet hours in this period. As said now look at it operator hours vs incidents or accidents for the last 5 years and the picture changes completely.
I will have to find another job in a different industry cause there should be no helicopters flying. The smaller helos in big trouble too.
I will have to find another job in a different industry cause there should be no helicopters flying. The smaller helos in big trouble too.
Grounding makes no sense. Even the initial cause of this accident has not yet been determined.
If it is found to be a mechanical issue which COULD affect other 332s of other variants, then a fleet check will be performed and affected or possibly affected aircraft will be grounded. Just like happened on the EC225
Do we ground all crews when a crew related accident happens? No.
Regardless of the cause, we must use technology and training to make Transport Category helicopters safer and to ensure that the industry can reliably transport workers to work and back home again. OEMs, Oil and Gas companies, Operators, Pilots, Engineers and passengers must work together to achieve this.
A hootin' hollerin' lynch mob mentality will help no one.
If it is found to be a mechanical issue which COULD affect other 332s of other variants, then a fleet check will be performed and affected or possibly affected aircraft will be grounded. Just like happened on the EC225
Do we ground all crews when a crew related accident happens? No.
Regardless of the cause, we must use technology and training to make Transport Category helicopters safer and to ensure that the industry can reliably transport workers to work and back home again. OEMs, Oil and Gas companies, Operators, Pilots, Engineers and passengers must work together to achieve this.
A hootin' hollerin' lynch mob mentality will help no one.
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So the offshore workforce want the RAF to turn up with... Chinooks and Pumas. Ones that would never be allowed on the civil register after the abuse they will have seen as a necessity of their roles in warfare.
Great idea.
Great idea.
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Super Puma L2 accident
First of all I would lie to send my condolences to the passengers that lost their lives and associated loved ones...its a very sad day.
My comments below are not in any way related to today's incident as we need to let qualified personnel get on with their subsequent investigation.
With regards to all the HUMS comments and looking at options to alert crew during flight as well as inform engineering prior to failure etc.We need to understand the philosophy of HUMS and whether it should be included in the cockpit.
HUMS essentially is measuring/monitoring the 'health' of a component. Every rotating shaft, gear and bearing produce a harmonic signature and these harmonic signatures are recorded/collected during each flight. Over the decades Smiths Industries-bought out by GE, gathered large volumes of this data to then produce 'thresholds' so that if the harmonic reading for a particular component exceeded this threshold then a message is generated to inform the engineer after downloading the data. It is important to mention that the automatic acquisition of this data can be taking during straight/level cruise...during a gust of wind...or during a turn, and so a harmonic that exceeded a threshold on one flight may be normal on the next flight. This is why its important for the engineer to assess via trending over a period of time or a 'step change' in data that may be related to a maintenance event for example.
In some cases like with AW, you can subscribe to online support where the data downloaded after each flight is washed through a remote AW HUMS database to then produce a report which is sent online back to the operator.
In essence HUMS moves maintenance away from reactive based maintenance to pro-active maintenance. So in the end the HUMS software is designed to maintain the 'health' of a harmonic signature...not the imminent failure of the component.
Now I put the question out there-do pilots want to be notified during flight of varying levels of 'health' of harmonic signatures of 20...30...40 accelerometers? Would this not be a disruptive impact of the cockpit environment?
I would like to think (as others have suggested) that it may evolve to be more like fixed wing where high priority data will be sent to a ground station in real time where qualified maintenance personnel are monitoring.
Just my 2 cents worth
SS
My comments below are not in any way related to today's incident as we need to let qualified personnel get on with their subsequent investigation.
With regards to all the HUMS comments and looking at options to alert crew during flight as well as inform engineering prior to failure etc.We need to understand the philosophy of HUMS and whether it should be included in the cockpit.
HUMS essentially is measuring/monitoring the 'health' of a component. Every rotating shaft, gear and bearing produce a harmonic signature and these harmonic signatures are recorded/collected during each flight. Over the decades Smiths Industries-bought out by GE, gathered large volumes of this data to then produce 'thresholds' so that if the harmonic reading for a particular component exceeded this threshold then a message is generated to inform the engineer after downloading the data. It is important to mention that the automatic acquisition of this data can be taking during straight/level cruise...during a gust of wind...or during a turn, and so a harmonic that exceeded a threshold on one flight may be normal on the next flight. This is why its important for the engineer to assess via trending over a period of time or a 'step change' in data that may be related to a maintenance event for example.
In some cases like with AW, you can subscribe to online support where the data downloaded after each flight is washed through a remote AW HUMS database to then produce a report which is sent online back to the operator.
In essence HUMS moves maintenance away from reactive based maintenance to pro-active maintenance. So in the end the HUMS software is designed to maintain the 'health' of a harmonic signature...not the imminent failure of the component.
Now I put the question out there-do pilots want to be notified during flight of varying levels of 'health' of harmonic signatures of 20...30...40 accelerometers? Would this not be a disruptive impact of the cockpit environment?
I would like to think (as others have suggested) that it may evolve to be more like fixed wing where high priority data will be sent to a ground station in real time where qualified maintenance personnel are monitoring.
Just my 2 cents worth
SS
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I work in the industry, no longer travelling offshore, but have flown on all variants from the early 80's, but mainly in Puma's over the last 15 years - in the back of course.
Offshore workers, the majority will not have a high IQ like pilots, and don't know much about flying, and most are not highly technical and can't understand "technical speak". What they see is an increased frequency of accidents and incidents, mainly with super puma variants, 2 in the last 4 years with loss of life, and the others we have been very fortunate in the conditions when the aircraft ditched. I agree that the aircrews are the real experts, and they fly every day in these aircraft, and if you think they have an excellent safety record and are good, then you have to convince the offshore workforce - because it does not look like that to them.
I read the Sintef report posted yesterday, and I'm afraid I don't think it is only luck that the Norwegians have had much less incidents than us, and this must be looked at seriously. The report is very honest and does state that these accidents could have happened in Norway - but they did not. Generally statistics over such a long period don't lie.
From the offshore workforce point of view, it is sensible to ground all pumas until we know what caused this crash - we should already have a good idea from the pilots, although detailed analysis and examination will be required - and the aircraft needs to be recovered first to get to the flight recorders.
Also please don't forget a lot of us knew some of the people that lost their lives. I knew someone on the 2009 crash and the crash on Friday - they were work colleagues, and we spend a large part of our lives living and working together. One of the reasons emotions run high, and unfortunately emotions overule sense immediately after loss of life.
In the back of all variants of Puma, it is cramped and uncomfortable, and yes the size of those of us in the back is also increasing - we maybe need to take some seats out and carry less PAX. I've never flown in an S92 - but those that do say they are similar to the old S61 in terms of space and comfort.
Offshore workers, the majority will not have a high IQ like pilots, and don't know much about flying, and most are not highly technical and can't understand "technical speak". What they see is an increased frequency of accidents and incidents, mainly with super puma variants, 2 in the last 4 years with loss of life, and the others we have been very fortunate in the conditions when the aircraft ditched. I agree that the aircrews are the real experts, and they fly every day in these aircraft, and if you think they have an excellent safety record and are good, then you have to convince the offshore workforce - because it does not look like that to them.
I read the Sintef report posted yesterday, and I'm afraid I don't think it is only luck that the Norwegians have had much less incidents than us, and this must be looked at seriously. The report is very honest and does state that these accidents could have happened in Norway - but they did not. Generally statistics over such a long period don't lie.
From the offshore workforce point of view, it is sensible to ground all pumas until we know what caused this crash - we should already have a good idea from the pilots, although detailed analysis and examination will be required - and the aircraft needs to be recovered first to get to the flight recorders.
Also please don't forget a lot of us knew some of the people that lost their lives. I knew someone on the 2009 crash and the crash on Friday - they were work colleagues, and we spend a large part of our lives living and working together. One of the reasons emotions run high, and unfortunately emotions overule sense immediately after loss of life.
In the back of all variants of Puma, it is cramped and uncomfortable, and yes the size of those of us in the back is also increasing - we maybe need to take some seats out and carry less PAX. I've never flown in an S92 - but those that do say they are similar to the old S61 in terms of space and comfort.
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Offshore workers, the majority will not have a high IQ like pilots, and don't know much about flying, and most are not highly technical and can't understand "technical speak". What they see is an increased frequency of accidents and incidents, mainly with super puma variants, 2 in the last 4 years with loss of life, and the others we have been very fortunate in the conditions when the aircraft ditched. I agree that the aircrews are the real experts, and they fly every day in these aircraft, and if you think they have an excellent safety record and are good, then you have to convince the offshore workforce - because it does not look like that to them.
However, I agree with your sentiments. Whatever some of the experts here might say, there have been too many accidents in this one area/region of operation using the SP - even though people will quote variants of type etc- over the past 3/4 years and there is a strong sense of unease against using these aircraft in future. Commercial airline passenger have a choice of routes and airlines. Offshore workers don't.
It would also be interesting to know if the initiator really is an Offshore Worker or if he is otherwise related to the industry (Operator or Manufacturer).
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Not sure if this has been posted ...
Shetland helicopter crash: all Super Pumas grounded | UK news | theguardian.com
Shetland helicopter crash: all Super Pumas grounded | UK news | theguardian.com
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Having read some of the comments on the ipetition and the facebook site you can only hope that most haven't been written by that group of people. If these have indeed been written by Offshore Workers this would strongly back thelarner's claim. The level of stupidity you find there truely beggars belief.
Not all of us offshore use Faceache, many of us have studied the recent accident reports very carefully and more than a few of us are watching what is being said in here. Don't tar us all with the same brush.
Last edited by coatimundi; 25th Aug 2013 at 09:43.