AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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And what about the co-pilot sat next to him. He stated that he knew the approach was f*cked up but felt incapable of doing anything about it.
So, to continue DB, the solution to your problem is? Come on, it's as clear as day despite my rose tinted misted specs - could it be more training for all? For co's and captains, until it is second nature to use ALL the f'king gizmo's. Two sim trips a year or whatever it is isn't enough is it? Now convince the bean counters. 
and btw, I don't know of a CFIT in RAF SAR during my 22 years in that particular role.
and btw, I don't know of a CFIT in RAF SAR during my 22 years in that particular role.
Last edited by Al-bert; 14th Sep 2013 at 14:12.
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Probably not just training to use all the gizmo's, but more importantly, training in proper decision making. Both for Captains and Copilots.
Decide what mode to use, when and how, knowing what to look for and decide when it does not do what is expected, analyse why and decide on a course of action, possibly to intervene and prevent a situation from developing into something lethal.
In order to make sound decisions, one needs to know the system, but also when hand flying might be more appropriate (i.e. because it gives quicker responses than many a/p systems would).
So perhaps a different approach in training, more away from training for the test?
Decide what mode to use, when and how, knowing what to look for and decide when it does not do what is expected, analyse why and decide on a course of action, possibly to intervene and prevent a situation from developing into something lethal.
In order to make sound decisions, one needs to know the system, but also when hand flying might be more appropriate (i.e. because it gives quicker responses than many a/p systems would).
So perhaps a different approach in training, more away from training for the test?
So, we fly manually and we have CFIT. We use the automatics (maybe incorrectly) and we have CFIT. We have had more manual CFITs than automatic ones thus far, but we need to understand that the new generation APs have only really been with us for 8 years out of say 40 years of NS flying.
Let's extrapolate the 8 years of data to 40 years and see where it could get us to with CFIT if we change nothing. At least we have quantified our risk a little. Then we can make a better assessment of the blend of skills that we should be recruiting, training and flying.
I am far from a luddite but was forced into luddite tendancies in my early career because we didn't even have heading or height hold in the S-76A then again we were shuttling a lot of the time, and it was all single pilot in the early 80s.
But what we did have, and something for which I was and will always be grateful and respectful was some very structured single pilot and two crew line training by some experienced LTCs, something which stood me in very good stead for the many hours and nights I spent in the RHS.
Let's extrapolate the 8 years of data to 40 years and see where it could get us to with CFIT if we change nothing. At least we have quantified our risk a little. Then we can make a better assessment of the blend of skills that we should be recruiting, training and flying.
I am far from a luddite but was forced into luddite tendancies in my early career because we didn't even have heading or height hold in the S-76A then again we were shuttling a lot of the time, and it was all single pilot in the early 80s.
But what we did have, and something for which I was and will always be grateful and respectful was some very structured single pilot and two crew line training by some experienced LTCs, something which stood me in very good stead for the many hours and nights I spent in the RHS.
DB - you have written some excellent stuff on this thread and I agree with probably 99.9% of it but this remark
is absolutely untrue - our training limits are COCISS by day and night over the sea and 1000m overland - there are no operational limits!
The average NS pilot,including the low time co-pilots, take-off, navigate and land, routinely in weather beyond your military SAR limits.
Thank you Crab - I couldn't remember if we had limits except for snow and icing! And serviceability of coffee boiler of course (joke - it never went u/s) 
ps just in case DB thinks you never go IMC because of the day/night trg limit of "CCISS" you'd better explain FCS procedures, RADOPS, modified transitions, AHT etc.......I had to explain all that to various green 78 Sqn types, oh, and the Irish Government, who couldn't understand why their shiny new Dauphin's didn't seem to work
ps just in case DB thinks you never go IMC because of the day/night trg limit of "CCISS" you'd better explain FCS procedures, RADOPS, modified transitions, AHT etc.......I had to explain all that to various green 78 Sqn types, oh, and the Irish Government, who couldn't understand why their shiny new Dauphin's didn't seem to work
Last edited by Al-bert; 14th Sep 2013 at 16:03.
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CRAB and ALBERT I concede to your posts as I thought your trg limits were your operational limits. My apologies.
DB
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 14th Sep 2013 at 17:04.
So perhaps a different approach in training, more away from training for the test?
In order to make sound decisions, one needs to know the system, but also when hand flying might be more appropriate (i.e. because it gives quicker responses than many a/p systems would).
But, you see, that's the sort of thing that (have I said this before?) TRAINING would improve.
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ALBERT do not think for one minute I do not have enormous respect for MIL SAROPS because I do. 3 years of HEMS, day and night (yes before JAR-OPS), in an unstabilsed, let alone coupled, AS355, risking all for often nothing. I know the efforts and the risks you take or have taken.
I am going out on a limb here and say do not judge others by your standards. What I mean by this is Mil SAR crew selection and training produces a very different product than Offshore selection. It has too given the nature of the job.
The success story of military SAROPS is down almost entirely to the skills and qualities of the front and rear crews. It surely was not down to the quality of the kit you had even though we love the old Seaking/S61!
DB
I am going out on a limb here and say do not judge others by your standards. What I mean by this is Mil SAR crew selection and training produces a very different product than Offshore selection. It has too given the nature of the job.
The success story of military SAROPS is down almost entirely to the skills and qualities of the front and rear crews. It surely was not down to the quality of the kit you had even though we love the old Seaking/S61!
DB
Your Apology is Graciously accepted DB. But that doesn't solve the conundrum of what went wrong at Sumburgh (et al) and how to fix it?
All I can offer is the suggestion of more training, more often, especially on the superwhizzokit, and maybe a lucky rabbits foot (joke re rabbits foot!).
(and the Gnome fuel control therefore engine response beats the S61 by miles btw - which helps a lot.)
All I can offer is the suggestion of more training, more often, especially on the superwhizzokit, and maybe a lucky rabbits foot (joke re rabbits foot!).
(and the Gnome fuel control therefore engine response beats the S61 by miles btw - which helps a lot.)
Last edited by Al-bert; 14th Sep 2013 at 18:19.
While we talk about Unusual Attitudes and CFIT.....I have to throw this one in for just a bit of comic relief. Now I want you to think of being in your Office and the Talking Bone begins to make funny noises.....you picks it up...and your Man at the other end begins to tell you about his Day in Nevada.
IDOT helicopter crash blamed on birds - Springfield, IL - The State Journal-Register
IDOT helicopter crash blamed on birds - Springfield, IL - The State Journal-Register
Last edited by SASless; 14th Sep 2013 at 19:36.
Simulator training of 'take over control' situations
As a number of the incidents & accidents that have been discussed here relate to cases in which the controlling pilot allowed the helicopter to gradually get out of a safe condition, to the extent that the subsequent report deemed that the non-controlling pilot should have intervened, could any of you enlighten me how this practice of recognizing and determining the correct point for taking control by the non-controlling pilot is practiced in the simulator in a realistic manner?
In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?
In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?
Last edited by Mechta; 14th Sep 2013 at 20:07.
could any of you enlighten me how this practice of recognizing and determining the correct point for taking control by the non-controlling pilot is practiced in the simulator in a realistic manner?
In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?
In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?
So, it is not "A Situation" that needs practicing, it is a whole - what shall I say? - job description.
We can't define a point for intervention. It is a matter of judgement. If that judgement is not clear cut, it may take time to decide to intervene.
I don't think we can ever define appropriate action for every scenario. That is, we have drills for predictable events or failures. But as far as is humanly possible, things are designed not to go wrong, so when they do it needs analysis, not impulse.
And time for analysis may be very short.
Last edited by keithl; 14th Sep 2013 at 21:11.
Perhaps the issue is our relationship with automation that is the problem - on one hand we want automation to reduce the pilot workload yet on the other, we require the pilot to constantly monitor what the automation is doing.
I do a lot of motorway miles and I rely on the cruise control to keep me at a sensible compromise between the speed limit and the point where plod will start to take an interest in me.
Depending on weather conditions and traffic I will spend either 10% or 90% of my time monitoring the cruise control to ensure it keeps me in the right place with reference to the surrounding cars. Sometimes the traffic density requires me to disengage the cruise control completely, sometimes a simple blip on the increase/decrease speed control is required.
There is no doubt that the cruise control can maintain a constant speed far more accurately than I can, but there is equally no doubt that sometimes it is too limited for the constant change in circumstances that motorway driving brings about.
Intelligent autopilot anyone???
I do a lot of motorway miles and I rely on the cruise control to keep me at a sensible compromise between the speed limit and the point where plod will start to take an interest in me.
Depending on weather conditions and traffic I will spend either 10% or 90% of my time monitoring the cruise control to ensure it keeps me in the right place with reference to the surrounding cars. Sometimes the traffic density requires me to disengage the cruise control completely, sometimes a simple blip on the increase/decrease speed control is required.
There is no doubt that the cruise control can maintain a constant speed far more accurately than I can, but there is equally no doubt that sometimes it is too limited for the constant change in circumstances that motorway driving brings about.
Intelligent autopilot anyone???
As a number of the incidents & accidents that have been discussed here relate to cases in which the controlling pilot allowed the helicopter to gradually get out of a safe condition, to the extent that the subsequent report deemed that the non-controlling pilot should have intervened, could any of you enlighten me how this practice of recognizing and determining the correct point for taking control by the non-controlling pilot is practiced in the simulator in a realistic manner?
In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?
In addition, what proportion of a pilot's annual simulator time might be spent in practicing these 'Its time to take over' scenarios?
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CRAB & PAX BRITTANIC - I think your points are striking at the heart of the matter. We have 3 x recent CFIW where the PM has not intervened and 1 x where the PM intervened (but the CVR actually indicated that in this case the PM only intervened after the PF asked for help) - all 4 end up in the water.
In the NS 4 years ago just after the ETAP crash, all Operators changed there procedures to include the concept of Night stabilised approachs. (to be fair Bristows at this time were already half way there)
The Stabilised Approach should detail the vertical and horizontal profile for all night approaches conducted in VMC and a policy for the use of Automation.
(Please note I personally do not believe "Night VMC" exists until the flight path of the helicopter can be assured by visual references alone. In offshore night approaches we only really achieve this by a combination of the correct sight picture of the helidecks lights supported by some surface texture from the installation environment - there remain many who believe they are VMC at night over water just because there are not in clouds).
Moreover, the night stabilised approach included intervention parameters for the PM (unacceptable deviations) and an intervention policies that detail exactly when the PM should take control.
The intervention policy is intended to "Flatten" any cockpit gradient in place thus empowering the PM, especially if PM is not the Commander, to take over control long before the helicopter.gets anywhere near a unsafe condition.
The same policies should already be in place, detailed in the OM, for all IFR approaches, both onshore and offshore.
I have to say that 4 years ago, in the Company I worked for at the time, I met considerable resistance from fellow TRI/TREs over these policies.
In fact a number refused to buy into the concept that descent beyond the HDP (the point at which the PF announces he believes has has the required visual references I detailed above, in sight), should not occur without the express agreement of the PM In my opinion, this crucial agreement not only regularly and formally acknowledges the latent power of the PM but also is the core concept of the MCC element of the stabilised approach.
This cultural resistance to change was palpable.
As a result I do not believe that any formal training or practice is carried out in the simulator or aircraft to fully familiarise the crews in the intervention parameters and policies. I also believe it is actually very difficult to setup scenarios which would stimulate and develop these skills during training. Finally in the training environment, most Pilots perform well enough that opportinuties for the PM to intervene are few and far between.
I hate to have to come back to CRABs question on whether we should have an "Intelligent Autopilot" to do the role of the PF for us!! This is exactly what the EC225, EC155 and soon the EC175 DAFCS does!!
However, PAX BRITTANICA, the EC225 DAFCS is useless unless the crews actually engage the coupler. You will have already realised, from the number of posters advocating less Autopilot and more Manual flying just how difficult culturally it can be to get them to use the coupler.
I fact Euroopter is so painfully aware of this resistance that serious consideration is being given to design the system so the coupler is always engaged, and therefore the protection always available, on all future helicopter designs, so as to remove this cultural obstacle amongst crews.
In the meanwhile, we will keep pressing for a change that recognises the differences in AP capability such that the CAA, and or the Helicopter Operator, mandate use of the coupler from and to, defined pints in the flight envelope.
We must not forget how this thread started. With the L2 Sumburgh accident. At face value, the AAIB interim report states that L2 was descending in 3 Axis mode (Mixed Mode). There is little doubt in my mind this is likely to be the prime causal factor in this accident. If that L2 had been fully coupled this accident could never have occurred.
We do not know at this stage WHY the approach was flown in mixed mode BUT if the PF self elected to operate in this manner it is because he operates within a culture and OM that has allowed him to do so.
Hopefully the HSSG, the Government enquiry into helicopter safety and the AAIB will identify these cultural obstacles and force the Operates to properly and adequately mandate the use of Automation in sufficient detail, for each type, such that the loss of life, caused by these completely avoidable accidents, ends forever.
In addition we must now surely all recognise the enormous safety benefits of a DAFCS with in built flight envelope protections.
DB
In the NS 4 years ago just after the ETAP crash, all Operators changed there procedures to include the concept of Night stabilised approachs. (to be fair Bristows at this time were already half way there)
The Stabilised Approach should detail the vertical and horizontal profile for all night approaches conducted in VMC and a policy for the use of Automation.
(Please note I personally do not believe "Night VMC" exists until the flight path of the helicopter can be assured by visual references alone. In offshore night approaches we only really achieve this by a combination of the correct sight picture of the helidecks lights supported by some surface texture from the installation environment - there remain many who believe they are VMC at night over water just because there are not in clouds).
Moreover, the night stabilised approach included intervention parameters for the PM (unacceptable deviations) and an intervention policies that detail exactly when the PM should take control.
The intervention policy is intended to "Flatten" any cockpit gradient in place thus empowering the PM, especially if PM is not the Commander, to take over control long before the helicopter.gets anywhere near a unsafe condition.
The same policies should already be in place, detailed in the OM, for all IFR approaches, both onshore and offshore.
I have to say that 4 years ago, in the Company I worked for at the time, I met considerable resistance from fellow TRI/TREs over these policies.
In fact a number refused to buy into the concept that descent beyond the HDP (the point at which the PF announces he believes has has the required visual references I detailed above, in sight), should not occur without the express agreement of the PM In my opinion, this crucial agreement not only regularly and formally acknowledges the latent power of the PM but also is the core concept of the MCC element of the stabilised approach.
This cultural resistance to change was palpable.
As a result I do not believe that any formal training or practice is carried out in the simulator or aircraft to fully familiarise the crews in the intervention parameters and policies. I also believe it is actually very difficult to setup scenarios which would stimulate and develop these skills during training. Finally in the training environment, most Pilots perform well enough that opportinuties for the PM to intervene are few and far between.
I hate to have to come back to CRABs question on whether we should have an "Intelligent Autopilot" to do the role of the PF for us!! This is exactly what the EC225, EC155 and soon the EC175 DAFCS does!!
However, PAX BRITTANICA, the EC225 DAFCS is useless unless the crews actually engage the coupler. You will have already realised, from the number of posters advocating less Autopilot and more Manual flying just how difficult culturally it can be to get them to use the coupler.
I fact Euroopter is so painfully aware of this resistance that serious consideration is being given to design the system so the coupler is always engaged, and therefore the protection always available, on all future helicopter designs, so as to remove this cultural obstacle amongst crews.
In the meanwhile, we will keep pressing for a change that recognises the differences in AP capability such that the CAA, and or the Helicopter Operator, mandate use of the coupler from and to, defined pints in the flight envelope.
We must not forget how this thread started. With the L2 Sumburgh accident. At face value, the AAIB interim report states that L2 was descending in 3 Axis mode (Mixed Mode). There is little doubt in my mind this is likely to be the prime causal factor in this accident. If that L2 had been fully coupled this accident could never have occurred.
We do not know at this stage WHY the approach was flown in mixed mode BUT if the PF self elected to operate in this manner it is because he operates within a culture and OM that has allowed him to do so.
Hopefully the HSSG, the Government enquiry into helicopter safety and the AAIB will identify these cultural obstacles and force the Operates to properly and adequately mandate the use of Automation in sufficient detail, for each type, such that the loss of life, caused by these completely avoidable accidents, ends forever.
In addition we must now surely all recognise the enormous safety benefits of a DAFCS with in built flight envelope protections.
DB
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https://www.sportys.com/PilotShop/product/17594
As long as 'joke' placards like this exist, they'll perpetuate a dismaying mindset that will be found in some corners of multi-pilot aviation and one that it seems is an important factor in a number of the accidents and incidents being discussed.
As long as 'joke' placards like this exist, they'll perpetuate a dismaying mindset that will be found in some corners of multi-pilot aviation and one that it seems is an important factor in a number of the accidents and incidents being discussed.
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In the meanwhile, we will keep pressing for a change that recognises the differences in AP capability such that the CAA, and or the Helicopter Operator, mandate use of the coupler from and to, defined pints in the flight envelope.
We must not forget how this thread started. With the L2 Sumburgh accident. At face value, the AAIB interim report states that L2 was descending in 3 Axis mode (Mixed Mode). There is little doubt in my mind this is likely to be the prime causal factor in this accident. If that L2 had been fully coupled this accident could never have occurred.
We do not know at this stage WHY the approach was flown in mixed mode BUT if the PF self elected to operate in this manner it is because he operates within a culture and OM that has allowed him to do so.
Hopefully the HSSG, the Government enquiry into helicopter safety and the AAIB will identify these cultural obstacles and force the Operates to properly and adequately mandate the use of Automation in sufficient detail, for each type, such that the loss of life, caused by these completely avoidable accidents, ends forever.
In addition we must now surely all recognise the enormous safety benefits of a DAFCS with in built flight envelope protections.
We must not forget how this thread started. With the L2 Sumburgh accident. At face value, the AAIB interim report states that L2 was descending in 3 Axis mode (Mixed Mode). There is little doubt in my mind this is likely to be the prime causal factor in this accident. If that L2 had been fully coupled this accident could never have occurred.
We do not know at this stage WHY the approach was flown in mixed mode BUT if the PF self elected to operate in this manner it is because he operates within a culture and OM that has allowed him to do so.
Hopefully the HSSG, the Government enquiry into helicopter safety and the AAIB will identify these cultural obstacles and force the Operates to properly and adequately mandate the use of Automation in sufficient detail, for each type, such that the loss of life, caused by these completely avoidable accidents, ends forever.
In addition we must now surely all recognise the enormous safety benefits of a DAFCS with in built flight envelope protections.
Again a very relevant point from DB. There are so many questions to be answered here and it will not be a single simple answer. What we do know is that a helicopter ended up in the drink with both engines operative. We assume that there was no other major technical issue with the aircraft. If this assumption is correct, then we are right in asking why and how. This why and how should be far reaching and most certainly not stop at the crew.
We have gone back and forward on the hand flying debate, and this is in my view an over simplistic argument. As already argued, this is not a hand flying issue, it is a poor use of coupler issue. It is a CRM issue. It is a supervision issue. Lack of SOPs. A company not fully supporting their operation and crew with appropriate supervision and support perhaps? Why? Why and how has this culture developed? Is it widespread across the NS? Is it developing? How has it managed to develop? Have we really lost our basic understanding of aviation safety culture due to commercial pressure? Why are our operators not pushing for better technology to be mandated from the manufacturers and authorities? This should be wide ranging from autopilots to safety equipment. I am still often astonished at how basic the S92 autopilot system is and how sloppy it can be. Why are we still not all flying P2E across the NS after so many years since its incarnation? Why do we not have STASS and proper survival suits? Why do we fly at night when the sea-state is above 6 and aircraft have only SS6 floats, basically condemning a ditching to be fatal to all or most on board? Why do we have inadequate and poorly used reporting systems? I would be willing to bet that a large number of incidents pass unreported.
Ok - not entirely relevant to this particular case, but all an indication of the culture we work in. We accept a lot of questionable risks that could easily be mitigated given the will, and still get the job done. That is the big picture. Why is it the case? That is the real question to ask in my view. Is it just money? Is it leadership? Do we want to accept a situation whereby we do the maximum possible with the minimum amount of money and resources to maximise profit? Only when it falls down will we know we went too far and by then we have gone way too far. I would suggest that is where we are now. We are taking people to and from work. We should not be trying to save their lives in the process.
I agree with Al-bert and Crab in that more training would be a godsend. I really hope this can be a reality. It was always a luxury we had in the military that training hours and aircraft without pax on board were available. Now we only have the sim. Al-bert mentioned the autopilot culture and said should we just go all the way, with pilots really just monitoring? This is the direction we are heading. With the introduction of the new rig-approach into the S92 autopilot system the pilot will effectively only need to take control once committed to landing. With the introduction of all these fantastic levels of automation we must be even more cautious as to how to implement them and how to support our pilots through training. We must also use them completely and thoroughly to reap their benefit. This has to develop. Basic flying skill MUST not be lost. Otherwise we might as well sit in Mumbai with a non-alcoholic cocktail. Sounds nice to me on a dark winter night but not sure it will sell!
We had these autopilot/manual flying arguments when I was monitoring coupled ILS approaches fifty years ago. One of the discussions in the BLEU at the time was the potential damage to the runway being caused by the mainwheels hitting the same two square yards of concrete every time.