AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
I think this thread is in danger of getting rather confusing with all the references to the new Cougar report, with its different region, attitudes, legislative framework and training regimes.
In the UK pilot incapacitation is covered in initial (MCC) training and recurrent training. For us, its a 36 month item but after the ETAP we included it in offshore ops recurrent training as well.
The trouble is that in the Sim, pilots are more or less expecting it and have no difficulty in recognising it and taking control.
However in the real world it can be much more subtle, unexpected and accompanied by other factors.
Therefore I would say that no reasonable amount of training can guarantee that the other pilot will take control in adequate time, especially if its the co taking over from the capt. We can only expect that this will probably happen.
In the case of the L2 its still too early for us to know whether there was a failure to take over by the co, although it certainly seems a possibility.
As to allowing recruitment of copilots only who already have thousands of hours, not only is this impractical at a time when the industry needs to recruit fairly heavily, but it also results in the recruitment of people that arrive with a lot of preconceived ideas and possible bad habits. One of the very few new recruits that we had to sack after many months of trying, for failing to reach a satisfactory standard, had about 5000 hrs.
I think its ridiculous to expect junior copilots to have the same skills and confidence as a high time captain - that is how the system works, one highly experienced pilot, one further down the learning curve than his captain (you never get to the top of the learning curve!). The captain is not supposed to screw up but if he does, the probability of a good outcome is less than if the roles were reversed.
In the UK pilot incapacitation is covered in initial (MCC) training and recurrent training. For us, its a 36 month item but after the ETAP we included it in offshore ops recurrent training as well.
The trouble is that in the Sim, pilots are more or less expecting it and have no difficulty in recognising it and taking control.
However in the real world it can be much more subtle, unexpected and accompanied by other factors.
Therefore I would say that no reasonable amount of training can guarantee that the other pilot will take control in adequate time, especially if its the co taking over from the capt. We can only expect that this will probably happen.
In the case of the L2 its still too early for us to know whether there was a failure to take over by the co, although it certainly seems a possibility.
As to allowing recruitment of copilots only who already have thousands of hours, not only is this impractical at a time when the industry needs to recruit fairly heavily, but it also results in the recruitment of people that arrive with a lot of preconceived ideas and possible bad habits. One of the very few new recruits that we had to sack after many months of trying, for failing to reach a satisfactory standard, had about 5000 hrs.
I think its ridiculous to expect junior copilots to have the same skills and confidence as a high time captain - that is how the system works, one highly experienced pilot, one further down the learning curve than his captain (you never get to the top of the learning curve!). The captain is not supposed to screw up but if he does, the probability of a good outcome is less than if the roles were reversed.
I was told a story, fictitious, before anybody starts jumping up and down, about some NS pilots made redundant during the collapse in the eighties.
They were offered a job building a wall around the United Kingdom. The money was good, as expected in the building trade; equal time with travel and accommodation plus a generous daily allowance. Half a dozen people applied and off they went.
The first few days were a bit shambolic as non of them knew anything about bricklaying but with a bit of professional instruction they went on their way by themselves. As they went on the standard improved and in a few weeks their finish was as good as any.
A few years later they approached the point where they had started off. Every one of them was a highly experienced bricklayer operating to a standard second to none. When they reached the beginning of the wall they all stood around in confusion.
None of them knew how to splice the new wall into the old.
That story illustrates the fact that experience is not the be-all and end-all of knowledge, A pilot can have thousands of hours monitoring an autopilot but in that there is no experience of piloting.
Some post ago somebody listed some accidents where he maintained that would not have happened with an autopilot engaged. I would counter that by suggesting that two of them would not have happened if the pilot had been trained in a military environment because he would had been there before.
In the military environment Auntie Betty gives you an aeroplane to play about with. Invariably it ends up in some hazardous situation but has the advantage of being either empty or light so there is the power and the manoeuvrability to get you out of it. The pilot puts the incident in the back of his mind and promises himself that he will not do that again. Later in the crew room or the bar he will recount the story and so others will tuck that information into the back of their heads as well.
There is none of that in the North Sea. There is not an opportunity for the training and even if an incident did happen neither of the crew would dare, for the sake of their careers, publicise it so the experience is not spread around. There are not many that trust the so-called anonymous reporting.
You can thrash somebody in the simulator as much as you like. It will only do what the programmer tells it to do. The actual aeroplane may have completely different ideas.
It does not affect me but I feel that the over reliance on automatics is wrong. I speak from forty eight years of flying and I started using automatic pilots in 1962. I have never had an autopilot go seriously wrong on me but I do know that they react slower than a pilots backside. I know that from years of monitoring them.
The profession dictates that a pilot should, without any prompting or resistance, should be able to fly a complete flight without monitoring an autopilot in perfect safety. If he cannot because of his training or company policy then he is not a pilot. He is what the beancounters call a button pushing bus driver; and should be paid as such.
One day somebody is going to have a total electrical failure at night in IMC and have forty five minutes with only basic flight controls to get on to the ground. I wish him luck.
They were offered a job building a wall around the United Kingdom. The money was good, as expected in the building trade; equal time with travel and accommodation plus a generous daily allowance. Half a dozen people applied and off they went.
The first few days were a bit shambolic as non of them knew anything about bricklaying but with a bit of professional instruction they went on their way by themselves. As they went on the standard improved and in a few weeks their finish was as good as any.
A few years later they approached the point where they had started off. Every one of them was a highly experienced bricklayer operating to a standard second to none. When they reached the beginning of the wall they all stood around in confusion.
None of them knew how to splice the new wall into the old.
That story illustrates the fact that experience is not the be-all and end-all of knowledge, A pilot can have thousands of hours monitoring an autopilot but in that there is no experience of piloting.
Some post ago somebody listed some accidents where he maintained that would not have happened with an autopilot engaged. I would counter that by suggesting that two of them would not have happened if the pilot had been trained in a military environment because he would had been there before.
In the military environment Auntie Betty gives you an aeroplane to play about with. Invariably it ends up in some hazardous situation but has the advantage of being either empty or light so there is the power and the manoeuvrability to get you out of it. The pilot puts the incident in the back of his mind and promises himself that he will not do that again. Later in the crew room or the bar he will recount the story and so others will tuck that information into the back of their heads as well.
There is none of that in the North Sea. There is not an opportunity for the training and even if an incident did happen neither of the crew would dare, for the sake of their careers, publicise it so the experience is not spread around. There are not many that trust the so-called anonymous reporting.
You can thrash somebody in the simulator as much as you like. It will only do what the programmer tells it to do. The actual aeroplane may have completely different ideas.
It does not affect me but I feel that the over reliance on automatics is wrong. I speak from forty eight years of flying and I started using automatic pilots in 1962. I have never had an autopilot go seriously wrong on me but I do know that they react slower than a pilots backside. I know that from years of monitoring them.
The profession dictates that a pilot should, without any prompting or resistance, should be able to fly a complete flight without monitoring an autopilot in perfect safety. If he cannot because of his training or company policy then he is not a pilot. He is what the beancounters call a button pushing bus driver; and should be paid as such.
One day somebody is going to have a total electrical failure at night in IMC and have forty five minutes with only basic flight controls to get on to the ground. I wish him luck.
Last edited by Fareastdriver; 14th Sep 2013 at 10:26.
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HC
The Cougar incident is entirely relevant if in the North Sea, as FED says
and
Surely you can see the parallels.
The Cougar incident is entirely relevant if in the North Sea, as FED says
if an incident did happen neither of the crew would dare, for the sake of their careers, publicise it so the experience is not spread around
A pilot can have thousands of hours monitoring an autopilot but in that there is no experience of piloting
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I would add the Cougar 491 to the list with parallels to the Shetland accident on the basis that the co-pilot was not authoritive enough with the PIC in making the decision to do a controlled ditch. We would most likely have had more survivors in that tragedy...this was stated in both the TSB report and the Wells inquiry.
Max
Max
Last edited by maxwelg2; 14th Sep 2013 at 10:05.
Satsuma, yes of course there are (probably) parallels, however as I said if multiple events with different circumstances in different continents all get lumped into a thread ostensibly about the L2 accident, thing will get so convoluted as to become dysfunctional. We have already seen plenty of contributors struggling to keep up when it was just about the L2. Its a free country and you can discuss what you like on here, just don't be under the illusion you are helping. Why not bring in every loss of control accident there ever was, that way there will be plenty of grist for fatuous comments such as "more manual flying required", even though some of the events occurred on an R22!
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Pilot experience versus competence
Maybe it's time to raise the minimums for co-pilots BEFORE starting off in Offshore flying. Maybe 1500 TT PIC in helicopters would be a good number, at least you'd have decent manipulation skills. I've always been surprised at how low the experience required levels are for Co-pilots all over the world when you are flying in one of the most demanding environments (IFR, Night over water etc)...
Which pilot would be better suited to offshore, multi crew operations? A pilot with 2000 hours crop spraying on Bell 47s who converts to a CPL/ATPL on an EC225, or a pilot who goes straight from a CPL training course, completes a full IR course, then converts onto the EC225 and is monitored and managed through a robust training process?
I recently visited a location where a senior captain with more than 20000 hours had been responsible for several very serious accidents due to lack of competence, thankfully none of them fatal! I've seen various other similar cases which fly in the face of experience versus competence.
A robust system should be in place to assess a new pilot's capabilities. They should then be assigned appropriate training to bring them up to the appropriate standard before initial line training on non-revenue flights. After this decreasing levels of supervision should be implemented to bring them on until they are eventually released to fly with any captain.
This process has been successfully applied by a number of operators for many years.
Lights blue touch paper, stands back and waits for the bang............................
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fatuous comments such as "more manual flying required", even though some of the events occurred on an R22!
OK, more training and practice too expensive and not relevant to todays whizzocopters so - if more automation is the only safe answer why not go the whole way?
Surely the answer is ultimately RPV's 'flown' by operators sat in air conditioned comfort somewhere, it needn't be Aberdeen, it could be Mumbai. Four axis, quadrupled AP's, no chance of disorientation, no human factors like fatigue and boredom or lack of manual skills. On a typical winter NS night the 'pilot' could be sitting on a veranda sipping non-alcoholic cocktails in perfect safety. One operator should be able to handle a couple of RPV's at once when they get to senior operator level. Think of the improved safety and cost savings, once the bears got used to the idea.
Surely the answer is ultimately RPV's 'flown' by operators sat in air conditioned comfort somewhere, it needn't be Aberdeen, it could be Mumbai. Four axis, quadrupled AP's, no chance of disorientation, no human factors like fatigue and boredom or lack of manual skills. On a typical winter NS night the 'pilot' could be sitting on a veranda sipping non-alcoholic cocktails in perfect safety. One operator should be able to handle a couple of RPV's at once when they get to senior operator level. Think of the improved safety and cost savings, once the bears got used to the idea.
Last edited by Al-bert; 14th Sep 2013 at 11:23.
My point is that those with a Luddite agenda are in danger of hijacking the thread. We don't know why the second pilot in each of these cases didn't take control and rectify the situation. A lack of confidence, quite probably. But to equate that to a lack of manual flying practice is a wild leap of (biased) faith, especially in an industry where manual flying skill are utilised for every takeoff and landing where, especially offshore each one is different and potentially challenging.
Those harking back to more manual flying are doing so because its all they know. These days we need to be more intelligent about it, and realised that the detail of what went wrong and more importantly why, will be different in each of these two cases. To imagine that flying a few more manual NPAs is going to fix it, is pathetic and counterproductive. So there.
Those harking back to more manual flying are doing so because its all they know. These days we need to be more intelligent about it, and realised that the detail of what went wrong and more importantly why, will be different in each of these two cases. To imagine that flying a few more manual NPAs is going to fix it, is pathetic and counterproductive. So there.
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Fairesrdriver
Every NS pilot,including the newest co-pilots, is capable of flying any mission with the AP coupled modes disengaged.
To infer that this does not happen to military trained pilots. Utter and complete rubbish:
1. The Blackpool accident aircraft was operated by two highly experienced ex military pilots who spent nearly all of their offshore flight time uncoupled.
2. The worse real UA I have been presented with, at night, accidentally set up by a highly experienced ex military pilot.
3. The ETAP ditching, flown into the sea by a highly experienced ex military pilot - the DAFCS with full envelope protection was not even deployed. The aircraft was bing hand flown.
I am an ex military pilot myself.
This phenomenon, if we can call it that, has happened to all manner of pilots with vastly differing experience bases and levels. No one is immune and if you think you are......Swiss cheese hole waiting for alignment alert!!
All offshore approaches, from the HDP to the helidecks are flown uncoupled. Day and Night. The coupler is only used to get the helicopter to the HDP. Even in an EC225.
This final act of flying, is a demanding and intensive skill requirement that is archieved by every NS pilot just like it is all over the world. There are no hiding places for poor handling skills especially at night.
General handling ability is not the culprit here. Specific skill sets, as yet unidentified, maybe.
Fareast Driver - I am guessing Australia. Do not confuse the benign conditions around your island with the demanding environment of the North Sea.
Throughout this progression, training and awareness on the AFCS and the coupler has always been poor. The rules concerning when and how I should use it, non existent. Lets try fixing this **** before we abandon the AFCS in favour of "Hand Flying" - which history proves, provides no protection AT ALL from these events.
I have had two nasty UAs on the NS. Both were reported to my Company as required by law. FDM precludes any attempt for crews to "hide" this kind of event. I do not believe they go unreported BUT they are very rare events, most of which result in accidents.
DB
Every NS pilot,including the newest co-pilots, is capable of flying any mission with the AP coupled modes disengaged.
To infer that this does not happen to military trained pilots. Utter and complete rubbish:
1. The Blackpool accident aircraft was operated by two highly experienced ex military pilots who spent nearly all of their offshore flight time uncoupled.
2. The worse real UA I have been presented with, at night, accidentally set up by a highly experienced ex military pilot.
3. The ETAP ditching, flown into the sea by a highly experienced ex military pilot - the DAFCS with full envelope protection was not even deployed. The aircraft was bing hand flown.
I am an ex military pilot myself.
This phenomenon, if we can call it that, has happened to all manner of pilots with vastly differing experience bases and levels. No one is immune and if you think you are......Swiss cheese hole waiting for alignment alert!!
All offshore approaches, from the HDP to the helidecks are flown uncoupled. Day and Night. The coupler is only used to get the helicopter to the HDP. Even in an EC225.
This final act of flying, is a demanding and intensive skill requirement that is archieved by every NS pilot just like it is all over the world. There are no hiding places for poor handling skills especially at night.
General handling ability is not the culprit here. Specific skill sets, as yet unidentified, maybe.
Fareast Driver - I am guessing Australia. Do not confuse the benign conditions around your island with the demanding environment of the North Sea.
Throughout this progression, training and awareness on the AFCS and the coupler has always been poor. The rules concerning when and how I should use it, non existent. Lets try fixing this **** before we abandon the AFCS in favour of "Hand Flying" - which history proves, provides no protection AT ALL from these events.
I have had two nasty UAs on the NS. Both were reported to my Company as required by law. FDM precludes any attempt for crews to "hide" this kind of event. I do not believe they go unreported BUT they are very rare events, most of which result in accidents.
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 14th Sep 2013 at 11:32.
HC,
I think that you might be the dinosaur here! Doing more of the same isn't working is it? Plenty of people with all sorts of experience have offered suggestions which you disdain. We have all flown with varying degrees of automation - some of us have even been to rigs without it. Continuing to do more of the same and expecting a different result is, I'm told, a sign of insanity.
I think that you might be the dinosaur here! Doing more of the same isn't working is it? Plenty of people with all sorts of experience have offered suggestions which you disdain. We have all flown with varying degrees of automation - some of us have even been to rigs without it. Continuing to do more of the same and expecting a different result is, I'm told, a sign of insanity.
DB
totally agree, with rest of your post too! From an outsider perspective (un-clouded by co policy and financial constraints) more time (and cash) must be set aside for continuation training if things are going to change.
Throughout this progression, training and awareness on the AFCS and the coupler has always been poor. The rules concerning when and how I should use it, non existent. Lets try fixing this **** before we abandon the AFCS in favour of "Hand Flying" - which history proves, provides no protection AT ALL from these events.
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HC
But that's exactly what the Cougar report said. His 1000 hours had almost all been spent in coupled flight and he didn't feel as though his manual flying skills were up to the job of taking control from the commander.
It's not a question of thread hijacking, it's a case of closely examining the experiences of others and seeing whether any of their shortcomings apply in the UK. If there are inexperienced pilots in the North Sea whose manual flying time is minimal compared to the time they spend in coupled flight then it appears as though they may well do. More manual flying required. In an aircraft!
But to equate that to a lack of manual flying practice is a wild leap of (biased) faith
It's not a question of thread hijacking, it's a case of closely examining the experiences of others and seeing whether any of their shortcomings apply in the UK. If there are inexperienced pilots in the North Sea whose manual flying time is minimal compared to the time they spend in coupled flight then it appears as though they may well do. More manual flying required. In an aircraft!
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Albert, you have offered no tangible advice at all in any of your posts. All you do is bleat on endlessly about manual flying skills. The average NS pilot,including the low time co-pilots, take-off, navigate and land, routinely in weather beyond your military SAR limits.
You are beginning to read like the worst kind of Troll, sanctimonious and arrogant. If that is what you aimed for...well done.
EDITED - having read you very last post - at last, you seem to understand. Please ignore all the above but stay on message now!!
You are beginning to read like the worst kind of Troll, sanctimonious and arrogant. If that is what you aimed for...well done.
EDITED - having read you very last post - at last, you seem to understand. Please ignore all the above but stay on message now!!
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 14th Sep 2013 at 11:50.
Fareast Driver - I am guessing Australia.
Plus eighteen years in the North Sea.
I'll back out now.
Last edited by Fareastdriver; 14th Sep 2013 at 11:56.
I have to agree with DB....and take issue with HC.
DB....are you familiar with the Flight Operations in Alaska out of Deadhorse and the weather they fly in up there? The folks in Canada flying out of Newfie Land also encounter some interesting weather. Don't think the North Sea is the worst place on earth for Offshore Flying.....there are places that make it look pretty mild. The Chukchi Sea area is far more remote and much more inhospitable than the North Sea. US Operators out of Deadhorse have been doing IFR Underslung work as a routine mission for Decades.
One of the dangers of running your own Cadet Program and then bringing those young pilots into the system is that it affords a great chance of limiting the "world view" of the organization. Bluntly put....it is incestuous and can lead to Blinder Vision.
That one 5000 Hour pilot failed to cut the mustard does not confirm the wisdom of hiring low hour pilots with minimum qualifications. If you did that.....would you ever hire an ex-military pilot?
I have in the past made comments over the quality of North Sea junior pilots sent to Nigeria to get "Command" time before rotating back to the North Sea as Captains.....most of whom were Cadets who had moved along in the system. Some of these young guys were selected for Training Positions as well.
If you want to teach a singular proprietary method....that is exactly the way to do it I guess....you take a kid and mold him to exactly fit the mold, repeat the Company mantra, and everyone is happy as the system is then self duplicating.
Sadly, if you have built in problems for any reason....those problems are very well entrenched and inflict a great expense before they are seen to be wrong and thus are very hard to change.
I believe in broadening the Gene Pool....by drawing a widely varied pool of pilots, train them to your standards and procedures, and if they cannot adapt then down the road they go. At the same time, it pays to remember there many paths to Salvation and some are better than others. The trick is being wise enough to embrace the different but better even if it is from an "Outsider".
HC's system has those built in problems just as every large Operator has...as over time the end result is a group of folks that see but one way to do things and that begets a bit of arrogance that is counter productive at times.
His outfit has done a great job of training Airline Pilots over the years so it would seem other Operators don't mind bringing in North Sea Helicopter pilots into the fixed wing Airline business which in my mind completely shoots down this notion we should train and retain our own pilots so we have a nice homogenous pool of people working for us.
Are we confusing ability for experience HC?
5,000 hours of Ag work certainly would not be a good foundation for North Sea Offshore flying would it? I can assure you any amount of North Sea Offshore flying does not set you up to be able to Longline or fly Forest Fires.
DB....are you familiar with the Flight Operations in Alaska out of Deadhorse and the weather they fly in up there? The folks in Canada flying out of Newfie Land also encounter some interesting weather. Don't think the North Sea is the worst place on earth for Offshore Flying.....there are places that make it look pretty mild. The Chukchi Sea area is far more remote and much more inhospitable than the North Sea. US Operators out of Deadhorse have been doing IFR Underslung work as a routine mission for Decades.
One of the dangers of running your own Cadet Program and then bringing those young pilots into the system is that it affords a great chance of limiting the "world view" of the organization. Bluntly put....it is incestuous and can lead to Blinder Vision.
That one 5000 Hour pilot failed to cut the mustard does not confirm the wisdom of hiring low hour pilots with minimum qualifications. If you did that.....would you ever hire an ex-military pilot?
I have in the past made comments over the quality of North Sea junior pilots sent to Nigeria to get "Command" time before rotating back to the North Sea as Captains.....most of whom were Cadets who had moved along in the system. Some of these young guys were selected for Training Positions as well.
If you want to teach a singular proprietary method....that is exactly the way to do it I guess....you take a kid and mold him to exactly fit the mold, repeat the Company mantra, and everyone is happy as the system is then self duplicating.
Sadly, if you have built in problems for any reason....those problems are very well entrenched and inflict a great expense before they are seen to be wrong and thus are very hard to change.
I believe in broadening the Gene Pool....by drawing a widely varied pool of pilots, train them to your standards and procedures, and if they cannot adapt then down the road they go. At the same time, it pays to remember there many paths to Salvation and some are better than others. The trick is being wise enough to embrace the different but better even if it is from an "Outsider".
HC's system has those built in problems just as every large Operator has...as over time the end result is a group of folks that see but one way to do things and that begets a bit of arrogance that is counter productive at times.
His outfit has done a great job of training Airline Pilots over the years so it would seem other Operators don't mind bringing in North Sea Helicopter pilots into the fixed wing Airline business which in my mind completely shoots down this notion we should train and retain our own pilots so we have a nice homogenous pool of people working for us.
Are we confusing ability for experience HC?
5,000 hours of Ag work certainly would not be a good foundation for North Sea Offshore flying would it? I can assure you any amount of North Sea Offshore flying does not set you up to be able to Longline or fly Forest Fires.
Last edited by SASless; 14th Sep 2013 at 12:09.
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Satsuma, what the co-pilot said and what the co-pilot may have been capable of doing are two different things!!
However, what he describes is a lack of confidence that can ONLY be overcome by practising that individual particular skillset.
"More Manual Flying" does not address any specific skillsets. It is a generalisation serving no particular purpose.
However, what he describes is a lack of confidence that can ONLY be overcome by practising that individual particular skillset.
"More Manual Flying" does not address any specific skillsets. It is a generalisation serving no particular purpose.
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 14th Sep 2013 at 12:06.
Double Bogey - if you had taken the trouble to read my previous posts instead of jumping to your own pre-formed conclusions you would see that I have never actually advocated manual flying as a replacement for automation, merely that it would seem to be a 'dying art' constrained as you undoubtably are by costs. I think pilots benefit from continuation training. Taking off, navigating and landing are enough to retain manual skills? Are you serious? As for mil weather limits, I'm guessing you were never on RAF Seakings, unless your fog is thicker than our fog, or snow or windspeed! 
Last edited by Al-bert; 14th Sep 2013 at 12:44.
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Fareast Driver, I always maintain there is no substitute for experience and you must have it by the bucketload, having read you CV post.
I must therefore revisit your comments and force myself to find some merit or reasoning in them. I have to say you have not made the job easy!!
I am surprised that you seem unaware that so many CFITs have occurred also to Military pilots. I hope you can see from my last post that there are no stereotypes in these events.
I have never, ever witnessed a pilot over relying on the AFCS. in fact what I see is the absolute polar opposite of this. Under reliance, spawned by poor systems knowledge and inadequate basic AFCS and recurrent AFCS training is what I see, every day, every training mission.
All offshore types have different AFCS systems with different capabilities and different traps for the unwary. Like any system or machine it is only as good as the person using it. In terms of training for these systems one size definitely will not fit all.
The latest Eurcopter DAFCS is light years ahead of anything else being produced by Sikorsky and AW. Provided the aircraft is coupled in IAS, or ALT, or V/S or indeed any combination thereof, the aircraft will not descend below 150 feet, OR reduce AS below 60 KIAS, without overridding actions from the pilots.
For you Fareastdrriver, who likes to fly manually. No problems. Even completely uncoupled the collective is still guarded for you by the DAFCS. Thus power is protected AEO which means you do not have to look inside to pull power any more. Just beep up and the collective stops at the first limit.
OEI and this power protection morphs into NR protection. Look outside to avoid all the obstacles and just pull like crazy until you hear the low rpm Beeps. Relax and the collective motors back down to maintain exactly the required OEI reference NR.
Fareastdriver, the EC225 will pay her respects, even to your Luddite appetites allowing you to enjoy your manual flying in a power/NR protected bubble.
This is the future. This is what we need. This us why the EC225 is so important right now.
However, even the EC225 cannot fully protect the passengers from poor crew training as graphically demonstrated in the ETAP ditching. Someone up front has to engage the DAFCS to deploy the flight envelope protections.
A perfectly serviceable EC225 with full flight envelope, power and NR protection HANDFLOWN INTO THE SEA BY EN EX MILITARY PILOT because he failed to deploy the one thing that would have saved him, one tiny little button 24 inches from his face.
And what about the co-pilot sat next to him. He stated that he knew the approach was f*cked up but felt incapable of doing anything about it. All he had to do was say "I have control" and press one tiny little button 2 inches from his left thumb and he could have immediatley closed his eyes for 10 f*cking minutes and they would have been home for tea and medals with only a bruised ego and and interesting FDM trace to explain.
Can you see it now Fareastdriver?
Can you understand now what this thread is about?
Manual flying is the very core of the problem. Too much of it, in ****e weather, at the most inappropriate ends of the flight envelope. Sadly this is aided and abetted by too little time spent learning the automatics AND most appallingly, if adequate time was spent learning the automatics THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NEVER, EVER end up at the edge of the envelope in this first place.
Do you see it now Fareastdriver!!
There is none so blind that cannot see!!
I must therefore revisit your comments and force myself to find some merit or reasoning in them. I have to say you have not made the job easy!!
I am surprised that you seem unaware that so many CFITs have occurred also to Military pilots. I hope you can see from my last post that there are no stereotypes in these events.
I have never, ever witnessed a pilot over relying on the AFCS. in fact what I see is the absolute polar opposite of this. Under reliance, spawned by poor systems knowledge and inadequate basic AFCS and recurrent AFCS training is what I see, every day, every training mission.
All offshore types have different AFCS systems with different capabilities and different traps for the unwary. Like any system or machine it is only as good as the person using it. In terms of training for these systems one size definitely will not fit all.
The latest Eurcopter DAFCS is light years ahead of anything else being produced by Sikorsky and AW. Provided the aircraft is coupled in IAS, or ALT, or V/S or indeed any combination thereof, the aircraft will not descend below 150 feet, OR reduce AS below 60 KIAS, without overridding actions from the pilots.
For you Fareastdrriver, who likes to fly manually. No problems. Even completely uncoupled the collective is still guarded for you by the DAFCS. Thus power is protected AEO which means you do not have to look inside to pull power any more. Just beep up and the collective stops at the first limit.
OEI and this power protection morphs into NR protection. Look outside to avoid all the obstacles and just pull like crazy until you hear the low rpm Beeps. Relax and the collective motors back down to maintain exactly the required OEI reference NR.
Fareastdriver, the EC225 will pay her respects, even to your Luddite appetites allowing you to enjoy your manual flying in a power/NR protected bubble.
This is the future. This is what we need. This us why the EC225 is so important right now.
However, even the EC225 cannot fully protect the passengers from poor crew training as graphically demonstrated in the ETAP ditching. Someone up front has to engage the DAFCS to deploy the flight envelope protections.
A perfectly serviceable EC225 with full flight envelope, power and NR protection HANDFLOWN INTO THE SEA BY EN EX MILITARY PILOT because he failed to deploy the one thing that would have saved him, one tiny little button 24 inches from his face.
And what about the co-pilot sat next to him. He stated that he knew the approach was f*cked up but felt incapable of doing anything about it. All he had to do was say "I have control" and press one tiny little button 2 inches from his left thumb and he could have immediatley closed his eyes for 10 f*cking minutes and they would have been home for tea and medals with only a bruised ego and and interesting FDM trace to explain.
Can you see it now Fareastdriver?
Can you understand now what this thread is about?
Manual flying is the very core of the problem. Too much of it, in ****e weather, at the most inappropriate ends of the flight envelope. Sadly this is aided and abetted by too little time spent learning the automatics AND most appallingly, if adequate time was spent learning the automatics THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NEVER, EVER end up at the edge of the envelope in this first place.
Do you see it now Fareastdriver!!
There is none so blind that cannot see!!
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 14th Sep 2013 at 13:01.