AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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Victor Papa is one brave individual, and I hope he doesn't lay down and conform. Keep presenting the improvements, to the top if you can! Show them what Senior Pilot had to say: for 75 pages it is your initiative, scorned by the auditors, that can substantially improve safe use of their product.
Last edited by mary meagher; 9th Sep 2013 at 20:32.
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At a push you could probably teach SLF to do it as well, given enough time.
Yes Please!
I'm willing to give it a go in the sim. Purely for academic research, you understand.
Yes Please!
I'm willing to give it a go in the sim. Purely for academic research, you understand.
Given enough time we might be able to teach Crab even!
diginagain
I totally agree with you but the present philosophy seems to be hand fly as little as possible and engage the autopilot at Vy (SP) and deselect at the last possible minute before landing on the rig. No wonder there is a disconnect between being a pilot and systems operator/monitor.
There have been so many accidents where the crew - FW mainly but some RW - have sat there wondering what is going on as the autopilot takes them to the scene of the crash - in the early days it wasn't unusual for Airbus pilots to say "what is it doing now?" The infamous incident where a fully serviceable Airbus did a low pass and instead of climbing away it stayed level and flew into the trees - I believe the wrong mode in the autopilot had been selected!
You need to maintain your manual flying skills for the time that everything seems to be going wrong - the crew at Sumburgh may have been distracted at the critical point where the IAS started to decay but they should have been able to recover. The ETAP crew should have done a visual approach to the rig - flown round it with the rig on the handling pilot's side so he had a reference - especially in those conditions and at night – ETAP was visual from Mungo which is about 15nm away. This would require good handling skills for night flying. To descend to 300ft 7nm from the rig was an odd decision!
It is no good saying that flying using the autopilot is safer - with 2 possible CFIT in modern SPs it doesn't compare well with the early 332L, with a simple autopilot/coupler I flew, which in my time didn't fly into the sea!
HF
I totally agree with you but the present philosophy seems to be hand fly as little as possible and engage the autopilot at Vy (SP) and deselect at the last possible minute before landing on the rig. No wonder there is a disconnect between being a pilot and systems operator/monitor.
There have been so many accidents where the crew - FW mainly but some RW - have sat there wondering what is going on as the autopilot takes them to the scene of the crash - in the early days it wasn't unusual for Airbus pilots to say "what is it doing now?" The infamous incident where a fully serviceable Airbus did a low pass and instead of climbing away it stayed level and flew into the trees - I believe the wrong mode in the autopilot had been selected!
You need to maintain your manual flying skills for the time that everything seems to be going wrong - the crew at Sumburgh may have been distracted at the critical point where the IAS started to decay but they should have been able to recover. The ETAP crew should have done a visual approach to the rig - flown round it with the rig on the handling pilot's side so he had a reference - especially in those conditions and at night – ETAP was visual from Mungo which is about 15nm away. This would require good handling skills for night flying. To descend to 300ft 7nm from the rig was an odd decision!
It is no good saying that flying using the autopilot is safer - with 2 possible CFIT in modern SPs it doesn't compare well with the early 332L, with a simple autopilot/coupler I flew, which in my time didn't fly into the sea!
HF
Last edited by Hummingfrog; 9th Sep 2013 at 21:21.
Given enough time we might be able to teach Crab even!
Instead, I selected an attitude, trimmed the aircraft and chose a power setting that would give me the required RoD - somehow we stayed within half a division of localiser and glidepath all the way down.....must have been luck I suppose
Blind Hogs do find an Acorn now and then.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
shock horror, I flew an ILS today to minima with absolutely no autopilot modes engaged whatsoever - goodness me what was I thinking, hand-flying is just so tricky!
Instead, I selected an attitude, trimmed the aircraft and chose a power setting that would give me the required RoD - somehow we stayed within half a division of localiser and glidepath all the way down.....must have been luck I suppose
Instead, I selected an attitude, trimmed the aircraft and chose a power setting that would give me the required RoD - somehow we stayed within half a division of localiser and glidepath all the way down.....must have been luck I suppose
Or to put it another way, Yawn.
Anyway, what this thread shows is that the old adage is true - you can ask 5 pilots the correct way to do something, and get 6 different answers.
There are a wide range of views here on how to fix the world of helicopters, the best way to operate etc, with a lot of confliction. So how is the correct strategy, out of all the crowd, to be determined? There would only be one thing worse than the present situation, and that would be to get everyone doing things the same, wrong way.
Seems like something has been lost along with the adoption of exceedingly clever Ap's and no amount of Crab bashing can excuse poor flying skills on the part of NS pilots. I never flew commercially but thirty years of SH and SAR Wessex and Seaking was a damn sight more demanding than rigs and Sumburgh and yes, I've landed on rigs (and Sumburgh) by day and night in the ****tiest weather imaginable and in both hemisheres as well as numerous ships, some of which were never designed to be landed on and mountain tops that shouldn't have been landed on in the prevailing conditions! Come on guys, stop making excuses for wrong check lists, over complicated autopilots, checks and procedures. Learn to pole the bloody things and if company accountants don't agree sue or shoot the b@
rds!
rds!
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simplicity and fundamentals
Crab is right here ... people enrolling in the NS often cannot hand fly an approach, you know it is true, its not that hard. Some people don't even know whether they should use the cyclic to maintain a descent angle or the collective. As for illogical AP modes 
Great to see simplicity and rationalisation being taken seriously here.
HC: "There would only be one thing worse than the present situation, and that would be to get everyone doing things the same, wrong way." - that's prophetically true.
Great to see simplicity and rationalisation being taken seriously here.
HC: "There would only be one thing worse than the present situation, and that would be to get everyone doing things the same, wrong way." - that's prophetically true.
Last edited by AnFI; 9th Sep 2013 at 22:52.
A-b, so you have had a long aviation career doing the things you did in the way you did them, without crashing. So bully for you, you must have all the right ideas!
Trouble is, so have very nearly all the rest of us. Just because one person, or even 10 people, get through a lifetime of aviation without crashing doesn't mean they are flyboy gods. Chances are it just means they were lucky, or at least not unlucky. It depresses me to hear the "I've always done it like this, its worked for me" line because its so unintelligent and fails to appreciate the nature of statistics and chance. The right way to operate is based on careful consideration of what could go wrong, how to trap it before it causes an accident, having error tolerant procedures to allow for inevitable human error and all the other good stuff which too many people never think about.
This is why, say, a democracy on how to operate would be a complete disaster. But that's the problem, which dictator is going to decide the right way?
Trouble is, so have very nearly all the rest of us. Just because one person, or even 10 people, get through a lifetime of aviation without crashing doesn't mean they are flyboy gods. Chances are it just means they were lucky, or at least not unlucky. It depresses me to hear the "I've always done it like this, its worked for me" line because its so unintelligent and fails to appreciate the nature of statistics and chance. The right way to operate is based on careful consideration of what could go wrong, how to trap it before it causes an accident, having error tolerant procedures to allow for inevitable human error and all the other good stuff which too many people never think about.
This is why, say, a democracy on how to operate would be a complete disaster. But that's the problem, which dictator is going to decide the right way?
HC - I don't claim to have all the right ideas, but it seems you think you do.
I, and most of the people I knew, put more emphasis on flying the aircraft rather than 'pushing buttons'. We had fewer buttons true, but the way we waggled those sticks kept us out of the sea. Maybe it might still work for todays pilots?
I, and most of the people I knew, put more emphasis on flying the aircraft rather than 'pushing buttons'. We had fewer buttons true, but the way we waggled those sticks kept us out of the sea. Maybe it might still work for todays pilots?
A-B,
You stated "No amount of Crab Bashing can excuse poor flying skills of North Sea Pilots.". Care to expound upon that will you....as that is a serious accusation.....the lack of flying skills you are talking of amongst the North Sea Pilots.
Do you excuse former RAF pilots from those you consider having poor pilot skills or are your comments all inclusive no matter the background and former training? Do you allow a subset of former RAF SAR Pilots to be excused from those suggestions as North Sea Pilots they too have sub-standard skills?
Why do you think North Sea Pilots have poor skills?
What is a cause for that you think?
Care to cite some data or incidents that would lead you to think of North Sea Pilots as you seem to do based upon your comments?
How would you remedy this unsatisfactory situation you see extant on the North Sea?
I have advocated a "shields down review" on the situation....so drop your Shields and tell us what your really think please.
You stated "No amount of Crab Bashing can excuse poor flying skills of North Sea Pilots.". Care to expound upon that will you....as that is a serious accusation.....the lack of flying skills you are talking of amongst the North Sea Pilots.
Do you excuse former RAF pilots from those you consider having poor pilot skills or are your comments all inclusive no matter the background and former training? Do you allow a subset of former RAF SAR Pilots to be excused from those suggestions as North Sea Pilots they too have sub-standard skills?
Why do you think North Sea Pilots have poor skills?
What is a cause for that you think?
Care to cite some data or incidents that would lead you to think of North Sea Pilots as you seem to do based upon your comments?
How would you remedy this unsatisfactory situation you see extant on the North Sea?
I have advocated a "shields down review" on the situation....so drop your Shields and tell us what your really think please.
Last edited by SASless; 9th Sep 2013 at 23:25.
SAS - simple, fly the aircraft! If you need inumerable checklists and ap options to fly an IFR approach to minima and you still fly into the sea (which most NS posters on here seem to think is what happened recently) then someone wasn't flying the aircraft. I cannot recall anyone that I knew in my RAF service making that particular mistake. More flying practice, less system monitoring perhaps?
SASless
I don't think that NS pilots have poor skills it is just that their hand flying skills do get degraded over time.
I joined the NS in 1990 to fly the 332L and began line flying up to the Shetland Basin. At that time the company mainly had long range contracts so we would sit in the cruise for 2-2.5 hrs with the height hold in and adjusting the heading every so often using the bug. We would take turns flying sectors so generally the Capt flew out and the Co-Pilot back. The rig landing pilot would be decided by the wind direction. So in a 5.5hr flight I might handle the controls for 5-10MINS. A 5000hr NS pilot could have, therefore, about 200hrs actually flying the 332L plus an hour for each base check he has done!
I don't know if the expressions "getting into an a/c" and "putting an a/c on" are familiar to you as a cousin but I felt I was "getting into an a/c" when I flew the line ie I didn't feel fully at one with it, I felt I couldn't read what it was doing. I then transferred to shuttle operations on the 332L this entailed very short sectors - hand flown and up to 21 landings a sortie - both day and night. I soon felt I was "putting an a/c on" as I could sense what it was doing - I didn't need to always check speeds/height etc as my spatial awareness was so much better as I flew the a/c more.
I think this is what is happening in the NS. You might join with good handling skills but they degrade with time and lack of practice. The relentless pressure to use the autopilot functions at every opportunity - driven by whom?? Just exacerbates the problem.
If I was HC's Dicator I would mandate that manual flying should be done at every opportunity but set wx limits for when the autopilot should be used. The NS does have some fine weather days when manual approaches can be safely flown to rigs and runways.
If the NS mantra is always use the autopilot as it is safer actually admits that NS pilots are not capable of safe manual approaches.
There is something wrong! We shouldn't see perfectly serviceable a/c ending up in the water
HF
Why do you think North Sea Pilots have poor skills?
I joined the NS in 1990 to fly the 332L and began line flying up to the Shetland Basin. At that time the company mainly had long range contracts so we would sit in the cruise for 2-2.5 hrs with the height hold in and adjusting the heading every so often using the bug. We would take turns flying sectors so generally the Capt flew out and the Co-Pilot back. The rig landing pilot would be decided by the wind direction. So in a 5.5hr flight I might handle the controls for 5-10MINS. A 5000hr NS pilot could have, therefore, about 200hrs actually flying the 332L plus an hour for each base check he has done!
I don't know if the expressions "getting into an a/c" and "putting an a/c on" are familiar to you as a cousin but I felt I was "getting into an a/c" when I flew the line ie I didn't feel fully at one with it, I felt I couldn't read what it was doing. I then transferred to shuttle operations on the 332L this entailed very short sectors - hand flown and up to 21 landings a sortie - both day and night. I soon felt I was "putting an a/c on" as I could sense what it was doing - I didn't need to always check speeds/height etc as my spatial awareness was so much better as I flew the a/c more.
I think this is what is happening in the NS. You might join with good handling skills but they degrade with time and lack of practice. The relentless pressure to use the autopilot functions at every opportunity - driven by whom?? Just exacerbates the problem.
If I was HC's Dicator I would mandate that manual flying should be done at every opportunity but set wx limits for when the autopilot should be used. The NS does have some fine weather days when manual approaches can be safely flown to rigs and runways.
If the NS mantra is always use the autopilot as it is safer actually admits that NS pilots are not capable of safe manual approaches.
There is something wrong! We shouldn't see perfectly serviceable a/c ending up in the water
HF
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Does the SP have radalt? If so, is there a procedure in NS for setting it at approach minima? Do NS operators carry div fuel or are the locations too remote?
Soz for all of the questions...
Soz for all of the questions...
HC - you really do need to take a chill-pill (in the modern vernacular) - I was only riposting SASless' swipe at me and you suddenly believe I am bigging myself up as some skygod! calm down dear, calm down.
Flying skills are perishable, no matter how good you are (or think you are) - it's one thing coping with a situation and another being comfortable and in control with spare capacity - that's what regular training gives you, both the skills and the confidence in your ability.
Flying skills are perishable, no matter how good you are (or think you are) - it's one thing coping with a situation and another being comfortable and in control with spare capacity - that's what regular training gives you, both the skills and the confidence in your ability.
I've not been around for a couple of days so apologies for referring to a previous posts but I feel that there are a couple of points that need clarification:
I disagree. The EmLub system is designed to work in the case of total loss of MRGB oil. It is not a 'fix all problems' solution that can make up for the catastrophic failure of the main gearbox shaft. This was the case for REDW and CHCN.
Hmmm, I wonder which company operated REDW's gearbox before it had recently returned to EC for overhaul...? Yep, like you said, 'extremely lucky'.
This was Air France Flight 296. Due to the unexpected low height for the fly-past (30'), the aircraft engaged it's 'alpha protection' mode so that when the co-pilot selected TOGA power, the elevators did not respond to the pilot's command. This was to prevent the aircraft stalling because it was already being flown at maximum angle of attack. The outcome, like you said, was that rather than climbing away, the aircraft flew straight into the trees.
This was Air France Flight 296. Due to the unexpected low height for the fly-past (30'), the aircraft engaged it's 'alpha protection' mode so that when the co-pilot selected TOGA power, the elevators did not respond to the pilot's command. This was to prevent the aircraft stalling because it was already being flown at maximum angle of attack. The outcome, like you said, was that rather than climbing away, the aircraft flew straight into the trees.
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Quite reasonably this is the time for pondering whilst we wait (no doubt for some time) for the AAIB report to divulge pretty much all.
But to me there still seems to be not enough discussion here on why, as Al-bert says, the aircraft just wasn't being flown here, given the assumed basic scenario. IR rated single pilots are expected to be able to perform these basic scanning functions on an IFR approach without any problem, and indeed this happens frequently and normally in the corporate world. Yet here we had a 3 axis autopilot, plus an IR rated co-pilot, and it apprently wasn't done. On, it would seem, a pretty straightforward IFR approach over flattish terrain.
We have opinion that says more automation is required with 4 axis autopilots used. And other opinion including the "children of Magenta" video from Helimutt that advocates selective use of less automation and more hand flying.
Before people get too carried away with the need for more to be spent on more training, better training, better avionics, autopilots, check lists, SOPs etc it would be good to get a sense of perspective on this accident. Just how many IMC approaches with say a 500ft or lower cloudbase safely take place in the NS every year? Anyone care to guestimate?
This approach ended up tragically. But all those others were presumably satisfactory, despite/because of the level of training/aircraft equipment etc. Or have NS pilots been worried for some time that there have been rather too many IFR approach errors that could well have caused an accident? And if so, have they been voiced on Pprune? I don't recall any such major threads.
But to me there still seems to be not enough discussion here on why, as Al-bert says, the aircraft just wasn't being flown here, given the assumed basic scenario. IR rated single pilots are expected to be able to perform these basic scanning functions on an IFR approach without any problem, and indeed this happens frequently and normally in the corporate world. Yet here we had a 3 axis autopilot, plus an IR rated co-pilot, and it apprently wasn't done. On, it would seem, a pretty straightforward IFR approach over flattish terrain.
We have opinion that says more automation is required with 4 axis autopilots used. And other opinion including the "children of Magenta" video from Helimutt that advocates selective use of less automation and more hand flying.
Before people get too carried away with the need for more to be spent on more training, better training, better avionics, autopilots, check lists, SOPs etc it would be good to get a sense of perspective on this accident. Just how many IMC approaches with say a 500ft or lower cloudbase safely take place in the NS every year? Anyone care to guestimate?
This approach ended up tragically. But all those others were presumably satisfactory, despite/because of the level of training/aircraft equipment etc. Or have NS pilots been worried for some time that there have been rather too many IFR approach errors that could well have caused an accident? And if so, have they been voiced on Pprune? I don't recall any such major threads.
75 pages and counting!
At the end of the day, the 2 pilots will lie in their beds and know exactly what went wrong - and they will have to live with it for the rest of their lives. Where they have gone, others will surely follow, perhaps for the following reasons:
As has been alluded to (and I subscribe very heavily to this theory), modern helos AND pilots employ modern techniques...perhaps, just perhaps we are running a little too fast into the future with aviation in general. Example: French A330 lost in bad weather due to poor understanding of basic aviation. The pilots were unable to resort to basic SA and flying techniques.
Crab referred to a colleague of his who flew 747's and needed to privately fly a light a/c out of hours to stay sharp. Ironically, one of my closest colleagues is a senior TRE for Virgin and he, too flies privately, doing aerobatics - to keep his hand in! Modern a/c coupled with modern flying techniques leave NO room for basic appreciation of flying skills.
Secondly: As has been touched on by Senior Pilot in post: #1495. The SOP's and processes of these companies are flawed due to bureaucracy yet when they are flagged up - senior management either can't or won't do anything about it.
Thirdly: Training programmes employed by these companies are unfit for purpose. They have been driven in the wrong direction for too long. We are seeing evidence of this even in the mil. I was teaching a Merlin driver the other day and she didn't know what to do after the flare phase of an auto because she hadn't been taught it for years and years!!!
Money (in the commercial world) has a lot to do with this as the emphasis is on automation and efficiency measures and not basic flying skills like teaching autos / recoveries from unusual attitudes / IVR / Settling with power / downwind approaches etc etc etc.
The above might be partly the answer to why the Norwegians have an impeccable track record...perhaps?
All food for thought. But I would wager a years salary that the crash eminated from some or all of these, in an environment where different pilots had different 'type' experiences, resulting in a most unfortunate outcome for 4 innocent bystanders.
For some of you reading this - you could be next if you don't break the chain...
At the end of the day, the 2 pilots will lie in their beds and know exactly what went wrong - and they will have to live with it for the rest of their lives. Where they have gone, others will surely follow, perhaps for the following reasons:
As has been alluded to (and I subscribe very heavily to this theory), modern helos AND pilots employ modern techniques...perhaps, just perhaps we are running a little too fast into the future with aviation in general. Example: French A330 lost in bad weather due to poor understanding of basic aviation. The pilots were unable to resort to basic SA and flying techniques.
Crab referred to a colleague of his who flew 747's and needed to privately fly a light a/c out of hours to stay sharp. Ironically, one of my closest colleagues is a senior TRE for Virgin and he, too flies privately, doing aerobatics - to keep his hand in! Modern a/c coupled with modern flying techniques leave NO room for basic appreciation of flying skills.
Secondly: As has been touched on by Senior Pilot in post: #1495. The SOP's and processes of these companies are flawed due to bureaucracy yet when they are flagged up - senior management either can't or won't do anything about it.
Thirdly: Training programmes employed by these companies are unfit for purpose. They have been driven in the wrong direction for too long. We are seeing evidence of this even in the mil. I was teaching a Merlin driver the other day and she didn't know what to do after the flare phase of an auto because she hadn't been taught it for years and years!!!
Money (in the commercial world) has a lot to do with this as the emphasis is on automation and efficiency measures and not basic flying skills like teaching autos / recoveries from unusual attitudes / IVR / Settling with power / downwind approaches etc etc etc.
The above might be partly the answer to why the Norwegians have an impeccable track record...perhaps?
All food for thought. But I would wager a years salary that the crash eminated from some or all of these, in an environment where different pilots had different 'type' experiences, resulting in a most unfortunate outcome for 4 innocent bystanders.
For some of you reading this - you could be next if you don't break the chain...