AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
The 225 is happy to descend fully coupled using NAV or HEADING plus IAS ( we use 120 going down) and ALTA. or even VS (which we hardly ever use- why start a descent/climb without tell "George" where to stop. He's a wonderful autopilot but not a deep thinker.)
Never had any problem with this.
If you wish you can change IAS using the chinese hat on the cyclic and VS with the beeper on the collective.
Alt capture with ALTA is very accurate and I have not seen it blow through any selected alt.
Once the alt is captured you can fine tune alt using the beeper on the collective say if you want to desend a few feet to catch a radalt height or climb a few feet for whatever reason such as a QNH change.
IAS selection using the chinese hat is very positive and you can remain fully coupled to <40 Kts. so it is very nice for rig landings.
It is also perfectly happy flying a fully coupled ILS.
The go around mode works a charm and is very positive.
The mod 45 doesn't send an "alarm" in the meaning of the word - what you get in extended descents ->125 kts is a HUMS warning and usually a "No Mod 45" caption once you get the IAS <125 it usually clears in about 5 minutes. Annoying but hardly alarming.
There seems to be a lot of misunderstanding on PPrune as to what these (No Mod 45 / Mod 45 Fail ) warnings mean. Some seem to think it denotes an actual warning of a transmission problem. In fact it is Hums telling you it is not getting the vibration readings it needs due to Hums priority or an out of acquisition parameters.
Once we all got trained in the acquision parameters it certainly doesn't happen very often some folks initially were selecting 123-124 knots going down and getting warmings we now select 120 and the system seems to like that.
During return to service training we got some HUMS No Mod 45 warnings when doing multiple rig circuits because of extended low torque , low IAS. returning to Q>60 and IAS>60 for a couple of minutes would clear the warning.
I am a former S-92 driver and new to the 225 but think the 225 is a fine aircraft. It took a while to get used to the differences between the 2 aircraft but that is normal. You have to learn to dance with your new girl and can't moon over the old one. I will keep my 92 tattoo however. LOL.
I am certainly not a 225 guru so take the above for what it is - ramblings of a driver, airframe.
In the wake of this tragic accident I hope we will see a small change in training priorities with an better Ops manual review with focus on changes since previous training / SOP / Use of automation syllabus. Just opinion.
What I don't want is a blizzard of emails, forms and paperwork from on high.
Too often when something happens there is a kneejerk reaction of this type because some folks think it necessary or are instructed to be seen "doing something" to solve the problem and reinventing the wheel looks better vs reinforcing aready good SOPs ect. (of course In my youth an ops manual was about 5 pages of really large font, double spaced writing and boiled down to "Stay Above 5 Feet and Don't do Nothing Stupid!" there was also a "Common Sense Will prevail" section.)
I think that we as an industry have needed to take a good look at ourselves and where we are, where we are going for a little while. I hope that if this happens the people doing the looking are not the folks who need looking at. Even those with the best of intentions find it hard to be self critical.I've seen that too often. I also hope that they will talk to the troops in the field an not only the generals in the chateau way behind the lines.
Never had any problem with this.
If you wish you can change IAS using the chinese hat on the cyclic and VS with the beeper on the collective.
Alt capture with ALTA is very accurate and I have not seen it blow through any selected alt.
Once the alt is captured you can fine tune alt using the beeper on the collective say if you want to desend a few feet to catch a radalt height or climb a few feet for whatever reason such as a QNH change.
IAS selection using the chinese hat is very positive and you can remain fully coupled to <40 Kts. so it is very nice for rig landings.
It is also perfectly happy flying a fully coupled ILS.
The go around mode works a charm and is very positive.
The mod 45 doesn't send an "alarm" in the meaning of the word - what you get in extended descents ->125 kts is a HUMS warning and usually a "No Mod 45" caption once you get the IAS <125 it usually clears in about 5 minutes. Annoying but hardly alarming.
There seems to be a lot of misunderstanding on PPrune as to what these (No Mod 45 / Mod 45 Fail ) warnings mean. Some seem to think it denotes an actual warning of a transmission problem. In fact it is Hums telling you it is not getting the vibration readings it needs due to Hums priority or an out of acquisition parameters.
Once we all got trained in the acquision parameters it certainly doesn't happen very often some folks initially were selecting 123-124 knots going down and getting warmings we now select 120 and the system seems to like that.
During return to service training we got some HUMS No Mod 45 warnings when doing multiple rig circuits because of extended low torque , low IAS. returning to Q>60 and IAS>60 for a couple of minutes would clear the warning.
I am a former S-92 driver and new to the 225 but think the 225 is a fine aircraft. It took a while to get used to the differences between the 2 aircraft but that is normal. You have to learn to dance with your new girl and can't moon over the old one. I will keep my 92 tattoo however. LOL.
I am certainly not a 225 guru so take the above for what it is - ramblings of a driver, airframe.
In the wake of this tragic accident I hope we will see a small change in training priorities with an better Ops manual review with focus on changes since previous training / SOP / Use of automation syllabus. Just opinion.
What I don't want is a blizzard of emails, forms and paperwork from on high.
Too often when something happens there is a kneejerk reaction of this type because some folks think it necessary or are instructed to be seen "doing something" to solve the problem and reinventing the wheel looks better vs reinforcing aready good SOPs ect. (of course In my youth an ops manual was about 5 pages of really large font, double spaced writing and boiled down to "Stay Above 5 Feet and Don't do Nothing Stupid!" there was also a "Common Sense Will prevail" section.)
I think that we as an industry have needed to take a good look at ourselves and where we are, where we are going for a little while. I hope that if this happens the people doing the looking are not the folks who need looking at. Even those with the best of intentions find it hard to be self critical.I've seen that too often. I also hope that they will talk to the troops in the field an not only the generals in the chateau way behind the lines.
Last edited by albatross; 7th Sep 2013 at 07:14.
llamaman
I hope you weren't including me in that comment.
I have flown with some very capable civilian trained pilots as well as some mil trained who were not as good. I was trying to explain to HC that there is a different concept applicable to basic Mil Training - basically accurate speed control is paramount for tactical reasons, therefore, using the cyclic to change altitude and as a consequence the speed varies is not acceptable during routine operations.
HF
There seems to be a small contingent within these forums desperate to drag everything back to a military v civilian bitchfest, a shame as this only serves as a petty sideshow to some really thought-provoking posts.
I have flown with some very capable civilian trained pilots as well as some mil trained who were not as good. I was trying to explain to HC that there is a different concept applicable to basic Mil Training - basically accurate speed control is paramount for tactical reasons, therefore, using the cyclic to change altitude and as a consequence the speed varies is not acceptable during routine operations.HF
I think it was HC's last comment that was directed at me since I have vigorously defended milSAR on other threads.
HF is entirely correct about mil training - it is just different to what non-mil will have experienced because it has a specific purpose.
HF - only did JP 3 myself before I managed to get the helicopter slot I joined up for
Albatross - it seems that everyone is very happy with the 225 autopilot - it's just the L2 that seems to be taking flak.
HF is entirely correct about mil training - it is just different to what non-mil will have experienced because it has a specific purpose.
HF - only did JP 3 myself before I managed to get the helicopter slot I joined up for
Albatross - it seems that everyone is very happy with the 225 autopilot - it's just the L2 that seems to be taking flak.
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ALBATROSS
I hope you do mind me saying, your post is the most informative, most incisive take on the current state of affairs.
We need you on the HSSG!!
Striking at the heart of any matter is the singular failing of a culture of management with poor aviation, let alone helicopter knowledge, surrounded by "Yes" men in the senior Training and Operational Positions whose weakness blights us all.
How can it ever be acceptable for Type Rating Flight training (SIM) on the most sophisticated Helicopters in civil operation, to be delivered by individuals who have never flown the type. Fix this first before anything else.
We need you on the HSSG!!
Striking at the heart of any matter is the singular failing of a culture of management with poor aviation, let alone helicopter knowledge, surrounded by "Yes" men in the senior Training and Operational Positions whose weakness blights us all.
How can it ever be acceptable for Type Rating Flight training (SIM) on the most sophisticated Helicopters in civil operation, to be delivered by individuals who have never flown the type. Fix this first before anything else.
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 7th Sep 2013 at 08:09.
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CRAB and HF, the things you talk about are long forgotten by us ex mil and civilian pilots mainly because we are not spending 90% of our flight time practising these things in the air.
In offshore flying, done properly, there is no scope for exploring the edges of envelopes or pissing about with PAT etc. Our 6 month recurrent training is arguably not sufficient and certainly is spent doing other things than what you two keeping discussing on this thread. It confuses most of us.
In the "average" offshore helicopter your concepts are already extent. This accident, in so far as we know, may well have been caused by the crew not realising early enough that their speed was decaying due to an inappropriate application of AP modes and power setting. Recognising these errors starts with understanding the AP display indications and a very very robust knowledge of "Mixed" mode flying and its potential pitfalls.
Having said all that, to illustrate how annoying your detail can be, you talk about cyclic controlling height, collective control speed or whatever, but on the back of the power curve all these concepts are different especially that the cyclic can no longer hold height. This why in the later EC models, if you are dumb enough to deploy ALT or V/S alone on the back of the power curve, the AP engages the mode on the collective.
Basic flight training is what it always is but we are way beyond PAT when the AP has control of just one AXIS (vertical and/or longitudinal).
For those who do not like the term "Mixed Mode", we are exploring this term now because we cannot describe the condition where ALT is alone on the collective anymore using 3/4 Axis nomenclature. Also, the term "Mixed Mode" we want to firmly associate with the concept that the Pilot Flying must take custody one or more controls.
Someone said earlier, that if they were forced to fly an approach in 3 Axis mode he would prefer to engage IAS and not V/S on the cyclic. I agree with this because from the very outset, the pilot has to modulate collective to maintain the vertical profile and is therefore far less likely to forget it at MDA at min IMC IAS.
DB
In offshore flying, done properly, there is no scope for exploring the edges of envelopes or pissing about with PAT etc. Our 6 month recurrent training is arguably not sufficient and certainly is spent doing other things than what you two keeping discussing on this thread. It confuses most of us.
In the "average" offshore helicopter your concepts are already extent. This accident, in so far as we know, may well have been caused by the crew not realising early enough that their speed was decaying due to an inappropriate application of AP modes and power setting. Recognising these errors starts with understanding the AP display indications and a very very robust knowledge of "Mixed" mode flying and its potential pitfalls.
Having said all that, to illustrate how annoying your detail can be, you talk about cyclic controlling height, collective control speed or whatever, but on the back of the power curve all these concepts are different especially that the cyclic can no longer hold height. This why in the later EC models, if you are dumb enough to deploy ALT or V/S alone on the back of the power curve, the AP engages the mode on the collective.
Basic flight training is what it always is but we are way beyond PAT when the AP has control of just one AXIS (vertical and/or longitudinal).
For those who do not like the term "Mixed Mode", we are exploring this term now because we cannot describe the condition where ALT is alone on the collective anymore using 3/4 Axis nomenclature. Also, the term "Mixed Mode" we want to firmly associate with the concept that the Pilot Flying must take custody one or more controls.
Someone said earlier, that if they were forced to fly an approach in 3 Axis mode he would prefer to engage IAS and not V/S on the cyclic. I agree with this because from the very outset, the pilot has to modulate collective to maintain the vertical profile and is therefore far less likely to forget it at MDA at min IMC IAS.
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 7th Sep 2013 at 08:46.
I have actually seen in the last years a true effort in many ways to avoid the kneejerk reaction syndrome - in the early 80s it was horrible.
For example there was blade strike incident and a customer aviation manager came out with a new rule that we could not land within 100 feet of a tree on pain of dismissal. The next day we loaded up the pax, flew to the work site circled and returned to base. The power line right of way was 100 feet wide so we couldn't land.
Rule rescinded about 20 minutes after the construction super called the President of the Corporation concerned. LOL
There are a lot of good folks in training / management in many companies but there seems to be something wrong in the system.
I can't comment on the North Sea operations or the companies operating therein in particular and my previous post was an attempt at an overview not location or company specific.
There have been a lot of great suggestions on this thread which if acted upon may improve safety worldwide.
A vast improvement over the 92 witch-hunt / screamfest LOL.
For example there was blade strike incident and a customer aviation manager came out with a new rule that we could not land within 100 feet of a tree on pain of dismissal. The next day we loaded up the pax, flew to the work site circled and returned to base. The power line right of way was 100 feet wide so we couldn't land.
Rule rescinded about 20 minutes after the construction super called the President of the Corporation concerned. LOL
There are a lot of good folks in training / management in many companies but there seems to be something wrong in the system.
I can't comment on the North Sea operations or the companies operating therein in particular and my previous post was an attempt at an overview not location or company specific.
There have been a lot of great suggestions on this thread which if acted upon may improve safety worldwide.
A vast improvement over the 92 witch-hunt / screamfest LOL.
Last edited by albatross; 7th Sep 2013 at 08:01.
“We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized.
I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization”
By Gaius Petronius Arbiter (Roman Satirist) 27 – 66 AD
I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization”
By Gaius Petronius Arbiter (Roman Satirist) 27 – 66 AD
I'm not quite sure what HC means with these comments. It would be an unusual scenario to see one flying near a power limit during a descent on an instrument approach. There are pros/cons to both techniques of flying an approach suffice to say that a modern 4-axis AP will take care of things much more accurately than your average line pilot!
The last comment smacks of a chip on the shoulder, military pilots are no more or less indoctrinated than their civilian counterparts. There seems to be a small contingent within these forums desperate to drag everything back to a military v civilian bitchfest, a shame as this only serves as a petty sideshow to some really thought-provoking posts.
The last comment smacks of a chip on the shoulder, military pilots are no more or less indoctrinated than their civilian counterparts. There seems to be a small contingent within these forums desperate to drag everything back to a military v civilian bitchfest, a shame as this only serves as a petty sideshow to some really thought-provoking posts.
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DB
You say that recognising an error of decaying airspeed starts with understanding AP displays and a very very robust knowledge of mixed mode flying.
Doesn't it start with simply monitoring the ASI? For those of us that have never flown an SP L2, what form is the ASI? A big round dial or digital display within a screen?
You say that recognising an error of decaying airspeed starts with understanding AP displays and a very very robust knowledge of mixed mode flying.
Doesn't it start with simply monitoring the ASI? For those of us that have never flown an SP L2, what form is the ASI? A big round dial or digital display within a screen?
Last edited by rotorspeed; 7th Sep 2013 at 09:58.
and not some simplistic BS that only works under limited circumstances.
Conversely, using collective to control speed and cyclic to control RoD only works in specific circumstances and only when using the higher autopilot functions.
If you want to fly a helicopter like a FW, then fine but it seems to have worked for many years when flown as it was designed.
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HC
The only reason that normal techniques don't work on 332L ILSs is because the autopilot is a piece of sh1t.
It is the only aircraft I have ever flown where, when you lower the lever the nose comes up and the speed bleeds off. The converse happens and both helpfully occur over a three to five second period so the ab initio HP is forever behind the aircraft.
If you fly the 'normal' technique in a 225, no problem -- I bet you didn't have to teach ab initio pilots to fly the glide path on cyclic in that.
It is the only aircraft I have ever flown where, when you lower the lever the nose comes up and the speed bleeds off. The converse happens and both helpfully occur over a three to five second period so the ab initio HP is forever behind the aircraft.
If you fly the 'normal' technique in a 225, no problem -- I bet you didn't have to teach ab initio pilots to fly the glide path on cyclic in that.
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The only reason that normal techniques don't work on 332L ILSs is because the autopilot is a piece of sh1t.
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There are a lot of good folks in training / management in many companies but there seems to be something wrong in the system.
...
There have been a lot of great suggestions on this thread which if acted upon may improve safety worldwide.
...
There have been a lot of great suggestions on this thread which if acted upon may improve safety worldwide.
The only stuff that changes in my company is that driven by clients or EASA, and that is mostly addressing non-problems.
As an example of the former we had a stabilised approach policy introduced due to customer insistence (we already had a speed stable one for IFR approaches) that introduced ROD limits that had us all hauling the speed back before 1000' on the ILS and had us royally screwing up ATC. So some of that was binned so we are now in the crazy situation where onshore IFR and offshore have no ROD limit but onshore VFR approaches do. Thanks for your help there! My wife and kids feel so much less anxious!
As to EASA bollocks we now can't commence an IFR approach at an onshore airfield if the temperature is zero or sub zero unless we have minima plus 400' cloud base and possibly some visibility limit -- sorry for the vagueness, but there is so much of this bollocks that comes out nowadays it's in one ear and out the other. This, from my experience solves a problem that only exists in EASA's imagination because they can't get their head round the idea of a limited icing clearance. I can only remember one crew getting badly caught out with icing in all the time I've done this, and that was because they were being idiots.
Rant over.
Last edited by Ray Joe Czech; 7th Sep 2013 at 12:47.
“We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized.
I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization”
By Gaius Petronius Arbiter (Roman Satirist) 27 – 66 AD
I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization”
By Gaius Petronius Arbiter (Roman Satirist) 27 – 66 AD
Crab, as I said there is no way I'm going to rid you of your indoctrination via Prune. Just to add one other point, moving the collective up and down disturbs the airframe more than slight cyclic adjustments, and in particular makes the engine noise wind up and down more, which destabilises the passengers' calmness, something which these days is a precious commodity. So you see, there are some things you have yet to have to concern yourself with.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 7th Sep 2013 at 11:35.
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GF
Yes, but I wouldn't want you to get the idea you would be constantly battling against it. You get used to the idiosyncrasies of it but it is quite striking converting onto or off type.
You learn when you have to pay particular attention to it, and it is much better than having no autopilot at all.
You learn when you have to pay particular attention to it, and it is much better than having no autopilot at all.
Last edited by Ray Joe Czech; 7th Sep 2013 at 11:52.
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I understand, thanks for the clarification. It seems though that the system requires fairly keen monitoring and/or manipulation to keep everything running smoothly?
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GF
Not as much as you think. ILS as discussed because of collective-pitch linkage, on level off, fine in stable flight. The PF would be hands on for low-level stuff.
Last edited by Ray Joe Czech; 7th Sep 2013 at 11:51.
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ROTORSPEED, monitoring the IAS will let you know when the speed is decaying. Knowledge of the AP Display and the pitfalls of 3 axis at min IAS IMC avoids the speed from decaying in the first place. That was my point.
DB
DB
Perhaps it is time to put to bed the differences in basic training and using different techniques to control height/speed.
We are assuming that, as the serviceability of the SP seems to have been OK, that there has been some form of procedural/pilot error. So how did this happen?
We have 2 experienced pilots flying a relatively simple IFR approach, in IMC, as cloud was probably scattered at 200ft, broken at 300ft. They knew the MDH was 300ft so would be trying to fly as accurately as possible to achieve the required visual clues at, or just before, the MAP. Yet the airspeed was allowed to decay to such an extent that the a/c developed a RoD which was high enough for the a/c to enter the water?
The NHP would have his eyes clued to the instruments while the HP would certainly be monitoring them while looking up to see if he had the required visual parameters to land. His scan in/out would increasingly be out as he neared MDH and probably fully out by the 100ft to go call.
The AIB full report will make very interesting reading especially looking at the casual factors such as training/autopilot approach SOPs/management philosophy on the use of the autopilot. Then the human factors as to why 2 pilots didn't recover from a low speed U/P before they entered the water. Then any technical faults which may have confused or misled the crew into thinking they were in control.
HF
We are assuming that, as the serviceability of the SP seems to have been OK, that there has been some form of procedural/pilot error. So how did this happen?
We have 2 experienced pilots flying a relatively simple IFR approach, in IMC, as cloud was probably scattered at 200ft, broken at 300ft. They knew the MDH was 300ft so would be trying to fly as accurately as possible to achieve the required visual clues at, or just before, the MAP. Yet the airspeed was allowed to decay to such an extent that the a/c developed a RoD which was high enough for the a/c to enter the water?
The NHP would have his eyes clued to the instruments while the HP would certainly be monitoring them while looking up to see if he had the required visual parameters to land. His scan in/out would increasingly be out as he neared MDH and probably fully out by the 100ft to go call.
The AIB full report will make very interesting reading especially looking at the casual factors such as training/autopilot approach SOPs/management philosophy on the use of the autopilot. Then the human factors as to why 2 pilots didn't recover from a low speed U/P before they entered the water. Then any technical faults which may have confused or misled the crew into thinking they were in control.
HF