AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
16000 hours of straight and level with the AP holds in - sounds riveting
It says "due to be released" - no-one could dispute that.
And that it will be published "later". Not "later today"! But let's hope that is what they mean. As it stands the news item is meaningless
And that it will be published "later". Not "later today"! But let's hope that is what they mean. As it stands the news item is meaningless
Join Date: Jan 2012
Location: XXXX
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why an ILS at 80 knots. It's a hangover from the days when a VNE of 90-95 knots was the norm. On every ILS there is at least 6,000 ft. of concrete at the other end so what is there to slow up for.
!20 over 80 equals 2/3rds the drift, windshear effects and most importantly, less time to screw the approach up. I started my ILS career strapped to 70 tons of aluminium and I had far less trouble at 145 than trying to fly it at 80 knots.
If a 737-200 with the same decision height can come out of cloud at minimums, line it up and carry out a crosswind landing whilst staring through two letterboxes why can't a helicopter do the same with wide angle windows and no crosswind problems.
Should this approach have been flown with a target speed of 120 knots this accident would not have happened.
!20 over 80 equals 2/3rds the drift, windshear effects and most importantly, less time to screw the approach up. I started my ILS career strapped to 70 tons of aluminium and I had far less trouble at 145 than trying to fly it at 80 knots.
If a 737-200 with the same decision height can come out of cloud at minimums, line it up and carry out a crosswind landing whilst staring through two letterboxes why can't a helicopter do the same with wide angle windows and no crosswind problems.
Should this approach have been flown with a target speed of 120 knots this accident would not have happened.
Fareastdriver,
RWY 09/27 EGPB 3871 ft long so a bit below your 6000 ft and RWY 09 they flew is LOC only so higher MDA than would be on ILS.
Following our stabilised approach procedures we can slow down to not below Vy on approach in bad weather but in deciding the speed, consideration must be given to the headwind component, increased drift angle in a crosswind and handling qualities.
This reduced speed is to assist in gaining the required visual references for landing.
Higher target speed might have prevented the accident but it all boils down to monitoring whatever you nominate as your approach speed, not?
Regards,
Finalchecksplease
RWY 09/27 EGPB 3871 ft long so a bit below your 6000 ft and RWY 09 they flew is LOC only so higher MDA than would be on ILS.
Following our stabilised approach procedures we can slow down to not below Vy on approach in bad weather but in deciding the speed, consideration must be given to the headwind component, increased drift angle in a crosswind and handling qualities.
This reduced speed is to assist in gaining the required visual references for landing.
Higher target speed might have prevented the accident but it all boils down to monitoring whatever you nominate as your approach speed, not?
Regards,
Finalchecksplease
RWY 09/27 EGPB 3871 ft long so a bit below your 6000 ft and RWY 09 they flew is LOC only so higher MDA
There is a different feel at 120 compared with 80. I used to open my window on finals offshore because I then had an instant Audio ASI. The same technique when looking over the side of the cockpit in a Tiger Moth. Even with the windows closed you will notice an unexpected change of performance.
You notice when it goes quiet. You pay more attention to how the aircraft feels when doing anything and if it doesn't feel or sound right there is something going wrong.
Kept me alive for forty-eight years.
So a 332L2 coming out of cloud with 125 knots at MDA wouldn't be able to stop with ground distance plus 3.781ft. of concrete.
Do the same "crack the window open" on finals offshore, one of the "old" Brent 212 shuttle pilots thought me that when I was a young co-jo and I still use it today
Join Date: Sep 2010
Location: Marineville
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Going slower, you obviously have more time to see a light in marginal conditions on the approach. Rather do 80kts in a helicopter than 155kts in a Lightning.
Far East Driver, today we can't open the window as the flight manual prohibits it, well in a 76 or 92, unless you can lock the stupid little window open (and most people don't have the lock).
Also the days of hearing what the aircraft is doing? Forget it, we are now in an airline type cockpit with most of the noise coming from air cooling fans for the electronics and EFIS.
Far East Driver, today we can't open the window as the flight manual prohibits it, well in a 76 or 92, unless you can lock the stupid little window open (and most people don't have the lock).
Also the days of hearing what the aircraft is doing? Forget it, we are now in an airline type cockpit with most of the noise coming from air cooling fans for the electronics and EFIS.
Last edited by TroyTempest; 20th Mar 2016 at 22:40. Reason: English Electric Lightning approach speed ��
Join Date: Jun 2014
Location: United Kingdom
Posts: 34
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Surely of more concern is the 'if we aren't clear of cloud at the published minima we'll just land anyway' mentality - which the co-pilot didn't challenge. That didn't go very well at the Cork (fixed wing) crash either, as I recall. Or the one with the Polish president on.
I agree that excessive speed reduction down to say Vy can be counterproductive and is not something I did, though I know lots of other people who did. However if there isn't much crosswind it is probably no big deal. The issues here however are that making a big speed change halfway down the approach thus totally destabilising it was not contrary to the stabilised approach policy in force at the time. Huh, some "stabilised approach" policy!
Also very relevant is the lack of appreciation not just of this crew, but from the sound of it lots of other crews, of the inappropriateness and danger of using VS mode without IAS mode when the speed is back near Vy or in fact I'd say below about 110kts.
Bottom line is that for the want of a button press (IAS mode, either with or without VS mode) the accident would not have occurred.
Also very relevant is the lack of appreciation not just of this crew, but from the sound of it lots of other crews, of the inappropriateness and danger of using VS mode without IAS mode when the speed is back near Vy or in fact I'd say below about 110kts.
Bottom line is that for the want of a button press (IAS mode, either with or without VS mode) the accident would not have occurred.
Bottom line is that for the want of a button press (IAS mode, either with or without VS mode) the accident would not have occurred
I'm not sure it's that astonishing if you mean the crew error. Pilots make errors, get over it!
What we need is error tolerance built in, such as clearly defined procedures whereby both pilots know exactly what is expected to transpire, and using the automation to its best advantage so the pilots can focus on the "big picture".
What we need is error tolerance built in, such as clearly defined procedures whereby both pilots know exactly what is expected to transpire, and using the automation to its best advantage so the pilots can focus on the "big picture".
So what then......
I'm not sure it's that astonishing if you mean the crew error. Pilots make errors, get over it!
What we need is error tolerance built in, such as clearly defined procedures whereby both pilots know exactly what is expected to transpire, and using the automation to its best advantage so the pilots can focus on the "big picture".
What we need is error tolerance built in, such as clearly defined procedures whereby both pilots know exactly what is expected to transpire, and using the automation to its best advantage so the pilots can focus on the "big picture".
This is not an automation issue.
This crash was caused by 2 pilots not carrying out their duties.
Pressing the IAS button would have reduced the required monitoring to a degree but not the duties of the crew.
Not sure about anyone else but if I know weather is 'doggers' I tend to pay that bit more attention during the approach???
So, if the crew were not monitoring the flight - I would be interested to know what were they doing?
I am fully aware pilots make mistakes (even monkeys fall out of trees!) but this 'error' appeared to extend for majority of the important part of the approach, starting with a woefully inadequate brief considering the known conditions.
There was an interesting line which confirmed that 'non-operational' crew discussion had been omitted from the report........
Shame as we might have learnt something.
Like most reports - the reader is often baffled as to why the crew reacted/behaved in a certain way. Please do not think that having the OEM prescribe how to use their aircraft will reduce accidents - fixed-wing have had such manuals for a while and still fall out of the sky due to all manner of automation-related reasons.
Very sad account with such a tragic outcome.
Automation is of course not the cause of the accident, but the accident is a good demo of why good automation and it's correct use enhances safety. The captain was very experienced and had a good record, and yet he made the fundamental mistake of failing to look at his airspeed for a long time, just at a time where his choices had made airspeed monitoring especially important. Classic human frailty. Like it or not, if he had engaged IAS mode which, one would have though, would be normal practice for flying an approach in marginal weather, the accident would not have happened.
The passengers wouldn't care why the accident wouldn't have happened, they just didn't want it to happen, and so foolish ideas that we should fly these sorts of things manually in order to maintain our skills, would be ridiculed and rightly so. Bottom line is that humans make mistakes, automation helps to reduce the impact of such mistakes. But only if it is used sensibly.
Let's hope that the 4 lives at least have a legacy of demonstrating to all other pilots why using a vertical mode on the cyclic near Vy is such a foolish thing to do.
The passengers wouldn't care why the accident wouldn't have happened, they just didn't want it to happen, and so foolish ideas that we should fly these sorts of things manually in order to maintain our skills, would be ridiculed and rightly so. Bottom line is that humans make mistakes, automation helps to reduce the impact of such mistakes. But only if it is used sensibly.
Let's hope that the 4 lives at least have a legacy of demonstrating to all other pilots why using a vertical mode on the cyclic near Vy is such a foolish thing to do.