AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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It's not the helicopter itself that I am getting at but the way an organisation deals with it's introduction. It also needs to ask itself "are our current training systems going to deliver the right solution for the new equipment", along with "Are our SOPs adequate for the new type."
As the human factor is still the main topic the question I believe is how far can the human brain adapt to automation and how can it be trained in a better way to deal with tasks like operating fully automated aircrafts but be able to change into a 'pants on the seat pilot' in split seconds.
The principles how humans think and learn has not changed a lot the last centuries. In some countries there is a bit more emphasis on learning - Scandinavia for example. Environmental and society aspects are important too to develop our brains to descent and non dysfunctional standards. Anxiety plays a big role in that.
One other important question after machinery and SOP's should be also about the quality of teaching in general. Are the instructors fit for their job?
Are the students fit enough, was their previous education beneficial to understand complex systems in an physical very active and demanding work enviroment?
Good to read some minds are questioning just a bit their own business here, but not that many and that thinking should come even more from high above; but who would expect bean counters in the UK are going to question themselves regarding the hind sight operational affects of counting beans? In other countries they do, occasionally. It may prevent the one or the other crash.
Again it is all about human factors, in a much wider sense. From bean counters to designers to drivers
HC
There has to be a form or a spread sheet for everything now. Its because the younger generation need to have a step by step process which has been mapped.
The days of being an expert are almost over, the lowering of education standards has ensured that the older generation have to write everything down so that the newer generation who have grown up without exams and with continuous assessment and multi-choice can follow instructions on how to do things (assuming they can read)
But my point is that whilst we have a culture that paper is king, and good judgment is deemed unimportant, we will continue to have these problems. It is of course a general ill of society not limited to helicopter operators.
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xlsky et al
I gave a presentation at Shell in 2012 and at RAeS in London last May at which I pointed out that whilst I can never claim to be an expert on the global pilot population my colleagues at the AWTA and those at other training centres are in a unique position to present some kind of opinion about the quality of pilots and the quality of instructors.
I took the liberty of speaking about my personal experience having now taught 340 students from 49 different countries. I have said before on Prune that the system that delivers instructors is dysfunctional and the system that delivers sim instructors even more so. Where sim centres track the regulations it's possible for many SFIs to be appointed with minimal preparation. There is a huge culture shock for the SFI when he/she discovers that they are required to teach complex manoeuvres without the benefit of a set of controls. Try it one day, then think about injecting a language problem into that equation. No fun at all.
If the situation for the instructors is grim then the situation for the global pilot population is worse. I would say that less than 50% are competent.
As HC said the industry is paralysed by commercial factors that dominate decision making and powerless regulators pushed this way and that by the competing commercial interests.
Without a solid training foundation the pilot fraternity will suffer badly. The wave of complex helicopters coming into the market are already running into problems with both maintenance and operating standards.
It's not all gloom for there are a few bright spots around the world and I wish those that are biting the bullet and getting their house in order the very best of luck.
It is an unfortunate reality that if you have never been lucky enough to see a 'good' operation at work then you don't know what 'good' looks like.
G.
I took the liberty of speaking about my personal experience having now taught 340 students from 49 different countries. I have said before on Prune that the system that delivers instructors is dysfunctional and the system that delivers sim instructors even more so. Where sim centres track the regulations it's possible for many SFIs to be appointed with minimal preparation. There is a huge culture shock for the SFI when he/she discovers that they are required to teach complex manoeuvres without the benefit of a set of controls. Try it one day, then think about injecting a language problem into that equation. No fun at all.
If the situation for the instructors is grim then the situation for the global pilot population is worse. I would say that less than 50% are competent.
As HC said the industry is paralysed by commercial factors that dominate decision making and powerless regulators pushed this way and that by the competing commercial interests.
Without a solid training foundation the pilot fraternity will suffer badly. The wave of complex helicopters coming into the market are already running into problems with both maintenance and operating standards.
It's not all gloom for there are a few bright spots around the world and I wish those that are biting the bullet and getting their house in order the very best of luck.
It is an unfortunate reality that if you have never been lucky enough to see a 'good' operation at work then you don't know what 'good' looks like.
G.
Enough is enough!
At the end of this 111 page story - there was an approach plate with an MDA and an inbound track. --- maintain the track- do not descend below the MDA and when you get to the MAP if not visual overshoot.
You use automation to assist you in this endeavour but at the end of the day even if you are sitting there with your hands in your lap watching "George" doing the flying it is your job to make sure that the IBT and MAP are being followed. If not decouple and -- horror of horrors - fly the aircraft.
I fear that the result of this will be more check lists, more paperwork, more boxes to tick. This will lead to more "heads down" in the cockpit reading another chapter of "Gone With the Wind" instead of 2 people concentrating on the approach, situational awareness and CRM.
Just my thoughts.
You use automation to assist you in this endeavour but at the end of the day even if you are sitting there with your hands in your lap watching "George" doing the flying it is your job to make sure that the IBT and MAP are being followed. If not decouple and -- horror of horrors - fly the aircraft.
I fear that the result of this will be more check lists, more paperwork, more boxes to tick. This will lead to more "heads down" in the cockpit reading another chapter of "Gone With the Wind" instead of 2 people concentrating on the approach, situational awareness and CRM.
Just my thoughts.
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some years ago Lufthansa introduced a combined ATPL course which included a full 4 years ? engineering or management degree at university. The whole purpose was to get highly qualified employees with first hand experience into the non cockpit workplaces for the company at a later stage in their career for training, fleet management and so on.
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Albatross
If you haven't read 'The Naked Pilot' then please do. You may think differently afterwards.
Don't forget that whilst sitting there watching 'George' they had expectations about how it would work. Were the crew properly trained to know what to expect - If we wait and see I suspect the AAIB will oblige us with their opinion on that.
G.
Don't forget that whilst sitting there watching 'George' they had expectations about how it would work. Were the crew properly trained to know what to expect - If we wait and see I suspect the AAIB will oblige us with their opinion on that.
G.
At the final analysis....I have the absolute requirement to ensure the aircraft is flown within the Tolerances required to accomplish a safe approach and landing. Amongst those duties is to monitor the flight path and all the instrument indications to confirm the correct flight path is being flown.
Automation, no automation, hand flown, flown by the other Pilot, no matter.....the PIC and in a Crew Served aircraft.....all Flight Crew Members share that responsibility but the final ultimate responsibility lies with the PIC.
We can discuss all the issues we wish....but in the end....prepared, trained, tired, sleepy, bored, sick, or not.....the occupants of the cockpit seats must perform.
A Non-Precision Approach to an Airport in day light in benign conditions in a completely airworthy aircraft should never wind up in a fatal crash of the aircraft due loss of control.
That this one did....is what gives rise this many paged discussion we are having.
Automation, no automation, hand flown, flown by the other Pilot, no matter.....the PIC and in a Crew Served aircraft.....all Flight Crew Members share that responsibility but the final ultimate responsibility lies with the PIC.
We can discuss all the issues we wish....but in the end....prepared, trained, tired, sleepy, bored, sick, or not.....the occupants of the cockpit seats must perform.
A Non-Precision Approach to an Airport in day light in benign conditions in a completely airworthy aircraft should never wind up in a fatal crash of the aircraft due loss of control.
That this one did....is what gives rise this many paged discussion we are having.
Geoffers: I think I know you, atleast I've been told I know you by people like PCPlod et al.
I have to say, that coming from an ex FAA Wafu you are speaking "nanny language". You have spent too long away from the coal face methinks.
I suspect your days at Rotorsim have contaminated your thoughts. I have heard some horror stories about both customers and staff at RS.
Don't tar everyone with the same brush.
As the boss of a training establishment teaching hundreds of pilots from 6 different nations at any one time, I think I know all about standards across the globe, too.
Each of my SFI's are atleast B1 standard, some A2. ALL mil pilots are of a standard which based on your take on the situation would be head and shoulders above the civvies you seem to have condemned.
And I don't believe that for a minute. I think RS may have a localised problem but both european (mil) and large company SFI's like Bristow, CHC, et al, definitely cut the mustard old boy.
I say again:
This is a run of the mill L2 doing a boring ILS approach in very benign conditions with a 50+ yr old experienced Captain who was asleep on the damn job - simples. The co-jo wasn't far behind. They watched a benign situation develop relatively quickly (nothing outrageous) into a terminal one.
Human error 100%...Nothing wrong with the machine, nothing sinsiter about the situation, weather normal. He took his eye off the ball and killed 4 innocent people. TRAGIC human error. Don't wrap it up into any nanny state technological, systemic or physiological complexity.....it wasn't and it ain't.
I have to say, that coming from an ex FAA Wafu you are speaking "nanny language". You have spent too long away from the coal face methinks.
I suspect your days at Rotorsim have contaminated your thoughts. I have heard some horror stories about both customers and staff at RS.
Don't tar everyone with the same brush.
As the boss of a training establishment teaching hundreds of pilots from 6 different nations at any one time, I think I know all about standards across the globe, too.
Each of my SFI's are atleast B1 standard, some A2. ALL mil pilots are of a standard which based on your take on the situation would be head and shoulders above the civvies you seem to have condemned.
And I don't believe that for a minute. I think RS may have a localised problem but both european (mil) and large company SFI's like Bristow, CHC, et al, definitely cut the mustard old boy.
I say again:
This is a run of the mill L2 doing a boring ILS approach in very benign conditions with a 50+ yr old experienced Captain who was asleep on the damn job - simples. The co-jo wasn't far behind. They watched a benign situation develop relatively quickly (nothing outrageous) into a terminal one.
Human error 100%...Nothing wrong with the machine, nothing sinsiter about the situation, weather normal. He took his eye off the ball and killed 4 innocent people. TRAGIC human error. Don't wrap it up into any nanny state technological, systemic or physiological complexity.....it wasn't and it ain't.
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TC - the aircraft crashed and four people were killed for the sake of one little button being pressed IAS.
The question is why was this button not pressed. The answer is that there was no directive, imperative or cultural reason to press it.
Sure it seems like the crew screwed it up. But we are all capable of that. For those of us who understand these issues it's more complex than human error.
DB
The question is why was this button not pressed. The answer is that there was no directive, imperative or cultural reason to press it.
Sure it seems like the crew screwed it up. But we are all capable of that. For those of us who understand these issues it's more complex than human error.
DB
DB,
Pushing that Single Button...."IAS"....should have been the exact right way to do what the Crew tried to accomplish.
But...my question keeps coming back to why the Crew did not do that and that is where I fully agree with you about it being far more complex an answer than it would appear.
To me....it simply defies logic.....but I think it follows from the Crew deciding to use different airspeeds and ROD's in what should have been a far more stable approach if a single approach airspeed had been decided upon.
Ultimately.....doesn't the "KISS" method of Helicopter flying apply?
Slow the aircraft to approach speed upon arriving at the initial approach fix, then maintain that airspeed to the Final Approach Fix....then if a further reduction in airspeed is desired.....prior to passing the FAF make any other Airspeed reduction and have that airspeed stabilized passing the FAF.....and hold that "Final" speed until completing the Landing Visually.
Changing more than one parameter at a time seems unnecessary if the Approach is planned properly.
Pushing that Single Button...."IAS"....should have been the exact right way to do what the Crew tried to accomplish.
But...my question keeps coming back to why the Crew did not do that and that is where I fully agree with you about it being far more complex an answer than it would appear.
To me....it simply defies logic.....but I think it follows from the Crew deciding to use different airspeeds and ROD's in what should have been a far more stable approach if a single approach airspeed had been decided upon.
Ultimately.....doesn't the "KISS" method of Helicopter flying apply?
Slow the aircraft to approach speed upon arriving at the initial approach fix, then maintain that airspeed to the Final Approach Fix....then if a further reduction in airspeed is desired.....prior to passing the FAF make any other Airspeed reduction and have that airspeed stabilized passing the FAF.....and hold that "Final" speed until completing the Landing Visually.
Changing more than one parameter at a time seems unnecessary if the Approach is planned properly.
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What's the slowest speed permitted in IAS mode?
My experience when doing the familiarization of the Super Puma (I was with Transport Canada at the time) was that even in 4 axis mode, the IAS hold couldn't maintain 40 knots, and so a limit (for the Canadian flight manual anyway) of 50 knots was imposed.
Got lots of calls after that about 'Why is the Canadian limit 50 KIAS when the French manual says 40 KIAS?'
Just wonder if the three axis mode was any good at holding 40 knots? If that was the commanded value…
My experience when doing the familiarization of the Super Puma (I was with Transport Canada at the time) was that even in 4 axis mode, the IAS hold couldn't maintain 40 knots, and so a limit (for the Canadian flight manual anyway) of 50 knots was imposed.
Got lots of calls after that about 'Why is the Canadian limit 50 KIAS when the French manual says 40 KIAS?'
Just wonder if the three axis mode was any good at holding 40 knots? If that was the commanded value…
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Shawn, on an approach to normal minima I cannot see any reason or sense in reducing airspeed below Vy. The JAR-OPS 3 landing limits provide sufficient cues at minima to decelerate and land visually. If those cues are not present we should GO-AROUND.
The L2 can fly four AXIS coupled at Vy no problem at all.
The EC225 can reduce to 30 KIAS coupled but again it should not be necessary when flying to, and observing the prescribed landing limits.
This accident has much more to do with culture, understanding and training than the error this pilot was legally allowed to make. Blame is never appropriate. Only understanding leading to corrective measures, procedures or behaviour is important.
I cannot stress enough the severe danger present when the IAS decays below 30 KIAS and the nose is rising with no discernable visual references. In this condition the normal rules no longer apply. The FIX is to do whatever it takes to prevent this condition occuring.
DB
The L2 can fly four AXIS coupled at Vy no problem at all.
The EC225 can reduce to 30 KIAS coupled but again it should not be necessary when flying to, and observing the prescribed landing limits.
This accident has much more to do with culture, understanding and training than the error this pilot was legally allowed to make. Blame is never appropriate. Only understanding leading to corrective measures, procedures or behaviour is important.
I cannot stress enough the severe danger present when the IAS decays below 30 KIAS and the nose is rising with no discernable visual references. In this condition the normal rules no longer apply. The FIX is to do whatever it takes to prevent this condition occuring.
DB
Why slow down from the initial approach speed st all? Any precision approach is going to have acres of concrete at the bottom which will give you plenty of space to slow down. Going slowly at DH doesn't improve your eyesight in poor visibility. Also the faster you go the less drift and less vertical speed corrections are required and you also have less time to foul it up.
If a twin turbine plank wing can use the same DH as you then you can use the same speeds as him.
If a twin turbine plank wing can use the same DH as you then you can use the same speeds as him.
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Speed on Final Approach
With reference to FarEastDriver's comments--
Yes by all means an increased speed on final is desirable in terms of ability to control drift, improved control response, etc. Also a higher speed on final improves the ability to mix with other traffic that may be flying at higher speeds (if applicable).
However in the U.S. and I would presume internationally as well, the ability to use the lowest category of approach minimums is predicated on a maximum speed at the missed approach point (which in the U.S. is 90 KIAS).
This brings up the question of decelerating on final approach, which may not be allowed by an operator's procedures manual ("stabilized approach" criteria), and also which complicates the problems of aircraft control on final.
SASless correctly says that it is desirable from the standpoint of unhurried and monitorable operations to establish approach speed at the initial fix and carry this through until the missed approach point. However if this speed is slow, i.e., 90 knots for the purposes of being able to use the lowest approach minima, this is going to present problems in a busy terminal environment in terms of fitting in with traffic flow.
Yes by all means an increased speed on final is desirable in terms of ability to control drift, improved control response, etc. Also a higher speed on final improves the ability to mix with other traffic that may be flying at higher speeds (if applicable).
However in the U.S. and I would presume internationally as well, the ability to use the lowest category of approach minimums is predicated on a maximum speed at the missed approach point (which in the U.S. is 90 KIAS).
This brings up the question of decelerating on final approach, which may not be allowed by an operator's procedures manual ("stabilized approach" criteria), and also which complicates the problems of aircraft control on final.
SASless correctly says that it is desirable from the standpoint of unhurried and monitorable operations to establish approach speed at the initial fix and carry this through until the missed approach point. However if this speed is slow, i.e., 90 knots for the purposes of being able to use the lowest approach minima, this is going to present problems in a busy terminal environment in terms of fitting in with traffic flow.
As I suggested.....so long as the final reduction of airspeed is immediately prior to the Final Approach Fix....and the IAS is stabilized prior to crossing the FAF....then in my view....that is my preferred method. Granted in a Helicopter, we are not talking a huge difference in reality. It is not like Jet flying here......we are talking Helicopters.
Airplanes used Vref speeds plus a few Knots for variables so why should we not do the same in Helicopters.
Depending upon weather.....using Cat A Approach minima is the right answer.....but for higher weather conditions where higher Speeds are not a bar to improving your chances of getting into the airport at the bottom of the approach, then going faster is fine too.
There is no simple cookbook solution to performing Instrument Approaches....but using a modicum of commonsense goes a long way in these discussions.
Airplanes used Vref speeds plus a few Knots for variables so why should we not do the same in Helicopters.
Depending upon weather.....using Cat A Approach minima is the right answer.....but for higher weather conditions where higher Speeds are not a bar to improving your chances of getting into the airport at the bottom of the approach, then going faster is fine too.
There is no simple cookbook solution to performing Instrument Approaches....but using a modicum of commonsense goes a long way in these discussions.
Surely, regarding any instrument approach, it's this simple.
- Maintain speed between Instrument Vmin and Vmax.
- Stay on the glidepath or above MDA until FAF is reached, if you can't, go around. Once visual, do what you like to effect a safe landing.
- Use the autoplilot in a sensible manner to reduce workload.
The only time these simple rules don't apply is if you're suffering a major malfunction or you've run out of fuel. People seem to be going round in circles on this forum over-complicating what should be a straightforward procedure.
Or am I missing something?
- Maintain speed between Instrument Vmin and Vmax.
- Stay on the glidepath or above MDA until FAF is reached, if you can't, go around. Once visual, do what you like to effect a safe landing.
- Use the autoplilot in a sensible manner to reduce workload.
The only time these simple rules don't apply is if you're suffering a major malfunction or you've run out of fuel. People seem to be going round in circles on this forum over-complicating what should be a straightforward procedure.
Or am I missing something?
Llama: quite right. 111 pages of so called experts summating that something unusual or intangible has perhaps happened to make the pilot err.
For goodness sake everyone - listen to yourselves. We're in this nanny state of ours because of naive statements like these on the last 111 pages.
There was NOTHING wrong with the A/c: FACT.
There was nothing wrong with the bloody weather: FACT.
There was no pilot incapacitation: FACT.
There was nothing wrong with the damn ILS: FACT.
The soft centred, fleshy bit in the middle of the helicopter made a mistake/miscalculated/disengaged from his duties/suspended logical thought/misidentified visual cues............
The pilot(s) made a mistake. Please can we label this accident appropriately and stop covering it in layers of mellifluous sophism!
For goodness sake everyone - listen to yourselves. We're in this nanny state of ours because of naive statements like these on the last 111 pages.
There was NOTHING wrong with the A/c: FACT.
There was nothing wrong with the bloody weather: FACT.
There was no pilot incapacitation: FACT.
There was nothing wrong with the damn ILS: FACT.
The soft centred, fleshy bit in the middle of the helicopter made a mistake/miscalculated/disengaged from his duties/suspended logical thought/misidentified visual cues............
The pilot(s) made a mistake. Please can we label this accident appropriately and stop covering it in layers of mellifluous sophism!
TC,
Bit drafty up there on that Horse?
Bit drafty up there on that Horse?