AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
The one particular series of aircraft, in one particular part of the North Sea, operated by multiple Operators within that Sector figure in this series of ditchings and fatal accidents.
I posed the question before about the possible significance of this....and suggested pure serendipity is a very unlikely root cause for the phenomenon.
Some folks are calling for grounding the entire fleets of the affected Aircraft and some challenge the rationale for that action.
I suggest it is the right time for a bottom up review of how the UK Sector does business....leaving nothing out of the review....sparing no Sacred Cows.
On the 225, EC and the Authority seem to have agreed upon the cause and cure for the Shaft problem. Whether that issue has actually been resolved satisfactorily or not will take time to decide.
What we know for sure is the UK Sector is putting aircraft into the water at an increasing rate, killing people in the process, and the Industry and Authority seem unable or unwilling to find a way to prevent these things from happening.
It is time to drop the Shields folks.....and find a better way.
The Gulf of Mexico Operators......well some of them anyway....have made significant changes....out of necessity and the accident trend has reversed and is decreasing. Bristow made a move away from Single Engined aircraft and seems to be moving towards a medium to heavy fleet as compared to prior years. Many of the singles they sold off....were snapped up by other GOM Operators.
The results of a Johns Hopkins Study ranked Mechanical Failure and Weather/Judgement failures as the two most common causes of accidents. Of the 139 people killed in the GOM in helicopter accidents.....44 were Pilots (remembering most of the fatal crashes involved single Pilot, single engine helicopters).
Oil- and Gas-Related Helicopter Crashes in Gulf of Mexico Killed 139 Over 26 Years -- Environmental Protection
I posed the question before about the possible significance of this....and suggested pure serendipity is a very unlikely root cause for the phenomenon.
Some folks are calling for grounding the entire fleets of the affected Aircraft and some challenge the rationale for that action.
I suggest it is the right time for a bottom up review of how the UK Sector does business....leaving nothing out of the review....sparing no Sacred Cows.
On the 225, EC and the Authority seem to have agreed upon the cause and cure for the Shaft problem. Whether that issue has actually been resolved satisfactorily or not will take time to decide.
What we know for sure is the UK Sector is putting aircraft into the water at an increasing rate, killing people in the process, and the Industry and Authority seem unable or unwilling to find a way to prevent these things from happening.
It is time to drop the Shields folks.....and find a better way.
The Gulf of Mexico Operators......well some of them anyway....have made significant changes....out of necessity and the accident trend has reversed and is decreasing. Bristow made a move away from Single Engined aircraft and seems to be moving towards a medium to heavy fleet as compared to prior years. Many of the singles they sold off....were snapped up by other GOM Operators.
The results of a Johns Hopkins Study ranked Mechanical Failure and Weather/Judgement failures as the two most common causes of accidents. Of the 139 people killed in the GOM in helicopter accidents.....44 were Pilots (remembering most of the fatal crashes involved single Pilot, single engine helicopters).
Oil- and Gas-Related Helicopter Crashes in Gulf of Mexico Killed 139 Over 26 Years -- Environmental Protection
Last edited by SASless; 25th Aug 2013 at 14:47.
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Why have some operators or locations never had an accident ?
Do not neglect the apparantly strange behaviour of random chance.
In any set of candidates - for example accidents per hour flown IFR in poor weather - there will be a small but finite random occurrance. The mathematics of chance tells us that it is perfectly normal to get some bunches and some large gaps. This is the nature of randomness - if the incidents were evenly spread they would not, by definition, be random.
What we do know is that accidents are not totally random, there are many factors which affect risk. Some risks such as training, culture, maintenance etc can be managed but others such as weather are beyond our control.
So - what can we do ?.
We must manage the known risks to the highest practical standards but there is little we can do about the weather in the North Sea or the random failure of a component which does not have a history of failures.
If an engine quits at 50 feet over the sea maybe we should not be asking why the engine quit but how we came to be too low and slow to recover.
[edit] My comments are general and are not intended to refer to this or any other specific accident.
Do not neglect the apparantly strange behaviour of random chance.
In any set of candidates - for example accidents per hour flown IFR in poor weather - there will be a small but finite random occurrance. The mathematics of chance tells us that it is perfectly normal to get some bunches and some large gaps. This is the nature of randomness - if the incidents were evenly spread they would not, by definition, be random.
What we do know is that accidents are not totally random, there are many factors which affect risk. Some risks such as training, culture, maintenance etc can be managed but others such as weather are beyond our control.
So - what can we do ?.
We must manage the known risks to the highest practical standards but there is little we can do about the weather in the North Sea or the random failure of a component which does not have a history of failures.
If an engine quits at 50 feet over the sea maybe we should not be asking why the engine quit but how we came to be too low and slow to recover.
[edit] My comments are general and are not intended to refer to this or any other specific accident.
Last edited by The Ancient Geek; 25th Aug 2013 at 15:12.
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Excerpt;
Ulykker i britisk sektor
Per Gram kan ikke si hvorfor det oftere er hendelser og ulykker med helikoptre på britisk side av Nordsjøen enn i Norge. Selskaper i både Storbritannia og Norge følger regelverk utarbeidet av EU.
- I Norge er det imidlertid foretatt ytterligere skjerping av trening og vedlikehold etter anbefalinger i tre rapporter utarbeidet fra forskningsinstitusjonen Sintef i Trondheim. Mulig at dette har hjulpet, påpeker Gram.
-En annen forskjell mellom de to landene er at norske helikoptre bare flyr med 80 prosents motorytelse mens britene utnytter 100 prosent av motorkraften under flyging. Dette mener mange her i landet er et viktig bidrag til den bedre norske sikkerhetsstatistikken.
Translated by Google;
Accidents in the UK sector
Per Gram can not say why it is often incidents and accidents involving helicopters in the UK sector of the North Sea than in Norway. Companies in both the UK and Norway follow the rules laid down by the EU.
- In Norway, however, made further intensification of training and maintenance for recommendations in three reports prepared by the research institute SINTEF in Trondheim. Possible that this has helped, says Gram.
- Another difference between the two countries is that Norwegian helicopter just flies by 80 percent engine performance while Britain uses 100 percent of engine power during flight. This mean a lot in this country is an important contribution to improving safety Norwegian statistics.
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Link for the news article in "Teknisk Ukeblad"
EUROCOPTER AS 332L2 SUPER PUMA - Andre nødlanding på sjø av samme selskap - tu.no/industri
EUROCOPTER AS 332L2 SUPER PUMA - Andre nødlanding på sjø av samme selskap - tu.no/industri
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Hello, new poster but I've been lurking here for oooh about ten years.
I work in O&G in Aberdeen but I'm a lawyer by training and qualification, grew up in the area and flew gliders at Aboyne when I was younger (some of you on here may well have been my instructors) so I have a reasonable understanding of how things work though I should state that I've never worked offshore and I'm not a pilot so I'm not going to go anywhere near the technical aspects.
I was reading this thread last night and thought that some of the comments regarding offshore workers were rather patronising. Then I saw the posts on Facebook...oh dear.
So far as I can tell, the Super Puma had an excellent reputation until around 2009 and since then it has obviously suffered from a spate of accidents. In my time at Aboyne the most memorable incident was G-TIGK being struck by lightning which was hardly a flaw in the aircraft itself. The posts by some here tend to dismiss the views of the passengers on the basis that they have not taken into account the statistics around hours flown, utilisation rates, differences between AS332/EC225 etc. Obviously these things are important but you have preferred the science of statistics and mathematics over the science of psychology.
Heli pilots are probably better educated and trained than the majority of offshore workers. You are entirely focused on risk-assessment from the moment you check the weather in the morning until you sit down with your drink of choice at home in the evening. For many of you this may just be your personality, for others it might have taken the training to drill it into you. Regardless of the source, you all calculate risk on an almost subconscious level. Most of the people you transport have not been brought up (professionally) with the same approach to risk. It is taught to them on courses and in classrooms but they rarely have the imagination to think that it might happen to them - the same, unfortunately, goes for many senior executives.
Having worked on FAIs I can definitely say that, until something bad happens, most people do not think 'it' will happen to them. Many professions (pilots, lawyers, doctors etc) work on the basis that 'it' most definitely will happen to them and so they work to avoid it. If you come from this perspective then the Facebook-type baying mob is confusing and frustrating. If you come from their perspective then you don't really give a hoot whether part of the transmission system is made from gold-plated titanium or chewing-gum provided it works. Faced with a sudden increase in serious incidents over a relatively short period they will get out the pitchforks regardless of the number of datasheets you attempt to fend them off with,
My point is to suggest that it would probably serve pilots well to understand that the people behind you are a) not well versed in the actual level of risk and what you do to mitigate it and b) not in control of their own destiny to any degree when they are flying with you - just think about the last time you were a passenger in a car you thought was going too fast and went for the brake in the passenger footwell; it's not a nice feeling.
I have noticed, in conversations with my brother (who works offshore and is not keen on choppers generally) that he and many of his colleagues seem to consider the pilots as being some kind of opposition. It appears to be part of the culture and I have no idea how it has developed but it needs to be worked on by both sides if things are to improve. For the avoidance of doubt I do always point out to him that the pilots don't consider it a barrel of laughs to declare an aircraft 'tech' when they have just flown halfway across the North Sea and that they are just as keen to get home for a beer and a curry as all the passengers.
I work in O&G in Aberdeen but I'm a lawyer by training and qualification, grew up in the area and flew gliders at Aboyne when I was younger (some of you on here may well have been my instructors) so I have a reasonable understanding of how things work though I should state that I've never worked offshore and I'm not a pilot so I'm not going to go anywhere near the technical aspects.
I was reading this thread last night and thought that some of the comments regarding offshore workers were rather patronising. Then I saw the posts on Facebook...oh dear.
So far as I can tell, the Super Puma had an excellent reputation until around 2009 and since then it has obviously suffered from a spate of accidents. In my time at Aboyne the most memorable incident was G-TIGK being struck by lightning which was hardly a flaw in the aircraft itself. The posts by some here tend to dismiss the views of the passengers on the basis that they have not taken into account the statistics around hours flown, utilisation rates, differences between AS332/EC225 etc. Obviously these things are important but you have preferred the science of statistics and mathematics over the science of psychology.
Heli pilots are probably better educated and trained than the majority of offshore workers. You are entirely focused on risk-assessment from the moment you check the weather in the morning until you sit down with your drink of choice at home in the evening. For many of you this may just be your personality, for others it might have taken the training to drill it into you. Regardless of the source, you all calculate risk on an almost subconscious level. Most of the people you transport have not been brought up (professionally) with the same approach to risk. It is taught to them on courses and in classrooms but they rarely have the imagination to think that it might happen to them - the same, unfortunately, goes for many senior executives.
Having worked on FAIs I can definitely say that, until something bad happens, most people do not think 'it' will happen to them. Many professions (pilots, lawyers, doctors etc) work on the basis that 'it' most definitely will happen to them and so they work to avoid it. If you come from this perspective then the Facebook-type baying mob is confusing and frustrating. If you come from their perspective then you don't really give a hoot whether part of the transmission system is made from gold-plated titanium or chewing-gum provided it works. Faced with a sudden increase in serious incidents over a relatively short period they will get out the pitchforks regardless of the number of datasheets you attempt to fend them off with,
My point is to suggest that it would probably serve pilots well to understand that the people behind you are a) not well versed in the actual level of risk and what you do to mitigate it and b) not in control of their own destiny to any degree when they are flying with you - just think about the last time you were a passenger in a car you thought was going too fast and went for the brake in the passenger footwell; it's not a nice feeling.
I have noticed, in conversations with my brother (who works offshore and is not keen on choppers generally) that he and many of his colleagues seem to consider the pilots as being some kind of opposition. It appears to be part of the culture and I have no idea how it has developed but it needs to be worked on by both sides if things are to improve. For the avoidance of doubt I do always point out to him that the pilots don't consider it a barrel of laughs to declare an aircraft 'tech' when they have just flown halfway across the North Sea and that they are just as keen to get home for a beer and a curry as all the passengers.
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SteinarN thank you for this additional information.
From what Steinar is telling us, Norwegian North Sea operators are setting a maximum torque limit of 80%. This would certainly impose less strain on the aircraft and its dynamic systems.
With what frequency I wonder do UK North Sea operators use between 80%-100% torque? Rig-based take offs with 10/12 pax+ depending on fuel?
From what Steinar is telling us, Norwegian North Sea operators are setting a maximum torque limit of 80%. This would certainly impose less strain on the aircraft and its dynamic systems.
With what frequency I wonder do UK North Sea operators use between 80%-100% torque? Rig-based take offs with 10/12 pax+ depending on fuel?
GF I think it may depend on type. The max torque in the cruise is around 80% for the 225 and L2, although we cruise the 225 at max cruise (~80%), everyone seems to operate the L2 at max cruise 65%. The S92 can I think be cruised at 100%, although nobody does that. So I don't think anybody cruises at >80% in UK sector. So we are left with the very brief excursions above 80% that occur during takeoff and maybe landing. I am not aware that our colleagues in Norway have any restriction on doing this - it is after all part of the spectrum of usage from which fatigue and life calculations derive. In any case, mandating a power limit for takeoff and landing could be counter-productive since it would be far worse to reduce the clearance from the structure, so that one day, the structure might be hit, as opposed to using the allowed full power.
Therefore, I don't see that the point made by SteinarN can be correct, and he does indicate that he is neither pilot nor engineer, so I suspect something perhaps "lost in translation".
I did read the execuitive summary of the Sintef #3 report. Whilst it contains a good deal of sense, most of the specifics are in fact platitudes that don't really indicate the detail of a way forward or indeed why the Norwegian side seems to have a better safety record than this side.
Having had a bit to do with our colleagues in Norway, I don't think there is a fundamental difference in the way we operate, and whilst I know less about how we maintain, again I dont think there is a significant difference, other than perhaps a cultural difference between Norwegian attitudes and UK attitudes. There does however seem to be more funding available in Norway, and greater reluctance from the oil companies to force the operators to keep their costs down - ie less "race to the bottom" than we have seen here. I know its an old line, but I do see the oil companies obession with minimising how much they spend on helicopter transportation, when it represents a tiny part of their overall budget, as a possible factor in at least some of the recent spate of accidents.
The difference between having an accident and nearly having an accident can be very small, and perhaps it is therefore a fairly small difference in resourcs that is responsible for the differing statistics.
Therefore, I don't see that the point made by SteinarN can be correct, and he does indicate that he is neither pilot nor engineer, so I suspect something perhaps "lost in translation".
I did read the execuitive summary of the Sintef #3 report. Whilst it contains a good deal of sense, most of the specifics are in fact platitudes that don't really indicate the detail of a way forward or indeed why the Norwegian side seems to have a better safety record than this side.
Having had a bit to do with our colleagues in Norway, I don't think there is a fundamental difference in the way we operate, and whilst I know less about how we maintain, again I dont think there is a significant difference, other than perhaps a cultural difference between Norwegian attitudes and UK attitudes. There does however seem to be more funding available in Norway, and greater reluctance from the oil companies to force the operators to keep their costs down - ie less "race to the bottom" than we have seen here. I know its an old line, but I do see the oil companies obession with minimising how much they spend on helicopter transportation, when it represents a tiny part of their overall budget, as a possible factor in at least some of the recent spate of accidents.
The difference between having an accident and nearly having an accident can be very small, and perhaps it is therefore a fairly small difference in resourcs that is responsible for the differing statistics.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 25th Aug 2013 at 16:03.
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I've tried googling but can't quite find what I'm looking for. Does anyone have and solid statistics (not anecdotal or hearsay) that the super puma has a better or worse safety record compared to similar types?
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HeliComparator thanks.
Seems that most people are using 80% for cruise. Hopefully we will find out if the Norwegians are doing something different which could be beneficial.
Seems that most people are using 80% for cruise. Hopefully we will find out if the Norwegians are doing something different which could be beneficial.
I'm going to get more flaming I'm sure, but here is my take on the recent spate of accidents to the Super Puma family.
REDL - could have been avoided if the correct maintenance procedures had been followed after the epicyclic CHIP warning (epicyclic should have been opened up)
ETAP 225 - pilot error, in part as a result of weak procedures in the Ops Manual and a pilot who, whilst very experienced, was relatively new to night operations in the N Sea
Bond 225 shaft failure - could have been detected before failure if rigorous HUMS monitoring was in place
CHC 225 shaft failure - could have been detected before failure if rigorous HUMS monitoring was in place
Latest L2 - who knows, but it doesn't seem to have been the repeat of any previous technical failures, certainly not a catastrophic failure otherwise the injury pattern and fuselage damage would have been much worse.
So, out of the 5, 3 are maintenance issues, 1 pilot error and 1 that we don't know about. Apart from the unknown latest one, none of them were unavoidable issues with the Super Puma family.
REDL - could have been avoided if the correct maintenance procedures had been followed after the epicyclic CHIP warning (epicyclic should have been opened up)
ETAP 225 - pilot error, in part as a result of weak procedures in the Ops Manual and a pilot who, whilst very experienced, was relatively new to night operations in the N Sea
Bond 225 shaft failure - could have been detected before failure if rigorous HUMS monitoring was in place
CHC 225 shaft failure - could have been detected before failure if rigorous HUMS monitoring was in place
Latest L2 - who knows, but it doesn't seem to have been the repeat of any previous technical failures, certainly not a catastrophic failure otherwise the injury pattern and fuselage damage would have been much worse.
So, out of the 5, 3 are maintenance issues, 1 pilot error and 1 that we don't know about. Apart from the unknown latest one, none of them were unavoidable issues with the Super Puma family.
Whilst I'm in rant mode, the other area where we Brits are failing is in the devaluing of human skill and experience. All a company has to do is to write a manual of instructions and procedures for employees to follow, and Bob's your uncle. It doesn't matter if the person who gets the job is an idiot or not. If he is an idiot, you can't get rid of him easily due to HR and employment issues. If he is good at his job, its not appreciated and the companys' attitude is that if he doesn't like something, he can be replaced by another bum on a seat. That tends to breed a culture of not bothering too much because why get stressed when you can just coast through your job and get your pay cheque at the end of the month?
When companies finally realise that their employees are their most valuable resource, things might improve! (along with the flying pigs etc)
That's probably enough ranting for one day!
When companies finally realise that their employees are their most valuable resource, things might improve! (along with the flying pigs etc)
That's probably enough ranting for one day!
Last edited by HeliComparator; 25th Aug 2013 at 16:24.
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If he is an idiot, you can't get rid of him easily due to HR and employment issues. If he is good at his job, its not appreciated and the companys' attitude is that if he doesn't like something, he can be replaced by another bum on a seat.
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That tends to breed a culture of not bothering too much because why get stressed when you can just coast through your job and get your pay cheque at the end of the month?
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Helicomparator, I agree fully. This is part of a bigger problem and the 332 yes is paying the price. I agree with your analysis as well that human error was involved and not just with the 332-I will ask again that we look at global type statistics for the last 5 years and incl causes differentiating between catastrauphic and preventable. I also believe we are loosing the plot in some areas. Engineers with good laptop skills and university degrees are preferred where I work above hands on experience and lets call it the good old hands on mechanic who looks and feels-a lot of our engineers do a after flight with gloves so yes good for OHASA but how do they feel the machine? Pilots spend time on tv screens and responding to promps as they should from warning lights or displays and yes its technology, but what happened to flying by the seat of your pants understanding warning vs what the machine is doing? Airbus accident comes to mind. I am not critisizing but we need to find a balance? Meanwhile let me continue my paperwork.........
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It doesn't matter if the person who gets the job is an idiot or not. If he is an idiot, you can't get rid of him easily due to HR and employment issues. If he is good at his job, its not appreciated and the companys' attitude is that if he doesn't like something, he can be replaced by another bum on a seat. That tends to breed a culture of not bothering too much because why get stressed when you can just coast through your job and get your pay cheque at the end of the month?
Most public companies require large numbers of people to be on board before any meaningful changes can take place and whenever one or two individuals come up with proposals, even if they are sound, there are invariably others who are eagre to challenge them, to emphasise the bottom line (which shareholders love) and find justifications for maintaining the status quo.
Therefore, it requires not only someone who understands the issues and has the guts to do something about it but, more significantly, the authority to make it happen.
Satsuma
Well that is tough, this is a professional pilot forum, not a public relations forum. Although I will say that I was thinking more of the support and managerial staff than the technicians and pilots. The pilots tend to have strong self-preservation, the engineers are tied up by so much paperwork whose raison d'etre is to work out who to imprison when things go wrong, that they tend to pay attention as well. But it would be foolish to think that a helicopter operator solely comprises these two groups - in fact they seem to be in the minority these days!
Helicomparator - that was an excellent and perceptive set of posts, not rants at all. Thank you.
What you describe is indeed a modern British problem, thanks largely to some well intentioned but very silly and badly written employment legislation, notionally about 'equality' but actually working against capability, competence and common sense. As you said. And sadly, ultimately that risks and costs lives. Hard fact.
This is an issue in lots of areas of engineering and business, not just in our aviation world.
I'm afraid the 'politically correct' lobby in HR and the legal side have a lot to answer for. Sometimes truth and PC behaviour don't go together.
Darned if I can see an answer, since the 'powers that be' are unlikely to have the bottle to grasp the real root causes and sort 'em out. Much easier to make soothing management speak noises.
What you describe is indeed a modern British problem, thanks largely to some well intentioned but very silly and badly written employment legislation, notionally about 'equality' but actually working against capability, competence and common sense. As you said. And sadly, ultimately that risks and costs lives. Hard fact.
This is an issue in lots of areas of engineering and business, not just in our aviation world.
I'm afraid the 'politically correct' lobby in HR and the legal side have a lot to answer for. Sometimes truth and PC behaviour don't go together.
Darned if I can see an answer, since the 'powers that be' are unlikely to have the bottle to grasp the real root causes and sort 'em out. Much easier to make soothing management speak noises.
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I can't quote yet (not enough posts) but I fully agree with the posts by Helicomparitor. And the post above. Spot on.
Last edited by thelearner; 25th Aug 2013 at 17:13.
HC - excellent work, 'paper safety' is exactly the right term; management devise box-ticking exercises, spreadsheets and colour-coded charts, using them as metrics to show how well they are managing the risks without actually spending the money required to remove or reduce them.
Sadly the military has gone down this same road with the MAA and a safety management scheme which is delivered with religious zeal - it is mostly arse-covering so no-one ends up in court, generates a massive amount of staff work and doesn't actually make anything safer at all.
Perhaps the parallels are there with the NHS - layers of management proving govt targets are being satisfied by ticking boxes but not enough doctors and nurses to actually treat the sick people.
Sadly the military has gone down this same road with the MAA and a safety management scheme which is delivered with religious zeal - it is mostly arse-covering so no-one ends up in court, generates a massive amount of staff work and doesn't actually make anything safer at all.
Perhaps the parallels are there with the NHS - layers of management proving govt targets are being satisfied by ticking boxes but not enough doctors and nurses to actually treat the sick people.